Bhatia v State of New South Wales

These proceedings were commenced by the plaintiff filing a statement of claim on 24 July 2023. The plaintiff is self-represented. Both defendants now apply for orders that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) on the ground that there is no reasonable cause of action disclosed in the plaintiff's statement of claim and the proceedings are an abuse of process and/or frivolous or vexatious. The second defendant filed its notice of motion on 6 October 2023 and the first defendant seeks an order to the same effect.

The first defendant is named on the statement of claim as “Department of Sports”. In connection with his claim, the plaintiff has corresponded by email with personnel in the New South Wales Office of Sport, which is an agency of the New South Wales government within the Department of Trade and Industry. It is apparently the plaintiff's intention to have brought this proceeding against the department or agency of the government that has responsibility for making grants to fund sporting activities. The correct defendant would be the State of New South Wales in accordance with section 5 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1988 (NSW).

I will make an order that the name of the first defendant be changed to the State of New South Wales. The second defendant is the Australian Sports Commission. That is a body corporate established by s 5 of the Australian Sports Commission Act 1989 (Cth). The Australian Sports Commission is capable of being sued as a body corporate in its corporate name. The statutory objects of the establishment of the Commission, as provided for in s 6 of the Act, include the following:

The statement of claim contains the following, under heading that are part of the form prescribed under the UCPR:

I have reviewed the content at the web address provided under the heading of Pleadings and Particulars. It does not actually contain any pleading or particulars. The web page at the given address consists of a series of video recordings of the plaintiff training with weights in a well‑equipped gymnasium. The videos display the plaintiff’s progress through training sessions on successive days over a time interval that is not made clear. Each video depicts the plaintiff performing between 20 and 30 repetitions of what I would describe as semi‑squats, in which the bar is held across the plaintiff's shoulders behind his head, and he lowers his body until his thighs are at 45 degrees to the gymnasium floor. The weight is increased from one video recording to the next, commencing at 130 kilograms and reaching to 200 kilograms in the final video of the sequence. That final video shows the plaintiff not only performing semi‑squats but also deadlifts and then four sets each of horizontal partial bench presses and incline partial bench presses, in each case with the bar lowered about halfway to the chest.

What I have quoted from the statement of claim is the entire substantive content of it. There is no cause of action disclosed either in the statement of claim or by reference to the plaintiff's website of training videos. In answer to the defendants’ summary dismissal application the plaintiff has not tendered, or submitted to the Court, anything that discloses a legal basis upon which he could claim that he has an enforceable right against either of the defendants to $75 million or any other sum, either as a liquidated amount or as damages for breach of any obligation owed to him, in contract, in tort, under public law or otherwise.

The defendants have tendered email correspondence from the plaintiff addressed to their administrative personnel and legal representatives. I have reviewed the correspondence to see whether the plaintiff may have some justiciable grievance that has failed to come through in the manner in which he has drafted the Court process. Bearing in mind the plaintiff’s self‑represented status, it is incumbent on the Court to try to ascertain from his extra curial communications whether he has a legitimate or at least arguable claim that that he is unable adequately to express in legal terminology for want of professional training.

However, no arguable claim appears from the email correspondence. The plaintiff seems to have formed a belief that State and Commonwealth funds are liberally dispersed to people who pursue private sporting endeavours and that as a person with a sporting interest he has an enforceable entitlement to some part of this largesse. On 19 September 2023, he wrote to the Court’s registry mailbox an email in the following terms:

On 20 September 2023 at 3.41pm, the plaintiff wrote to the solicitor for the second defendant as follows:

The solicitor for the second defendant replied at 5.18pm the same day in an email that included the following:

The plaintiff wrote further in response to this at 5.44pm on 20 September 2023 as follows:

That appears to be the full extent of the correspondence from which the Court could try to ascertain the existence of any cause of action. None is revealed. The solicitor for the second respondent was quite correct to state that this Court is not an appropriate forum for the plaintiff to seek a grant for funding. The correspondence makes clear to the plaintiff that any funding from the second defendant is subject to a grant, which would be in the discretion of the relevant government agencies and that he would need to make an application for a grant in order to be considered.

There is no legal of factual basis for these proceedings having been brought. In my view, the claims of both defendants that the process as filed does not disclose any reasonable cause of action is correct. It is also correct to say that in their insubstantial form the proceedings are an abuse of process and frivolous and vexatious.

Accordingly, I make the following orders: