R v Medich

HIS HONOUR : Ronald Edward Medich (“the applicant”) applies for bail. The Crown opposes the application. He is charged with two offences; solicit to murder and murder. Apart from the provisions of s 32 Bail Act 1978 which apply to all bail applications, the Bail Act makes special provision for murder. Section 9C Bail Act provides: “An authorised officer or court is not to grant bail to a person in respect of an offence of murder unless the authorised officer or court is satisfied that exceptional circumstances justify the grant of bail.”

Section 32(7) Bail Act provides that matters beyond those identified in s 32 which the court accepts as relevant may be considered when determining an application for bail to which s 9C applies.

The applicant submits that the court would find that there are exceptional circumstances and would grant him conditional bail on the terms which are as follows: “(a) Reside at [address as provided to the Court]; (b) Not be away from this address between the hours of 9pm and 6am; (c) Report to Police daily between the hours of 7am and 8pm; (d) Remain within the area outlined in blue and set out on Exhibit PAM(1)-2 (Bail Area) or such other area as the Court may order; (e) Submit to electronic monitoring; (f) An acceptable person deposit by way of cash or bank guarantee an amount of $1,000,000.00, that acceptable person being Roy Medich; (g) Not use any mobile telephone number [as provided to the Court]; (h) Not use any landline telephone number, other than a telephone number notified to the Court and the officer in charge within 7 days of bail being entered; (i) Not approach or contact in any way any co-accused; (j) Not contact or approach Mrs McGurk except through her legal representative; (k) Not approach any international points of departure; (l) Surrender his passport to police and not apply for any further passport until his bail undertaking is discharged.” Relevant principle

The Crown submitted that the words “exceptional circumstances” place a very high onus upon the applicant to justify the grant of bail. Mr Terracini SC for the applicant contended that a finding of exceptional circumstances does not require the court to find that the case is special, only that it is out of the ordinary or unusual. He cited what Rothman J said in R v Daron John Wright (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Rothman J, 7 June 2005, unreported) at [9]: ”The use of the term “exceptional circumstances” means that the circumstances need to be exceptional but not necessarily special.”

Mr Terracini further submitted that an accumulation of factors can give rise to exceptional circumstances. He referred to R v Young [ 2006] NSWSC 1499 in which Johnson J said at [20]: “It seems to me that exceptional circumstances may be found in a case by the coincidence of a number of features. These can include features subjective to the particular applicant, features which bear upon the nature of the alleged offence and features which emphasise that, absent this particular test, the applicant is otherwise a person who will answer bail.”

It is well established that s 9C places a heavy onus on an applicant for a grant of bail on a charge of murder: see for example R v Connelly (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hoeben J, 16 February 2006, unreported); R v Pirini (Supreme Court of New South Wales, McClellan CJ at CL, 8 September 2009, unreported); R v Pirini (Supreme Court of New South Wales, James J, 20 April 2010, unreported). Exceptional circumstances may arise from one or more factors either singularly or combined: see Pirini (8 September 2009); Young , R v Jacobs (2008) NSWSC 417. A weak Crown case may constitute exceptional circumstances: Memery v R (2000) VSC 945.

Although exceptional circumstances may be established by a weak Crown case, an assessment of the existence of exceptional circumstances is not limited to this consideration. In Pirini (8 September 2009), McClellan CJ at CL said at [44-45]: “For my part I would not confine the consideration of exceptional circumstances to a consideration of the strength of the Crown case alone. Although it is a central issue the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offending and of the offender are also relevant although the weight to be afforded them may differ in each case. All of the matters in s 32 must be considered. A primary consideration when determining whether to grant bail is whether the accused will attend to answer the charge at a later trial. However, the court must also be concerned with the protection of witnesses other persons including relatives of a victim and the protection and welfare of the community. These considerations must be balanced with the likely period of incarceration of an individual before trial.” The Crown case

The Crown alleges that the applicant was the “mastermind” behind the contract killing of Michael McGurk. Mr McGurk was shot outside his Cremorne home at about 6:25pm on 3 September 2009. He sustained a single gunshot wound to the right side of the head from which he died. It is the Crown’s case that the applicant asked Lucky Gattellari (“Gattellari”) to have Mr McGurk murdered.

Gattellari was a very close business associate and personal friend of the applicant. Gattellari explains in a statement dated 19 October 2010 at par 9 that the reason why the applicant wanted Mr McGurk dead was: “because Ron Medich loaned Michael McGurk large sums of money for Michael McGurk’s businesses that Michael McGurk never paid back and was involved in legal disputes through the courts and was costing Ron Medich lots of money, embarrassment and his relationship with Ron Medich’s wife Odetta deteriorated as a result of this.”

Included in the material tendered by the Crown on the bail application is a summary of litigation between the applicant and the deceased conducted in the Supreme Court of NSW Equity Division prior to Mr McGurk’s murder.

A brief summary of the Crown facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offence is as follows. Gattellari had a conversation in May or June 2009 at Tuscany restaurant with the applicant during which the applicant said: “I need to put an end to this. I need some help from you. I need you to find someone to kill [McGurk] for me.” Gattellari replied: “Are you sure about this because there is no going back.” The applicant said: “Yes, I am absolutely sure, if you can find someone I want him dead.”

A few days after this meeting, the applicant asked Gattellari again, “Have you had any luck finding the person to do that job?” Gattellari said, “Not yet, are you really sure you want to do this?” The applicant said, “Absolutely sure.”

Gattellari initially offered Haissam Safetli (“Safetli”) $250,000 to carry out the murder which figure was subsequently increased to $300,000. Gattellari explained that Mr McGurk was causing him and the applicant headaches and costing them a lot of money. Safetli was also told that after Mr McGurk’s murder, that the applicant wanted to follow up on Mr McGurk’s wife Kimberley and she had to get a message that she had to pay everything that her husband owed, return all properties, and if she did not do this, it would not end there.

Safetli had previously carried out surveillance upon Mr McGurk’s home at the request of Gattellari and Senad Kaminic (“Kaminic”). Kaminic was an associate and employee of Gattellari and had introduced him to Safetli.

Gattellari subsequently met with the applicant and told him that he had found someone to kill Mr McGurk. He said: “I think I have found someone to kill McGurk for you, are you sure you still want to go through with this?“ The applicant replied: “Absolutely.” Gatellari said: “Basically they want $300,000, but it will cost you about half a million dollars to do the whole thing.” The applicant replied, “That’s very expensive you’ve gotta be fucking kidding.” The applicant said, “When?” Gattellari told him that he would need some money up front and they would not start without expenses.

Some days after this conversation, the applicant supplied Gattellari with $250,000 in cash for facilitating the murder. Gattellari paid $50,000 in cash to Safetli as an initial instalment on the contract payment. Safetli made attempts to solicit someone willing to carry out the murder but was initially unsuccessful. According to Gattellari, the applicant would regularly ask why it was taking so long and had not been finished.

Safetli states that he attended the Tuscany restaurant around late July/early August 2010. Also present at the restaurant were the applicant and Gattellari. The applicant asked Safetli, “Are you sure you can get this job done in four weeks?” Safetli replied, “Yes a hundred per cent.”

During August 2009, Christopher Estephan (“Estephan”) agreed to assist Safetli and preparatory steps were taken to murder Mr McGurk at Cremorne.

On 3 September 2009, Gattellari, Kaminic, and the applicant were having lunch in a Haymarket restaurant. At 2:48pm the applicant was contacted by a police officer to inform him that criminal charges laid against Mr McGurk for the firebombing of premises at 42A Wolseley Road, Point Piper and Beaconsfield had been withdrawn by the Director of Public Prosecutions. The police officer states that the applicant became angry and said “the bastard is down celebrating having lunch at the Chophouse restaurant having lunch as we speak”, and “…he has cost me a fortune in legal bills.” At 2:50pm telephone records show Gattellari sent a text message to Safetli. As this was occurring, Safetli and Estephan were travelling towards Cremorne. Telephone records disclose that Safetli sent a text message to Gatellari at 3:09pm. Mr McGurk was shot dead at about 6:25pm.

At 8:03pm, a text message was sent from the mobile phone service of Bassam Safetli to a mobile phone service used by Gattellari at the request of Safetli. The message read, “Job’s done.” Bassam Safetli is Safetli’s brother.

In the weeks and months following the murder, Safetli was paid the balance of the $300,000 by Gattellari and Kaminic. Estephan was paid approximately $30,000 for his involvement in the murder.

During July 2010, Safetli informed an associate that he required assistance in completing some “jobs” given to him by his “bosses” being the applicant, Gattellari and Kaminic.

He stated that at their request he was to approach Kimberley McGurk whilst she was at home in an attempt to influence her as executor of the McGurk estate to reach a settlement in certain civil proceedings for which he had been promised by Gattellari a payment of $50,000. Safetli was paid this amount in cash by Gattellari around 5 August 2010.

At about 6:30pm on 8 August 2010, Safetli and his associate drove to Mrs McGurk’s home in Cremorne. Safetli’s associate approached Mrs McGurk who was inside the house telling her, “Pay your husband’s debt”.

On the following day, Safetli handed an envelope containing a significant amount to his associate as payment for delivering the message to Mrs McGurk. He also gave Kaminic $15,000 in cash as a commission for arranging his involvement in the job.

According to Gattellari, the catalyst for the approach to Mrs McGurk was the applicant’s anger about the removal by the Supreme Court of a caveat the applicant had placed on the McGurk home at Cremorne.

The applicant had applied to the Supreme Court, Equity Division to extend a caveat that he had placed on the property but was unsuccessful. He was ordered to pay the costs of the deceased’s estate and the caveat lapsed.

Between 15 September 2010 and 8 October 2010, Safetli questioned assertions made by Gattellari that should he take full responsibility for the murder he would be looked after financially. Safetli asked Gattellari what guarantee did he have that this would occur. Gattellari replied, “I got the guarantee…yesterday…I am having another meeting tomorrow and I might even be able to give you a bigger fucking guarantee…” Shortly stated, Gattellari was also recorded as saying: “If the shit hits the fan the other fucking bird will take charge of everything and we will all be fucked.” In response to Safetli’s statement: “I don’t know what you’re talking about,” Gattellari said: “Ron’s wife.” Police pursuant to a Surveillance Device warrant recorded these conversations.

On 13 October 2010 Gattellari, Kaminic, Safetli and Estephan were arrested and charged with offences relating to the murder. The applicant was arrested on 26 October 2010 and charged with soliciting the murder.

The Crown facts further disclose a number of telephone conversations of relevance. LL, a business associate, recounts that she had a telephone conversation with the applicant on 3 March 2009 during which they discussed his dispute over the ownership of Lot 25 Captain Cook Highway Mowbray Queensland. LL recalls that the applicant said that “…McGurk is fighting with me over this and he wants to say it is his, if he gives me any more trouble over this I’m going to kill him.”

ME, an associate of LL, had his ear close to the phone and was listening to the conversation. He recalls the applicant saying something similar to “…if McGurk doesn’t stop giving me a hard time I will kill him.”

PM, a business associate of both Mr McGurk and the applicant, recalls the applicant saying in a telephone conversation in early 2009 something along the lines of, “I don’t want to say anything over the phone, but McGurk will be fixed up.”

PM attended a business meeting with the applicant in Auckland, New Zealand on 15 May 2009. He recounts that throughout the meeting the applicant made a number of comments about Mr McGurk including “I’m going to fix him”, “Don’t worry he won’t be a problem for much longer” and “It doesn’t matter whether he gets locked up for the firebombing, either way he won’t be a problem.”

The Crown also places reliance on conversations that Mr McGurk had in which he referred to the applicant. Richard Allsop, legal counsel to Mr McGurk, recalls conversations around mid-2009 during which “Mr McGurk repeatedly stated to [him] that he regarded [the applicant] as ‘unstable’ and ‘out of control’”. Mr Allsop recounts that Mr McGurk repeatedly stated that the applicant was making threats against him.

GS, an associate of Mr McGurk, recalls that Mr McGurk related that Gattellari said to him “I’m going to kill you unless you sort out your differences with [the applicant].” Submissions on the Crown case

Mr Terracini submitted that the Crown case against the applicant relies largely on the evidence of Gattellari, Kaminic and Safetli, all of whom are criminally concerned in the murder. The Crown had conceded in the Local Court that its case was reliant on the evidence of Gattellari and there was no electronic evidence directly implicating the applicant.

Mr Terracini referred to inconsistencies in the statements of the three co-accused and detailed in his written submissions some of what were referred to as “the starkest inconsistencies.” It was contended that on the Crown case there is in fact an “independent animus” between Gattellari and Mr McGurk and that Gattellari himself had a motive for the murder.

In oral submissions, Mr Terracini said that the Crown case was so weak that the police still did not know whether it was Safetli or Estephan who fired the fatal shot.

The Crown submitted that the case was a strong one and that the applicant had the means and motive to kill Mr McGurk. The Crown case, I was informed, relies “basically” on the evidence to be given by Gattellari, that is supported by Kaminic and Safetli. It was bolstered by the applicant’s motive to have Mr McGurk disposed of which related to the monies that Mr McGurk owed him and the orders for court costs made against him. Assessment of the Crown Case

As this is a bail application my assessment of the strength or otherwise of the Crown case is limited to an examination of the material tendered by the Crown (ex A) and affidavits tendered by the applicant of relevance to this issue.

The deponents to these affidavits all sworn on 13 December 2010 are: Peter Andrew Medich (affidavit no 2); John Charles Kelly SC; John Gerard Bamford; and Andrew Dowling Howard

Witnesses have not been called and the material is untested. However I am obliged to make an assessment upon the material before me.

The cornerstone of the Crown case is the evidence of Gattellari. The Crown case can only succeed if the jury accepts Gattellari’s testimony. As he is a person who might reasonably be supposed to have been criminally concerned in the murder, the trial judge will be required to give a warning to the jury that his evidence may be unreliable and for that reason alone, the jury must approach his evidence with considerable caution: s 165(1)(d) Evidence Act 1995. A similar warning will be required when Kaminic, Safetli and Estephan testify.

An analysis of the statements made by the co-accused reveals inconsistencies that are significant and cannot lightly be dismissed. It is inappropriate, having regard to the early stage of the proceedings that my analysis of the evidence should be provided in detail. I consider it sufficient for present purposes to state that the material inconsistencies include: a) the versions given of surveillance of Mr McGurk prior to the conversation between Gattellari and the applicant in May/June 2009: see [11] above. b) the evidence of Kaminic and Gattellari as to when the applicant is said to have provided the funds to Gattellari for the murder. c) whether there was direct contact between Safetli and the applicant at the Tuscany Restaurant: see [17] above.

The material inconsistencies have the potential to significantly undermine the credibility of Gattellari, Kaminic and Safetli.

There is material in the Crown case which suggests, as Mr Terracini submits, that Gattellari had an independent motive to harm Mr McGurk. Such a conclusion is supported by the statements of Safetli and Kaminic that Safetli was requested by Gattellari to undertake surveillance of Mr McGurk in about March/April 2009.

The affidavits of Peter Medich and Andrew Howard stand in opposition to Gattellari’s assertion that the applicant would look after Safetli’s family.

Some support for the Crown case, which is independent from the statements of the co-accused, is found in the conversations to which I have referred at [30]-[35]. The Crown submits that these conversations are relevant to the applicant’s motive to have Mr McGurk killed.

The extent of the applicant’s animosity towards Mr McGurk that is demonstrated by these conversations is to be considered, however, in the light of the affidavit of Mr Kelly SC, which indicates that the applicant was anxious to settle the proceedings in the Equity Division of this Court. Mr Kelly observed the applicant “to be very happy with the fact that the Supreme Court proceedings were to be amicably settled with Mr McGurk.” Furthermore, it is evident from Mr Bamford’s affidavit that the Crown’s contention that the litigation between the applicant and Mr McGurk provided a motive for murder will be strenuously contested at trial.

As to the applicant’s anger when he was informed on the day of the murder that the charges against Mr McGurk were withdrawn which provides support for the Crown case, neither Kaminic nor Gattellari in their statements mention the applicant reacting adversely to a telephone conversation nor do they recall a text message being sent at 2:50pm to Safetli. At the present time, there is no statement that speaks of the content of the message.

It seems that, notwithstanding up to 22,000 telephone intercepts, and 5,400 hours of listening device surveillance, there is no recorded conversation that refers to the applicant. The Crown made this concession before Townsden LCM on 27 October 2010.

I conclude that the Crown case is not strong but it is not so weak that it could be said that it will inevitably fail. The assessment of the honesty and reliability of Gattellari and the other co-accused is a matter for a jury. On the present state of the evidence, the applicant has, in my opinion, a reasonable prospect of a jury not being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the offences with which he is charged.

This conclusion, by itself, does not justify a finding of exceptional circumstances. Delay

Another matter relied upon by the applicant as constituting exceptional circumstances (either by itself or in combination) was the delay that was likely to occur in the prosecution of the applicant.

Mr Bowe, in his affidavit, recounts that the solicitor for the Director of Public Prosecutions informed Moore LCM on 9 December 2010 that it was the Crown’s view that the brief would not be completed for another four months. The prosecution sought an adjournment to 20 April 2011 but the proceedings were adjourned for further mention on 27 January 2011.

Mr Terracini submitted that the co-accused would need to be sentenced before the applicant’s committal hearing which will significantly add to the delay. It was unlikely that the committal hearing would be listed before late next year and the trial not until well into 2012.

The Crown did not disagree that the applicant’s trial might not take place before mid 2012. The Crown said: “Those people will have to be dealt with in relation to whatever crime the Director eventually agrees they should be charged with, they have to be sentenced, then there has to be a committal with them giving evidence against the applicant. That will take some considerable time, but that is not an exceptional circumstance, it is merely part of the process of justice in any of these cases.”

Delay in the prosecution of an applicant is capable of constituting exceptional circumstances within s 9C: Pirini per James J at [93].

Although the anticipated delay in the present case is likely to arise from the complexity of the proceedings and the co-operation of the co-accused, the impact of delay on the applicant is increased as he is currently in custody in segregation until his trial. I do not consider the delay in this case by itself amounts to exceptional circumstances, but it is to be considered in combination with my assessment that the applicant has reasonable prospects of being found not guilty by the jury and the other matters under s 32 Bail Act that are relevant to the present application. The interests of the applicant

Section 32(1)(b) Bail Act provides that in making a determination as to a grant of bail, the court is to have regard to the interests of the person, having regard only to: “(i) the period that the person may be obliged to spend in custody if bail is refused and the conditions under which the person would be held in custody, and (ii) the needs of the person to be free to prepare for the person’s appearance in court or to obtain legal advice or both, and (iii) the needs of the person to be free for any lawful purpose not mentioned in subparagraph (ii)…”

I have referred to the period of time that the applicant may be obliged to spend in segregated custody if bail is refused. I accept the applicant’s submission that the preparation of his case will be difficult if he is not at liberty. The Crown brief that has been served to date is in excess of 5,000 pages and the further material to be served is anticipated to have in excess of 11,000 telephone intercepts and 5,400 hours of listening device material. I give modest weight to this consideration.

I give little weight to the applicant’s need to have regular contact with his stockbroker and up to the minute information regarding the stock market in order to conduct his share trading.

The applicant presently has matters in the Federal Court of Australia and the Family Court of Australia. Mr Bamford deposes to the complexity of the litigation in the Federal Court. As to the proceedings in the Family Court, it appears from Mr Dowd’s affidavit that the applicant’s wife, by way of an interim application, seeks orders in relation to the children of the marriage and financial matters. Mr Dowd opines that detailed instructions are required to meet the interim application that is listed for hearing in the Family Court in Sydney on 11 January 2011. The orders sought by Mrs Medich include allowing her to leave the country and to take the children with her, which the applicant opposes.

I accept that is will be difficult for the applicant’s legal representatives to obtain detailed instructions in either proceeding whilst the applicant is in custody. I particularly give weight to the applicant’s need to be at liberty to oppose the orders sought in the Family Court. Flight

The Crown submitted that the applicant is a flight risk, being a person of considerable wealth, such that it is likely that he has the resources available and possible connections to people who could assist him in leaving the country illegally. The Crown contended that it is clear from the Department of Immigration records that the applicant travels extensively for business and is likely to have connections in China.

Mr Terracini submitted, on the other hand, that the applicant has a close family relationship with his children and siblings and strong ties to the jurisdiction. He pointed out that the applicant is a 62-year-old man who has only one prior matter on his record, namely a low-range drink driving offence. He has neither been subject to bail conditions nor failed to appear. He voluntarily surrendered himself to police and has made no attempt to flee even though he has been a suspect from the time of the murder.

Section 32(1)(a) Bail Act obliges the court to consider the probability of whether or not the person will appear having regard, relevantly, only to: “(i) the person’s background and community ties, as indicated…by the history and details of the person’s residence, employment and family situations and the person’s prior criminal record…, and … (iii) the circumstances of the offence (including its nature and seriousness), the strength of the evidence against the person and the severity of the penalty or probable penalty, and … (iv) any specific evidence indicating whether or not it is probable that the person will appear in court.”

The applicant has extensive community ties within Australia. He grew up in the South Western suburbs of Sydney and attended St Joseph’s College at Hunters Hill. After his secondary schooling, he completed a chartered accountancy course whilst working for a Sydney firm. He married in 1975 and has four children of that relationship. His children grew up in the Cabramatta area with their father and mother until their parent’s separation in 1990. The applicant obtained custody of the children who continued to live with him in Sydney. He remarried in 1990 and there are two children of that marriage; boys aged 18 and 13. All of the applicant’s children reside in Sydney as does his brother Roy. He has developed extensive business interests in Sydney and elsewhere in Australia.

His primary business interests relate to share trading and property development. All of his assets are located in Sydney save for a house in France to which he has never travelled. The assets of his marriage have been frozen pending the outcome of the Family Court proceedings.

The Department of Immigration and Citizenship movement records reveal that between 1 January 2007 and 13 October 2010, the applicant travelled overseas on ten occasions. Five of those trips were to New Zealand, three to Hong Kong, one to South Africa and one to Honolulu. All of the trips were undertaken in connection with his business activities save for a holiday in Hawaii. These records disclose that he travelled overseas twice this year and returned to Australia. He voluntarily attended at his solicitor’s office on 27 October 2010 for the purpose of being arrested. He has made no attempt to flee.

None of this material indicates that the applicant will not appear if granted bail. On the contrary, it suggests that he is likely to appear.

He is, however, charged with murder which carries with it a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life. The consideration that the severity of the penalty might strongly motivate him not to attend court is moderated by the assessment of the strength of the Crown case.

The material before me does not establish that the applicant is a flight risk, either because of his wealth or business connections. Notwithstanding this observation, I firmly bear in mind that there is always a possibility that an affluent person with an overseas property may be tempted to flee because he faces a murder charge. The protection of witnesses

The Crown contended that the evidence of the threat made to Mrs McGurk demonstrates that the applicant has the will and resources to interfere with Crown witnesses, particularly the co-accused, over whom he has considerable influence. The Crown put to me that should the applicant be released, he would be more easily able to threaten anybody that he wished including the family of the co-accused.

Mr Terracini argued that there was no evidence that the applicant authorised the threatening visit to Mrs McGurk. I do not agree that there is “no evidence”. Gattellari states that the catalyst for the approach to Mrs McGurk was the applicant’s anger over the removal of the caveat registered against the Cremorne property. I have observed that the Crown case is not strong. Mr Bamford’s observations of the applicant during the settlement of the costs orders provide some further weight, albeit slight, to my assessment of the strength of the Crown case.

Mr Terracini, somewhat pragmatically, observed that if the applicant is, as the Crown alleges, “well connected and powerful”, he could interfere with witnesses indirectly whilst in custody.

I take into account in considering this bail application: - The protection of Mrs McGurk: s 32(1)(b1)(ii) - The protection and welfare of the community, having regard to: a) the seriousness of the crime of murder committed by the contract killing of Mr McGurk: s 32(1)(c)(i); b) the likelihood of the applicant interfering with Crown witnesses, either directly or indirectly including the possibility of threats being made to their family members: s 32(c)(iii); c) whether or not it is likely that the applicant will commit any serious offence whilst on bail: s 32(c)(iv).

The material before me does not establish that it is likely that the applicant will commit a serious offence whilst on bail or interfere with Crown witnesses. Decision

I am satisfied that the applicant has discharged the high onus of establishing exceptional circumstances arising from the combination of: - the lack of strength in the Crown case; - the lengthy period of time that the applicant would spend in segregated custody before trial when there is a reasonable prospect of a jury not being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the offences, and; - his interest in being at liberty to oppose the Family Court proceedings.

I emphasise that the bail conditions proposed by the applicant have played no part in my finding of exceptional circumstances.

I propose to grant conditional bail. Bail Conditions

Bail is granted subject to the following conditions: 1. That the applicant enters into an agreement to observe the following requirements as to his conduct while at liberty on bail: a) He is to appear at Central Local Court on 27 January 2011. b) He is to reside at [address as provided to the Court]. c) He is not to be absent from that address between the hours of 9pm and 6am. d) He is to report to the officer-in-charge of the City Central Police Station, Day St, Sydney, daily between the hours of 7am and 8pm. e) He is to remain within the area outlined in blue on the map being Annexure A to these bail conditions. f) One acceptable person is to enter into an agreement with a cash deposit or bank guarantee or security over real property in the sum of $1,000,000.00 to forfeit that amount if the applicant fails to comply with his bail undertaking. g) He is not to use any mobile telephone other than telephone number [as provided to the Court]. h) He is not to use any landline telephone number, other than a telephone number notified to the Court and the officer-in-charge, Detective Sergeant Mark Fitzhenry, within 7 days of bail being entered. i) He is not to communicate, directly or indirectly (except through his legal advisors), with any person whom he has received notice is to be called, or is likely to be called, by the Crown at his committal hearing or trial. j) He is not to approach or to contact or to attempt to contact or communicate with in any way whatsoever any co-accused or members of the co-accuseds’ families. k) He is not to approach or to contact or to attempt to contact or communicate with in any way whatsoever Mrs McGurk or members of her family, except through her legal representatives. l) He is not to approach any international points of departure. m) He is to surrender his passport to police and not apply for any passport or international travel documents whilst at liberty on bail. n) He is to submit to electronic monitoring to be undertaken by Abakus ElmoTech Pty Limited monitoring device to be fitted by the authorised representative of Abakus ElmoTech Pty Limited prior to the accused being released from custody. o) Abakus ElmoTech Pty Limited is to notify any mobile number or electronic email address nominated by the Office of the DPP of any breaches of bail conditions (c), (e) and (b). The applicant is to pay the costs of Abakus ElmoTech Pty Limited. p) He is to be of good behaviour in all respects throughout the period of his liberty on bail. 2. Bail is to be automatically revoked in the event of any breach of any one of these conditions and the applicant may thereupon be arrested by any police officer.