AG Australia Holdings Limited v Burton & Anor

QB 360 held that the offence was established when the accused had tampered with samples of goods, the quality of which was disputed, with intent to deceive arbitrators. R v Kellett [1976] 1 QB 372 held that the offence was committed where a respondent to a divorce case threatened to sue a potential witness in that case for slander for a statement which that person had made to an enquiry agent, with the intent of causing that potential witness not to give evidence in the case. The ratio decidendi of that case was that: “… a threat (or promise) made to a witness is, like an assault on a witness, an attempt to pervert the course of justice, if made with the intention of persuading him to alter or withhold his evidence, whether or not what he threatens (or promises) is a lawful act, such as the exercise of a legal right, and whether or not he has any other intention or intends to do the act if the evidence is not altered, or withheld.” (at 393) 109 However, I had not been referred to any case, and my own researches have not revealed any case, which suggests that any offence connected with interfering with the course of justice is committed if an employer seeks to enforce a confidentiality clause in an agreement with his employee (or former employee), by preventing the employee from disclosing, to a solicitor, out of court, confidential information of the employer. Interfering with the Course of Justice – Application in Civil Law 110 The notion of interfering with the administration of justice has been recognised, in connection with certain civil proceedings, outside the context of a criminal charge. I have already mentioned Egerton v Brownlow , where the concept was applied to strike down a condition subsequent in a settlement. When that was the context in which Lord Lyndhurst made the remark, “It is admitted, that any contract or engagement having a tendency, however slight, to affect the administration of justice, is illegal and void” , some caution is called for in applying that remark to a widely different context. 111 In Lound v Grimwade (1888) 39 Ch D 605 Stirling J dealt with an action to set aside a bond under which the plaintiff promised to pay money. The action succeeded, because part of the consideration for giving the bond was a promise that no criminal proceedings would be begun against the plaintiff, and that certain other criminal proceedings would be conducted in such a way that the plaintiff’s name would not be mentioned, or if it was mentioned the plaintiff would be exonerated from all blame in connection with the transactions there in question. This consideration was clearly one which would amount to the offence of interfering with the administration of justice. However, in coming to that conclusion Stirling J made some remarks which could potentially mislead. His Lordship quotes Lord Lyndhurst’s famous sentence from Egerton v Earl Brownlow , and continues (at 612-3): “Upon this principle it has been repeatedly held that agreements tending to affect the course of legal proceedings are illegal, even though those proceedings may not be strictly criminal in their nature. Thus an agreement to pay money in consideration of the withdrawal of opposition to the discharge of an insolvent has been held to be illegal: Hall v Dyson (17 QB 785); Hills v Mitson (8 Ex 751). In Elliott v Richardson (Law Rep 5 Cp 744) an agreement by a shareholder in a company which was being compulsorily wound up that he would endeavour to postpone the making of a call was held to be illegal on the ground that it amounted to an interference with public justice; see especially the judgment of Mr Justice Willes (Law Rep 5 CP 748) with which the other judges (Keating J and M Smith J) agreed. A fortiori , must an agreement which tends to interfere with the course of criminal proceedings be illegal.” 112 It is the last sentence in this passage just quoted which is the ratio of the decision. The first sentence of the passage quoted is, in my view, too widely stated, and not borne out by the cases relied on. 113 Hall v Dyson (1852) 17 A & E 785 and Hills v Mitson (1853) 8 Ex 751 were each cases where an insolvent debtor had applied for his discharge from custody, the plaintiff had set about opposing that discharge, but dropped his opposition in return for money. The report of Hall v Dyson does not mention Egerton v Lord Brownlow . The reasoning of Lord Campbell CJ (at 791) was: “In the present case, the creditor is, as it were, bought off; and he was under a moral obligation to continue his opposition, in as much as, by giving notice of it, he had led the other creditors to believe that he really intended to oppose. The consequence of his withdrawing is that justice is disappointed, because the adjudication is made without the proper investigation having taken place. It seems to me that the consideration for receiving the money, which is, to withdraw his opposition, and that after having given notice of it, is clearly immoral. Patterson J held that the agreement sued on was illegal: “… in as much as it is contrary to the policy of the Insolvent Debtors’ Act, and amounts moreover to a fraud on the creditors. The duty of opposition on the part of the creditor may be a duty only of imperfect obligation: but, if he has the option of pursuing one course or the other, it is an immoral act, against the policy of the law, and a fraud upon the other creditors, to take money for exercising that option (at 792). Colleridge J agreed. 114 Thus, in Hall v Dyson it was the specific type of interference with the administration of justice which led to the conclusion that the agreement was contrary to public policy – that the opposing creditor had taken on a role in the litigation, that other creditors were likely to rely on his continuing to perform, so that the opposing creditor was not free to consult only his own private interests in deciding to withdraw his opposition. As well, for any creditor to receive a personal benefit in this way was contrary to the policy of the Insolvent Debtors Act , which required creditors to be treated equally. 115 Hills v Mitson did no more than apply Hall v Dyson (at 758). Elliott v Richardson (1870) LR 5 CP 744 concerned an agreement between A (a shareholder in a company in the course of winding up) and B (a shareholder in and creditor of that company) that A would seek to postpone the making of a call on shares in the company, and support the admission to proof of B’s claimed debt, in return for which B would pay the calls due on A’s shares. Willes J’s preferred ground of decision was that the agreement was unenforceable because it amounted to maintenance. He went on to give a view on another point that had been raised, holding that the agreement amounted to an interference with the course of public justice. However, he then went on : “In order to explain my view on that point, we must look at the nature of the Winding-Up Acts” , and gave a summary of the way those Acts had substituted a court-controlled process for the previous cumbersome procedures. He concluded, at 749: “It seems to me that this an essential part of the intentions of the legislature, that the proceedings should be taken with reasonable speed; and that being so, any secret agreement by which persons who are given a locus standi , as representing their own interests, should, for money, undertake to delay proceedings to the prejudice of the other shareholders and creditors, is void, not only as being against public policy, but as being against the clear intention of the legislature under the Winding-Up Acts.” 116 Both Keating J and Montague Smith J, gave separate judgments, based solely on the agreement being contrary to the policy of the Winding-Up Acts. Holding the agreement to be contrary to public policy because it was contrary to the policy of a specific statute is, with respect to Stirling J, a long way from holding that “agreements tending to affect the course of legal proceedings are illegal.” 117 A moment’s consideration will show that there are many agreements which “tend to affect the course of legal proceedings” in one sense of that expression, but which are not illegal. · Legal practitioners are paid for their services, and sometimes have a provision in their retainers whereby, if funds are not provided in advance, they are entitled not to appear at litigation. That type of contract could have a significant effect on the course of legal proceedings, if it resulted in the lawyer ceasing to act close to the hearing date, yet it would not seriously be suggested that it was illegal or unenforceable as contrary to public policy. · An agreement settling legal proceedings has a profound effect on the course of those legal proceedings, but is not contrary to public policy. Even a claim for private injury resulting from an act which amounts to an indictable offence can be compromised, provided that it is not a matter of public concern, Kerridge v Simmonds (1906) 4 CLR 253, at 258-260 per Griffiths CJ . · Many agreements to fund the bringing of litigation are now regarded as not amounting to maintenance. In Kien Nam Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 932 Dunford J quoted, at [10] from Steyn LJ in Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 at 328, “Nevertheless the offences and torts of maintenance and champerty lingered on in atrophied form for more than a century after any public interest in maintaining them had disappeared” . Dunford J continued, at [11] and [12]: “Since then the offences and torts of maintenance and champerty have been abolished in England and in a number of the Australian states. In New South Wales, the relevant statute is the Maintenance and Champerty Abolition Act 1993 No. 88. However, s 6 provides that the Act does not affect any rule of law as to cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or as otherwise illegal whether the contract was made before or after the commencement of the Act. In recent times the courts have taken a more liberal attitude to what constitutes an interest in the litigation or other motive recognised as justifying maintenance of litigation by a stranger to it: Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1, Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679, Magic Menu Systems v AFA Facilitation Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 261 at 267, Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577 at 607, Martell v Consett Iron Co Limited supra, so that the provision of legal assistance by trade organisations, trade unions and employers or where the maintainer has a "genuine commercial interest" in the outcome of the litigation are no longer regarded as offending the rules against maintenance of other persons' litigation. It appears that there is a further exception in relation to bankruptcy and company administration cases, e.g. Re Tosich Constructions Pty Limited , Re William Felton Co Pty Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 228 at 232 . ” See also NAB Ltd v Market Holdings Pty Ltd (in Liq) [2001] NSWSC 253; (2001) 37 ACSR 629 at [221]-[223] per Young CJ in Eq; Hogarth v Gye [2002] NSWSC 32 at [8] per Bryson J; Cadwallader v Bajco [2001] NSWSC 1193 at [151] per Austin J. Officer’s Statutory Duties – Corporations Act 118 On the other hand, there are several indictors that it is in accord with public policy that a confidentiality agreement, like the one on which GIO sues in the present case, should be enforceable. 119 Section 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) says; (1) a person who obtains information because they are, or have been, a director or other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly use the information to: (a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or (b) cause detriment to the corporation. Note 1: This duty continues after the person stops being an officer or employee of the corporation. Note 2: This subsection is a civil penalty provision (see section 1317E). 120 The definition of “officer”, in section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), includes: “… a person … who makes, or participates in making, decisions that effect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation.” 121 In Grove v Flavel (1986) 4 ACLC 654, at 659 Jacobs J (with whom Matheson and Olsson JJ agreed) noted the wide variety of roles in a company which fell within the definition of “officer” , and said: “It seems to me, therefore, that what is “improper” for the purposes of sec 124(2) cannot be determined by reference to some common uniform or inflexible standard which applies equally to every person who is an officer, but rather must be determined by reference to the particular duties and responsibilities of the particular officer whose conduct is impugned.” 122 That observation would also apply to section 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 123 While section 183 is contravened only if the employee, etc improperly uses the information, concerning the predecessor of that section (section 232(5) of the Corporations Law ) Young J said, in Rosetex Co Pty Ltd v Licata (1994) 12 AC LC 269, at 273: “… “information” in s232(5) means the sort of information which equity would protect by injunction if a director used it in breach of his fiduciary duties. “Improper” use of that information is in much the same plight as a breach of fiduciary duty under the general law.” 124 In R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501, at 514-515 Brennan, Dean, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said, concerning the proscription, in section 229(4) of the Companies (South Australia) Code , of an officer or employee making, “improper use of his position as such an officer or employee, to gain, directly or indirectly, and advantage for himself or for any other person or to cause detriment to the corporation” : “Impropriety does not depend on an alleged offender’s consciousness of impropriety. Impropriety consists in a breach of the standards of conduct that would be expected of a person in the position of the alleged offender by reasonable persons with knowledge of the duties, powers and authorities of the position and the circumstances of the case. When impropriety is said to consist in an abuse of power, the state of mind of the alleged offender is important ( Hindle v John Cotton Ltd (1919) 56 SLR 625 at 630-631): the alleged offender’s knowledge or means of knowledge of the circumstances in which the power is exercised and his purpose or intention in exercising the power are important factors in determining the question whether the power has been abused. But impropriety is not restricted to abuse of power. It may consist in the doing of an act which the director or officer knows or ought to know that he has no authority to do.” See also per McHugh J at 521-522. 125 That construction can, it seems to me, properly apply to section 183 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 126 The existence of section 183 suggests that the maintenance of confidences by a former corporate officer is something which public policy requires – at least in those circumstances where there is not a countervailing obligation. 127 But MBC and Mr Burton do not assert that there is any obligation on someone who is the repository of confidential information, which could possibly be of use in litigation, to assist a legal practitioner in the preparation of that litigation. In this respect there is a fundamental difference between the position Mr Burton has been in when he has been freely disclosing information in the privacy of MBC’s offices, to the situation he would be in when he was answering questions, pursuant to a subpoena, in a courtroom. 128 What MBC and Mr Burton say is that public policy requires that, if a person who has such information wishes to assist a lawyer in preparation of litigation, public policy requires that he be free to do so, notwithstanding any contractual obligations he might have undertaken. It does not seem consistent with section 183 that a former corporate officer have that freedom, except perhaps if the nature of the information sought to be disclosed was such that the former employee was not acting “improperly” in disclosing it. I shall return to this topic later (see paragraph 210 below). Confidentiality and the Availability of Evidence in Court Proceedings 129 There are well established limitations on obligations of confidentiality, being limitations which are established for the purpose of enabling the system of administration of justice to operate. Thus, at common law, a witness who is called to give evidence in court is not entitled, on the ground of owing an obligation of confidence alone, to decline to answer any relevant question which is permitted to be put ( D v National Society for the Prevention to Children [1978] AC 171, at 218, 230, 237). If the confidential information also is the subject of a privilege recognised in the law of evidence which applies in the court before whom the person is called, it is that privilege, not the confidentiality, which provides a ground on which that person need not give the evidence. 130 However, the rules of court state the extent of the obligation in this respect. The rules of court standardly provide for the issue of subpoenas to give evidence and subpoenas for production. They standardly provide for the form of the subpoena which may be issued, though allowing for the court to authorise the subpoena to issue in some other form (eg Supreme Court Rules Part 37 Rule 2, Federal Court Rules Order 27 Rule 2). The obligation under the subpoena is, typically, an order that the recipient shall attend for the purpose of giving evidence before the court, at a nominated time and place and until the recipient is excused by the court from further attending. The rules of court which create this obligation to attend, say nothing about the recipient of a subpoena having any obligation to say a single word to the party who issues the subpoena, outside the context of answering questions in court. 131 While the administration of justice is a very important matter of social policy, it is not one which overrides all other matters of public importance. There are many constraints under which litigation operates, where, as a matter of public policy, information is not able to be used at all in litigation. In the Federal Court (which is probably the relevant court to consider for present purposes) the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applies. It denies the court evidence when it is the subject of client legal privilege (section 117-126), religious confession privilege (section 127), self incrimination privilege (section 128), evidence relating to the reasoning process of a judicial officer (section 129), various public interest privileges (section 130), or evidence of settlement negotiations (section 131). As well, the court has a discretion to exclude evidence in the circumstances where section 135 applies, to limit the use of evidence under section 136, and to not receive evidence which was obtained improperly or in contravention of a law, or in consequence of an impropriety or contravention of a law under section 138. A subpoena to give evidence will usually not be enforced against an expert who has had no connection with the facts of the case ( Application of Forsyth ; Re Cordova v Philips Roxane Laboratories Inc [1984] 2 NSWLR 327). When there are these limitations on the court actually receiving evidence in litigation, it ought not come as a surprise if more extensive limitations can be imposed, consistently with public policy, on a lawyer’s receipt of information and documents, in the privacy of his own office, for the purpose of eventually being used in litigation. 132 As well, when a case is in the course of preparation, limits are imposed on the ability of a litigant to compel the production of information which is relevant to the case. While there are procedures of discovery, and interrogatories, whereby a litigant can compulsorily obtain documents, and information, from an opposite party, those procedures are always subject to the control of the court. In the course of controlling those procedures, one of the factors which the court takes into account, is whether information is confidential. Confidentiality can be taken into account in deciding whether to order discovery at all, and if so to what extent, Science Research Council v Nassé [1980] AC 1028 at 1065-1066, 1071-1072, 1073, 1077, 1085, 1089-1090. Further, the court can, in appropriate cases such as when the opposite party is a trade rival, allow inspection of a discovered document which is confidential on the basis that it is disclosed only to counsel, solicitors and nominated experts, not to the client: Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd [1996] 2 VR 34. 133 If documents are obtained from a third party on subpoena, and the third party objects to those documents being inspected, the court decides whether, when, and subject to what, if any, limitations, inspection can occur: National Employers’ Mutual General Association Ltd v Waind and Hill [1978] 1 NSWLR 372. 134 If the court requires the disclosure of information, or documents, for the purpose of one piece of litigation, the court ensures that (unless leave of the court is obtained) the information, or document, is not used for any other piece of litigation – Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280 (document obtained on discovery) Ainsworth v Hanrahan (1991) 25 NSWLR 155 (answer to interrogatories); Central Queensland Cement Pty Ltd v Hardy [1989] 2 Qd R 509 (witness statement). 135 It is already established that there are circumstances where the law will prevent a repository of confidential information from making that information available to someone else, for the purpose of litigation. The obligation of confidentiality which is imposed on legal practitioners, is a familiar example of this restraint. In Rakusen v Ellis, Munday & Clarke [1912] 1 Ch 831, at 835 Cozens-Hardy MR said: “A solicitor can be restrained as a matter of absolute obligation and as a general principle from disclosing any secrets which are confidentially reposed in him. In that respect it does not very much differ from the position of any confidential agent who is employed by a principal.” 136 Concerning the responsibility of a solicitor entrusted with confidential information, who is called on to use that confidential information for another client, in another case, Cozens-Hardy said, at 835-6: “… and if this had been a case of Mr Munday having obtained from the plaintiff, who said that he had been wrongfully dismissed, confidential information bearing upon the circumstances or the alleged justification of the wrongful dismissal, and if it had been a case of Mr Munday afterwards appearing in the action for the defendants, speaking for myself, I should have said that was a case in which he was putting himself in a position in which he could not as an honest man discharge his duty to the defendants without consciously or unconsciously availing himself of information which he had obtained while acting for Mr Rakusen. That would be a typical case in which a person ought not to be allowed to put himself in a position in which he could not clear his mind from the knowledge he had obtained. I cannot bring myself to doubt that any respectable solicitor would in those circumstances have said at once, “I am very sorry I cannot act for you because I am familiar with the circumstances alleged by the other side, which circumstances have been communicated to me confidentially”” . 137 Fletcher-Moulten LJ said at 839: “In almost all business there must be persons in such a confidential relationship to the employers or to the people who are employed by them for purposes connected with the business, that the knowledge which they acquire is not knowledge at their own disposal but consists substantially of the secrets of the employer. Such employments come to an end sometimes at the choice of the master, sometimes at the choice of the servant, and thereupon difficulties necessarily arise, because the person who is no longer in employment still has in his breast secrets which are the property of his past employer. The view that the law takes of the rights of the parties in that position is too clear to be disputed. The employee is quite free to go into the service of people who may be rivals or the opponents of his former master. The law does not say that the possession of those secrets shall cripple his work, or sterilise it. He may go into employment quite inconsistent with the employment which he had in the past. All that the law says is: you shall not disclose or put at the service of your new employer the secrets that belong to your old employer.” 138 Buckley LJ said, at 842: “There is a general principle, applicable not to solicitors only, but to confidential agents of all kinds, that confidential information shall not be used against the principal from whom, or for whom, and in whose employment, it has been obtained. There is no general rule that a solicitor who has acted in a particular matter for one party shall not under any circumstances subsequently act in that matter for his opponent. Whether he will be restrained from so acting or not depends on the particular circumstances. Of course he will be restrained from communicating confidential information … “ 139 No doubt there are many cases where it would be convenient for a plaintiff to prove its case by obtaining confidential information from a former solicitor of the defendant. Yet it is quite clear that a plaintiff cannot adopt this course, notwithstanding the practical difficulties which not proceeding this way might occasion to the plaintiff in running his litigation. It is also quite clear that if a plaintiff attempts to do so he will be restrained by injunction, and that any difficulties which the issuing of such an injunction might occasion to the plaintiff in running his litigation will provide no reason for refusing to grant the injunction. This outcome is not a consequence of particular responsibilities which are placed upon solicitors, but is the operation of the ordinary law concerning confidential information. 140 The availability of an injunction to restrain a solicitor from disclosing confidential information has not since been doubted. – D & J Constructions Pty Ltd v Head (1987) 9 NSWLR 118, Edmonds, “Trusting Lawyers with Confidences – Conflicting Realities (A Review of the Test and Principles Applying to Lawyers’ Conflicts of Interests)” (1998) 16 ABR 222; In Re a Firm of Solicitors [1992] 1 QB 959. While Rakusen has been disapproved in some subsequent decisions (eg by the House of Lords in Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (1999) 2 WLR 215) , it was on the grounds that it did not go far enough, in refusing an injunction in circumstances where it could not be demonstrated that acting for a later client would result in an abuse of confidential information. In Bolkiah v KPMG , at 225, Lord Millett (with whom all other of their Lordships hearing that case agreed) said, at 225: “Whether founded on contract or equity, the duty to preserve confidentiality is unqualified. It is a duty to keep the information confidential, not merely to take all reasonable steps to do so. Moreover, it is not merely a duty not to communicate the information to a third party. It is a duty not to misuse it, that is to say, without the consent of the former client to make any use of it or to cause any use to be made of it by others otherwise than for his benefit. The former client cannot be protected completely from accidental or inadvertent disclosure. But he is entitled to prevent his former solicitor from exposing him to any avoidable risk; and this includes the increased risk of the use of information to his prejudice arising from the acceptance of instructions to act for another client with an adverse interest in a matter to which the information is or may be relevant.” (See also Wan v McDonald (1992) 33 FCR 491 at 512, Carindale Country Club Estate v Astill (1993) 42 FCR 307, Malleson Stephen Jaques v KPMG Peat Marwick (1990) 4 WAR 357 at 362-3.) Lord Ashburton v Pape 141 The question of whether an injunction is available to prevent confidential documents from being used, by a party to litigation, and the solicitor of the party to litigation, has been decided in Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469. Mr Pape was a bankrupt. Lord Ashburton was a creditor of Pape, who opposed Pape’s discharge from bankruptcy. Lord Ashburton had, previously, written letters to his former solicitor, Mr Nocton, which were privileged. Pape served on one of Mr Nocton’s clerks a subpoena requiring him to produce the letters in the bankruptcy court. The clerk took the letters to the court, and, before the subpoena was called on, handed the letters to Pape. Pape’s solicitors, Langford and Redfern, took copies of the letters, and returned the originals to Pape. Lord Ashburton commenced litigation against Pape, Langford, Redfern, and Nocton, seeking an injunction restraining the defendants from, in effect, disclosing the contents of the letters, or parting with them, otherwise than to the plaintiff or by deposit in court. An interlocutory injunction was granted by Neville J, requiring Pape to hand over to Nocton all original letters from Lord Ashburton to Nocton in his possession or control. There was also an order restraining Pape, Langford and Redfern, their servants and agents, “… until judgment or further order from publishing of making use of any of the copies of such letters or any information contained therein except for the purpose of the pending proceedings in the defendant … Pape’s bankruptcy and subject to the direction of the Bankruptcy Court.” 142 Lord Ashburton appealed against the inclusion of the exception in the interlocutory injunction. 143 In Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759 the English Court of Appeal had dealt with the admissibility of copies of privileged documents. The action was one where Mr Calcraft sued for trespass in a fishery. The substantial question concerned the upper boundary of that fishery. The plaintiff succeeded at trial. On appeal, the defendant wished to rely on some documents which had been discovered since the trial. The documents in question were proofs of witnesses, and rough notes of evidence used in defence of an earlier action for trespass in that fishery. Mr John Calcraft, a predecessor in title of the present plaintiff, had financed the defence of that earlier action. (Thus, though the report does not expressly say so, it seems a reasonable inference that Mr John Calcraft was one of the persons entitled to the legal professional privilege in those proofs of witnesses and notes of evidence.) The proofs of witnesses and notes of evidence had remained with Mr John Calcraft’s solicitor, until that solicitor’s practice was wound up, and were then placed in storage. It was from that storage that the present appellant had obtained the proofs of witnesses and rough notes of evidence. They made copies of the documents. The plaintiff (the 1898 Mr Calcraft) threatened legal action, and the originals of the documents were thereupon handed over to him. The question for the court was whether the copies were admissible in evidence. Lindley MR (with whom Rigby and Vaughan Williams LJJ agreed) held that the copies were admissible, notwithstanding that the originals were privileged. 144 When Lord Ashburton v Pape was heard, the argument for the appellant started out by giving a précis of the principle in Calcraft v Guest , namely (at 471): “Communications which have passed between a client and his solicitor before any dispute has arisen between the client and his opponent are privileged from production, so the original letters cannot be used. If, however, an instrument in the hands of a solicitor which is privileged from production comes improperly into the hands of a stranger who makes a copy of it, the secondary evidence so obtained is admissible in case of notice to produce the original being duly given, and the production resisted on ground of privilege.” 145 The argument then went on: “But in this case there has been a breach of confidence on the part of Nocton. Pape obtained the letters from him, and a person who obtained privileged letters from anyone who is in a fiduciary is in no better position than the trustee himself. The equity prevails against persons deriving under the breach of contract or duty: Tipping v Clarke (1843) 2 HARE 383; Morrison v Moat (1851) 9 HARE 241.” 146 Thus, the argument pointed to an essential difference between Calcraft v Guest , and Lord Ashburton v Pape . In Calcraft v Guest , while the documents in question were privileged, that privilege was one owed to Mr John Calcraft. All the report tells the reader about the relationship between Mr John Calcraft, and the 1898 Mr Calcraft, is that Mr John Calcraft was a predecessor in title of the 1898 Mr Calcraft, so far as the fishery was concerned. There is no basis in the report of Calcraft v Guest for finding that any obligations of confidence, which might have been owed by Mr John Calcraft’s solicitor to Mr John Calcraft, (and also, presumably, by the people into whose hands the proofs of witnesses and rough notes of evidence had come) were owed to the 1898 Mr Calcraft. Thus, a difference between Calcraft v Guest and Lord Ashburton v Pape was that in Lord Ashburton v Pape Lord Ashburton was a plaintiff who was owed an equity of confidence, in relation to the papers in question. 147 The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, striking out the exception which had been contained in Neville J’s interlocutory injunction. Cozens-Hardy MR said, at 472: “Now, the question is raised that that exception is wrong, and that the injunction ought to go to the full extent until the trial of the action, namely from publishing or making use of any of the copies of letters or information contained therein. In my opinion the contention of the appellant is right.” 148 After referring to authorities to show that a recipient of confidential information can be restrained from using it, Cozens-Hardy MR went on, at 472: “Apart, therefore, from these pending or threatened proceedings in bankruptcy, it seems to me to be perfectly clear that the plaintiff can obtain the unqualified injunction which he asks for. Now, can it make any difference that Pape says “I want, by means of these copies, to give secondary evidence in the bankruptcy proceedings?” In my opinion that is no ground for making any distinction. The rule of evidence as explained in Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759 merely amounts to this, that if a litigant wants to prove a particular document which by reason of privilege or some circumstance he cannot furnish by the production of the original, he may produce a copy as secondary evidence although that copy has been obtained by improper means and even, it may be, by criminal means. The court in such an action is not really trying the circumstances under which the document was produced. That is not an issue in the case and the court simply says “Here is a copy of a document which cannot be produced; it may have been stolen, it may have been picked up in the street, it may have improperly got into the possession of the person who proposes to produce it, but that is not a matter which the court in the trial of the action can go into.” But that does not seem to me to have any bearing upon a case where the whole subject matter of the action is the right to retain the originals or copies of certain documents which are privileged. It seems to me that, although Pape has had the good luck to obtain a copy of these documents which he can produce without a breach of this injunction , there is no ground whatever in principle why we should decline to give the plaintiff the protection which in my view is his right as between him and Pape, and there is no reason whatever why we should not say to Pape in pending or future proceedings, “You shall not produce these documents which you have acquired from the plaintiff surreptitiously, or from his solicitor, who plainly stood to him in a confidential relation.” For these reasons I think the appeal ought to be allowed so far as it asks, and only so far as it asks, to strike out the exception.” 149 When Cozens-Hardy MR said, “without a breach of this injunction” , I take him to be meaning, “without a breach of the injunction granted by Neville J” . Further, while the case before the court concerned an interlocutory injunction, in this passage Cozens-Hardy MR seems to be stating principles which would apply even on a final hearing. If that is so, then to that extent the remarks are obiter dicta; even so, they are, in my respectful view, a correct application of principle. 150 While the basis of the order made in Lord Ashburton v Pape was that the documents were confidential, the particular form of order which it was appropriate to make was also influenced by the fact that the documents were the subject of legal professional privilege. When a court grants a remedy to enforce an equity of confidence, it aims to provide a remedy which ensures that the defendant gains no advantage from there having been a breach of confidence. In Ashburton v Pape , if the breach of confidence had not occurred, the copied documents would never have been made, and would not have been available to tender in evidence. It is well in accord with the principle on which a remedy for breach of equitable obligations of confidence is founded, that copies so made should not be, ever, tendered in evidence. 151 Kennedy LJ said, at 474: “I agree that the better view seems to me to be that although it is true that the principle which is laid down in Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759 must be followed, yet, at the same time, if, before the occasion of the trial when a copy may be used, although a copy improperly obtained, the owner of the original can successfully promote proceedings against the person who has improperly obtained the copy to stop his using it, the owner is nonetheless entitled to protection, because, if the question had arisen in the course of a trial before such proceedings, the holder of the copy would not have been prevented from using it on account of the illegitimacy of its origin. If that is so, it decides this case. There is no question here as to the facts, and on them it is quite clear that these copies ought never to have got into Mr Pape’s possession in any shape or form.” 152 I confess I have difficulty in understanding the first sentence that I have just quoted. My difficulty arises from the use of the word “because”. If, however, “because” were replaced with “notwithstanding that” , the sentence is readily intelligible, and consistent with the views of Cozens-Hardy MR. Further, it is clear from the final sentence that Kennedy LJ regards that as important that these copies should never have been in Mr Pape’s possession at all. 153 Swinfen Eady LJ said, at 475, that the act of Mr Nocton’s clerk in handing over the letter was a gross breach of his duty of confidentiality, and that by that means Pape had obtained possession of the letters and had proceeded to copy them, and still kept the copies. He continued. “The principle upon which the Court of Chancery has acted for many years has been to restrain the publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained or of information imparted in confidence which ought not to be divulged. Injunctions have been granted to give effectual relief, that is not only to restrain the disclosure of confidential information, but to prevent copies being made of any record of that information and, if copies have already been made, to restrain them from being further copied, and to restrain persons into whose possession that confidential information has come from themselves in turn divulging or propagating it.” 154 Swinfen Eady LJ then, at 475-476 said: “If the defendant has obtained copies of books, it would very probably be by means of some clerk or agent of the plaintiff and if he availed himself surreptitiously of the information, which he could not have had except from a person guilty of a breach of contract in communicating it, I think he could not be permitted to avail himself of that breach of contract. That is Pape’s position here. If he is allowed to retain possession of these copies or to divulge the contents, he is availing himself of the breach of contract by Brooks the clerk, by means of which these letters have come into his hands.” 155 His Lordship continued, at 476: “Then objection was raised in the present case by reason of the fact that it is said that Pape, who now has copies of the letters, might wish to give them in evidence in certain bankruptcy proceedings, and although the original letters are privileged from production he has possession of the copies and could given them as secondary evidence of the contents of the letters, and, therefore, ought not to be ordered either to give them up or be restrained from divulging their contents. There is here a confusion between a right to restrain a person from divulging confidential information and the right to give secondary evidence of documents where the originals are privileged from production, if the party has such secondary evidence in his possession. The cases are entirely separate and distinct. If a person were to steal a deed, nevertheless in any dispute to which it was relevant the original deed might be given in evidence by him at the trial. It would be no objection to the admissibility of the deed in evidence to say that you ought not have possession of it. His unlawful possession would not affect the admissibility of the deed in evidence if otherwise admissible. So again with regard to any copy he had. If he was unable to obtain or compel production of the original because it was privileged, if he had a copy in his possession it would be admissible as secondary evidence. The fact, however, that a document, whether original or copy, is admissible in evidence is no answer to the demand of the lawful owner for the delivery up of the document, and no answer to an application by the lawful owner of confidential information to restrain it from being published or copied.” 156 In Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] 1 QB 670 the English Court of Appeal considered another case where a note to which legal professional privilege attached (being legal professional privilege of the plaintiffs – 678G) came to be in the hands of the defendants. The plaintiffs were in the process of suing the defendants. The defendants used the privileged note as the basis for an amendment to their defence. The plaintiffs applied to have those portions of the defence struck out, and sought an injunction restraining the defendant from using or relying on the copy note, and requiring the defendant to deliver up the note and any further copies which it might have made of that note. That application succeeded. May LJ, at 683 said: “I confess that I do not find the decision in Lord Ashburton v Pape logically satisfying, depending as it does upon the order in which applications are made in litigation. Nevertheless I think that it and Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759 are good authority for the following proposition. If a litigant has in his possession copies of documents to which legal professional privilege attaches he may nevertheless use such copies as secondary evidence in his litigation; however, if he has not yet used the documents in that way, the mere fact that he intends to do so is no answer to a claim against him by a person in whom the privilege is vested for delivery up of the copies or to restrain him from disclosing or making any use of any information contained in them. 157 Nourse LJ, at 684D, agreed with this proposition. Nourse LJ also stated some propositions in which he contrasted the rule of evidence established by Calcraft v Guest , and the equitable jurisdiction reaffirmed in Lord Ashburton v Pape . He says, at 685: “Second, although the equitable jurisdiction is of much wider application, I have little doubt that it can prevail over the rule of evidence only in cases where privilege can be claimed. The equitable jurisdiction is well able to extend, for example, to the grant of an injunction to restrain an unauthorised disclosure of confidential communications between priest and penitent, or doctor and patient. But these communications are not privileged in legal proceedings and I do not believe that equity would restrain a litigant who already had a record of such a communication in his possession from using it for the purposes of his litigation. It cannot be the function of equity to accord a de facto privilege to communications in respect of which no privilege can be claimed. Equity follows the law … Fourth, once it is established that a case is governed by Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 there is no discretion in the court to refuse to exercise the equitable jurisdiction according to its view of the materiality of the communication, the justice of admitting or excluding it or the like. The injunction is granted in aid of the privilege which, unless and until it is waived, is absolute. In saying this, I do not intend to suggest that there may not be cases where an injunction can properly be refused on general principles affecting the grant of a discretionary remedy, for example on the ground of inordinate delay.” 158 The decision in Ashburton v Pape has been referred to in the High Court without any adverse comment: The Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 50 per Mason J; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, at 68, per Gibbs CJ. 159 The decision in Ashburton v Pape has been applied in a series of cases where documents the subject of legal privilege have, by mistake, come into the hands of an opposite party to litigation. In each case, the courts have made orders aimed at undoing the mistaken disclosure – Guiness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027; Hooker Corporation Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538; Webster v James Chapman & Co [1989] 3 All ER 939; Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon [1991] 1 WLR 73. 160 In Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468 Hunt CJ at CL considered a situation where, by mistake, the DPP had sent to the solicitor for some accused persons an internal memorandum which drew together facts, and advice received from counsel, the case officer, the informant police officer, and the Senior Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions in the Sydney office, concerning an application made by the accused that the committal proceedings be discontinued. His Honour made orders restraining the defendants from using or otherwise dealing with the document, and requiring them to deliver the document up to the DPP. The basis of that decision was expressly stated to be both the equitable obligation of confidence, and legal professional privilege (at 486). 161 In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Rettke (1995) 31 IPR 457 Cooper J considered a situation where Mr Rettke, a public servant employed in the Australian Tax Office, was engaged in litigation with the Commission for the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation of Commonwealth Employees. He annexed to an affidavit filed in those proceedings a copy of a tax return (then 17 years old) of a taxpayer. Mr Rettke said that a copy of that taxpayer’s file had been sent to him, unsolicited. The court held that the contents of the file were confidential information, and ordered Mr Rettke to deliver up to the Deputy Commission of Taxation all copies of the taxation return in his possession power of control, and: “Other than (a) in the performance of his duties as an officer within the meaning of that term as defined in section 16 of the Income Tax Assessment Act; or (b) in proceedings pending in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal between Rodney Noel Rettke and Comcare if it be held to be relevant and admissible by the Tribunal, Rodney Noel Rettke by himself his servants and agents or otherwise be restrained from disclosing to any person the contents of the 1978-1979 taxation return of NL, A and D Land Trading as NL Land & Co.” (at 465) 162 In Sullivan v Sclanders (2000) 77 SASR 419 the South Australian Full court considered a situation where Sclanders was suing Sullivan, concerning a business venture which Sullivan and Sclanders had formerly operated. Sclanders came into possession of various copied documents. The copies were obtained by the original of the documents being surreptitiously removed from Sullivan’s room, the copies made, the originals returned to Sullivan’s room, and the copies sent off to Sclanders. Sclanders sought an order from the Supreme Court that he be permitted to seek legal advice about the contents of the documents. That order was made, at first instance. On appeal, it was held that an obligation of confidentiality attached to the documents, and that orders should be made restraining the use of that confidential information. Gray J said, at 424: “A person who has confidential information belonging to another may be restrained from using it without the owner’s consent, by injunction. Equity acts in regard to the unconscionable circumstances in which the confidential documents were obtained and disseminated. Equity may grant relief from the consequences of reprehensible conduct. To be effective, this relief may bind third parties who have come into possession of the information and can protect the defendants from oral or written dissemination or other use. The granting of equitable relief as sought in this matter does not preclude the truth from being ascertained. Discovery and production, either pre action or during an action, will ensure that the relevant documentary material is available, according to the ordinary rules of procedure. If the documents are relevant, then they will be discovered and produced, subject to claims of privilege. 163 The orders made included orders requiring Sclanders to file an affidavit identifying all copies made, an order that all copies be brought into court, sealed, preserved and not opened without an order of the judge of the court, and orders: - “that the statement of claim be struck out, sealed, preserved and not opened without an order of a judge of this court - that the plaintiff be at liberty to file a fresh statement of claim making no use either directly or indirectly of the confidential documents or their contents - that the plaintiffs be restrained from disseminating or making use of the contents of the confidential documents” (at 431) Whistleblower Legislation 164 There has been some legislation which deals with a problem, which parliaments evidently perceived, of obligations of confidentiality sometimes inhibiting performance of more public duties. The Protected Disclosures Act 1994 provides a number of protections, including (under section 21) protection from liability, “despite any duty of secrecy or confidentiality or any other restriction on disclosure” to disclosures made to a precisely defined group of authorities, a member of parliament, or a journalist. However, the provisions of the Act apply only to a disclosure made by a “public official” (section 8). 165 Commonwealth legislation also provides protection to certain federal public servants who report breaches or alleged breaches of a code of conduct to identified office holders ( Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) section 16; Parliamentary Service Act 1999 (Cth) section 16. See also Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South Australia), Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (QLD), Public Interests Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT). The South Australian and Queensland legislation can apply (at least in some circumstances) to relieve private sector employees from their obligations of confidentiality – but that legislation is not part of the public policy which is to be applied in deciding the legality or enforceability of the contractual obligation on which GIO here sues. 166 The partial release of obligations of confidentiality for public officials, under the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 , mirrors to some extent the way that equitable principles of confidentiality operate differently when applied to private individuals, to the way they operate when applied to governments: the Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 51-53 per Mason J, Minister for Mineral Resources v Newcastle Newspapers Pty Ltd (1997) 40 IPR 403 at 408-409 per Young J. 167 That parliaments have, comparatively recently, enacted legislation to permit “whistleblowing” but have not made it extend to someone in the situation of Mr Burton, is an indication that there is no public policy which prohibits the enforcement of the confidentiality obligations which GIO here seeks to enforce. Comparing a Plaintiff’s Situation in Suing a Natural Person, and Suing a Corporation 168 When a plaintiff sues a natural person defendant, and that defendant has confidential information which is relevant to the case, the defendant is able to make that information available voluntarily to the plaintiff if it so chooses. If the defendant chooses not to, the plaintiff can, in some circumstances, obtain that confidential information through processes of discovery, and interrogatories. To the extent it is not able to obtain the information through discovery and interrogatories, the plaintiff must do without. 169 Any corporation must necessarily carry on its activities through natural persons. When a corporation discloses confidential information to a natural person, on terms that this information will be used only for the purposes of the corporation, the person to whom the information is disclosed comes under a constraint, which affects what would otherwise be his freedom of action, to voluntarily disclose that information. If a corporate defendant is sued, and has disclosed confidential information to an employee, which is relevant to that litigation, for the courts to permit enforcement of that restraint on the employee places the plaintiff in the same situation it is in when it sues a natural person who has confidential information. If justice can be properly administered in the one case, it can likewise be properly administered in the other. Conclusion on Whether Enforcement of the Contract Contravenes Public Policy 170 Having surveyed these principles which the community has already adopted formally by law, I can see no basis for holding that a former employee, who has been entrusted with his employer’s confidential information, and has promised not to disclose it, ought be free on grounds of public policy to disclose that information to a solicitor, if he so wishes, and if the solicitor bona fide wishes to receive that information for the purpose of advancing litigation which the solicitor is in the course of running . 171 In Re Morris , Jordan CJ said that the court could also look at principles which the community as a whole has already adopted tacitly by the general course of corporate life. No specific evidence on that matter was put before me. As a matter of judicial notice, I do not find that there is any definite principle which this community adopts in the general course of its corporate life, whereby former employees are free to disclose their former employer’s secrets to a solicitor who wishes to use those secrets in litigation against the former employer. 172 In these circumstances, I do not find that public policy requires the terms of the confidentiality undertaking to be treated as void, or for the court to decline to enforce them, to the extent that the confidentiality undertaking prohibits Mr Burton from disclosing confidential information to MBC. No Confidence in an Iniquity 173 An alternative basis upon which MBC and Mr Burton oppose the grant of an injunction is that the court will not confer the cloak of confidentiality on information which discloses an iniquity. 174 As Gummow J has demonstrated in Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (VIC) (1987) 14 FCR 434 the famous epigram of Wood V-C in Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch (NS) 113, at 114, that “there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity” was made in the context of deciding the scope of an implied obligation of good faith in an employment contract. That being the proper sphere of operation in the decision in Gartside v Outram , it is not directly applicable to the present case, where there is an express obligation of confidentiality. In case another court takes a different view concerning this matter, however, I shall make some observations about how the “no confidence in iniquity” principle might apply in the present circumstances. 175 In Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (1987) 14 FCR 434 Gummow J, at 451 ff considered the supposed “public interest” defence to breach of confidence, and what could be drawn from Gartside v Outram . His Honour concluded at 454: “From this consideration of Gartside v Outram I conclude that that case provides insufficient basis for an “public interest defence” of the kind that, in its name, has been developed in the recent English authorities. The truth as to what Gartside v Outram decided is less striking and more readily understood in terms of basic principle. It is that any court of law or equity would have been extremely unlikely to imply in a contract between master and servant an obligation that the servant’s good faith to his master required him to keep secret details of his master’s gross bad faith to his customers.” And at 455-6: “Finally, if there be some other principle of general application inspired by Gartside v Outram , it is in my view of narrower application than the “public interest defence” expressed in the English cases. Such a narrow principle would not be concerned with contractual protection of confidence. Where the plaintiff asserts a contractual right, the law of contract, supplemented by equitable defences where equitable relief is sought, sufficiently deals with the situation. Any principle of the kind I am now considering will be applied in equity where there is no reliance on contractual confidence. That principle, in my view, is no wider than one that information will lack the necessary attribute of confidence if the subject matter is the existence or real likelihood of the existence of an iniquity in the sense of a crime, civil wrong or serious misdeed of public importance, and the confidence is relied upon to prevent disclosure to a third party with a real and direct interest in redressing such crime, wrong or misdeed.” 176 As the present case is one where the plaintiff relies on contractual protection of confidence, the principle articulated by Gummow J in the last sentence of the passage just quoted, has no room to apply. The “Public Interest” Defence 177 The present status of a “public interest” defence in Australia in an action for breach of confidence in equity’s exclusive jurisdiction is not clear. Both before, and after, the decision of Gummow J in Corrs Pavey there was some (though not universal) acceptance of the line of cases developed in England, in part on the basis of Gartside v Outram , whereby there was a “public interest defence” to actions for breach of confidence in equity’s exclusive jurisdiction. By a “public interest defence” I mean a defence whereby it is the task of the individual trial judge to decide whether, in the circumstances of the individual case before him or her, the public interest is better served by enforcing, or not enforcing, an obligation of confidence. In The Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 56-57 Mason J (sitting as a single judge of the High Court) said , “It has been accepted that the so called common law defence of public interest applies to disclosure of confidential information.” (This statement does not make clear whether it “has been accepted” by courts, or by the parties in the instant case.) In David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holdens Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294 Hutley AP said, at 305-306: “The case for the appellant was that there had to be a balancing between the interests of the respondent and the confidentiality of its material and the right of the public to know and the right of the press to assist the public to know and that on a proper weighting of these interests no injunctions should have been granted. I am unable to accept the basis of the appellant’s case. This is not a case in which the right of confidentiality is destroyed by iniquity: see Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396. This is a case in which the technical information must be of high commercial value and is a trade secret upon the acquisition which great sums of money have been, and may be expended. It is something in which a right of property is recognised: see Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 443. This right of property is not to be taken away from its proprietor without good reason … if the correct way to approach the matter were to weigh the interest of the respondent in confidentiality of its technical and project information and the interest of the public to know, represented by the professional disseminator of information, namely, the newspaper, there could be only one answer: industrial progress is more worthy than satisfied curiosity. However, in my opinion, there is no question of weighing one against the other at all. The proprietary right in its confidential information of this kind is not to be weighed against other circumstances, except in cases where questions of iniquity are involved.” 178 Samuels JA, at 309, rejected the notion of confidence as property, and agreed with the remark of Lord Denning MR in Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 QLR 760 at 764, that, “In these cases of confidential information it is a question of balancing the public interest in maintaining the confidence against the public interest in knowing the truth.” Samuels JA went on, at 310, to say, “It therefore seems to me, without finally determining the matter, that the parties before us were correct in perceiving their dispute to depend upon a balance of competing interests. I deal with the matter on that footing.” 179 Street CJ adopted the approach, at 297-298, of setting out the appellant’s submission (which summarised circumstances which English cases had held to justify disclosure of confidential information in the public interests) said (at 298), “I do not, however, wish to be taken to accede either to the proposition that there is a common thread running through the categories put forward by the appellant or to that proposition that, if there be a common thread, it is crystallised in the formulation of principle put forward. No matter how benevolently one views the approach advocated by the appellant, the evidentiary material in the present case does not establish any error on the part of the learned judge of first instance involving this concept of public interest.” 180 In Westpac Banking Corporation v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1991) 19 IPR 513 at 525 Powell J said: “I turn, then, to the question of the public interest, as I indicated in Spycatcher [ Attorney General for the United Kingdom v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 341] (NSWLR at 382), it seems to me that the law in this area has now progressed to the stage where the so called “iniquity rule” has been subsumed in a more general rule, namely, that publication of otherwise confidential material might be permitted in cases in which there is shown to have been some impropriety which is of such a nature that it ought, in the public interest, be exposed. However, as I also sought to point out in Spycatcher (NSWLR at 380), a decision that, in a particular case, information might be allowed to be published, does not inevitably lead to publication to the community at large being permitted: cf and cp Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 392; Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1984] 3 WLR 539 (Powell J went on to say that the “balancing” exercise could rarely be carried out satisfactorily at an interlocutory stage of proceedings.) 181 However, the view that there is no “public interest defence” of the type I have described has also had its supporters. 182 In Castrol Australia Pty Ltd v Emtech Associates Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 31 Rath J, at 53-57 reviewed the development which had occurred in England of the “no confidence as to disclosure of iniquity” dictum. He noted (at 54) that Viscount Finlay in Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956 at 965-6 said: “It would be startling if it were the law that an agent who is negligent in the custody of a letter handed to him in confidence by his principal might plead in defence that the letter was libellous. There may, of course, be cases where some higher duty is involved. Danger to the State or public duty may supersede the duty of the agent to his principal.” At 55, Rath J quoted from the judgment of Ungoed-Thomas J in Bellof v Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241, where Ungoed-Thomas J said: “The defence of public interest clearly covers, and, in the authorities does not extend beyond, disclosure, which as Lord Denning MR emphasised must be disclosure justified in the public interest, of matters carried out or contemplated, in breach of the country’s security, or in breach of law, including statutory duty, fraud, or otherwise destructive of the country or its people including matters medically dangerous to the public; and doubtless other misdeeds of similar gravity. Public interest, as a defence in law, operates to override the rights of the individual (including copyright) which would otherwise prevail and which the law is also concerned to protect. Such public interest, as now recognised by the law, does not extend beyond misdeeds of a serious nature and importance to the country and thus, in my view, clearly recognisable as such.” Rath J went on to say, at 55: “This passage, in my respectful view, expresses no more than a reasonable elaboration of Viscount Finlay’s “higher duty” concept, and is an acceptable statement of the law as to the defence of public interest in an action for breach of contract … . what is particularly important in Ungoed-Thomas J’s formulation of principle is his emphasis on the gravity of the conduct that may give rise to the defence. If there is to be a defence labelled public interest, some such confinement of its vague boundaries is in my view essential.” And at 56: “In my opinion the court, in considering whether just cause for breaking confidence exists, must have regard to matters of a more weighty and precise kind than a public interest in the truth being told.” 183 In Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 22 FCR 73, at 111, Gummow J said: “Further, I would accept the submissions by counsel for the applicants in the SK&F proceedings that (i) an examination of the recent English decision shows that the so called “ public interest” defence is not so much a rule of law as an invitation to judicial idiosyncrasy by deciding each case on an ad hoc basis as to whether, on the facts overall, it is better to respect or to override the obligation of confidence; and (ii) equitable principles are best developed by reference to what conscionable behaviour demands of the defendant not by “balancing” and then overriding those demands by reference to matters of social or political opinion.” 184 A similar conclusion concerning the operation of the “public interest defence” was reached in Bacich v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1992) 29 NSWLR 1, at 16 by Brownie J, who, referring to the decision of Rath J in Castrol Australia Pty Ltd v Emtech Associates Pty Ltd (1980) 51 FLR 184 at 210-216; 33 ALR 31 at 53-57, said that Rath J: “… described the decision in Woodward v Hutchin [1977] 1 WLR 760; [1977] 2 All ER 751 as being “the spring tide” (at 214; 56) of the notion, substantially developed through a series of decisions to which Lord Denning MR was a party, more or less equating the defence of iniquity to the balancing of competing public interests, a view which his Honour rejected, correctly in my respectful view.” See also Sullivan v Sclanders (2000) SASR 419 at 427. 185 Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 34 ALR 105 deserves a more extended discussion, concerning the “public interest” defence and the “iniquity” rule. In that case, Sheppard J considered a situation where Matthews, a former Victorian Manager of Allied Mills had handed to the Trade Practices Commission a diary, and various other documents. The Trade Practices Commission later took proceedings against Allied Mills, seeking injunctions and the imposition of penalties for breaches of section 45 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 . Allied Mills sought orders restraining the Commission from making use of, or disclosing, information contained in those documents, and an order for the delivery up of those documents. The basis on which it asserted confidentiality was an implied term in Matthews contract of service and an obligation in the exclusive jurisdiction of equity (page 113). 186 His Honour accepted that, “subject to the positive matters relied on by the Commission” , Allied Mills had made good its claim that there had been a breach of confidence (page 119). The “positive matters relied on by the Commission” were that, in that case, a prima facie case had been made out that Allied Mills had engaged in an iniquity, namely a breach of section 45 of the Trade Practices Act (page 143) that the diary itself disclosed that iniquity (page 145) and that, while the other documents did not themselves disclose the iniquity, the order should be refused on the basis that the Commission was an appropriate authority who had decided to prosecute the breach of the Trade Practices Act (page 145-146). The latter basis of his Honour’s decision was one arrived at by analogy with the way that the Equity Court will not issue an injunction to compel the police, or other prosecuting authorities, to return property which those prosecuting authorities need for the purpose of a trial. His Honour drew on the decision of Goff J (as he then was) in Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680. Sheppard J summarised that decision by saying: “It was held by Goff J that the fact that the letter was relevant to criminal proceedings was not sufficient by itself to destroy the privilege, the correct tests to apply being both whether there was a bona fide and reasonably tenable charge of crime or fraud and whether the letter could be shown prima facie to be preparatory to the Commission on a crime or fraud. It was further held that on the limited facts before the court the warning in the solicitor’s letter should not be regarded as being in preparation for, or in furtherance of or as part of, any criminal designs on the plaintiff’s part and that therefore the letter was privileged and the copy confidential. But, although there had been a breach of confidence, and in such circumstances an innocent recipient of information could be restrained, there were good reasons why it would not be proper for the court to interfere in cases where there was a conflict between the private right of the individual in equity and the duty of the State to prosecute offenders. Accordingly, the recipient being the Board of Trade and the intention being to use the letter in a public prosecution, the court’s equitable jurisdiction in confidence would not be exercised.” (page 133) Sheppard J quoted the following from the judgment of Goff J at 690-1: “…The right and duty of the police to prosecute offenders prevails over the accused’s right of ownership. He cannot demand his own goods back. By analogy it seems to me that the interests and duty of the defendants as a department of the State to prosecute defenders under the Companies Act must prevail over the offender’s limited proprietary right in equity to restrain a breach of confidence…” (34 ALR at 135) 187 In the course of holding that there was a prima facie case of iniquity, his Honour carried out an extensive review of the case law. He concluded, at 141: “The authorities establish that the public interest in the disclosure (to the appropriate authority or perhaps the press) of iniquity will always outweigh the public interest in the preservation of private and confidential information.” 188 This statement was expressly disapproved by Gibbs CJ in A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, at 545-6. After quoting the statement, Gibbs J said: “That is too broad a statement, unless “iniquity” is confined to mean serious crime. The public interest does not, in every case, require the disclosure of the fact that a criminal offence, however, trivial, has been committed. And the administration of justice, although a fundamental public interest, is not an exclusive public interest.” 189 In A v Hayden , Mason J, without expressly alluding to this statement of Sheppard J said, at 560: “It may be that the public interest in the administration of justice and the enforcement of the criminal law is so strong that it cannot be outweighed by any countervailing public interest, but I am by no means presently persuaded that this is the case.” Thus, that conclusion of Sheppard J cannot safely be accepted as stating the law. 190 Sheppard J also said, at 142: “In my opinion a breach of the provisions, whether of part IV or part V of the [Trade Practices] Act, is an iniquity within the rule formulated in Gartside v Outram …” 191 As the case before Sheppard J concerned only a breach of part IV, this conclusion of his Honour is a dictum in so far as it relates to a breach of Part V. Section 79 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) makes contravention of a provision of Part V a crime, except where the contravention is of section 52 and certain other nominated sections. Section 52 can be contravened by a completely innocent misrepresentation, made in circumstances which are of no enduring importance to the community. I respectfully doubt that it is correct to say that all breaches of section 52 are an iniquity within the rule formulated in Gartside v Outram . Though his Honour had noted, at 121, that a contravention of section 52 is not criminal, the only other specific discussion of section 52 in his judgment is at 123, in a passage which does not, in my respectful view, lead to any conclusion that a breach of section 52 is necessarily an “iniquity” . It is likely, also, that Sheppard J was influenced, in reaching his conclusion, by the view he had earlier reached at 141 (quoted above at paragraph 187 above). Further, I doubt that the tort of negligence necessarily amounts to an iniquity, within the rule formulated in Gartside v Outram (though, in some circumstances, it conceivably might.) Significance for Present Purposes of the Uncertain Status of the “Public Interest” Defence 192 Because the present case is one where the GIO seeks to enforce an express contractual obligation, the uncertainty about the scope of this “public interest defence” does not directly impact on the result of the present case. The cases in which that topic has been discussed in Australia have been ones where the source of the obligation of confidentiality was either in the exclusive jurisdiction of equity, or in an implied term of a contract. 193 Whether the obligation of confidentiality arises from express contract, implied contract, or in the exclusive jurisdiction will bear upon how legal principles deal with the fact that the subject matter of the confidence involves some form of wickedness. Concerning the circumstances in which equity will recognise an obligation of confidence independently of any contact, Deane J said, in Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No.2] (1984) 156 CLR 414, at 437-438: “It is unnecessary, for the purposes of the present appeal, to attempt to define the precise scope of the equitable jurisdiction to grant relief against an actual or threatened abuse of confidential information not involving any tort or breach of some express or implied contractual provision, so wider fiduciary duty or some copyright or trade mark right. A general equitable jurisdiction to grant such relief has long been asserted and should, in my view, now be accepted: see The Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 50-52. Like most heads of exclusive equitable jurisdiction, its rational basis does not lie in proprietary right. It lies in the notion of an obligation of confidence arising from the circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or obtained.” 194 Concerning an obligation of confidence of that type, the fact that the subject matter of the confidence is some form of wickedness can be relevant in two ways. The first concerns whether the obligation of confidence exists at all. Concerning some types of information, communicated in circumstances which might ordinarily give rise to an obligation of confidence, the recipient of the information is entitled to say, “I am not, in conscience, obliged to keep quiet about conduct like that.” The second way in which the wickedness of the conduct might be relevant, in equity’s exclusive jurisdiction, is if the person seeking to enforce an obligation of confidence has himself engaged in conduct which gives rise to an equitable defence of unclean hands ( Dewhirst v Edwards [1983] 1 NSWLR 34 at 51; FAI Insurances Ltd v Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd (1987) 15 NSWLR 552 at 561, A-G ( UK v Heinemann Publishers Aust (1987) 8 NSWLR 341 at 383-384; Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (1987) 14 FCR 434 at 456-457. 195 If the obligation being sought to be enforced is said to be an implied term in a contract, the wickedness of the conduct sought to be kept confidential is relevant to whether the implication of confidentiality is made – Gartside v Ourtram ; Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461; Smorgon v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1976) 134 CLR 475 at 486-490. In deciding what are the implied terms in a contract, the court uses well established tests for deciding whether the term is implied so as to give the contract business efficacy ( BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 at 282-283; Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 347), a term implied by law from the nature of the contract itself ( Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239; Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 448-452 per McHugh and Gummow J), or implied from custom ( Bryne v Australian Airlines Ltd at 440), or is an implication contained in the express words of the contract ( Marcus Clarke (Vic) Ltd v Brown (1928) 40 CLR 540 at 553-4). (This listing is substantially drawn from Heydon JA in Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [2001] NSWCA 61 at [28].) Further, these rules of implication are ones which apply where there is a formal contract complete on its face. When there is no such formal contract, the court must first infer what the terms of the contract are before any question of implication arises ( Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd at 422 per Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ). As well, if an injunction is sought to enforce an obligation of confidentiality arising from an implied term in a contract, whether the person seeking the injunction had engaged in conduct which is iniquitous can be relevant to the equitable defence of unclean hands. 196 Where there is an express term in a contract, the contract will be enforced, unless there is some public policy which prevents it being enforced. For example, I would not doubt that there is a public policy which makes void an express contract to keep secret the committing of a widespread and serious fraud, and that a contract to keep quiet about such a fraud would be void regardless of whether the way the defendant was proposing to breach the contract was by bringing legal proceedings, or assisting other people to bring legal proceedings, to redress the consequences of the fraud. The scope, and limitations, of any such public policy which makes void or unenforceable an express contract to keep confidential some iniquitous subject matter are decided by engaging in the same sort of enquiry as I have earlier engaged in to decide whether GIO’s contract with Mr Burton is void or unenforceable on the ground that it interferes with the administration of justice. As well, if an injunction is sought to enforce an express obligation of confidentiality, questions of whether the plaintiff has engaged in iniquitous conduct can be relevant to whether a defence of unclean hands is made out. 197 In the present case, it is not necessary to reach a final conclusion about whether there is a public policy which prohibits, because it relates to iniquitous conduct, the enforcement of the particular contract which GIO has entered with Mr Burton, nor about whether breach of section 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) , or negligence, amounts to an “iniquity” . This is because of the view which I have come to concerning whether, in the present case, any iniquity has been proved. How Iniquity is Proved 198 In the context of the related principle, that legal professional privilege does not protect communications made for an illegal or improper purpose, ( R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153 ) it is established that there must be a prima facie case established that the communications came into existence for the improper purpose, before the privilege is shown not to apply. See AG-NT v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 at 516, 517, 525; Re Moage (1998) 26 ACSR 726, at 733-734. 199 In A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, at 546 Gibbs CJ said: “It is clear that a person who owes a duty to maintain confidentiality will not be allowed to escape from his obligation simply because he alleges that crimes have been committed and that it is in the public interest that he should disclose information relating to them. He bears the burden of establishing the facts on which he relies to relieve him of the obligation.” His Honour referred to cases which establish, in the related field of legal professional privilege, that if the privilege is not to apply on the ground that the communication was to further a fraud, a prima facie case of fraud must be made out. He continued at 547: “Similarly, where an obligation of confidentiality has arisen, whether as a result of express contract or because the relationship between the parties gives rise to a duty of confidence, the party who alleges facts which show that the obligation does not extend to the circumstances of the case must prove his allegations. That means that in the present case the defendants must establish, at least prima facie that the failure to disclose the information would tend to obstruct the course of justice and would be contrary to the public interest. It would not be enough to justify the disclosure of the confidential information in the present case that the police have requested it. It would be necessary to show, at the very least, that there is reasonable ground to believe that any plaintiff whose identity it is sought to disclose is implicated in the commission of an offence. Put in another way, at least what has to be shown prima facie is that there is “a bona fide and reasonably tenable charge of crime” against any plaintiff whose identity is sought to be disclosed. The bona fides of the police in the present case is not in doubt, but it is a question whether any charge against each plaintiff is reasonably tenable.” 200 The mere allegation that conduct which counts as iniquity has been committed is not enough: Bacich v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1992) 29 NSWLR 1, at 16; Deputy Commission of Taxation v Rettke (1995) 31 IPR 457, at 464; Grofam Pty Ltd v KPMG Peat Marwick (1993) 27 IPR 215 at 219-220, 222. 201 In Castrol Australia Pty Ltd v Emtech Associates Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 31, at 52, Rath J, in rejecting a submission that the Trade Practices Commission should be able to use a particular confidential report for the purpose of investigating possible breaches of the Trade Practices Act , said (at 52): “There is accordingly no evidence before the court of a breach of section 53(c). So far as section 55 is concerned, it may be necessary for the prosecution to prove mens rea. I do not decide this point; it is enough in my view at the interlocutory stage that such proof may be necessary. Even if I am wrong in this view, there is still the possibility of a defence on reasonable mistake, or reasonable reliance on information supplied by another person, under section 85(1). Until such a possibility is negatived, or at least shown to be unlikely, I think the court should reject the submission that on the evidence as it now stands there is a prima facie case of an offence under the Trade Practices Act . For similar reasons I do not think that there is such a likelihood of relief being granted in respect of a breach of section 52(1) as to justify the withdrawal of this courts protection of a confidence that has been established on undisputed evidence with reasonable clarity. I do not mean to suggest that if the evidence had shown a breach by the plaintiff of the Trade Practices Act this of itself would excuse the Commission from its obligation of confidence. All I am saying is that the evidence does not show such a breach , with the result that, whatever the position might otherwise have been, the Commission is not excused from its obligation of confidence on this ground.” 202 Castrol v Emtech concerned an interlocutory injunction, so somewhat different considerations applied concerning the standard of proof required, to those which apply in the present hearing, which is a final hearing. Even so, the decision is consistent with the view that a prima facie case of iniquity must be made out before the Gartside v Outram principle becomes applicable. 203 In the present case, it is clear that the applicants in the Federal Court proceedings allege negligence, and misleading and deceptive conduct. The objective facts, about how the Part B statement gave no warning of any imminent financial disaster, and of the times at which GIO made announcements to the stock exchange, are clear. However, I am not satisfied that there has been demonstrated any case, even at the prima facie level, that there has actually been negligence, or misleading and deceptive conduct. The evidence establishes nothing more than allegations of negligence, and of misleading and deceptive conduct. How does the Material, Disclosure of which is Unsuccessfully Sought to be Restrained, Relate to any Iniquity? 204 There is a further problem about the interrelationship between the information which Mr Burton has provided to MBC, and any negligent and misleading and deceptive conduct of GIO. The cases where the “iniquity” rule has been invoked have been ones where the information sought to be kept confidential was information that crimes, or other serious anti-social activities which fell within the description of “iniquity,” had been committed. In Gartside v Outram itself the plaintiff sought to restrain their former clerk from copying documents and communicating information. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiffs carried on business in a way which defrauded their customers by creating false business records, and that the defendant had made no disclosures except of these fraudulent transactions. It was in this context that Wood VC said (26 LJ Ch (NS) 113 at 114: “The equity upon which the Bill is founded is a perfectly plain and simple one … by which any person standing in the confidential relation of a clerk or servant is prohibited, subject to certain exceptions, from disclosing any part of the transactions of which he thus acquires knowledge. But there are exceptions to this confidence or perhaps, rather only nominally, and not really exceptions. The true doctrine is, that there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity. You can not make me the confidant of a crime or a fraud, and be entitled to close up my lips upon any secret which you have the audacity to disclose to me relating to any fraudulent intention on your part: such a confidence cannot exist.” 205 Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396 concerned an action where plaintiffs had commenced proceedings claiming an injunction, damages and delivery up of confidential papers, which (it was alleged) the defendant had disclosed in breach of an implied term of his contract of service. The defendant filed a defence which alleged that the plaintiffs were engaged in a price fixing agreement contrary to the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 , and had issue a misleading circular saying that increased charges were mainly to offset a particular tax. As the case concerned only what was an arguable defence, its precedent value is limited. However, the remarks of Lord Denning MR at 405 are to the effect that there can be no confidence which prevents an employee disclosing: “… the proposed or contemplated commission of a crime or a civil wrong. But I should have thought that was too limited. The exception should extend to crimes, frauds and misdeeds, both those actually committed as well as those in contemplation, provided always – and this is essential – that the disclosure is justified in the public interest. The reason is because “no private obligations can dispense with that universal one which lies on every member of the society to discover every design which may be formed, contrary to the laws of the society, to destroy the public welfare”: See Annesley v Anglesea (Earl) (1743) LR 5 QB 317n; 17 State Tr 1139. The disclosure must, I should think, be to one who has a proper interest to receive the information. Thus it would be proper to disclose a crime to the police; or a breach of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act to the registrar. There may be cases where the misdeed is of such a character that the public interest may demand, or at least excuse, publication on a broader field, even to the press. 206 Likewise, Ungoed-Thomas J in Beloff v Pressdram Ltd (quoted above at paragraph 182) suggested that what must be disclosed is itself the iniquity. In Allied Mills Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 34 ALR 105 Sheppard J gave effect to the “iniquity” principle in circumstances where the information in which his Honour held no confidence existed was information which itself disclosed the iniquity – see paragraph 186 above. 207 In the present case, Mr Burton and MBC have chosen to conduct their case by not tendering the draft statement of Mr Burton. Mr Murphy regards him as a material witness in the case. However, the evidence does not let me decide whether his materiality lies in the fact that his evidence itself discloses that GIO engaged in negligent conduct, or misleading and deceptive conduct, or whether his evidence provides more general information about the re-insurance business of GIO. That nothing contained in the lengthy statement of Mr Burton led to any amendment of the statement of claim suggests that the latter alternative is at least a realistically possible one. 208 It would, in my view, be extending the law to decide that, even in the exclusive jurisdiction of equity, the protection of confidence did not extend to information which was relevant to an allegation of iniquity, though not itself disclosing that iniquity. 209 This provides an additional reason, in my view, why, even if the principle that there is no confidence to protect an iniquity had application in the present case, where an express obligation of confidence is sought to be enforced, that principle is not shown to apply to the facts of the present case. 210 I had earlier (in paragraph 128 above) left open the possibility that section 183 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) might not apply in situations where the nature of the information sought to be disclosed was such that a former employee was not acting “improperly” in disclosing it. Assuming that that view of section 183 is correct, the foregoing discussion of how the “no confidence in an iniquity” principle would apply in the present circumstances, if there were no contractual obligation, shows that there is no reason to believe that any such exception implicit in section 183 applies in the present case. Discretionary Considerations 211 Mr Burton and MBC rely on the following factors as reasons why the court should, in the exercise of its discretion, decline relief. (a) The relief sought would have the consequence of suppressing evidence of GIO’s wrongdoing and that of its former directors. The unclean hands doctrine applies. (b) The high public interest in the administration of justice, and the potential delay or prejudice to the Federal Court proceedings which would occur if Mr Burton’s statement could not be used. (c) Except to the extent that the information is ultimately disseminated in open court, the confidentiality of the information will be maintained by the undertaking which Mr Murphy has proffered. (d) It would be futile to grant the relief sought, because Mr Burton can be the subject of a subpoena issued by the Federal Court requiring him to give evidence and truthfully answer questions put to him in the very areas which might have been and may in future be covered by discussions between MBC and Mr Burton. (e) The evidence of any damage or prejudice to GIO resulting from the breach or apprehended breach of the proposed confidentiality undertaking is weak, and can be adequately covered by confidentiality undertakings which will be sought by MBC from any experts to whom information obtained from Mr Burton is conveyed. (f) Equity should not lend its aid to GIO so as to enforce its alleged rights against persons who, at the time the relevant events occurred, were shareholders in GIO. GIO’s enforcement of its contractual right would be a technical and unmeritorious reliance on the doctrine of separate legal personality. 212 Any defence of unclean hands requires that the defendant prove that the plaintiff’s hands, are, in the relevant sense, unclean. In the present case, that would require proof, not mere allegation, that GIO has engaged in conduct which disentitles it to claim equity’s protection to protect its confidences. For reasons which I have given earlier, the defendant has not proved that GIO has engaged in such conduct. 213 If the plaintiff is otherwise entitled to an injunction, I would not regard the fact that the grant of that injunction might cause delay or prejudice to the Federal Court proceedings as a sufficient reason for refusing it. While there is no denying that the public interest in the administration of justice is a high one, if the contract sought to be enforced is not itself void or unenforceable by reason of public policy, and if a defence of unclean hands has not been made out, I can see no other head of principle under which the public interest in the administration of justice can be taken into account in deciding whether or not to grant an injunction. 214 Here, MBC has received confidential information of the plaintiff, in circumstances where it understood that there was a contractual obligation on Mr Burton forbidding him from disclosing confidential information. MBC thought that it was excused from that contractual obligation because it intended to use the information for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of litigation. In so thinking, MBC was mistaken. Solicitors sitting in their offices do not have the power to relieve people from, or override, contractual obligations of confidence, merely because they wish to obtain information to use in litigation. If an employee is bound to attend at his employer’s premises between 9:00 am and 5:00 pm, it is not open to a solicitor to say “You need not adhere to your contract, because I need to see you to obtain information from you to use in litigation.” In the same way, the fact that a solicitor wishes to obtain information from an employee, or former employee, for use in litigation, does not relieve that employee, or former employee, from a valid contractual obligation of confidence. 215 Now that Mr Burton has talked with MBC, and provided a draft statement, MBC is in the situation where it has information which it should never have had. Conscionable behaviour on its part requires that it give up the information it should not have had, and not, in the future, obtain any benefit from having once had that information. Approaching the remedy in that way is in accordance with the principle whereby: “… a person who has obtained information in confidence is not allowed to use it as a springboard for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential communication.” ( Terrapin Ltd v Builders’ Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375 at 391) 216 Approaching the remedy in that way does not prevent any of the information which Mr Burton has from being used in the Federal Court proceedings, if it is obtained in accordance with the ordinary procedures of the Federal Court, and if MBC are disentitled from using the information that they never should have had to assist them in better seeking out information and documents from Mr Burton, using those procedures. 217 When MBC has taken active steps to persuade Mr Burton to disclose the confidential information, has recognised, from the time of the first meeting between Mr Murphy and Mr Burton that the information he was disclosing was confidential, has provided an indemnity to Mr Burton against any liability arising out of his provision of the confidential information to MBC, it was at all times taking the risk that its receipt of the information might be wrongful. It is not in accordance with the principles on which equity grants remedies that MBC, and the people for whom MBC acts in the Federal Court proceedings, might be delayed or inconvenienced if MBC were to be put back into the situation it should have been in, if there had been no breach of Mr Burton’s contractual obligations. It is quite clear that damages are not an adequate remedy for the breach of contract which has taken place, nor for the future breaches of contract which are likely, if an injunction is not granted, to take place. 218 The arguments that GIO ought not receive an injunction, because Mr Burton can be required to give all the information contained in his statement (and whatever else he might have told MBC) under subpoena, and until that happens the confidentiality undertakings can protect the information, is not an argument I find persuasive. Mr Burton is in breach of his contract, and MBC is, at least after absorbing this judgment, knowingly in receipt of the fruits of that breach of contract. It is not in accordance with equity’s approach in giving remedies to allow the wrongdoer to retain the fruits of wrongdoing, on the ground that the plaintiff will not thereby be any worse off, unless it is very clearly the case that the granting of relief would be futile. ( Grocott v Aysom [1975] 2 NZLR 586 at 589 per Cooke J; Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 at 735 per McGechan J) 219 It is not as though the defendants are incapable of complying with the injunction ( Wookey v Wookey [1991] Fam 121; Vincent v Peacock [1973] 1 NSWLR 466 at 468), or that there are no means of enforcing the injunction if the defendants were to choose to disobey it ( In Re S (a minor) [1991] Fam 121). Rather, there is every reason to believe that if an injunction were to be issued, it would be obeyed. I am not satisfied that it is inevitable that the granting of relief would be futile. Until such time as any information which Mr Burton has is obtained, in accordance with the procedures of the Federal Court, GIO is entitled to have that information kept confidential. Nor is it inevitable that all the information which Mr Burton has, to which the obligation of confidentiality attaches, will become disclosed through procedures of the Federal Court. The Federal Court proceedings are large and complicated litigation, and the trial of them is some time off. I know nothing about the state of Mr Burton’s health, or his intentions about remaining in Australia. (He was recruited by GIO from England.) I cannot say that it is impossible that the Federal Court proceedings will settle before trial, or at least before Mr Burton has concluded giving evidence in them. 220 The fact that there is little risk that GIO would be prejudiced by disclosure of its confidential information, in breach of the confidentiality undertaking which MBC proffer, is not to the point. The damage or prejudice which GIO will suffer in the present case if an injunction is not granted, is the loss of the opportunity of having the Federal Court proceedings tried in accordance with the law, and meaning by that tried using evidence, obtained through procedures, which are in accordance with the law. In Sullivan v Sclanders (2000) 77 SASR 419 the South Australian Full Court made orders to ensure that Sclanders could receive no benefit, in the litigation, from what amounted to stolen information. Gray J said, at 431,: “That is not to say that the material, or much of it, may not be discoverable in due course in regard to the causes of action identified by the plaintiffs. That is a different issue. The truth will be ascertained by the process of discovery, and production. The admissibility of relevant material will be addressed at trial. … It has been suggested that, as the documents are likely to be discoverable in any event, nothing is achieved by granting relief. I do not agree. The plaintiffs should not be advantaged by what has occurred. The plaintiffs offered, in lieu of a stay, to amend the statement of claim if the appeal were to succeed. However, this would lead to considerable debate as to what part of the statement of claim reflected the document or its contents. A more effective approach to minimise any unfair advantage is to strike out the entire statement of claim. The plaintiffs should be at liberty to deliver a fresh statement of claim without either directly or indirectly making use of the confidential documents or their contents. In my view, if these steps are not taken equity will not be done.” 221 Williams J said, at 420: “In taking instructions for a fresh statement of claim it may be prudent for anyone who is aware of the contents of the confidential documents are who has been associated with the drafting of the original statement of claim to consider the possibility of embarrassment. Whether a change of solicitors is necessary may depend upon the precise scope of the intended further instructions – which must then be given and taken without any reliance upon the confidential material. The plaintiffs themselves and their advisers must understand the very considerable difficulties which they may face by reason of the knowledge which they have acquired. If constructed, Chinese walls may not have firm foundations.” That approach to the granting of a remedy seems to me to be appropriate in this case. 222 The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Lord Ashburton v Pape , which had the effect that the surreptitiously obtained material could not be used at all in the bankruptcy court, illustrates how it is within the scope of the way in which an equity court will enforce an obligation of confidence, to ensure that no advantage is obtained in litigation from the breach of confidence. 223 I see no reason of principle why it is a discretionary reason to deny the injunction that the plaintiffs in the Federal Court proceedings were once shareholders in GIO. In any listed company, shareholders come and go. The duty of confidentiality was owed to the company, not the shareholders. There is no power in the shareholders, or in any sub-group of shareholders or former shareholders, to decide that a company should not enforce its contract. Further, the class represented by the plaintiff in the Federal Court proceedings is a minority of the people who were, during the period that the Part B statement was current, shareholders of GIO. I see no basis on which, even if the present defendants can speak for the whole of that minority of shareholders (a matter about which I am not satisfied) that provides any reason for treating any differently the rights of the company as a whole. Can MBC be Injuncted? 224 In G v Day [1982] 1 NSWLR 24 Yeldham J considered a situation where a person had provided some information to the Corporate Affairs Commission on the express term that his name not be disclosed. A newspaper proposed to name him as being the provider of information to the Corporate Affairs Commission. Yeldham J granted an injunction against the newspaper disclosing his name, saying (at 35): “In the present case it is plain that the plaintiff initially made it apparent to the persons to whom he divulged what he claimed to have seen that, by reason of the fears which he entertained, he would only proffer such information if his identity was not disclosed. That this was his attitude and that he received assurances that his anonymity would be preserved was, and certainly now is, known to the first and second defendants, who were not, of course, parties to the original conversations. But whether or not they were aware of these matters, they are liable in an appropriate case to be restrained from publishing what is confidential information, even if they initially received it in good faith.” 225 In Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680, at 690 Goff J considered a situation where the Board of Trade were handed, by mistake, a copy of a letter which had been written to the plaintiff by his solicitor, and which was consequently privileged. The Board of Trade proposed to use that letter as evidence in some criminal proceedings against the plaintiff. On the way to his ultimate conclusion, Goff J said, at 690: “In the present case there was not impropriety on the part of the defendants in the way in which they received the copy, but that, in my judgment, is irrelevant because an innocent recipient of information conveyed in breach of confidence is liable to be restrained.” 226 In Wheatley v Bell [1982] 2 NSWLR 544 Helsham CJ in Eq deal with a situation where the first defendant had received confidential information from the plaintiff concerning a novel type of business activity. The first defendant sub-licensed the right to operate such a business to two people, who knew nothing about the concept being obtained by the first defendant in breach of confidence. Even so, Helsham CJ granted injunctions against those people. His Honour said, at 549: “The other defendants, in effect, claim that they are persons who should be likened to bona fide purchasers for value without notice. It is said that persons in that position are, in this field of confidentiality, free to make use of information which has come to them innocently; that they are in no way tainted with the breach of trust or quasi breach of trust that effects the person from who they obtained the information, and that, therefore, there is no equity in the plaintiffs to obtain any relief of any sort against the innocent recipients of information, albeit that it comes through the hands of a person who is guilty of imparting it in breach of the duty of confidentiality that that imparter owes to the giver of the information. I am satisfied that the analogy which has been drawn in some of the American cases and by some of the text writers, of the situation of the innocent defendants to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, is not the correct way of approaching the question of whether the injunction should go in the present circumstances or not. The defence of bona fide purchaser for value is an equitable defence directed towards the resolution of priorities in relation to property rights. It is an attempt to sort out amongst the claimants interest in property the order in which their respective interest should prevail. But I believe that there are no property rights associated with the type of equity involved here; it is equity to restrain a person acting in breach of confidence which is owed to another …” See also Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] 1 QB 670 at 685 proposition “third” ; English & American Insurance Co Ltd v Herbert Smith (1987) 14 FSR 232 at 238. 227 This line of authority provides a sufficient ground for an injunction against MBC. As well, however, the plaintiff sought an injunction against MBC on the basis that MBC had committed the tort of inducing breach of contract. 228 In Short v City Bank of Sydney (1912) 15 CLR 148, at 160 Isaacs J said that for a defendant to have committed the tort of inducing breach of contract: “… the defendant must have induced or procured the doing of what he knew would be a breach of contract. A bona fide belief reasonably entertained that it was not a breach of contract would be fatal to the claim. If the defendant did not know of the existence of the contract, he could not induce its breach; if he reasonably believed it did not require a certain act to be performed, his inducing a party to the contract to do something inconsistent with it could not be regarded as an inducement or procurement knowingly to break the contract; if he believed on reasonable grounds that the contract had been rescinded, or performance waived, when in fact it had not, he could not be said to knowingly procure its breach.” 229 In Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 27 NSWLR 473, the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA) quoted this passage, at 509, and continued: “In summary, the defendant must know of the contract and sufficient of its terms to know that what the defendant induced or procured the party to the contract to do would be in breach of the contract. If the defendant knew of the existence of the contract but believed reasonably that what the defendant induced or procured the party to do was not a breach, or reasonably believed that the contract had been rescinded or performance waived, the defendant had not knowingly induced or procured the breach.” 230 In the present case, no suggestion was made that Mr Murphy was anything other than bona fide in forming the view that Mr Burton would not be acting in breach of contract by disclosing confidential information to Mr Murphy. However, Mr Murphy had no reasonable basis for this view. He conducted no research which led him to the conclusion that the view was correct. Mr Murphy’s cross-examination contained the following: “Q. Do you accept that in light of what you have described concerning your legal opinion about the propriety of disclosures being sought by you and given by Mr Burton of matters you concede should otherwise be confidential displays, that so far as you were concerned it never mattered what the content of his equitable obligation was or the particular terms of any contractual obligation were because in your view if you wanted to speak to him as a potentially useful witness you could? Do you accept that? A. Yes. Q. Which meant that any detailed consideration of or view about the contractual obligations was to your mind irrelevant, is that right? A. Unnecessary. Q. And thus irrelevant in your progress as a litigator, is that right? A. Yes. Q. You accept, do you not, that in that attitude of yours you were knowingly taking the risk that by inviting his disclosures you were inviting a breach of contract, do you agree with that? A. No, I don’t believe that I was taking a risk of a breach of contract because I believed he is entitled to make a witness statement to me. Q. You are not suggesting, are you, that you have such a confidence in your opinion that the possibility of it being wrong never crossed your mind? A. No. Q. So you were taking a risk that it was right? A. I believe my opinion was right. Q. But you were taking a risk about whether it was right? A. Yes.” 231 Mr Murphy explained the evidence which I have set out in paragraph 30 above: “Q. And it remains the case that throughout your supposed taking into account of Mr Burton’s equitable and employment obligations you personally had no case law or statute law in mind making good the view based on propositions a, b and c? A. Me personally, that’s correct. I have taken advice at various points from members of the Bar who no doubt had a better grasp of it than I.” 232 The nature of the advice that was given by members of the Bar, the instructions on the basis of which it was given, and the time at which it was given, were not further explained. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the taking of that advice turned Mr Murphy’s initially unreasonable view into a reasonable one. In these circumstance, in my view, an injunction against MBC is also justified on the grounds of the tort of inducing breach of contract. Form of Order 233 Mr Burnside QC tells me, and I accept, that there is an obligation on Victorian legal practitioners to maintain their files for seven years. That will need to be taken into account, in deciding the form of order appropriate in the present case. 234 There has been no argument about the precise form of orders which are appropriate. I propose to make orders in the form which seem to me to be appropriate, uninstructed by argument, but to order that those orders not be entered until after 10 days from the date of this judgment. If, within seven days of the date of this judgment, either party seeks to have the matter re-listed for the purpose of argument about the form of orders, I shall extend the order that the orders not be entered until a suitable time for that argument to take place, and shall give consideration to whether the orders ought be revoked or modified in any way. The orders are made by reference to the Further Amended Summons, the text of which is set out at paragraph 52 above. 235 The orders I make are: 1. Orders 1 in the Further Amended Summons, with the addition at the end of, “or as otherwise required by law” . 2. Orders 2, 5 and 6 in the Further Amended Summons. 3. Order 4 in the Further Amended Summons, save that the words “deliver to the Court” are deleted and replaced with the words, “identify, place in sealed containers, each container prominently marked ‘ by order of the Supreme Court of New South Wales not to be opened without the order of the Court or the Federal Court of Australia’, store at a location away from any office at which work is carried out relating to proceedings number N955 of 1999 in the Federal Court of Australia, and not open any such container without an order of this Court or the Federal Court of Australia.” 4. Defendants to pay costs of the plaintiff. 5. These orders not to be entered until 10 days after the delivery of these reasons for judgment.