R v Ghazzawy

On 27 October 2016 Ibrahim Ghazzawy (“the offender”) pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to s. 101.5(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) (“the Code”) in the following terms (omitting the particulars):

An offence contrary to s. 101.5(1) of the Code carries a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment. Section 19AG of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (“the Act”) requires that I fix a single non-parole period which is at least three-quarters of the head sentence.

A statement of facts was tendered by the Crown without objection. As set out below, those facts make reference to a number of other persons, collectively referred to as the “Khalid group”. Some of the members of that group are yet to come to trial. When they do so, it will be in respect of a charge of conspiracy to do acts in preparation for a terrorist act or acts. I should make it clear at the outset that this offender is to be sentenced, not for being part of an alleged conspiracy, but for the substantive offence to which he has pleaded guilty. It should also be noted that the facts as tendered included copies of the actual documents made by the offender. Those documents are not reproduced in this judgment, although the narratives are set out:

Tendered in the offender’s case on sentence were the following documents:

Ms Robilliard provided her report following a four hour assessment which was undertaken with the offender in custody. Having set out, at some length, the offender’s family background, Ms Robilliard noted that the offender had indicated that to her that he was not aware of any mental health problems within his immediate or extended family network, that he did not report any prior history of treatment for mood disorders or mental illness, and that he was not currently undertaking any treatment. Ms Robilliard’s report does not diagnose the offender as suffering from any form of mental illness.

Commencing at para. 35, Ms Robilliard set out the background to the offending as it was reported to her by the offender. At the time, she had access to what she referred to as the “JCTT Sydney statement describing the activities of Ibrahim Ghazzawy and others in relation to the offence”. I do not have that document before me but I am proceeding on the assumption that its contents are essentially the same as the statement of facts tendered by the Crown. In dealing with the offender’s account of the offending, Ms Robilliard stated (at para. 40):

Under the heading “Attitude to the offence” Ms Robilliard stated the following (at para. 41):

Ms Robilliard then administered the Personality Assessment Inventory (“PAI”) which she described as “a self-administered objective test of personality and psychopathology designed to provide information on critical individual variables”. Commencing at para. 47 of her report, Ms Robilliard set out the scores returned by the offender following that testing. Those scores may be summarised as follows:

The final section of Ms Robilliard’s report was headed “Summary and clinical opinion”. To a significant extent, that part of the report recounted the history provided to her by the offender. However in terms of the offending, Ms Robilliard said (commencing at para. 69):

At the sentence proceedings before me (commencing at T12 L25) Ms Robilliard was cross-examined on the contents of her report by the Crown. That cross-examination was limited and it is appropriate that it be reproduced in full:

The material in relation to the offender’s proposed enrolment in the PRISM program is set out at [4](ii) above. The term “PRISM” is an acronym for “Proactive Integrated Support Model”, a remedial and early intervention project directed to assisting inmates who are identified as being at risk of violent extremism.

In an email from the offender’s solicitor of 7 February 2017 to Dr Sharon Klamer, Senior Psychologist at Corrective Services NSW, the following was stated:

The “strong indications toward deradicalistion” (sic) referred to in the email were not otherwise identified.

The response from Dr Klamer of 13 February 2017 was in (inter alia) the following terms:

The character material tendered on the offender’s behalf set out at [4](iii) above speaks (inter alia) of the offender’s strong family ties, along with the fact that in the observations of those who provided the testimonials, the offender is a caring and thoughtful person who had not previously displayed a propensity for violence.

The Crown submitted that any sentence imposed upon the offender must necessarily have regard to the object and purpose of the legislation creating the offence, and the maximum penalty prescribed by the Parliament. It was submitted that one of the defining features of terrorist action lies in the fact that its object is to use serious violence, or the threat of serious violence, as an instrument of coercion, or of intimidation, of the community or government, in the pursuit of a political, religious or ideological cause. It was submitted that it was self-evident that terrorist action has the capacity to cause significant harm and that in these circumstances, the predominant considerations on sentence were:

The Crown submitted that in these circumstances issues of rehabilitation played a minor role, and that generally speaking the subjective circumstances of the offender should be given less weight than would otherwise be the case.

The Crown submitted that the religious or ideological motivation of an offender which is necessarily established by proof of an offence such as this, is relevant to the issue of community protection, and the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending. It was submitted, in particular, that the courts have repeatedly recognised that in cases where an offender has not established that he or she has resiled from a previously held religious and/or ideological motivation, the element of community protection will assume even greater importance. Importantly, in terms of the present case, the Crown submitted that in the absence of sworn evidence from the offender:

The Crown emphasised that unlike an offence of an attempt, the objective seriousness of the present offending was not to be determined by reference to the proximity of the commission of a terrorist act, but rather by reference to the offender’s conduct, and his intention at the time. In terms of assessing that objective seriousness, the Crown submitted that relevant factors included:

The Crown made a number of further submissions concerning the specific matters that I am required to take into account pursuant to s. 16A of the Act. In doing so, the Crown emphasised that s. 16A(1) requires that I impose a sentence that is of a severity which is appropriate in all of the circumstances of the case, and that in addition to any other relevant factors, I must specifically take into account the matters listed in s. 16A(2) of the Act. By reference to the latter, the Crown submitted that:

As to [20](vii) above, it was the Crown’s submission that the renunciation of extremist ideology was, as a mitigating factor, one to be established by the offender on the balance of probabilities. In this regard, and for the reasons previously outlined, the Crown submitted that I would place little weight upon the statements made by the offender to Ms Robilliard in that respect, or upon the report of Ms Robilliard generally. In terms of the offender’s enrolment in the PRISM program, the Crown submitted that whilst that may be a relevant factor, its weight was once again to be assessed in the context of the offender having chosen not to give sworn evidence before me. The Crown submitted that as a consequence, it was a matter deserving of limited weight.

In all of the circumstances, the Crown submitted that a substantial sentence of full time imprisonment was the only appropriate sentencing option in the present case.

It was submitted on behalf of the offender that any assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending should have regard to the fact that (inter alia) the offender had “produced 143 words in three handwritten notes …. couched in the language of possibility”. It was submitted that the utility of the documents was limited, that they represented little more than a written commitment to a generalised consideration of a potential terrorist attack, and that they established little more than the fact that the offender was prepared, at least at that time, to embrace the ideology underlying such a potential attack.

It was submitted on behalf of the offender that generally speaking, the documents were expressed in vague terms, such that it was highly unlikely that a person considering preparing for a terrorist act would have found them to be of any interest. It was submitted that the limited utility of the documents reflected the fact that the offender was operating at an “amateurish level”. It was emphasised that the offender was not found in possession of any other materials which could have been used in the commission of a terrorism offence, and that this suggested that the documents were prepared, and the words written, in a context of a “low capacity for anyone to use the documents in an imminent offence”.

To the extent that the statement of facts made reference to the activities and statements of other persons with whom this offender had originally been charged, and with whom he associated at or about the time of the offending, senior counsel for the offender emphasised the need to ensure that the objective seriousness of the single offence to which the offender had pleaded guilty was determined by reference to his actions, and not by reference to the actions of others, or the actions of a particular group as a whole.

Senior counsel for the offender acknowledged that the plea of guilty reflected the offender’s acceptance that he knew of the connection between the document(s) he made, and the preparation for a terrorist act. However, it was submitted that his plea of guilty was “not inconsistent” with his explanation to Ms Robilliard that as far as he was concerned, the notes were “empty words” which were said in an effort to try and “appear strong” and be accepted by the members of the group. It was submitted that the plea, in combination with a series of other factors, all pointed to a conclusion that the offender had renounced his previously held radical beliefs and his adherence to terrorism, and that such “public stance” demonstrated an acceptance of responsibility, a facilitation of the process of justice, his contrition and his remorse.

Senior Counsel submitted that the short period of time over which the offence was committed was a matter which was relevant to an assessment of its objective seriousness. He also submitted that the period of time which had elapsed between the commission of the offence and the offender’s arrest was significant, there being no evidence that he had committed any offences at all during that intervening period.

Senior counsel for the offender made lengthy submissions addressing the issue of the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation, and the associated question of whether the offender had renounced his previously held extremist beliefs. It was variously submitted that I should find on the evidence that the offender had renounced his previous commitment to violent jihad and its accompanying ideology, that he was not “an entrenched radical”, that he had a “low likelihood of recidivism”, that he had “renounced violent jihad in his assessment by Ms Robilliard”, that there was “no evidence to suggest that he remained radicalised”, and that there was “real admissible evidence of a clear potential for rehabilitation”. Aside from Ms Robilliard’s report, the evidentiary basis for such conclusions was said to lie in the offender’s expressed willingness to undergo the PRISM program, his plea of guilty, his conduct between the commission of the offence and his arrest, and the observations made by those who had provided testimonials. In these respects, senior counsel took issue with the Crown’s proposition that the offender’s renouncement of his previous adherence to extremist beliefs was a matter of mitigation that he was required to establish on the balance of probabilities.

In response to the Crown’s submission as to the weight to be given to Ms Robilliard’s report, senior counsel’s written submissions included the following (at para. 26):

The proposition that the Act was not intended to “introduce” the restrictions of which the Court of Criminal Appeal spoke in R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 353; (2001) 127 A Crim R 369 was said to be supported by the decision in Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629; [2003] HCA 14 at [21].

Finally, by reference to the provisions of s. 16A(2) of the Act, senior counsel for the offender submitted that:

The ultimate submission made by senior counsel on behalf of the offender was that an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending, and what was described as the offender's powerful subjective case, supported the imposition of "a relatively short custodial sentence".

It will be apparent from what I have said that there is a significant issue between the parties as to the weight to be attributed to the report of Ms Robilliard, and more specifically, the weight to be attributed to the statements by the offender to her. Before considering the substantive submissions of the parties, it is appropriate that I address the specific issues arising from Ms Robilliard’s report.

The significance of Ms Robilliard’s report lies partly in the fact that it records a number of statements made by the offender which bear upon my assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending, and my determination of whether he has renounced any previously held extremist beliefs (the latter being a matter relevant to the assessment of his prospects of rehabilitation). These issues arise against a background of the offender having chosen, as is his right, not to give sworn evidence in his sentence proceedings.

In R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 353; (2001) 127 A Crim R 369, Smart AJ (at [58]) made the following observations regarding the use of hearsay statements made in reports of the nature of that prepared by Ms Robilliard:

Spigelman CJ also said (at [79]):

Those statements of principle have been consistently applied by sentencing judges, and by the Court of Criminal Appeal, including in cases of offending of the present kind. For example, in R v Elomar and ors [2010] NSWSC 10; (2010) 264 ALR 759 Whealy J (as his Honour then was) said (at [162]):

His Honour’s conclusion that little weight could be attached to statements of a self-serving kind where an offender does not give sworn evidence was upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeal (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Simpson J (as her Honour then was) in Elomar v R [2014] NSWCCA 303; (2014) 300 FLR 323 at [815]-[818]:

The same approach was taken by Bongiorno J (as his Honour then was) in R v Benbrika [2009] VSC 21; (2009) 222 FLR 433 where his Honour considered the weight to be given to correspondence written by an offender whilst in prison, and which was said to evidence a renunciation of his commitment to violent jihad. His Honour said (at [148]-[151]):

His Honour’s decision was the subject of an appeal to the Victorian Court of Appeal: Benbrika v R (2010) 29 VR 593; [2010] VSCA 281. In respect of those parts of his Honour’s judgment set out at [39] above, the Court (Maxwell P, Nettle and Weinberg JJA) said (at [586]-[587]):

As I have noted, senior counsel for the offender relied upon the decision of the High Court in Weininger as authority for the proposition that s. 16A of the Act was “not intended to introduce … restrictions” as to the weight which could be attached to evidence of this nature. However that decision should not, in my view, be read as authority for the proposition that in a case of sentencing of a federal offender, a sentencing judge should simply accept as truthful, hearsay statements of the kind made by the offender to Ms Robilliard. To approach the matter in that way would be to completely ignore the authorities to which I have referred.

The absence of sworn evidence from the offender does not render the report of Ms Robilliard inadmissible or irrelevant. The terms of s. 16A(2) of the Act require me to take into account matters that are “relevant” and “known to the Court”. Ms Robilliard’s report meets those criteria. Moreover, Qutami and the other decisions to which I have referred are not authority for the proposition that evidence of hearsay statements can never be accepted. However the weight to be given to Ms Robilliard’s report generally, and the statements made by the offender which are recounted within it, is another matter entirely. This is particularly so in circumstances where the issues to which that evidence goes are very much in dispute between the parties.

Much of the concluding paragraphs of Ms Robilliard’s report (paras. 61 and following) amounted to little more than a recitation of the history provided to her by the offender. The definitive opinions expressed were limited and were, in any event, based at least partly upon the statements made to her. Moreover, some of the opinions Ms Robilliard did express were couched in terms which were less than certain. For example, Ms Robilliard said that she thought it “possible” that at the time of the offending the offender “could” have produced a particular profile (at para. 76). In terms of his renouncement of previously held extremist views, she stated (again at para. 76) that the events since his arrest “could” have prompted him to review his position. The somewhat indecisive terms in which Ms Robilliard expressed such opinions may reflect the fact that she herself was unable to unreservedly accept what the offender had told her. In any event, it remains the case that the statements made to her by the offender are untested, and her opinions are limited and, to the extent that she expressed them, at least partly equivocal. In these circumstances, only limited weight can be given to the contents of Ms Robilliard’s report.

In R v Khazaal [2009] NSWSC 1015 Latham J (at [19]-[20]) identified four factors relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness of offending contrary to s. 101.5 of the Code, namely:

In R v Kahar; R v Ziamani [2016] 1 WLR 3156; [2016] EWCA Crim 568 the Court concluded that, depending on the facts of a particular case, the following matters were likely to require consideration:

I accept the submission of the Crown that in sentencing for offending of this kind the predominant considerations include the protection of the community, the punishment of the offender, the denunciation of the offence, and general deterrence: Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCCA 360; (2007) 199 A Crim R 470 at [89] per Spigelman CJ citing R v Martin (1999) 1 Cr App Rep (S) 477 at 480 per Lord Bingham CJ.

In the present case there was no actual injury inflicted upon any person or any property as a consequence of the offending. However, it is necessary to bear firmly in mind that the provision under which the offender has been charged is directed specifically to conduct connected to preparatory acts of terrorism. The seriousness with which Parliament regards such an offence is reflected in the maximum penalty, by which the Parliament has indicated that the threat of terrorist activity requires the imposition of condign punishment: Lodhi at [79] per Spigelman CJ.

It follows that the fact that an act (in this case the making of documents by the offender) was committed at an early stage does not necessarily mitigate the seriousness of the offending. Even though the offender’s conduct in the present case did not give rise to any imminent, let alone actual, threat of injury or damage to persons or property, a substantial sentence is nevertheless required: Lodhi at [83] per Spigelman CJ. I bear in mind, of course, that the offender does not appear before me for sentence for actually committing the terrorist act(s) to which reference is made in the documents that he, in part, created. However, such act(s) necessarily inform the nature and gravity of his offending. Moreover, assessing the objective seriousness of the offending in the present case by reference to the number of words written by the offender reflects, in my view, a distorted approach. The emphasis must necessarily be upon the content of what was written, and the sentiments expressed, rather than upon the number of words used to do so.

Bearing in mind the conclusions I have reached regarding the limited weight to be placed upon the untested statements made by the offender to Ms Robilliard, I do not accept the term “empty words” to be an apt description of what the offender wrote, in circumstances where the offender expressly referred to (inter alia):

Such references cannot, as the offender would apparently have it, be effectively dismissed on the basis that they are simply empty words. There was considerable detail in what the offender wrote. Specific targets of a proposed violent attack were identified. The documents reflect considerable consideration having been given to the form of that attack which, had it eventuated, would have resulted in considerable harm being visited upon both human life and property.

Further, and in the absence of sworn evidence from the offender, I am unable to accept his assertions to Ms Robilliard that he was “talking it up to look good to people” in order to “fit in” and “be accepted”, and that he “opposes violence on anyone”. What the offender wrote is, frankly, the antithesis of an opposition to violence.

In the circumstances I am satisfied that the offender’s state of mind at the time of the offending was consistent with what he wrote. The plain words used by the offender reflect an unequivocal commitment to violent jihadist beliefs which, in this case, were manifested in a documented plan to engage in a violent attack.

Moreover, I do not accept that the offending was “amateurish”. On the contrary, there was a level of sophistication in what the offender wrote, reflected in his specific identification of two proposed targets, his reference to the specific areas in which those targets were located, and his reference to the degree to which those areas might impact upon any proposal to carry out a violent attack. There is no evidence that it was the offender who was responsible for actually identifying the targets. However, the specificity with which he described them is a clear indicator of his knowledge of the connection between what he wrote, and a terrorist act or acts. In that sense, the offending was not spontaneous.

I have had regard to the fact that the period over which the offending was committed is limited. However, when one views the content of the documents the period of the offending becomes of less significance. This is particularly so when one considers that the offender made a multiplicity of statements, albeit over a short period, advocating violent attacks.

All of these matters reflect an offence of considerable objective seriousness. Put simply, the documents made by the offender were connected with preparation for a terrorist act or acts, directed towards damage to both property and individuals. By his plea, the offender has admitted to knowing of that connection.

It was the submission of senior counsel for the offender that viewed objectively, the offending was “below mid-range”. Assessment of the objective seriousness of offending does not require a sentencing judge to attempt to quantify the distance between the actual offence before the Court and the conduct involved in a putative offence in the middle of a range: PK v R [2012] NSWCCA 263 at [25] per McCallum J. However, I should state in any event that I am unable to accept the submission of senior counsel for the offender in this regard. The present offending, for the reasons I have stated, is of considerable objective gravity, falling at a level substantially higher than that which was submitted.

The offender told Ms Robilliard (inter alia) that he “regretted” his involvement in the offending. Even if that statement were accepted as truthful, an expression of regret in becoming involved in the commission of an offence does not necessarily equate to an expression of genuine contrition. In the absence of sworn evidence from the offender, little weight can be attributed to his statement to Ms Robilliard in this respect. I do however accept that his plea of guilty is some evidence of his contrition.

The offender was arrested and charged on 10 December 2015. The parties agree that the brief of evidence was substantially served by 20 January 2016 and was completely served by 7 September 2016. The indictment alleging the offence to which the offender ultimately pleaded guilty was not presented until 14 November 2016 and a plea of guilty was entered by the offender on that day. However, the Crown acknowledged that the negotiations leading to the plea of guilty had commenced at a time when the matter was still in the Local Court. The Crown expressly conceded that the offender’s plea was entered at “an early opportunity”, albeit not at the earliest opportunity.

The Crown’s submissions set out the principles which govern the treatment of a plea of guilty when sentencing an offender for a federal offence. Those principles may be summarised as follows:

In the present case, the Crown had available to it expert forensic evidence which established that the offender wrote on the three documents in question, and that these documents were handed to other persons, some of whom added to the handwriting. Had the matter proceeded to trial, the Crown would have asked the jury to draw an inference as to the offender’s state of mind from (inter alia) the content of what he had written. In these circumstances, it is difficult to accept the submission made on behalf of the offender that the Crown case was not strong. I must also take into account that although the plea was entered at an early stage, it was not entered at the earliest opportunity.

That said, and as I have found, the plea is some evidence of contrition on the part of the offender. The Crown did not, as I understood it, argue against the proposition that the plea was also some evidence of an acceptance of responsibility on the offender’s part, nor did the Crown submit that the offender was not entitled to any discount at all. The amount of the discount is a discretionary matter, taking into account all of the factors to which I have referred. Whilst it is not necessary for me to do so, I record the fact that I regard the appropriate discount to be 15%.

In my view, given the views that I have expressed below regarding the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation, there remains a real need for any sentence imposed to reflect the need for personal deterrence.

One of the predominant sentencing considerations in a matter such as this is the necessity to deter others who may be minded to offend in a similar way. General deterrence is therefore an important consideration in the sentencing process.

The offender is presently 21 years of age, was aged 18 at the time of the offending and has no criminal history. Considerations of general deterrence and principles of retribution are, in most cases of a youthful offender, of less significance than would be the case when sentencing an adult for the same offence. The law recognises the potential for the cognitive, emotional and/or psychological immaturity of a young person to contribute to the breach of the law and accordingly, an allowance may be made for an offender’s youth and not just his or her biological age: KT v R [2008] NSWCCA 51; (2008) 182 A Crim R 571 at [22] – [26] per McClellan CJ at CL.

That said, considerations of general deterrence and retribution cannot be completely ignored when sentencing a young offender. There remains a significant public interest in deterring violent, anti-social conduct of the kind in which this offender engaged. Moreover, the emphasis given to rehabilitation when sentencing a young offender may be moderated when he or she has conducted himself or herself in a way an adult might conduct himself or herself, and has committed a crime of violence or considerable gravity: KT at [25] and the authorities cited therein.

In the present case, the offender’s subjective assessment of his offending included his statement to Ms Robilliard that he was “immature and stupid”. True it is, that when immaturity of an offender is a significant contributing factor to the commission of an offence, the criminality involved will be less than if the same offence was committed by an adult: BP v R [2010] NSWCCA 159; (2010) 201 A Crim R 379 per Johnson J at [78]; see also HJ v R [2014] NSWCCA 21 at [56] per Garling J. However, the offender’s statement to Ms Robilliard was in the nature of a “self-assessment” as it were, and was again one expressed in the absence of any sworn evidence. For the reasons I have already expressed, limited weight can be given to it.

The offender’s youth is clearly relevant to fixing an appropriate sentence, and I have had regard to it. However, the seriousness of the present offending is such that the importance of retribution and general deterrence cannot give way entirely, or even substantially, to considerations of youth, or indeed the interests of rehabilitation: JM v R [2012] NSWCCA 83; (2012) 223 A Crim R 55 at [108] per Simpson J (as her Honour then was).

As I have previously set out, senior counsel for the offender strenuously submitted that I should find that the offender had renounced his previous commitment to violent jihad and its accompanying ideology. Renouncement of violent jihad ideologies bears directly upon an assessment of the prospects of rehabilitation: R v Rahme; R v Mohammed [2008] 4 All ER 661; [2008] EWCA Crim 1465 at [32]. If a sentencing court is satisfied that an offender charged with terrorism offences has resiled from his previous extremist views, appropriate allowance must be made for that fact when fixing a sentence: R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 1475 at [145] per Whealy J.

By his plea, the offender has admitted to knowing of a connection between his making of the document(s) and the preparation for a terrorist act. The particulars pleaded in the indictment to which the offender pleaded guilty included the fact that:

In circumstances where the offender has admitted, by his plea, to having committed an offence, proof of which required knowledge of a connection between his act and the preparation for a terrorist act, the abandonment of a previously held extremist ideology is plainly a factor to be established by the offender on the balance of probabilities: R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [25] – [28] (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Hayne and Callinan JJ). As set out in [38] above, the Court of Criminal Appeal in Elomar specifically noted (at [815]) that the sentencing judge had been justified in concluding that the failure of one of the offenders in that case to give evidence “meant that he had not discharged the onus of establishing, on balance, that he had given up the extremist views which he previously held”. In the present case, there is a similar absence of evidence from the offender and for the reasons previously expressed, little weight can be attributed to his statements to Ms Robilliard.

However it was further submitted on behalf of the offender that the authorities established that “a guilty plea to terrorism offences also constitutes a sign of a movement away from extremist views”. Such a submission overstates the position. In Touma (which was the first of the authorities relied upon by senior counsel in support of this submission) Whealy J said (at [144] – [146]:

The second authority relied upon by senior counsel in support of his submission was R v Sharrouf [2009] NSWSC 1002. In that case, Whealy J observed (at [49]-[50]):

It is not correct to say that a plea of guilty by the offender constitutes a sign of a movement away from extremist views. It may be a sign, but the caution with which the issue must be approached will be evident from the statements of Whealy J. I find myself in precisely the same position as his Honour. The offender’s plea may be an indicator of some move away from his previously held beliefs, but that can only be regarded as being the position on a cautious basis.

A similar approach must be taken to the other matters relied upon by senior counsel for the offender in this regard. The offender’s proposed participation in the PRISM program, the absence of further offending and the observations of the offender by others may indicate a move away from adherence to radicalised beliefs. However once again, in the absence of any sworn evidence from the offender, a cautious approach must be taken. It must also be observed that in cases of this type of offending, issues of rehabilitation assume less significance: Martin at 480; Kahar at [15].

I am unable to accept the various submissions set out in [28] above regarding the offender’s renunciation of his previously held beliefs. I am prepared to accept, with some caution, that the offender’s plea of guilty, and the other matters relied upon, may be some evidence of a move away from such beliefs and that they are, as such, indicative of the fact that there is some prospect of rehabilitation. I can put it no higher than that.

Section 16A(2)(k) requires that I take into account the need to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence. That consideration is necessarily encompassed by a consideration of all of the factors to which I have referred.

The written submissions filed on behalf of the offender suggested that it was open to me to “confirm the prospects of rehabilitation and protect the community by a longer than usual parole period” and that such a course would serve to “reinforce and confirm the deradicalisation”. That appears to amount to a submission that I should make a finding of special circumstances pursuant to s. 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). However, that provision has no application to a sentence imposed upon a federal offender. As I have noted at [2] above, s. 19AG of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) imposes a requirement that I fix a single non-parole period which is not less than three quarters of the head sentence.

I make the following orders: