Vinall v St George Bank – A Division of Westpac Banking Corporation

On or about 10 April 2024, the plaintiff, Ms Fiona Vinall, borrowed $288,000 from the Defendant, St George Bank – A Division of Westpac Banking Corporation (the Bank), by way of a variable home loan.

As at 30 June 2025, the balance of the plaintiff’s mortgage was $284,192. Her minimum monthly repayment was $1,778. The plaintiff met her obligations until mid-2025, in the following circumstances.

Unless required for clarity, amounts in cents are ignored.

By letter dated 17 June 2025, the Bank told her that her interest rate was to decrease, and that her monthly repayment was to reduce to $1,732 (ie. by $46 per month). The Bank wrote “Your new monthly repayment amount of $1,732.00 starts after 10 July 2025”.

A fair minded person reading this communication might well understand it to convey that, from and after 10 July 2025, the repayment amount would reduce. The plaintiff so understood it. She started paying the reduced rate on 12 July 2025, but payments under the mortgage were to be made in arrears and the new and reduced payment referable to the period after July 2025 would thus (says the Bank) only kick in one month later.

On 12 July 2025, the plaintiff paid $1,732. At this time her account was $1 in advance. For some reason, she also separately paid $0.89.

On this footing, the plaintiff’s payment for July 2025 left a shortfall of $44.11.

On 12 August 2025, she made another repayment of the reduced monthly amount (which had, by then, started to operate). She says that, at this time, her bank statement showed arrears of $44.11. She did not take this to be a shortfall in her instalment payments but took it as an administration charge levied on her.

Whilst she paid the correct (reduced) instalment amount, she did not immediately make up the $44.11 shortfall. This she did on 16 August 2025 when she paid that sum in full (and indeed was once more in advance by $1).

Thus, whatever else may be said, if there had been any legally cognisable shortfall, by 16 August 2025, it had been made up.

But the Bank reported to credit reporting bodies the shortfall in payment by the plaintiff for July and August 2025 as “adverse repayment history information”. An immediate and substantial deterioration to her credit rating was caused by this. She was advised by mortgage brokers that refinancing or new lending was not available.

In the meantime, the plaintiff had entered into a contract to buy a house for herself and her child at Box Hill, NSW. The purchase was scheduled to settle on 1 December 2025, but she could not complete because of her adverse credit rating.

The plaintiff promptly asked the Bank to reverse the adverse entry but, obdurately, the Bank refused.

The plaintiff then found it necessary to approach this Court on a matter involving $44.11, unpaid for one month.

On 28 January 2026 Slattery J, one of the most experienced judges on the Court, gave the plaintiff leave to serve the Statement of Claim on the Bank by email, and listed the matter before him for an interlocutory application on 30 January 2026. On that day, he Bank did not appear because, as I understand it, notice of the proceedings had not reached an appropriate administrative destination in the Bank. The plaintiff tried to contact the Bank more than once during the day, without being able to achieve any response. Indeed, Slattery J’s chambers emailed the Bank, also without any success.

Accordingly, on 30 January 2026, Slattery J made the following order:

His Honour adjourned the proceedings to Tuesday, 3 February 2026.

The matter came before me, sitting as duty judge.

Prayer 2 of the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim seeks the following relief:

The plaintiff was in Court, and a solicitor appeared for the Bank. The solicitor conveyed to me that the Bank was not in a position to deal with the matter. I enquired whether there was a responsible bank officer dealing with the issue, and was told that there was.

I directed the parties to confer with a view to resolving the problem and stood the matter over before me to Friday, 6 February 2026.

I confess to not having anticipated what would happen on that day.

The Bank arrived, represented by Counsel and armed with an affidavit from a bank officer seeking to defend the indefensible, namely, maintaining that the credit record was (and presumably remained) an accurate reflection of what had happened, ie. that there had been an adverse credit event by the $44.11 payment shortfall.

I was told that the Bank was powerless to do anything, other than to ask some third-party information agency to change the records, which change was at the pleasure of the agency. The Bank had not yet taken any steps to bring about any such change.

I point out that the alleged payment shortfall of $44.11 for one month is of the order of 2.48% of one monthly payment of $1,778 and 0.0155% of the then-principal owing of $284,000-odd. If there was a shortfall, it did not come about by the plaintiff’s failure to pay an increase but by payment of a reduced amount too early. In any event, by the time the matter came before Slattery J, nothing was owing.

On Friday, 6 February 2026, I fixed the matter for final hearing on Monday, 9 February 2026.

In these extraordinary circumstances I also took the unusual (but not unknown) step of requiring the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank to be present in Court at the hearing.

Over the weekend, my Associate received a communication from the Bank’s solicitors stating that:

I excused the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank from attending on Monday morning.

By Monday morning, amendment of the record had been achieved.

Thus, as events subsequently showed, the Bank was, over the weekend, able to take steps to procure the alteration of the credit records to reflect the reality that there was no adverse repayment history information.

When the matter was called on Monday, Counsel appeared for the plaintiff. He informed me that he was not ready for a final hearing on damages. Ultimately, there was no opposition to that part of the case being transferred to the District Court. I express no opinion on its prospects of success, but I did ask Counsel whether he was sure if that was what he wanted.

The Bank was represented by Senior and Junior Counsel.

Given that there is no contest that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought in Prayer 2 of the Statement of Claim, I will make an order to that effect.

Nevertheless, in the special circumstances of this case, I consider it appropriate to give reasons as to why that order was justifiably sought and (ultimately) correctly conceded.

If there had been any default (which I consider there had not), its consequence was so minimal that it cannot be fairly described as adverse to the Bank and certainly not sufficiently adverse to be reported as such. The Bank would not be entitled to rely on it for any conscientious purpose.

The power to vary the interest rate was in the hands of the Bank alone. It varied the rate by its letter dated 17 June 2025, which elected to reduce the interest rate “after 10 July 2025”. Fairly regarded, this means that a reduced payment could be made immediately after 10 July 2025. The letter is at best ambiguous, and at worst likely to mislead.

But even if this is wrong, the plaintiff had fixed the problem by the time she asked the Bank to have the record changed.

The maintenance of an adverse credit recording became inaccurate, incomplete and misleading.

Once the circumstances were brought to the notice of the Bank, one would have thought that, applying basic commercial morality, and rational thought, a significant financial institution would not have treated, and especially not have maintained, that this miniscule underpayment (which had been rectified) was aptly recorded as an adverse credit event. Yet, when this was brought to the attention of the Bank and the plaintiff requested that her credit history be amended, she initially received no response and later rejection.

I regard the refusal of the Bank to fix the problem as legally unjustifiable and short on commercial morality. Having regard to the de minimis dimensions of the shortfall, the substantially unequal bargaining position of the parties, the profound adverse consequences for the plaintiff of the adverse credit reporting being maintained, coupled with the absence of any meaningful consequence for the Bank either by the event itself or by the recording of it, not taking steps to erase the recorded event was unconscionable.

I observe that the Bank has statutory obligations under the ch 3 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) to provide certain credit information to credit reporting bodies, including information whether an individual has met an obligation to make a monthly repayment which is due and repayable in relation to consumer credit. This includes missing a monthly payment irrespective of the actual payment cycle for that obligation.

One can readily understand that information reporting systems, which operate robotically and independently of human thought or integrity, might record what happened here as an adverse event. But I cannot readily understand how the Bank, as it did, continued to maintain, knowing all the circumstances, that this was appropriately reported as an adverse event, or that the information recorded was or remained accurate, complete and not misleading.

Section 21U(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) states:

Upon becoming aware of all these circumstances, the Bank was obliged to have the record corrected.

I make the following orders: