Patsalis v Local Court of NSW

1. [1]

   On 2 July 2021, the plaintiff, Michael Patsalis, filed a Summons seeking leave to appeal from a decision of Abdul-Karim LCM, in criminal proceedings which were then before the Local Court of NSW.

2. [2]

   On 10 February 2022, the plaintiff was granted leave to file, and proceed upon, a Second Further Amended Summons which had been orally varied by that time.

3. [3]

   For the reasons which follow, I would not grant leave to the plaintiff to appeal, and I would dismiss the Summons.

Summary of Background

1. [4]

   Mr Patsalis is charged with a number of criminal offences which are listed for trial in the Local Court on 2 May 2022.

2. [5]

   On 30 November 2020, on Mr Patsalis’ application, the Local Court issued a subpoena for the production of documents to Mr Boucas, who is the principal victim of the offences alleged against Mr Patsalis, and who complained to the Police.

3. [6]

   The subpoena originally required the production of 10 different categories of documents.

4. [7]

   Mr Boucas engaged a solicitor who corresponded with the Local Court and Mr Patsalis about the subpoena. In the course of that correspondence, on 2 February 2021, by email and on 3 February 2021 in written submissions, Mr Patsalis provided Mr Boucas with amended versions of the categories of documents required to be produced by the subpoena.

5. [8]

   On 4 February 2021, Mr Boucas, through his solicitor, made an oral application in the Local Court to have the subpoena set aside.

6. [9]

   Mr Boucas’ application was not resolved on 4 February 2021. There is some suggestion that the Magistrate reserved his decision on that date.

7. [10]

   In any event, the matter came before his Honour again on 9 June 2021, on which occasion Mr Patsalis made further submissions opposing the application to set aside the subpoena. Neither Mr Boucas nor his solicitor appeared on that occasion.

8. [11]

   As a result of decisions made that day by Abdul-Karim LCM about other subpoenas, Mr Patsalis ultimately pressed for the production by Mr Boucas of only two categories of documents.

9. [12]

   On 9 June 2021, Abdul-Karim LCM made orders, for which his Honour gave ex tempore reasons, setting aside paragraphs 5 and 7 of the subpoena which were the two categories of documents pressed by Mr Patsalis.

Charges in the Local Court

1. [13]

   Mr Patsalis is charged with:

   1. (1)

      six counts of dishonestly obtaining financial advantage or causing disadvantage by deception contrary to s 192E(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW);

   2. (2)

      one count of impersonating a police officer with intent to deceive and purporting to exercise powers and functions contrary to s 546D(2) of the Crimes Act; and

   3. (3)

      one count of impersonating a police officer contrary to s 546D(1) of the Crimes Act.

2. [14]

   Mr Patsalis has entered pleas of not guilty in respect of each count.

3. [15]

   Mr Boucas is the principal victim of the offences alleged against Mr Patsalis. Mr Boucas is proposed to be a Crown witness at the hearing of the charges, which is due to commence on 2 May 2022.

4. [16]

   The Crown’s case against Mr Patsalis is that he approached Mr Boucas at some stage in 2020 and, by deception, procured from Mr Boucas payments totalling $19,200. Mr Boucas was deceived because:

   1. (1)

      in relation to some of the money paid, Mr Boucas thought he was loaning Mr Patsalis money to pay medical bills for Mr Patsalis’ treatment of stomach cancer, which condition was a fiction; and

   2. (2)

      in relation to other money paid, Mr Boucas thought he was paying Mr Patsalis, who was pretending to be a police officer, to settle tax debts which Mr Patsalis claimed Mr Boucas owed to the Australian Taxation Office.

5. [17]

   Mr Patsalis’ case at the hearing will be to deny the charges and instead allege that Mr Boucas first approached Mr Patsalis. Mr Patsalis claims that Mr Boucas made “full confessions” to Mr Patsalis that Mr Boucas had committed serious tax offences which amounted to tax fraud.

6. [18]

   In the context of Mr Patsalis’ application for the issue of the subpoena the subject of this application, Mr Patsalis says Mr Boucas’ bank records, business records and tax records will prove the fact that Mr Boucas committed tax fraud.

7. [19]

   At the hearing in the Local Court on 9 June 2021, the Magistrate proceeded on the basis:

   1. (1)

      of the facts broadly summarised above and as they appear in the police statement of facts; and

   2. (2)

      that Mr Patsalis was seeking access to the material to impugn the credit of Mr Boucas at the defended hearing.

The Subpoena the Subject of this Application

1. [20]

   As noted earlier, the subpoena originally required the production of 10 categories of documents. For reasons which will be explained, Mr Patsalis presses only for the production of the documents required by paragraphs 5 and 7 of the subpoena.

2. [21]

   It is therefore not necessary to record the entire contents of the subpoena issued on Mr Boucas. However, for the purpose of establishing the context of this application, the following may be observed about the categories of documents required to be produced by the subpoena.

3. [22]

   Paragraphs 1 and 2 required all communications between Mr Boucas and H&R Block, Fairfield, a firm of tax accountants.

4. [23]

   Paragraph 3 required all of Mr Boucas’ communications and records regarding an accident involving Mr Boucas on 1 July 2020.

5. [24]

   Paragraph 4 required all communications from Transdev, a public transport company, to Mr Boucas about Mr Boucas’ accident (as described in paragraph 3), and “all associated records”.

6. [25]

   Paragraph 5, as amended by Mr Patsalis’ submissions in the Local Court dated 3 February 2021, requires, essentially, all records of Mr Boucas’ business, Mosaicon, relating to: the sale of religious icons; the teaching of painting courses; and the painting of church murals. It reads, in full:

7. [26]

   Mr Patsalis in his submissions to this Court dated 29 December 2021, has sought to amend paragraph 5 so that it would only require the production of documents which are dated between 2011 to 2020.

8. [27]

   Paragraph 6 purportedly requires all of Mr Boucas’ communications ever, although it may be suggested that the paragraph only requires all of Mr Boucas’ communications regarding his role as the current facilitator of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese Book Centre in Redfern.

9. [28]

   Paragraph 7, as amended by Mr Patsalis’ email of 2 February 2021, requires: all Mr Boucas’ income tax records between 2011 and 2020; and contact details for Mr Boucas’ tax agents in that period. It reads, in full:

10. [29]

    Paragraph 8 requires Mr Boucas’ phone call records for 1, 5 and 22 to 25 July 2020. Paragraph 9 requires all bank records. Finally, paragraph 10 requires all documents relating to Mr Boucas’ care for his mother. The paragraph purports to require production by both Mr Boucas and Mr Boucas’ mother.

11. [30]

    On 9 June 2021, before Abdul-Karim LCM, Mr Patsalis only pressed for the production of documents required by paragraphs 5 and 7 of the subpoena.

12. [31]

    On the same day, Mr Patsalis was granted access to inspect H&R Block records, Commonwealth Bank records and Transdev records, which were produced in response to other subpoenas issued on those organisations.

13. [32]

    On the basis that Mr Patsalis was given access to the H&R Block records, Mr Patsalis abandoned his call on paragraphs 1 and 2. On the basis that Mr Patsalis was given access to the Transdev records, Mr Patsalis abandoned his call on paragraphs 3 and 4.

14. [33]

    It is not clear why Mr Patsalis did not press for the production of documents required by the remainder of the subpoena.

15. [34]

    Nevertheless, it seems that the only paragraphs that remain in dispute are paragraphs 5 and 7.

16. [35]

    Mr Boucas has never produced any document in response to the subpoena issued to him.

The Local Court’s Reasons

1. [36]

   On 9 June 2021, the Magistrate, having dealt with the other subpoenas referred to, delivered ex tempore reasons for his decision to set aside paragraphs 5 and 7 of the subpoena. Given the length of the transcript, it is useful to set those reasons out in full here:

Second Further Amended Summons

1. [37]

   It is convenient to set out the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff in his Second Further Amended Summons. They are as follows:

Parties

1. [38]

   There are three named defendants to these proceedings: the Local Court; Mr Graeme Kilgour, the police prosecutor in the Local Court; and Mr Boucas. They have each filed a submitting appearance.

2. [39]

   On 27 October 2021, the Attorney-General filed a Notice of Motion seeking leave pursuant to s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) to intervene in the proceedings and be joined as the fourth defendant pursuant to r 6.27 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).

3. [40]

   On 10 December 2021, a Registrar of this Court granted, by consent, the orders sought by the Attorney-General in his Notice of Motion.

Issues to be Resolved

1. [41]

   In summary, it is necessary to resolve the following issues:

   1. (1)

      Does this Court have jurisdiction under the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) to hear Mr Patsalis’ application for leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, Mr Patsalis’ appeal? This requires an assessment of whether Mr Patsalis’ appeal is on a ground that involves, or grounds that involve, a question of law alone.

   2. (2)

      Should leave be granted to Mr Patsalis to appeal the impugned decision of the Local Court to set aside the subpoena to Mr Boucas?

   3. (3)

      If leave is granted, should Mr Patsalis’ appeal be upheld? This requires an assessment of whether the subpoena has a legitimate forensic purpose and, if so, whether the subpoena is oppressive or is otherwise an abuse of process.

Jurisdiction

1. [42]

   Mr Patsalis appeals to this Court under s 53(3)(b) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, which relevantly provides:

2. [43]

   Mr Patsalis must show that his appeal involves a question of law alone.

3. [44]

   There is a question of law alone if the question of law can be stated and considered separately from the facts to which it may be connected in a given case: Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; [1986] HCA 88 at 287; Franklin v Commissioner of Police [2018] NSWSC 310 at [19].

4. [45]

   Questions concerning any application of correct legal principle to the facts of a case are questions of mixed fact and law: R v PL [2009] NSWCCA 256; 261 ALR 365 at [26]. A “question of law alone” does not extend to an error of mixed fact and law: Carlton v R [2008] NSWCCA 244; 189 A Crim R 332 at [10].

5. [46]

   It is appropriate first to consider whether the Grounds now raised by the plaintiff in the Second Further Amended Summons are “questions of law alone”.

6. [47]

   Care must be taken in considering grounds of appeal such as those set out in the Second Further Amended Summons because, often, the framing of a question does not obviously or self-evidently identify a question of law. Bathurst CJ and Bell P in Orr v Cobar Management Pty Limited (2020) 103 NSWLR 36; [2020] NSWCCA 220 considered this issue. At [58] ff, the Chief Justice and the President said:

7. [48]

   In addition to demonstrating that the appeal is based on a question of law alone, a plaintiff must also persuade the Court that leave to appeal ought be granted.

8. [49]

   Leave from interlocutory decisions such as this, involving matters of practice and procedure, should not readily be granted, save for cases where it can be demonstrated that an error has caused an injustice: Fantakis v Local Court of New South Wales [2020] NSWSC 931 at [24] referring to NAR v PPC1 [2013] NSWCCA 25; 224 A Crim R 535 (“NAR”) at 539-540, [17] and PPC v Williams [2013] NSWSC 1607; 238 A Crim R 25 (“PPC”) at 35, [52]; see also Queanbeyan City Council v Environment Protection Authority [2011] NSWCCA 108 at [25].

9. [50]

   In NAR, Beech-Jones J (as his Honour then was) said, at [18]:

10. [51]

    In PPC, Gleeson JA said, at [51]:

11. [52]

    Mr Patsalis submits that leave should be granted because he “has demonstrated… 5 errors of law” and that there is “significant merit in the appeal”. Mr Patsalis further submits that there has been a “grave injustice… to [him]” and that if leave is refused “a further grave injustice will occur”.

12. [53]

    Mr Patsalis further submits that the appeal would “not interfere with the continued prosecution of [him] in the Local Court because the trial does not commence until 2 May 2022”.

13. [54]

    Finally, Mr Patsalis submits that ground 6 “raises an important question which warrants leave being granted”.

14. [55]

    The Attorney-General submits that Mr Patsalis has failed to justify why there should be a grant of leave.

15. [56]

    The Attorney-General submits that Mr Patsalis’ submissions as to the merits of his appeal are based on generalised statements of principle and do not properly go to the question of whether leave ought be granted in this particular case. The Attorney-General also submits that Mr Patsalis has failed to identify any authority for his submission that the grant of leave is “arguably stronger” where the appeal is brought prior to the commencement of the criminal trial.

16. [57]

    The Attorney-General further submits that:

    1. (1)

       the underlying merits of the appeal are weak;

    2. (2)

       the Local Court’s decision has caused no injustice to Mr Patsalis;

    3. (3)

       the present appeal does not raise any “important question” to be resolved, as contemplated by Gleeson JA in PPC; and

    4. (4)

       it is in the interests of justice more broadly that this Court refuse to entertain substantively unmeritorious leave applications.

17. [58]

    The Attorney-General also refers to my decision in Feeney v NSW Police [2017] NSWSC 190, where I observed at [32] that reasons for not granting leave would include that:

    1. (1)

       the case is a summary criminal proceeding; and

    2. (2)

       ordinarily, a court ought not intervene at an interlocutory stage in the conduct of a summary criminal proceeding, particularly when the applicant has the right to appeal against any decision of the Local Court to the District Court.

Grounds 1A and 1AA

1. [59]

   These Grounds ought be considered together as the submissions dealt jointly with both grounds.

2. [60]

   The principal issue is whether the conclusion of the Local Court Magistrate that “there is no evidence to suggest firstly that the victim has committed tax fraud” was open to him, on the material before him.

3. [61]

   The plaintiff submits that, to the contrary of this conclusion, admissions contained in the material before the Magistrate demonstrated unarguably that the victim, Mr Boucas, had committed tax fraud.

4. [62]

   The plaintiff submitted that there was uncontroverted evidence of this by reason of the contents of the statement of Mr Boucas dated 24 July 2020, which was before the Magistrate. Mr Boucas outlined in that statement a conversation which he said that he had with the plaintiff, the contents of which the plaintiff says contain a clear admission of tax fraud. The plaintiff’s case in the criminal proceedings will be that no such conversation took place. However, because the prosecution depends upon that conversation, amongst other evidence, the plaintiff says he was entitled to issue the subpoena on the basis that the conversation constituted an admission of tax fraud.

5. [63]

   The conversation contained in the statement of Mr Boucas is as follows:

6. [64]

   The conversation continued in ways that are not directly relevant.

7. [65]

   It is to be observed that in this conversation, the plaintiff asserted to the victim that the victim had not reported his “earnings for a couple of years”. In substance, the victim responded that he did not know that “this was very serious”.

8. [66]

   The conversation is capable of a number of possible constructions.

9. [67]

   One is that the plaintiff was asserting to the victim that he had not lodged tax returns for a couple of years and the victim was asking whether that was a serious problem for him. The second is that the plaintiff could have been asserting that, although tax returns may have been lodged, they did not contain all of the moneys earned by the victim.

10. [68]

    Whatever meaning can be drawn from these somewhat ambiguous words, the mere fact that a tax return had not been lodged or, alternatively, that a tax return had been lodged but with an incorrect report of income earned, does not of itself and without more bespeak a tax fraud. A fraud is a wrongful or dishonest deception of another, including the Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”), made by one or more acts which are intended to result in financial or personal gain either to the individual perpetrating the acts or to another.

11. [69]

    The mee fact that a person did not lodge a tax return may amount to a criminal offence, but that does not mean that such failure is necessarily fraudulent. There could be a number of explanations as to why a person did not lodge a tax return. One explanation may be that the person is an Australian resident and that their taxable income was not more than the tax‑free threshold, which is presently $18,200.

12. [70]

    Secondly, there may be a reasonable excuse for not lodging the tax return. Thirdly, the effect of not lodging the tax return may not be to give, here the victim, any financial advantage. For example, had the victim been employed and if tax had been withheld from wages and paid to the ATO, any tax return lodged may not have resulted in a requirement that the victim pay any additional income tax but rather that the victim may be entitled to receive a refund. Hence, the failure to lodge a tax return could not have constituted a fraud since it gave rise to no financial advantage to the victim or detriment to the ATO.

13. [71]

    Fourthly, a failure to lodge a tax return even when tax was in fact owed to the ATO may not constitute a fraud because it may not have been accompanied by any dishonesty. For example, if the failure to lodge the tax return was the result of advice given by an independent tax agent that there was no obligation to lodge the tax return, in those circumstances it may be that no dishonesty accompanied the failure to lodge the tax return and, accordingly, no fraud occurred.

14. [72]

    I immediately do not say that any of these reasons were relevant to the alleged circumstances of Mr Boucas. However, I am satisfied that it was open to the Magistrate to find that the mere contents of the statement of Mr Boucas, to which I have made reference at [63] above, would not of itself and without more, require the Magistrate to form a conclusion that the victim had committed tax fraud and that, accordingly, there was evidence of tax fraud.

15. [73]

    As these grounds are not made out because it was open on the evidence to the Magistrate to find that there was no evidence that the victim had committed a tax fraud, I conclude that they do not raise question of law alone, nor would it be appropriate for a grant of leave to be extended on these grounds.

Grounds 1B and Grounds 1BB

1. [74]

   Again, it is appropriate that these grounds be considered together.

2. [75]

   These grounds raise the question of whether the conclusion of the Magistrate, that the terms of sub-paragraph 2 of paragraph 5 of the Subpoena (which I have set out above at [25]) were “plainly very broad”, was open on the evidence, and if not, whether an error of law occurred.

3. [76]

   In the Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564, Jordan CJ said at 573:

4. [77]

   The contents of both paragraphs 5 and 7 the subpoena called for all documents regarding the victim’s teaching courses. Although examples were given of such courses in 2015, 2016 and 2019, there was no time limit attributed to the call for the documents, nor was there any restriction on the type of documents. The paragraph would have included things such as instructional materials distributed to students, lists of supplies and equipment needed, lists of reference material to which students may have regard and many other documents which had nothing whatsoever to do with the assertion that the victim, Mr Boucas, had committed tax fraud.

5. [78]

   In concluding that the paragraph was “plainly very broad” and that classes being offered were entirely irrelevant to the matter before the Court, the Magistrate was doing no more than applying the principle to which reference is made above in Small.

6. [79]

   There was no error in the Magistrate’s conclusion. His conclusion involved the application of settled principle to the facts of this case, namely, what the terms of the subpoena were and, therefore, did not involve a question of law alone.

7. [80]

   Because the Magistrate was, in my opinion, correct, and because these two grounds do not involve a question of law alone, leave to appeal on these grounds ought also be refused.

Ground 4

1. [81]

   This ground submits that the Magistrate failed to give proper or adequate reasons for his decision. If this is established, it would constitute a question of law which the Court is called upon to consider.

2. [82]

   The plaintiff submits that the reasons delivered by the Magistrate did not give proper or adequate consideration as to the absence of connection between the documents which were sought by the subpoena and the issues which were to be ventilated at the hearing as identified in Ground 5 of the appellant’s Summons.

3. [83]

   It is convenient to consider Ground 5 in combination with Ground 4.

4. [84]

   Ground 5 asserts an error of law on the part of the Magistrate in drawing his conclusion that the appellant had failed to demonstrate a legitimate forensic purpose or that it was “on the cards” that the documents sought by paragraphs 5 and 7 of the subpoena would materially assist his case.

5. [85]

   The submissions in support of Ground 5 have some similarity to, although they are not identical with, the plaintiff’s submissions with respect to the earlier grounds about his assertion of the commission of tax fraud by Mr Boucas. The plaintiff submits that one of the central issues to be contested in the criminal proceedings was whether it was, as the prosecution asserted, the plaintiff who first approached Mr Boucas and had the conversations to which reference has been made earlier, or whether it was Mr Boucas who approached the appellant and, as contended for by the plaintiff, made full voluntary confessions and admissions to him about his commission of serious tax crimes and sought the plaintiff’s assistance in resolving those serious offences.

6. [86]

   In his reasons delivered orally at the conclusion of argument, the Magistrate set out, correctly, the terms of the disputed paragraphs in the subpoena addressed to the victim, being paragraphs 5 and 7.

7. [87]

   He drew attention to the fact that the onus fell on the plaintiff in these proceedings to establish to the Local Court on the balance of probability that there was a legitimate forensic purpose for the documents being sought by the subpoena. His Honour then set out in a summary, but entirely accurate, form the relevant tests in accordance with the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Attorney-General of NSW v Chidgey [2008] NSWCCA 65; (2008) 182 A Crim R 536 at [62]. His Honour also referred to the decision of Hamill J in R v Jenkin (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 697 at [17] and [21].

8. [88]

   His Honour then referred to, albeit briefly, the submissions made by the plaintiff to him, which were principally in writing but also oral.

9. [89]

   His Honour then turned to his decision. He said that the terms of subpoena were too wide. As earlier discussed, this was a correct conclusion. The terms of paragraphs 5 and 7 in the subpoena reflect a classic fishing expedition on the part of Mr Patsalis. Mr Patsalis did not identify any specific documents by title or nature, he did not always identify any specific time period for the existence of those documents, when a time period was nominated it was for a very lengthy period – 9 years – which continued after the offences were alleged to have occurred, and the terms of the subpoena caught many, many documents which had nothing whatsoever to do with any issue raised by Mr Patsalis in the criminal proceedings.

10. [90]

    This alone, on the grounds set out in Small is a sufficient basis to set aside a subpoena.

11. [91]

    His Honour however went on to consider whether the arguments of Mr Patsalis had persuaded him that there was a legitimate forensic purpose for seeking the documents, and whether it was “on the cards” that the documents, if produced, would assist him in meeting the prosecution case.

12. [92]

    His Honour found that there was no relationship between the contents of the subpoena and the issues before the Court. In large part, his Honour placed emphasis on the fact that he was not satisfied that the material before him gave rise to any credible assertion of tax fraud being committed by the victim. As earlier discussed, this was a matter open to his Honour.

13. [93]

    The reasons for judgment, as earlier indicated, were given orally.

14. [94]

    In my view they addressed, albeit briefly, the appropriate facts, the relevant authorities and applied the authorities to those facts and found that the Court was not satisfied by the plaintiff in these proceedings that the subpoenas ought be allowed.

15. [95]

    I do not regard it as essential to the reasoning which disposes of an interlocutory application on a subpoena in a Local Court where those reasons are given orally and at the end of considerable argument which included the discussion of various of the issues ultimately relevant for the determination of the matter to include a full discussion of each and every argument put in the course of the oral and written submissions.

16. [96]

    In my view, these reasons were entirely adequate in the particular circumstances.

17. [97]

    I would not be prepared to uphold Ground 4 and it follows that Ground 5 would also fail.

Ground 6

1. [98]

   The plaintiff submits there had been a denial of procedural fairness to Mr Boucas in the course of the hearings before the Local Court and, accordingly, an error of law existed, and the decision of the Magistrate should be set aside.

2. [99]

   In support of this ground, the plaintiff argues that the transcript of the proceedings before the Local Court reveals that Mr Boucas and his then solicitor were not in court throughout the hearing with respect to the subpoena.

3. [100]

   In the course of the hearing in the Local Court, the Magistrate was informed that the victim’s solicitor objected to producing the documents pursuant to the subpoena and that he had lodged written submissions. The Magistrate identified those written submissions by date and by the identity of the lawyers. He read out parts of those submissions and heard submissions from the plaintiff as to their effect. The Court was informed of emailed negotiations between the plaintiff and the victim’s solicitor with respect to the content of the subpoena which had resulted in the plaintiff redrafting parts of the schedule to the subpoena.

4. [101]

   No particular further mention was made of the contents of the submissions during later discussions.

5. [102]

   The plaintiff submits that because the victim and his solicitor were not present in Court, there was a denial of procedural fairness to the victim.

6. [103]

   I do not accept this submission as correct. Whilst it was open to Mr Boucas or his solicitor to attend Court when the subpoena was returnable to make submissions seeking the Court set it aside, or excusing production of the documents pursuant to it, there was no obligation on them so to do. The Magistrate was entitled to proceed to deal with the application of the plaintiff for an order that the victim comply with the subpoena whether the victim was present or not. It was clear the victim and his solicitor originally had notice of the subpoena and had the opportunity to put submissions in writing about whether it should be enforced. They did so. In those circumstances there was no denial of procedural fairness.

7. [104]

   Even if there was a denial as submitted, this is not a ground that would justify the grant of leave. Mr Boucas does not appear in this Court making complaint about a denial of procedural fairness. His presence could not have made any difference to the outcome because the Magistrate declined to enforce paragraphs 5 and 7 of the subpoena.

8. [105]

   There is no reason for a grant of leave on this ground.

Conclusion

1. [106]

   In light of the foregoing reasoning, I conclude that, with the exception of Ground 4, none of the grounds raise a point of law alone and in respect of those grounds the Summons should be dismissed. In respect of Ground 4, I am not satisfied that the reasons delivered by the Magistrate were, in the particular circumstances, inadequate.

2. [107]

   Nor, having regard to the terms of the subpoena, am I satisfied that there is any reason for leave to be granted.

Orders

1. [108]

   I make the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Summons dismissed.