[2016] NSWSC 1469
Boege v Attorney General of New South Wales
Application refused
Catchwords
CRIMINAL LAW – application pursuant to s 78(1) Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act for an enquiry into conviction for common assault – where three applications previously dealt with under Part 7 of the Act – where Supreme Court not satisfied that there are special facts or special circumstances to justify the taking of further action – whether Supreme Court should refuse to consider or otherwise deal with the application – application refused
Cases cited
- Application by Petronella Boege for an inquiry into conviction and sentence pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (Supreme Court (NSW), Adamson J, 27 March 2012, unrep)
- Application of Petronella Boege pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (No 3)[2016] NSWSC 729
- Further application of Petronella Boege pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001[2015] NSWSC 1925
Legislation cited
- Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001
- Crimes Act 1900
Judgment
- [1]
HIS HONOUR: Petronella Boege applies for an inquiry into her conviction at Bega Local Court on 5 January 2000 for one offence of common assault contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900. The prosecution case was that Ms Boege punched her husband several times in the head during a disagreement over a number of photo albums in the wider context of the breakdown of her marriage. The offence occurred in the presence of a police constable. Ms Boege was convicted and fined $500.
- [2]
Ms Boege appealed against her conviction to the District Court of New South Wales. On 8 March 2001, Shillington QC DCJ dismissed the appeal.
- [3]
Ms Boege now applies for an inquiry into her conviction pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001.
- [4]
This application is not the first such application made by Ms Boege. There have been three previous applications. The first was considered by her Honour Adamson J in reasons delivered on 27 March 2012. The application was dismissed.
- [5]
Following the dismissal of that application, Ms Boege petitioned the Governor of New South Wales asking for a review of the conviction pursuant to s 76 of the Act. That petition was declined on 30 January 2013.
- [6]
Ms Boege made a second application to this Court pursuant to s 78 of the Act. Her Honour Wilson J refused that application: see Further application of Petronella Boege pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 [2015] NSWSC 1925.
- [7]
Ms Boege made a third application to this Court pursuant to s 78 of the Act. Her Honour Adams J refused that application: see Application of Petronella Boege pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 729.
- [8]
It is unnecessary for present purposes to refer to these applications in any more detail.
The application
- [9]
Ms Boege’s application is supported by extensive and detailed written submissions dated 25 July 2016, to which is annexed a significant bundle of documents. Ms Boege has also filed submissions in reply to the Attorney-General’s submissions dated 27 September 2016. In summary, Ms Boege now contends as follows:
- [10]
I have read Ms Boege’s submissions and considered all of the annexed material.
Consideration
- [11]
Section 79 (3) of the Act provides relevantly as follows:
- [12]
This matter has previously and obviously been dealt with under Part 7 of the Act. Three separate applications have been considered by three separate Supreme Court judges who all reached what amounts to the same conclusion. For what it is worth, I have revisited all of those decisions. The conclusions reached in each case are unexceptionable. I would also have reached the same conclusion as the judges who dealt with them.
- [13]
Nothing promoted or provided by Ms Boege in the present application is new. I am completely satisfied that there are no special facts or special circumstances that justify the taking of further action. In the circumstances I refuse to consider or otherwise deal with this application. It is clearly frivolous and vexatious and a monumental waste of this Court’s time. In any other litigious context it would arguably amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.