Adamson v Chalik

Before me today as Duty Judge is a notice of motion that was set down for hearing on 23 March 2026, seeking relief under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) r 36.16. A notice of motion was filed by the applicant/plaintiff seeking vacation and/or adjournment of today's hearing date. That application was initially raised by email to the Common Law Registrar, who then escalated the matter to me as the Judge who had been allocated the applicant/plaintiff's notice of motion for hearing today.

The plaintiff, Mr Adamson (a solicitor), appeared by AVL as did Mr Chalik, the first defendant pursuant to leave given by the Court. The second and third defendants were represented by Mr Allchurch of the Crown Solicitor’s Office. They have filed submitting appearances and so Mr Allchurch was excused. The fourth defendant was represented by Mr Ziman, solicitor.

The first notification of a wish to seek to vacate and/or adjourn today's hearing was the email last Wednesday 15 April 2026. That was followed by various further correspondence which unfortunately I will have to go through in some detail.

The formal notice of motion to vacate was not filed until Friday 17 April 2026 at 1:52pm. The orders sought in the notice of motion were:

The medical certificate that accompanied the notice of motion was uninformative. It simply stated that Mr Christopher Adamson has a medical condition and will be unfit for work from 15 April 2026 to 22 April 2026 inclusive.

The notice of motion was followed up by correspondence from the Court which I will turn to, that advised that the certificate was inadequate.

This morning at 8:44am a further affidavit of the applicant/plaintiff was filed that added some further medical material, which I will come to, but which I consider also to be inadequate to support the application to vacate today's hearing date.

The notice of motion listed for hearing before me today with a two-hour estimate was filed on 1 December 2025. That notice of motion sought to set aside orders made by another judge of this Court on 28 November 2025. It also sought an order that a costs assessment, which I understand now is already completed, should be stayed pending the hearing of the notice of motion.

The delay with that notice of motion being listed was caused by the plaintiff/applicant's own failure to serve that notice of motion until he was ordered to do so by the Common Law Registrar on 17 February 2026 when its existence was discovered. This is a significant matter to which I will return.

On 23 March 2026, the Common Law Registrar listed the applicant/plaintiff's notice of motion for hearing for today. The Common Law Registrar, as is the usual practice, made orders that certain things had to happen. One is that the applicant/plaintiff had to file and serve his evidence in support of the application by 11 March 2026. He did not do so.

At this point of the ex-tempore reasons, the following loud interjection occurred:

There was also an order made that submissions were to be filed and served by Mr Adamson by 3 April 2026. He failed to do so.

On 24 March 2026, an affidavit was forwarded to the Court, apparently authored by Mr Adamson. That affidavit was not received by the Court and was not filed because it was not provided in accordance with the Court's timetable and, therefore, does not have any role.

Regardless, I have looked at that affidavit and saw it was entirely uninformative as to the application, and referred to a document which was not annexed and, in any event, was irrelevant to the orders sought in the notice of motion which are focused on the judgment of Sweeney J on 28 November 2025.

I need to refer to the background of the proceedings to put these applications into context.

Proceedings in this Court were commenced by Summons on 28 July 2025. The relief sought by the plaintiff is in relation to a decision of the Manager of Costs Assessment in this Court. That decision was the Costs Manager (the second defendant) refusing to revoke an assignment of a particular costs assessment to a particular assessor (the third defendant).

The first defendant is a party to what seems to have been longstanding litigation in another part of this Court. The second and third defendants are the Manager of Costs Assessments and the Costs Assessor respectively. The fourth defendant is, it seems, a person potentially affected by the costs assessment.

The Summons included an order sought on an urgent basis pursuant to UCPR r 49.15, restraining the Costs Manager and the Costs Assessor from determining the costs assessment. The Summons also sought a declaration regarding bias, a declaration asserting there was a conflict of interest (without really explaining why), an order restraining the Costs Assessor from “participating in any way”, seeking a declaration that the Costs Manager was breaching the rules of fairness, and demanding the assessment be referred to “another suitably experienced costs assessor” who was not located in the Coffs Harbour area. The application also sought an extension of time to review the decision of the Costs Manager, if required.

On 27 August 2025, there was a directions hearing before the Registrar which, among other things, provided leave to the plaintiff to file his Amended Summons.

On 29 August 2025, an Amended Summons was filed which tidied up some of the bases for some of the relief sought, expressing it now to be under ss 66 and 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).

On 28 October 2025, the first defendant filed a Reply. He is representing himself in these proceedings and has assisted the Court today with some sensible written submissions, as has the solicitor for the fourth defendant.

On 25 September 2025, there was a further directions hearing which required any Further Amended Summons to be filed and served by 2 October 2025, and for the plaintiff to file and serve his evidence in the proceedings by that time.

On 10 October 2025, there was a further directions hearing and there was further timetable provided for the defendant's evidence.

On 14 November 2025, there was a directions hearing in respect of a notice of motion that had been filed on 13 November 2025 by the plaintiff. That notice of motion sought an interim stay of the costs assessment. That motion was listed for hearing before Sweeney J on 28 November 2025.

Sweeney J heard that application and gave judgment, in her role as Duty Judge. Another order sought was the adding of “Paclaw” (Mr Adamson’s firm) as second plaintiff.

On 28 November 2025, her Honour gave the plaintiff leave to join Paclaw as the second plaintiff, but refused the plaintiff's application for the stay of the costs assessment. Her Honour ordered that the plaintiff pay costs forthwith to the fourth defendant in a specified sum of $3,500.00. Her Honour ordered that the plaintiff also pay the first defendant's costs, although, that was reserved until final hearing, (noting the first defendant is not legally represented).

Three days later, on 1 December 2025, the plaintiff filed the notice of motion that is listed for hearing before me today. Contrary to the UCPR, it was not supported by an affidavit.

On 17 February 2026, when that motion, effectively, and these proceedings were before the Common Law Registrar again for directions, a direction was made requiring the applicant/plaintiff to serve his evidence in support of his notice of motion by 11 March 2026, and the respondent's evidence in reply was required by 18 March 2026. As I have stated, the applicant/plaintiff did not file and serve his affidavit by 11 March 2026 as required.

When the matter was before the Common Law Registrar on 23 March 2026, she ordered that the plaintiff serve his submissions by 3 April 2026. That did not happen. She ordered the defendants serve their submissions by 14 April 2026. That did happen, and I have reviewed those submissions.

The notice of motion is unedifying in that it does not identify which of her Honour’s orders the plaintiff seeks to set aside under UCPR r 36.16. To not specify is odd in circumstances where one of the orders her Honour granted was actually one of the orders that the plaintiff had sought.

Because no affidavit was filed in support of the notice of motion, and the affidavit forwarded to the Court on 24 March 2026, does not explain or specify the basis, or the order which should be the subject of UCPR r 36.16, it seems to me that the application does not have much merit.

Turning now to the history of events associated with the application to adjourn today, those events must be read against what has already occurred; that is, no request before 15 April 2026 to adjourn the matter, no explanation before 15 April 2026 as to why orders have not been complied with, and a complete failure by a solicitor of this Court to comply with obvious clear directions and requirements to progress the proceedings.

I have already referred to the email on 15 April 2026 that was forwarded to the Common Law Registrar. That email stated that the plaintiff “cannot fly because he is ill” and, therefore, requested the date be vacated and adjourned to a date to be fixed. It was not stated in that email anything about the medical condition or conditions, or why the date should be vacated simply because the applicant/plaintiff could not fly in circumstances where leave to appear via AVL for country parties is easily given. It did not specify when the applicant/plaintiff would be well enough to appear; nor did it explain why counsel could not be retained, or a solicitor agent retained to conduct what is a pretty straightforward application. By that I mean straightforward if evidence was appropriately gathered and filed and served as was ordered.

At 10:17am that morning, the first defendant forwarded an email to the Common Law Registrar making clear his opposition to the adjournment. He pointed out, appropriately, that the motion was not supported by evidence, that an email to the Registrar is not a notice of motion, and suggesting that the notice of motion should be dismissed on the papers. The first defendant also submitted that the timing is consistent with a pattern of conduct exhibited by the plaintiff in these proceedings. It highlighted the failure to serve the 1 December 2025 notice of motion for a number of months, and failure to comply with the orders made by the Court.

The fourth defendant also indicated his opposition to the adjournment proposed for similar reasons.

The Registrar forwarded the correspondence to my chambers late on 15 April 2026.

At 9:07am on 16 April 2026, an email was provided by the plaintiff. It is expressed in terms of speaking in the third person but appears from its content to be authored by the plaintiff himself. It advised that the plaintiff “as a 72-year-old, has other chronic health conditions”, has recently become seriously ill and unable to work and prepare for the hearing next week and attend the hearing on 20 April 2026. It advised that he was unable to make contact with his regular general practitioner yesterday and had attended on a general practitioner at a clinic nearby who had assessed his condition and advised that if his condition worsens he should be hospitalised. That email attached a certificate of a Dr McNamara of Coffs Harbour Urgent Care. It is dated 15 April 2026 and only discloses that the plaintiff has a “medical condition” and will be unfit for work from 15 to 22 April 2026 inclusive.

At 9:47am, my Associate forwarded an email to the parties noting that any application to adjourn the matter will have to be made by notice of motion and affidavit in support, that any alleged medical condition will need to be evidenced by a medical certificate, and that if no such application is filed, is refused by the Court or if there is no appearance on behalf of the applicant/plaintiff, the Court will proceed to make orders in the absence of any non-attending party.

The first defendant, at 10:13am on 16 April 2026, corresponded and requested leave to provide some updated submissions.

The submissions from the fourth defendant were provided by Mr Ziman, solicitor. They were succinct and focused, and pointed out that there was an outstanding order of Sweeney J that the plaintiff pay the fourth defendant's costs in a specified sum of $3,500.00 forthwith and that has not occurred. Among other reasons, it was submitted that the matter should proceed.

At 10:49am, the plaintiff forwarded another email stating he was unable to prepare a notice of motion, “nor can any person in my present condition do so as evidenced in the TMC medical certificate”. It stated that “no one is available to assist”, and that he is not able to give proper instructions because of his health, and that he is “likely infectious”. It concludes:

I note in passing the first available day thereafter is actually tomorrow, Tuesday 21 April 2026, and there is no purpose adjourning until tomorrow, but I assume it is a reference to after 22 April 2026 being the end of the medical certificate.

On 16 April 2026, at 12:00pm, there were submissions provided by email by the first defendant in respect of some potential costs arguments that I do not need to deviate to at the moment.

As noted, on 17 April 2026 at 1:52pm, the notice of motion to vacate the hearing with the same supporting medical certificate was filed.

The “Written Submissions” attached to the affidavit by the applicant/plaintiff, rather than comprising submissions in respect of the application to adjourn the proceedings, appeared to be a lame, late, inadequate attempt to actually comply with the order made that written submissions be provided by 3 April 2026 in support of the plaintiff's 1 December 2025 notice of motion. They are, to be blunt, almost incomprehensible. They seem to suggest that the plaintiff is under the impression that stating “the application involves complex issues of bias, procedural fairness and professional conduct issues”, and refers to a long annexure, which still has not been provided to the Court, as some kind of excuse not to proceed. It closes with this statement: “The above and the onset of illness so close to the hearing make it impossible to instruct another law”(sic).

This morning at 8:44am, a further affidavit was provided that does identify some more detail about the applicant/plaintiff's medical conditions. It does not, however, explain adequately, or at all really, why the applicant has not complied with the orders, or why he is unfit today to proceed with arguing the notice of motion proper. The further material comprises a certificate of a Dr Ashrafi that outlines that the applicant/plaintiff has ulcerative colitis, chronic pain and androgen deficiency, that these conditions require ongoing medical management, and “can affect his ability to travel at short notice”. It is suggested that, due to the nature of his health conditions, the plaintiff/applicant “requires adequate time to make appropriate medical and travel arrangements” and needs “a minimum of three clear business days notice of any court listings to enable him to safely organise his travel and manage his health needs accordingly”. Accompanying that medical certificate is a photocopy of a label for a medication for doxycycline hyclate; and a product information sheet which outlines that that particular medication is an antibiotic used to treat bacterial infections and also lists vomiting, diarrhoea or rash as being common side effects.

Also this morning, at 9:01am, was an email from the applicant/plaintiff requesting a telephone link. At my request, my Associate advised that the applicant needs to appear by AVL. This is because telephone links to court do not tend to be satisfactory and I did not want to have the hearing interfered with by telephone difficulties.

At 10:00am, the plaintiff appeared. He argued robustly and vociferously for his adjournment. He interrupted the Court, shouted, and coughed theatrically into the microphone. I listened to his oral submissions. They were largely a repetition of the medical evidence, but included platitudes such as “the law is quite clear”, and it “would be most unfair”, and “I am sick”, and that he “really can't see how anybody could argue to the contrary that in the circumstances this matter should be anything other than vacated” given he is ill.

The first defendant, in addition to the written submissions opposing the adjournment, made the astute observation that the applicant has in fact appeared, and seems to be able to share his views on the matter with the Court, “profusely”. That is a fair description.

Whilst delivering these reasons for judgment, the applicant/plaintiff interrupted loudly and rudely on a number of occasions, leading to the need to mute his microphone to allow me to complete the necessary task of delivering complete reasons as to why I am refusing the applicant's adjournment.

Section 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (“the CPAct”) requires that parties to litigation assist the Court, and do all they can to further the overriding purpose, which is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. Subsection (3) specifically requires that a party to civil proceedings do so.

As outlined in the history I have given, I have a real concern that the plaintiff, who is a solicitor of many, many years experience, is not doing so and, in fact, is doing the contrary. I take into account that occasionally illness occurs and people are genuinely unable to appear or unable to prepare. Having evaluated the evidence provided in support of the application, I do not accept that that evidence supports that the plaintiff has been unable to prepare and nor is he unable to appear by AVL consistent with the leave given. He has in fact appeared.

The Court also must, when deciding matters before it, bear in mind the objects of case management: s 57 of the CPAct, which includes efficient disposal of the business of the Court and the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources. Section 57 also refers to the timely disposal of proceedings before the Court.

I note that my staff and I have had to expend substantial time dealing with the flurry of correspondence from the applicant/plaintiff on Thursday and Friday and again this morning, seeking to adjourn these proceedings. The parties also have been put to that inconvenience.

Section 58 of the CPAct requires the Court follow the dictates of justice. I have borne all those matters set out in s 58 in mind. One, in particular, is relevant: subs (2)(b)(ii): the degree of expedition with which the respective parties have approached the proceedings, including the degree to which they have been timely in their interlocutory activities. I note, regretfully, the plaintiff has engaged in what I consider to be deliberate delaying tactics, not just with the application to adjourn today but with the underpinning application listed for hearing today under UCPR r 36.16, evidenced by his delay in serving it, and his failure to comply with the directions to file and serve his evidence and submissions.

The Court is required under s 59 of the CPAct to implement the object of eliminating lapse of time between commencement of proceedings and final determination. That applies also to interlocutory applications which have the effect of delaying the underlying proceedings.

Section 60 of the CPAct requires that I also consider proportionality of costs. I am concerned about costs wasted and thrown away if the matter is adjourned. The first defendant appears for himself today but is obviously prepared and has provided the Court with the assistance of written submissions. The fourth defendant has instructed a solicitor, who has provided written submissions in the application proper, and appears before the Court ready to argue opposition to the notice of motion filed on 1 December 2025.

In all the circumstances, the application for adjournment is refused. It would be unjust to the parties, a waste of the Court’s time, and is not adequately supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff is to pay the defendants’ costs.