ALL IS 1 PTY LTD (t/as Banga Legal) v Townsend

HIS HONOUR: The precise origins of the phrase "all is one" are somewhat elusive. It appears in Greek [1] , and other [2] philosophy. Generally, its meaning takes its colour from its milieu. Unadorned by context, broadly it may suggest or convey a type of unified purpose of persons operating or engaged in an endeavour, as well as those who are drawn into it. The professional relationships of the parties, initially connected through All Is 1 Pty Ltd, the first plaintiff (a company through which a legal practice is operated and trading under the name, Banga Legal (BL), at Oran Park) have disintegrated. Unlike the company namesake, they have had no collective unity.

Samir Banga is a solicitor who is the sole director and shareholder of All Is 1 (Mr Banga). He is married to Ms Gill. In late January 2025, the defendant (Ms Townsend) who had involvement in the endeavour at Banga Legal parted ways with the plaintiff.

Ramifications from that cessation, including strong dispute about the reasons for it, persist, and are the subject of proceedings in two courts, namely the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Division 2 Court) and this Court. The particular listing before me this morning is the plaintiffs' notice of motion filed on 23 January 2026 seeking to amend their claim in this Court. However, for reasons which follow, there is a more fundamental question which arises regarding the parties’ disparate claims, which, in my estimation, ought to be addressed prior to pleading or other case management questions.

The divergent paths that the parties have taken have resulted in each seeking separate relief (equitable relief in the case of All Is 1 and Mr Banga) and (relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) [3] (Fair Work Act) in the case of Ms Towsend) arising out of what appears to be the same set of substratum of facts in two courts that do not obviously have jurisdiction to deal with and grant relief sought in the other court.

So at odds are the parties in engaging with one another that despite them having commenced separate proceedings the best part of a year ago, neither of the opposing parties have filed a defence or response to the other's respective court claims.

Laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth and laws made by the Parliaments of the States form “a single though composite body of law” [4] and Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution makes provision for an “integrated national court system” [5] . ‘Jurisdiction’ is a generic term but relevantly signifies authority to adjudicate [6] .

The authority to adjudicate comprised in the conferral of federal jurisdiction is authority to exercise, within the limits permitted by or under s 75, s 76 or s 77, the judicial power of the Commonwealth, by s 71 vested in the High Court, in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction [7] . Further, “the character of judicial power, as distinct from the source of the authority of a particular court to adjudicate a particular justiciable controversy, is unaffected by the source of the law that is to be applied to determine the legal rights and legal obligations in controversy” [8] .

Courts have authority to decide when the exercise of judicial power resolves a justiciable controversy of a kind which falls within the court’s limits (subject matter jurisdiction), and when the persons bound by the exercise of judicial power are amenable to its exercise (personal jurisdiction) [9] .

Commonly, resolution of a matter within federal jurisdiction may involve application both of Commonwealth law and of State law and can even be resolved entirely through the application of State law [10] .

The inapt term ‘accrued jurisdiction’ has been said to refer to the inherent power of a superior court such as the Federal Court to settle the controversy before it, provided there are federal issues which the court has jurisdiction to entertain [11] , and where the non-federal part of the claim (e.g. under State law or common law, and concerning other parties) arises ‘out of common transactions and facts’ or ‘a common substratum of facts’ [12] and relates to the same ‘matter’ [13] . The label ‘accrued’ is inapt where jurisdiction turns on parties - as for example identity of a party as the Commonwealth, within the sense of s 75(iii) of the Constitution may be a sufficient animating circumstance without any federal law supplying the substantive rights and liabilities which are tendered for adjudication [14] .

The ‘associated jurisdiction’ of a Court refers to “matters not otherwise within its jurisdiction that are associated with matters (the core matters) in which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked” [15] . In the case of the Federal Court, it extends to but is also confined by the areas of federal jurisdiction mentioned in ss 75 and 76 Constitution [16] . It is the conferral of jurisdiction in another, different, federal matter in respect of which jurisdiction could be, but has not been, conferred [17] .

There may be overlap between associated and accrued jurisdiction, but differences remain [18] . However, the relevance of associated jurisdiction compared to accrued jurisdiction has significantly diminished [19] . Creyke observes that [20]

The extent of a court’s jurisdiction is answered by the nature of the ‘matter’ before it. For example, if the Federal Court is properly seized of a ‘matter’ in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction to adjudicate all issues comprising the ‘matter’.

A ‘matter’ is a justiciable controversy, being the subject matter for determination in legal proceedings brought for its determination and encompasses all claims made within the scope of the controversy [21] . “What is and what is not part of the one controversy depends on what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships” [22] .

Despite the fact that the parties have different perspectives and reasons as to why Ms Townsend’s employment at BL was terminated, in discussion with counsel this morning, I explored with the parties the extent to which the circumstances of Ms Townsend’s termination of employment, arises out of a ‘matter’ and a common set of facts.

Lest one thinks that the parties' claims in the two courts are discrete and unconnected, the basic facts that I will recount suggest otherwise.

It appears to be common ground that Ms Townsend commenced attendance at Banga Legal in or about August 2022. Whether she commenced work on some form of volunteer basis, which transitioned into some form of contract work or employment, is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, during the period of time that she was there, in particular up to December 2024, it is clear enough that Mr Banga asked her to undertake certain tasks (he says at least) on a confidential basis.

For her part, Ms Townsend intimates that in January 2025, she was admonished inappropriately for seeking alternative employment and belittled for her declining work and health burnout. It is evident, and Mr Thomas has confirmed this, that despite the fact that no response has been filed to Ms Townsend's claim in the Division 2 Court, that the plaintiffs will say that her employment was terminated because (at least in part) of alleged breaches of confidential information imparted to her.

It is clear from the nature of the relief sought in each of the courts that there will need to be an examination of the circumstances in which Ms Townsend was engaged at BL; what tasks she was given to do; what information was disclosed to her; what duties, obligations and rights arose from those tasks; her performance of those tasks, and particularly whether they were carried out appropriately or in a manner giving rise to breach of any such duties and obligations.

The facts that I have outlined above are suggestive of a single ‘matter’ controversy despite differing claims for relief in both courts. I will return to this below.

Various risks arise where parties litigate issues between them in separate proceedings.

The risk of inconsistent findings in different Courts arises. To test that, it may be posed that if these proceedings continue, it is possible that the Court might find that confidential information was imparted to her, which gave rise to certain duties, including fiduciary duties, and that she breached those duties. However, the possibility also arises that in the Division 2 Court, if her claim for impermissible termination is progressed, there may be findings that no confidential information was imparted to her, and whatever duties she had, she did not breach them.

Further risks arise regarding inefficient use of resources in having fragmented litigation in separate Court administrations and separate judges dealing with claims between the same parties [23] as well as two sets of legal costs for each of the parties.

This Court has no jurisdiction to determine any claims of alleged breaches of s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act, including claims for compensation [24] .

The Division 2 Court has directly conferred original jurisdiction [25] and associated jurisdiction [26] . It is mandated to determine matters completely and finally and to “grant all remedies to which any of the parties appears to be entitled in respect of a legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by a party in the matter” [27] . However, such a provision does not confer jurisdiction, but empowers the Court to grant appropriate relief in a case which is properly within jurisdiction [28] . Other than any jurisdiction conferred on it in respect of a ‘matter’ arising under the Constitution or a federal statute, which enables it to determine a whole ‘matter’, it has no directly conferred equitable jurisdiction.

The extent of its whole ‘matter’ jurisdiction was not the subject of submissions and at this point there is no need for me to decide that. It suffices to note that there is some commentary on it [29] and the question of the existence and scope of any ‘accrued’ jurisdiction may depend upon its status as a superior court of record [30] .

In light of the above, it seems to me that unless action is taken to address the disparate litigation, both proceedings may progress with a risk of inconsistent findings, complication and increased costs.

The proceedings in this Court have thus far not advanced in terms of defences but have been hard-fought. The parties have, to a large degree, engaged in what might be described as ancillary disputes, including matters relating to representation for Ms Townsend [31] .

Notwithstanding that both sets of proceedings were commenced some 10 to 12 months ago, neither of the parties thus far has seemingly been willing to grasp the nettle and to take steps to address whether a single Court is able to resolve their claims and to seek to have the proceedings joined, if it is indeed possible, by means of cross-vesting application or other steps.

Unless that real issue is addressed, there is a risk that the proceedings, with concomitant time, effort, and expense, will be continued in two courts and, as I have mentioned, with the risk of inconsistent findings and increased costs.

Because the parties to this point have not turned their minds to that issue (or have not at least expressly addressed it), on the hearing of the application this morning, I raised it directly with the parties' legal representatives.

The Court is not a silent or idle participant in the effective case management of civil litigation. Progression of proceedings is actively overseen by the Court and not merely or predominantly left to forensic decisions of the parties [32] . Particularly where parties fail to engage with one another regarding the conduct of litigation, the Court may intervene and direct steps to facilitate parties to confront and address real issues previously ignored by them.

Civil litigation in each of this Court and the Division 2 Court is conducted by reference to an overriding or overarching purpose of legislative process rules.

Terminology slightly differs in the expression of those purposes. However, the intent is the same. In this Court, the overriding purpose of the statute and rule provisions is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings [33] . In the Division 2 Court, the overarching purpose of the provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible [34] .

Parties in this Court have a duty to assist the Court to further that overriding purpose [35] and in the Division 2 Court parties must act in a way that that is consistent with the overarching purpose [36] . Practitioners in this Court must not, by their conduct, cause a party to the proceedings to be put in breach of that duty [37] and practitioners in the Division 2 Court must not only take account of the duty imposed on the party but assist the party to comply with the duty [38] .

In essence, practitioners are expected to appropriately lift their gaze purely from objectives of clients so that the overriding/overarching purpose informs their actions in managing their responsibilities both to clients and to the Court and to co-operatively communicate and act with one another to that end.

Commendably, having raised the above-mentioned issues and risks associated with fragmented litigation with them, both counsel readily acknowledged that this is a matter that needed to be grappled with.

In those circumstances, I have proposed that the parties confer and come up with a reasonable plan to address the issue of disparate proceedings and jurisdiction with a view to reporting back to the Court to see whether a more just, quick, and cheap means of resolving their disputes is possible by reference to litigation, in one of the Courts or the other, whether that be cross-vested proceedings or proceedings commenced in a new single court, such as the Federal Court, that may be able to deal with the matter.

That task is not necessarily straight-forward, at least as the matter presently stands. There are no statutory provisions permitting conferral of jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of the Division 2 Court’s jurisdiction, nor for transfer of proceedings from this Court to the Division 2 Court directly [39] .

Clearly, the Federal Court has jurisdiction under the Fair Work Act, and in circumstances where a federal matter is properly raised in that Court, it would also very arguably have jurisdiction to deal with issues arising out of a common substratum of facts [40] .

To conclude, I will return to where I started. Notwithstanding the disintegration of the parties' relationship, there is both statutory mandate [41] and good common sense for the parties and their legal representatives to embrace the type of unity befitting the “All is 1” (all-is-one) nomenclature, that since January 2025 has eluded them, and to see whether they can co-operatively work to simplify the mechanism and structure of resolution of their disputes in the manner in which I will now order.

I have not ignored or forgotten the particular relief sought in the plaintiffs’ notice of motion. Instead, I have re-ordered priorities. However, it seems to me that as a matter of case management, that can be deferred until the above, more pressing issue is addressed.

The orders of the Court are as follows. The Court: