Carvana v State of New South Wales

By his fourth amended statement of claim filed on 25 August 2022, the plaintiff, Mr David Carvana, has claimed damages for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and trespass to goods against the defendant, the State of New South Wales. Mr Carvana was not legally represented.

It was not in dispute that, by virtue of s 9B(2) the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) and s 5 of the Crown Proceeding Act 1988 (NSW), the State was the appropriate defendant since it accepted that it would be vicariously liable in respect of relevant torts, if any, committed by the relevant officers and former officer of the New South Wales Police Force named in the pleading: Senior Constable Rae; Senior Constable Simpson; and, Mr (formerly Sergeant) Minns.

The facts and circumstances on which Mr Carvana’s claims are based arise out of a complaint by Ms Fawcett concerning Mr Carvana’s conduct towards her which led to SC Rae and SC Simpson attending Mr Carvana’s business premises on 18 October 2017 and his subsequently being arrested, charged, bailed, and then dealt with in the Wollongong Local Court. First, I shall consider the witnesses and the factual findings as to what relevantly occurred on 18 October 2017 and thereafter. Next, I shall address the causes of action relied on by Mr Carvana and then, to the extent necessary, I shall consider questions of loss and damage.

In addition to himself as the principal witness in his case, the plaintiff, Mr Carvana, also called the following lay witnesses:

The defendant’s lay witnesses who gave oral evidence were:

The evidence also included affidavits or statements from the following witnesses (prepared for the purposes of these proceedings or for the purposes of the proceedings in Wollongong Local Court), without the maker of the affidavit or statement being called to give evidence:

In assessing the evidence as a whole, I have taken into account that these witnesses who did not give oral evidence were not cross examined and I was not able to observe them give evidence. Accordingly, I approached their evidence with a degree of caution, as appropriate. Nonetheless, since Ms Fawcett’s statement was made on the day of the incident in question, I accepted that the information in that statement was likely to have been fresh in her memory at that time and, therefore, likely to be more reliable than if the statement had been given some considerable time later. Furthermore, the statements of Ms Fawcett and SC Simpson were not made for the purposes of the present proceedings and thus were unlikely to have been influenced, subconsciously or otherwise, by the issues raised in these proceedings. None of their evidence was inherently incredible and it was largely consistent with other evidence. On these bases, it appeared to me that their evidence should generally be accepted, except if it was inconsistent with contemporaneous notes or recordings or other credible evidence.

Dealing with the lay witness called by the plaintiff who gave oral evidence (other than Mr Carvana) my observations and assessment were as follows.

Mr Domenico Carvana (the plaintiff’s father whom I shall call Mr Carvana Senior), and Ms Fuller both gave evidence by audio-visual link. In making my assessment of their evidence, I did not give it more or less weight because it was given in this way. Mr Carvana Senior provided a written statement which had “October 2017” written on it, [7] and Ms Fuller provided an undated written statement. [8] It was somewhat unclear when and how their written statements had been prepared, although the evidence suggested that they had been prepared for the criminal proceedings in Wollongong Local Court, heard on 16 May 2018. I was not satisfied on the evidence that they were contemporaneous records of what those witnesses saw and heard on 18 October 2017, in the sense of being made on that date or within the next few days. In addition, Mr Carvana Senior expressly accepted that it was a possibility that he had “not remembered those events very well”. [9] Ms Fuller said that she could not “give complete and full details but I do agree with what I’ve written in my statement and that’s how I remember it still today”. [10] From their preparedness to make appropriate concessions and my observation of the way in which they both gave evidence and the content of that evidence, I formed the view that both Mr Carvana Senior and Ms Fuller were each honestly attempting to tell the truth as they recalled it, assisted by their statements. I generally accepted their evidence except where it was inconsistent with evidence from contemporaneous notes or recordings or other credible evidence. I shall deal with any specific conflicts in the evidence when making findings as to what relevantly occurred.

As to the lay witnesses called to give oral evidence by the defendant, Mr Robert Minns, a retired sergeant of police, gave evidence by audio visual link and provided a written statement dated 30 January 2023. [11] Once again, I have not given this evidence more or less weight because of the manner in which it was given. Mr Minns’s statement was said to be based on his refreshing his memory from:

It did not appear that Mr Minns, who was the custody manager at Wollongong Police Station in the early evening of 18 October 2017, made any other contemporaneous notes of his interactions with Mr Carvana on that day. Mr Minns was prepared to make appropriate concessions as to what he could recall or not and what may have happened. [12] I found nothing in his evidence that was inherently incredible or unlikely. Observing him give evidence and taking into account the content of the evidence he gave and all relevant circumstances, I formed the view that Mr Minns was an honest witness genuinely trying to recall what occurred on the relevant occasion and I generally accepted his evidence. If, however, there was any conflict between Mr Minns’s evidence and contemporaneous records, I would accept what was in the records. As to specific conflicts in the evidence between Mr Carvana and Mr Minns, I shall deal with such matters when making my findings as to what occurred.

The other lay witness who was called by the defendant to give oral evidence was SC Rae. He provided a written statement dated 23 December 2022 which included as annexures his police statement dated 18 October 2017, the 18 October 2017 COPS Event and a USB containing the video recordings from Mr Carvana’s telephone and recordings of the two 000 calls. [13] Like other witnesses, SC Rae made appropriate concessions and gave suitably qualified answers. [14] SC Rae was cross examined with some force by Mr Carvana. [15] Nonetheless, SC Rae’s responses to these or other questions did not cause me to form the view that he was dishonest or that his evidence was generally unreliable. In my view, SC Rae conscientiously attempted to answer the questions he was asked in cross examination, some of which were not particularly clear, and I had no reason to believe that he was not being honest and frank. Once again, I generally accepted SC Rae’s evidence except if there were contemporaneous notes or recordings which were inconsistent with that evidence. Specific matters about which he gave evidence and which were the subject of dispute are addressed when I make my factual findings.

Turning now to the principal witness in the plaintiff’s case, Mr Carvana himself, he gave oral evidence and his statement (described as an affidavit) dated 26 August 2022 was admitted into evidence. [16] In addition, accounts of the relevant facts given by Mr Carvana as recorded in other documents were also in evidence. [17]

I formed the view, based on my observation of Mr Carvana and the evidence as a whole, that he was an intelligent and articulate man, who was an experienced and successful accountant who has also been involved in managing other businesses. My assessment was that Mr Carvana found it stressful to prepare and conduct his own case as an unrepresented litigant as well as finding it difficult to maintain objectivity in relation to his evidence, especially when it might adversely affect his case. I did not, however, form the view that Mr Carvana was generally deliberately dishonest.

In addition, I formed a number of other impressions concerning his evidence as a result of observing him in the witness box and in light of his evidence. First, Mr Carvana had a tendency to give unrestrained or somewhat exaggerated responses which were not always responsive to the question asked and aspects of which were not entirely credible. [18] One particular illustration of this is the following question and answer during Mr Carvana’s cross examination: [19]

Secondly, Mr Carvana appeared on occasions to be avoiding answering a question; sometimes anticipating where a line of questioning was going and trying to give his answers accordingly, rather than answering the question actually asked. [20] On other occasions, he appeared to be attempting to avoid answering questions and then contradicting himself in a subsequent answer. [21]

Thirdly, Mr Carvana on one occasion gave answers in cross examination which were inconsistent with earlier answers and evidence but appeared unwilling to acknowledge the full extent of any inconsistency. [22] Mr Carvana was also not prepared to concede that his memory of events was more likely to be accurate the closer in time to his arrest than later. [23] I did not gain the impression that Mr Carvana would make appropriate concessions contrary to his interests unless effectively left with no potentially arguable alternative.

Fourthly, at times during his evidence, Mr Carvana said he was “getting worked up” or similar descriptions. [24] This appeared to me to be correct and, when he was worked up, this interfered with his ability to answer questions reliably. This was also consistent with the fact that, when being psychologically assessed previously, Mr Carvana described himself as often “over-reacting” to situations. [25] My observation of him in court indicated that there was a degree of overreaction from time to time on his part, which may have been a response to being cross examined and a litigant in person but it detracted from the credibility and reliability of his answers.

Fifthly, Mr Carvana would often not wait for the end of a question and interrupted the cross examiner, including on occasion by claiming that the cross examiner was confused or was trying to upset him or some similar contention. [26]

The evidence which I accepted also established that Mr Carvana has had long standing anxiety and depression conditions, and these contributed to his becoming dependent on Alprazolam (a benzodiazepine supplied under the name Xanax or Kalma) from well before 2017. The evidence did not suggest that his mental health conditions had resolved by the time Mr Carvana gave evidence before me. I accepted the unchallenged expert evidence that long term benzodiazepine use, such as has occurred in Mr Carvana’s case, can adversely impact an individual's capacity for memory. [27]

In light of my observations of Mr Carvana giving evidence, how the evidence unfolded in court and its content, his circumstances, including those outlined above, and ordinary human experience, I was of the view that in Mr Carvana’s case the processes of memory in relation to the events on 18 October 2017 were probably overlaid subconsciously by perceptions of self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what could have been said or done, so as to provide an illustration of what McLelland CJ in Eq said in Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319: [28]

For these reasons and in the circumstances, I have accepted Mr Carvana’s evidence where it is consistent with contemporaneous records or with the evidence of others. Where, however, there were no relevant contemporaneous records or his evidence conflicted with that of other witness, I approached his evidence with considerable caution. I shall deal with specific conflicts between his evidence and other evidence, when making relevant findings.

There was no substantial dispute as to the background to the events of 18 October 2017 or as to many aspects of what occurred in the car park and later on that day.

In 2017, the plaintiff’s accountancy practice, David Carvana & Associates, and a company with which Mr Carvana was associated called Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd occupied premises behind the post office at Fairy Meadow in New South Wales. Along the side of the premises was a driveway leading from the street to a car parking area behind. At the end of the driveway nearer the street there was a gate. At the entrance to the driveway, along the driveway and elsewhere in the car parking area were signs stating, variously, that: it was private property and unauthorised parking was not permitted; parking was only available for “employees or visitors” of David Carvana & Associates and Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd; or, parking was “Restricted / Customer parking only”. It was not in dispute that Mr Carvana or some persons or entities associated with Mr Carvana owned the land which included the driveway and parking area.

Prior to 18 October 2017, Mr Carvana had been annoyed by unauthorised parking in that parking area. Ms Fawcett had parked her black SUV in the parking area previously when she went to the post office at Fairy Meadow and Mr Carvana had photographed or videoed her vehicle in the parking area and told her not to park there. Mr Carvana had also posted on social media concerning a black SUV parking in the parking area without his authorisation.

On 18 October 2017, Ms Fawcett again parked in the parking area. Mr Carvana saw her and asked her, in effect, not to park there but indicated that she could do it this one time. Subsequently, Mr Carvana realised that Ms Fawcett’s black SUV was the vehicle he had videoed or photographed on previous occasions and he became annoyed that she was continuing to park in the parking area despite his warnings to her not to do so. As a result of becoming annoyed, Mr Carvana decided to let the air out of the tyres of Ms Fawcett’s SUV.

The evidence of what occurred in the car park involving Mr Carvana and Ms Fawcett on 18 October 2017 included:

Just before about 11:40 am on 18 October 2017, Mr Carvana began to let the air out of the passenger’s side rear tyre of Ms Fawcett’s vehicle and videoed himself doing so. The video showed Mr Carvana’s thumb on the release valve of the tyre and a hissing sound from the air being released could be heard on the recording. After about 10 or 15 seconds, Ms Fawcett can be seen walking up the driveway towards Mr Carvana. As she approached her car, she said “Please don’t do that. Don’t touch my car”. She arrived at the vehicle and asked Mr Carvana politely to stop. Ms Fawcett said “Please give me back my thing” and reached out to retrieve the tyre valve cap which Mr Carvana had removed but this was resisted by Mr Carvana who attempted to keep hold of it.

At this point the video swung around in various directions and Mr Carvana could be seen kicking or stomping on the running board of the vehicle one or two times. Ms Fawcett said in her statement that she observed no damage as a result of this. Ms Fawcett became upset and yelled out “For God’s sake, what are you doing?” and Mr Carvana then said “I just realised who you were”. Ms Fawcett loudly accused him of trying to damage her car and called out “Help, help, help, this man is abusing me.” It was at this point that Mr Carvana said “I have not touched you” and also said that she had done it four or five times before and he had her on video. He continued saying “Fuck off my property” and told her never to come back. Ms Fawcett yelled out that Mr Carvana was “insane” then said she was leaving and called him an “insane lunatic”.

Ms Fawcett said in her statement, after describing Mr Carvana stomping on the “step plate” of her car, that Mr Carvana used both hands to push her shoulders and chest while continuing to hold his telephone in one hand. She said that he gave her “a good shove and [she] took a big step back, about a metre and a half”. In the first 000 call, Ms Fawcett repeated that Mr Carvana pushed her. As noted above, Mr Carvana expressly stated during the video recordings that he did not touch Ms Fawcett. On my review of the video recording of the incident, I was not satisfied that Mr Carvana made physical contact with Ms Fawcett so as to push her away, as recounted in her statement, although there was some earlier physical contact when Ms Fawcett attempted to recover the valve cap.

In both her first 000 call and in her statement, Ms Fawcett also said that she felt threatened by what Mr Carvana had done. I accept that she felt physically threatened in the car parking area, especially as a result of Mr Carvana’s stomping on the running board of her car and speaking aggressively, and that this was a genuine and reasonable reaction on her part to what occurred.

By this time, Mr Carvana Senior was outside in the parking area and could observe what occurred. In his statement, he said that “[a]fter shouting a barrage of offensive, abusive words, the woman got in a black SUV, did a u-turn and lowered the window to scream for help”. This was not consistent with what was shown on the video recording. It was not Ms Fawcett who used offensive, abusive words and she called for help while standing next to her vehicle not from inside the vehicle.

In response to Ms Fawcett’s calls for help, a male passer-by walked up the driveway. Mr Carvana told the passer-by to get out of his property and to call the police, if he wanted to. Mr Carvana walked down the driveway and shut the gate at the end of the driveway, which prevented Ms Fawcett from leaving. He told passers-by who had stopped to look that he owned the property, pointed to the signs and said that she had done it 16 times. He also said “I didn’t touch her. I wouldn’t touch a lady.”

In the meantime, Ms Fawcett had returned to her vehicle, turned it around and driven down towards the gate. As recorded on the video, Mr Carvana explained, either to persons who were standing nearly or for the purposes of the recording, “Guys this is the one that does it all the time so I was flattening her tyre … Here it is on video guys, the fucking bitch again. I blocked her in. I got her good this time.”

At about this time, Ms Fawcett made her first 000 call.

On the second video taken by Mr Carvana on his telephone, Ms Fawcett’s car is shown behind the shut gate with Mr Carvana outside the gate. He is recorded as saying various things including: “I finally got her and locked her in now. It’s illegal. Let the cops come and have some fucking fun. … She’s not getting out of here. She can fuckin’ stay in tonight … I’ve fuckin’ had enough”. Ms Fawcett continued making her first call to 000 during this time.

A third video depicts the gate open and Ms Fawcett driving out and across the footpath where she stopped, left her car and took photographs of Mr Carvana on her telephone and then gave a description of him as part of her first 000 call.

At about 11:40 am, an urgent call was broadcast over the police radio to which two uniformed officers in a police vehicle, SC Simpson and SC Rae, responded. The information given to them was that: a male was verbally abusing the informant, punching her car and blocking her in but no person was injured; the person of interest had pushed the informant; there was a dispute over the informant parking on the person of interest’s land; the informant had stopped responding to the telephone operator and was arguing; and, the situation was escalating.

After Ms Fawcett finished her first 000 call, she drove to a service station to refill her tyre with air and then returned to her place of work.

As a result of being assigned to deal with the incident, the police officers drove to the post office at Fairy Meadow, which was the location given to them, but were unable to locate Ms Fawcett.

From her workplace, Ms Fawcett called 000 again in order to let police know that she had returned to work so that she would feel safe and it was not an emergency anymore.

After being informed of the second 000 call at about 11:55 am, SC Simpson and SC Rae attended Ms Fawcett’s place of work and spoke to her. Ms Fawcett then attended Corrimal Police Station where, at about 12:20 pm, she made her statement, which was in evidence in these proceedings. That statement was largely consistent with the video recordings made by Mr Carvana, except for some differences in the actual words used and Ms Fawcett’s recollection that she had been physically pushed by Mr Carvana after he had stomped on the running board of her SUV.

Having obtained this statement from Ms Fawcett, SC Simpson and SC Rae went to the Fairy Meadow post office and then drove into the car parking area behind the post office where the incident involving Mr Carvana and Ms Fawcett had taken place. The police officers parked there at about 1:45 pm.

SC Rae parked the police vehicle behind Mr Carvana Senior’s car. Mr Carvana was in the carparking area smoking a cigarette. SC Rae and SC Simpson left their vehicle and Mr Carvana became argumentative as to why they had parked as they did in the carpark. SC Simpson introduced herself to Mr Carvana and told him that she worked at Wollongong police station. SC Simpson said they wanted to speak to Mr David Carvana and he introduced himself but wanted them to go into his office. SC Simpson said that they could remain outside so as not to cause any parking issues and indicated that they only needed to talk to him briefly to advise him of the investigation and offer him the opportunity to be interviewed. Mr Carvana still insisted on their going into his office.

The police officers and Mr Carvana went into his office and the door was left open. SC Simpson informed Mr Carvana that they were investigating allegations of assault against a female who had parked in the car parking area that morning and damage to her car. Mr Carvana was cautioned by SC Simpson.

When SC Simpson asked him what had happened in the car parking area that morning, Mr Carvana looked on his mobile telephone and told the police officers that the woman had done this countless times and he had photographs of her. While Mr Carvana was looking on his telephone he also called out to his receptionist and asked her the dates of the previous incidents. He showed the officers a photograph of a female similar to Ms Fawcett. When asked what had happened that morning, he spent a short time looking on his telephone for video footage of what occurred. Mr Carvana was again offered an opportunity to participate in an electronically recorded interview at Wollongong police station but he indicated that he did not want to do so.

Mr Carvana eventually located the video footage. Before Mr Carvana showed the video to SC Simpson, she could hear a hissing sound. There was a potential dispute as to whether, at this point, SC Simpson snatched the telephone out of Mr Carvana’s hand, as Mr Carvana at one point contended, or Mr Carvana handed the telephone to her to look at the video which was playing, as SC Simpson and SC Rae stated. During cross examination on 10 July 2023, Mr Carvana said that SC Simpson “snatched the phone and put it in her pocket. 100%. Vivid memory”. [29] In cross examination the next day, Mr Carvana said “I never ever in memory in this room used the word that she snatched the phone from me, snatched. So don’t change my words, please”. [30] Mr Carvana also gave evidence on the second day, however, that he passed the telephone to SC Simpson and that he had never held anything back from police. [31] That latter evidence was consistent with the evidence of SC Simpson and SC Rae and, based on the evidence as a whole and the other circumstances referred to above, I am satisfied that Mr Carvana voluntarily handed his telephone to SC Simpson so that the police officers could view video footage of the incident in the car parking area on the telephone.

While SC Simpson was holding the telephone and the video was playing, she saw what appeared to her to be Ms Fawcett approaching and having a conversation with Mr Carvana, his stomping on the side of the car, a physical confrontation between Mr Carvana and Ms Fawcett, and her calling out for help. SC Rae could also see the video footage. At about this time, SC Simpson accidently touched the screen of the telephone and the video restated from the beginning and she saw, for the first time, Mr Carvana’s hand releasing air from the valve on Ms Fawcett’s vehicle. SC Simpson’s evidence, which I accept, was then as follows:

Mr Carvana continued to seek the return of his telephone and became upset when SC Simpson refused. Mr Carvana offered to have the relevant videos downloaded onto a USB stick by the secretary in the office so they could be taken to the police station, but SC Simpson did not accept that this should be done.

Mr Carvana then shut the door of his office and stood so as to prevent the two police officers from leaving if they did not return his telephone. During this time, Mr Carvana said that he wanted his telephone back so he could speak to his solicitor, including in relation to whether the police had a right to seize his telephone, and because he had other businesses to run. He was yelling and becoming more and more irate. SC Simpson warned Mr Carvana that he was potentially committing an offence by not allowing the police officers to leave. Mr Carvana’s evidence was that he “recalled … perfectly” what occurred and that she did not say that. [32] Both SC Simpson and SC Rae gave evidence of words to that effect being said and their evidence was inherently credible. In my view in the circumstances, it was more probable that Mr Carvana, being upset and irate at the time, did not remember what was said to him and it is quite improbable that he recalled the situation perfectly when he was giving evidence. In light of the evidence as a whole and my observations of the witnesses, I do not accept Mr Carvana’s evidence and accept that of SC Simpson and SC Rae in this regard.

In his statement, Mr Carvana said that, at this point, the police officers drew “their lasers [sic, tasers] on me in my office” and, in his oral evidence, he maintained that their tasers were drawn in his office. The statement of Mr Carvana Senior, however, included that, at about this time, “the officer hinted that they might use the TASER gun”. According to Mr Carvana, however, Mr Carvana Senior was not in the office at the time when the tasers might have been drawn and Mr Carvana did not recall his father being present when Mr Carvana was being spoken to by police. [33] Similarly, in cross examination, Mr Carvana Senior agreed that it was correct that he did not get involved or see anything until the police left and his son walked out of the front door of his office. [34] If that is correct, it is difficult to understand how Mr Carvana Senior could have formed the view that the police officers “hinted” that they might use their tasers in Mr Carvana’s office at the relevant time.

Senior Constable Rae expressly denied in par 17 of his statement deploying tasers stating:

He was not challenged on this evidence in cross examination that the tasers were not deployed or drawn.

In Mr Carvana Senior’s cross examination, he also gave an account different from that of his son. Mr Carvana Senior said: [35]

When pressed, Mr Carvana Senior accepted that he could have been seeing the officers pull out the telephone but maintained that he “had the impression that they were pulling instead this taser gun”. [36]

It was not suggested that any taser was actually deployed against Mr Carvana.

To the extent that it is necessary to resolve the factual issue, I note that the officers only said that they did not draw or deploy their tasers. In my view, on the balance of probabilities, given that Mr Carvana was visibly and verbally agitated at not having his telephone returned and shut the door of his office preventing the officers from leaving, the officers probably felt physically threatened and may have moved their hands to their tasers in case they needed to be deployed. This may have caused Mr Carvana to fear that the tasers might actually be drawn and deployed but, as it happened, this did not occur. Mr Carvana Senior was probably told about it subsequently and believed he had a memory of it. I am not satisfied that there was any inappropriate conduct on the part of SC Simpson and SC Rae in this regard.

After some time and probably after he was informed that he might be committing an offence, Mr Carvana moved away from the door so that SC Simpson and SC Rae could leave his office and they went into the reception area where the receptionist was and where clients were waiting. Mr Carvana appeared to SC Simpson to be very angry, saying that he had to speak to his solicitor and the officers could not leave with his telephone. SC Simpson explained why she was refusing to return his telephone and indicated that he was free to call his solicitor. I accept SC Simpson’s evidence that she remained calm and did not respond inappropriately to Mr Carvana’s anger and verbal aggression.

Mr Carvana offered to have the material on his telephone downloaded onto a USB for the officers to take with them provided that they left his telephone with him. [37] SC Simpson did not take up this offer nor did she give Mr Carvana back his telephone.

SC Simpson and SC Rae returned to their police vehicle.

SC Rae turned the police vehicle around in order to drive out of the driveway from the car parking area and onto the street. By this time, however, Mr Carvana was lying down on the driveway between the police vehicle and the exit onto the street preventing the officers from driving out. SC Rae drove slowly down the driveway towards Mr Carvana, stopped a few metres from where he was lying, wound down his window and told him to move out of the way. After a while, Mr Carvana stood up but remained in the middle of the driveway still preventing the officers from driving out. He was asked three or four times to move and SC Rae warned him that if he failed to move out of the way he was obstructing police and could be arrested. Mr Carvana continued to refuse to move out of the way until he had spoken to his solicitor on the telephone.

After waiting for several minutes with their conversation with Mr Carvana going around in circles, SC Simpson and SC Rae got out of their vehicle. Mr Carvana was still standing in front of the police car and did not move out of the way.

I find that Mr Carvana, in the driveway, appeared to be overreacting to the circumstances by lying on the ground and then standing in front of the police car and his speech and actions did not appear calm or rational.

There was then a dispute as to whether Mr Carvana was arrested by SC Rae or SC Simpson. Mr Carvana maintained he was arrested by SC Simpson. SC Rae’s evidence was that he arrested Mr Carvana and SC Simpson’s evidence was to the same effect. The Court Attendance Notice issued on 18 October 2017 in respect of the alleged offending recorded that SC Rae was the officer who “apprehended” Mr Carvana and SC Rae was listed first under the heading “Arresting Officer” but SC Simpson was also listed under that heading but after SC Rae. There did not appear to me to be any reason why SC Rae and SC Simpson would not have given truthful evidence, including in their statements made on or shortly after the day in question. Given his heightened emotional and physical state at the time of the events in question, it is more likely that Mr Carvana’s recollection was faulty. In all the circumstances and based on the evidence as a whole, I find that SC Rae decided to arrest Mr Carvana and did so.

Senior Constable Rae gave evidence in par 21 of his statement to the effect that he suspected that Mr Carvana had committed “the offence of obstructing police … in circumstances where he was preventing us from leaving the car park, initially by laying on the ground in front of the vehicle and later by standing in front of the vehicle, blocking our exit”. SC Rae also gave evidence that he was satisfied that it was reasonably necessary to arrest Mr Carvana in order to stop him from continuing to commit or repeating that offence. This satisfaction was said to be based on the senior constable’s belief that if Mr Carvana was not arrested, he would continue to prevent the police officers from exiting the car park by standing in front of the vehicle or otherwise obstructing the driveway. In this regard, SC Rae relied not only on Mr Carvana’s lying and standing in front of the police vehicle and conduct towards the police officers up to that point in the driveway but also on Mr Carvana’s attempt to prevent the officers leaving his office and the officer’s awareness that Mr Carvana had locked Ms Fawcett in the car park earlier that day, from the information provided over the police radio and in the video recordings depicting what occurred.

At about 2 pm, SC Rae spoke to Mr Carvana, stating his rank, name and station and saying to Mr Carvana that he was under arrest for obstructing police. He was cautioned and advised of his rights.

Mr Carvana did not respond to this but remained in the middle of the driveway. He was not handcuffed but SC Simpson called for a caged police vehicle to attend the car parking area. Mr Carvana was still saying that he wanted to speak to his solicitor. The caged vehicle and a motor-cycle officer arrived after a short time and Mr Carvana was taken to Wollongong Police Station.

During some of the time while Mr Carvana was blocking the driveway, Mr Carvana Senior was at the scene and Mr Carvana had animated conversations with his father about telephoning his solicitor. There was a dispute on the evidence as to whether at some time during the events in the driveway Mr Carvana Senior’s telephone was taken by police so that Mr Carvana he could not speak to his solicitor.

Mr Carvana Senior’s evidence in his statement was:

A slightly different version was given by Mr Carvana Senior in Ex 19. This version was similar to Mr Carvana’s account in his statement concerning this aspect of what occurred. Mr Carvana said:

SC Simpson’s evidence in her statement, prepared for the purposes of the criminal proceedings against Mr Carvana and not the present proceedings, did not mention her taking Mr Carvana Senior’s telephone. SC Rae’s evidence at par 23 of his statement was that at no time did he seize Mr Carvana Senior’s telephone, nor did he see SC Simpson do so and he did not believe it was seized. SC Rae’s evidence in this regard was not challenged in cross examination. Furthermore, it was his evidence that he did not know whether Mr Carvana Senior had his telephone with him, but he did say to his son that he could not call the solicitor because Mr Carvana Senior did not know his number. [38]

On the Carvanas’ accounts, Mr Carvana Senior’s phone was grabbed before Mr Carvana lay down on the driveway or while he was lying there. According to the police, they remained in the car during this period and only left their vehicle after Mr Carvana stood up.

Having regard to all of the matters relating to the relevant witnesses referred to above and the evidence as a whole, I find that Mr Carvana Senior’s telephone was not seized by police, in the sense of being taken and retained by the officers in the exercise of their relevant powers. I was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that either officer grabbed Mr Carvana Senior’s telephone. In any event, if one or other of the officers did take hold of Mr Carvana Senior’s telephone at some time while the officers and Mr Carvana were in the driveway, it was returned to Mr Carvana almost immediately. In addition, I was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that either of the officers said that Mr Carvana Senior could not make calls to anybody on his telephone as was contended by him.

While waiting for the caged vehicle and during Mr Carvana’s animated conversations with his father, SC Simpson noticed that he was motioning towards his chest. She asked him whether he was experiencing pain or discomfort and he said he was not, but he indicated that he had previously had a heart attack and that stress was bad for him. SC Simpson offered to call an ambulance but Mr Carvana declined the offer. To SC Simpson’s observation, Mr Carvana did not appear physically incapacitated at that time. An ambulance was not called at this time. I accept that there was some discussion of Mr Carvana’s need for medication, but I was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there was a specific request for Mr Carvana to be allowed to take his medication with him that was refused by the police officers.

At 2:30 pm, Mr Carvana arrived at Wollongong Police Station. In his statement, he said that he was “confused, upset, lost and obviously worried and anxious”. According to him, he was told, when he arrived at the station: “you know where to go”, and he responded: “are you guys on drugs, are you sure you have the right person, because I have never been here before, so where do I go?” and this elicited a stern response. If Mr Carvana did respond in this way, it could well have provided a basis for police officers forming the view that Mr Carvana was reacting aggressively and unreasonably, especially if the words “you know where to go” were actually spoken as a question. This was, in my view, the probable explanation of why Mr Carvana was instructed sternly where to go.

Mr Carvana’s details were entered into the police custodial system and a Custody Management Record or CMR was created. Acting Sergeant Victoria Elliott was the Custody Manager at that time and read Mr Carvana a summary of Pt 9 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (LEPR Act). Mr Carvana signed the Form 31 Summary of Pt 9, adding and initialling a notation: “(Read by Custody Officer to me very well! [word indecipherable] all sounds Good!)”. This would, in my view, have provided a reason for the officer to think that Mr Carvana was being flippant and antagonistic.

During Mr Carvana’s assessment on being taken into custody, it was recorded in the CMR that he suffered from illness, namely a prior heart attack and anxiety, and his behaviour was aggressive. This last observation was also consistent with Mr Carvana’s evidence that he found the questions asked of him by the officers completing the documentation “silly” and he said that “any silly question would be replied with a silly answer”. Once again, this probably gave the appearance of Mr Carvana being flippant and antagonistic.

On a visual assessment, it was noted in the CMR that he was in pain and complained of tightness of his chest and stress. Mr Carvana provided details of his medication and identified that he had heart problems. An ambulance was called and attended from 2:40 to 2:55 pm. The CMR recorded:

Mr Carvana’s solicitor, Mr Sinadinovic (incorrectly recorded on the CMR as Mr Sinadovic) attended Wollongong Police Station and spoke to Mr Carvana in private from 3:12 to 3:39 pm. Following that conversation, SC Simpson again offered Mr Carvana the opportunity to participate in a recorded interview, which he refused.

A/Sgt Elliott noted in her record of her inspection at 3:45 pm that Mr Carvana:

At 4:13 pm, Mr Carvana declined the offer of tea or coffee from A/Sgt Elliott.

At about 5:30 pm, Mr Minns (who was then a Sergeant of Police) arrived to commence his shift as custody manager, taking over from A/Sgt Elliott at 6:00 pm.

At 5:31 pm, SC Simpson checked Mr Carvana’s mobile telephone into the exhibits management system, known as EFIMS. In this regard, it is convenient to note here that on 26 October 2017 the Cellebrite downloading had been completed by 2:52 pm and the telephone was collected by Mr Carvana’s solicitor, Mr Sinadinovic, at 3:20 pm on 26 October 2017.

When Sgt Minns entered the charge room, he saw that Mr Carvana (with whom he had had no previous contact) was in the dock and the door was open. Sgt Minns noticed that Mr Carvana was lying on the floor instead of sitting on the seat, was crying and appeared to be very emotional.

In his statement, Mr Carvana described the situation at this point in the following terms:

On my assessment, while I accept most of the underlying actions set out in this version, Mr Carvana’s descriptions of his emotional responses to the actions were, in my view, a demonstration of his tendency to overreact to situations. This tendency, which pre-dated and post-dated the subject incident, was acknowledged by Mr Carvana when he completed Depression, Anxiety and Stress scale forms in 2010, 2019 and 2020. In those forms he answered that the statement “I tended to over-react in situations” applied to him during the preceding week either “to a considerable degree, or a good part of time” or “very much, or most of the time – ALMOST ALWAYS”. [39] In my view, Mr Carvana allowed his evidence to be coloured by his overreactions in this instance, as well as in others.

Mr Minns’s evidence was largely consistent with the underlying actions referred to by Mr Carvana but he denied putting his head in the cell and saying “that’s how you treat a criminal” and I would not find on the balance of probabilities that that occurred.

I find that, in accordance with his usual practice, Sgt Minns went to close the door of the dock where Mr Carvana was until he had been briefed about each person in the charge room. Without entering the dock, Sgt Minns told Mr Carvana that this was what he was going to do and that he would come back and talk to him after that. In pars 11 and 12 of this statement, Sgt Minns then described what occurred as follows:

I accept what is set out in those paragraphs but note that it is probable that Mr Minns’s “words … to the effect of ‘do not do that’” were more colourful than is recorded in his statement but were said in response to a perceived attempt by Mr Carvana to prevent him closing the door. I was not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that Sgt Minn’s reaction was unreasonable in all the circumstances.

Sgt Minns was briefed by the outgoing custody manager who informed him, inter alia, that Mr Carvana had been seen by the ambulance and was fine. The sergeant was also briefed by SC Simpson and SC Rae about what had led to Mr Carvana being in custody. Sgt Minns then instructed SC Simpson and SC Rae to proceed with finishing the charge process and preparing the Court Attendance Notice (CAN).

Sgt Minns spoke to Mr Carvana and told him what was going to occur.

At 6:17 pm, SC Simpson completed the charge process and CAN H65336205 was served on Mr Carvana. By that CAN, Mr Carvana was charged with the following offences:

The CAN contained, inter alia, the following:

At 6:20 pm on 18 October 2017, Mr Carvana signed the bail acknowledgement and three minutes later was released on conditional bail by Sgt Minns, with the appropriate paperwork.

In light of the evidence as a whole, I was not satisfied that it was established on the balance of probabilities that there was anything that occurred at the police station which involved any significantly demeaning or disrespectful conduct on the part of any relevant police officers towards Mr Carvana. Indeed, Mr Carvana’s conduct from time to time was such that it was likely to have been seen as flippant and antagonistic and this probably accounted for any sternness or harshness in the officers’ conduct that he perceived.

During the hearing, Mr Carvana, in effect, submitted that it was significant that the CCTV footage from the police station which showed the circumstances he experienced while in custody was no longer available. This was touched upon during the cross examination of SC Rae who explained that, if the CCTV footage was not recorded, or burned, on a disk or USB stick, it was deleted after six months. It was not established in evidence that what occurred at the police station as recorded on the CCTV footage was relevant to the Local Court proceedings nor was it established that the relevant footage had been put on a disk or USB stick within six months. I was not satisfied, on the evidence as a whole, that any relevant inference or conclusion could be drawn from the fact that the CCTV footage of what occurred at Wollongong police station was no longer available when subsequently sought by Mr Carvana.

The charges the subject of the CAN were eventually listed to be heard on 16 May 2018 before Wollongong Local Court. On that occasion, Mr Carvana was represented by Mr C Nicholls and a solicitor.

The transcript of those proceedings [41] relevantly included the following:

Mr Carvana relies on three causes of action:

I shall deal with each cause of action in turn.

In the present case, there was in effect no dispute that:

The State contended that his arrest was lawful, since it was authorised by s 99(1)(a) and (b)(i) of the LEPR Act. If the arrest was so authorised, this constitutes a defence to the tort of false imprisonment. The burden of establishing the elements of the defence fall upon the State: Zaravinos v State of New South Wales (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; [2004] NSWCA 320 at [12], [37], [38]) (Bryson JA, Santow JA and Adams J agreeing).

Section 99 of the LEPR Act relevantly provided at the time of Mr Carvana’s arrest:

In addition, under s 202(1) and (2) of the LEPR Act as in force on 18 October 2017, which applied by virtue of s 201(1)(a) of that Act, a police officer who exercised the power of arrest under s 99 was required to provide, as soon as reasonably practicable, the following to the person subject to the exercise of the power:

Finally, it should be noted that s 4(1)(a) of the LEPR Act stated, at the relevant time, that unless the Act otherwise provided, the LEPR Act did not limit “the functions, obligations and liabilities that a police officer has as a constable at common law”. One relevant aspect of the functions or obligations of an arresting officer at common law, which was also reflected in s 99(3) of the LEPR Act, was that an officer may only exercise the power of arrest without a warrant for the purpose of taking the person before a magistrate or authorised officer to be dealt with according to law to answer a charge for the offence for which he is arrested.

In New South Wales v Robinson (2019) 266 CLR 619; [2019] HCA 46 at [109] (and see also [93]), the majority (Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ) explained the situation, in respect of provisions which are not materially different from those which are applicable in the present case, in the following terms:

Consequently, in the circumstances of the present case SC Rae’s arrest of Mr Carvana would be lawful if:

The factual findings as to the circumstances preceding Mr Carvana’s arrest have been set out above. It was not suggested in the present case that SC Rae did not suspect Mr Carvana had committed an offence when he arrested Mr Carvana. In that regard, SC Rae’s evidence was credible and well supported by the surrounding circumstances. Having regard to all the evidence as a whole, I accept that he did actually suspect, at the relevant time, that Mr Carvana had obstructed police and committed an offence under s 58 of the Crimes Act, which at the time, relevantly provided:

As to whether there were reasonable grounds for SC Rae’s suspicion, a number of propositions have been established in the authorities which have dealt with s 99(1)(a) of the LEPR Act or substantially similar provisions in other Acts. Many of these authorities were reviewed by McColl JA (Hoeben JA agreeing) in Hyder v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] NSWCA 336; 217 A Crim R 571 (Hyder) when considering s 3W of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which relevantly corresponds in large measure with s 99 of the LEPR Act. In addition, the Court of Appeal has also recently considered the operation of this section in Hrdavec v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWCA 52 (Hrdavec). The propositions derived from these authorities relevantly include:

I have already accepted that SC Rae did actually suspect that Mr Carvana had committed an offence. Applying the principles referred to above, I am also comfortably satisfied that a reasonable person in the position of an independent observer, as a result of seeing Mr Carvana’s lying and standing in front of the police officers’ vehicle in the driveway effectively preventing them leaving the premises and doing what was required of the officers as part of their investigation, would have had, at least, a proper basis for suspecting, and indeed would in this case have suspected, that Mr Carvana was obstructing police in the performance of their duties, and thereby committing an offence.

Thus, in my view, both the subjective and objective requirements in s 99(1)(a) of the LEPR Act were satisfied in the present case.

Section 99(1)(b)(i) depends on the state of satisfaction of the arresting officer, relevantly for this case, that SC Rae was “satisfied that the arrest is reasonably necessary … to stop the person committing or repeating the offence …”. Accordingly, unlike the requirement for reasonable grounds under s 99(1)(a), “a challenge to the existence of a suspicion or state of satisfaction will only be available where it can be shown that the state of satisfaction was manifestly unreasonable, or ‘arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or not bona fide’, as explained by Gummow J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [(1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [131]-[137]].” (footnotes omitted): State of New South Wales v Randall [2017] NSWCA 88 at [13] (Basten JA, McDougall J agreeing on the question of liability at [142]).

As noted above, SC Rae’s evidence was that he was satisfied that it was reasonably necessary to arrest Mr Carvana in order to stop him from continuing to commit or repeating the offence of obstructing police. This satisfaction was said to be based on his belief that if Mr Carvana was not arrested he would continue to prevent the police officers from exiting the car park by standing in front of the vehicle or otherwise obstructing the driveway. SC Rae did not rely, however, only on Mr Carvana’s conduct in the driveway but also on his earlier attempt to prevent the officers leaving his office and SC Rae’s awareness that Mr Carvana had locked Ms Fawcett in the car park earlier that day, which was derived from the information provided over the police radio and the video recordings depicting what occurred and Ms Fawcett’s statement.

Given my assessment of SC Rae as a witness and taking into account all the evidence as a whole and my findings, I accept that the senior constable was satisfied that it was reasonably necessary to arrest Mr Carvana in order to stop him continuing to commit or repeating the offence.

Accordingly, the requirement in s 99(1)(b)(i) has been satisfied.

In light of my findings above that SC Rae was in uniform and that he told Mr Carvana his rank, name and station and that he was under arrest for obstructing police, I am satisfied that SC Rae complied with s 202 of the LEPR Act, when arresting Mr Carvana.

It was not submitted in the present case that at the time SC Rae arrested Mr Carvana he did not intend to take him before an authorised officer to be dealt with in relation to the offence for which he was arrested. No such suggestion was put to the senior constable in cross examination. Furthermore, after Mr Carvana was arrested and taken to Wollongong police station, SC Rae and SC Simpson attended and Mr Carvana was charged with the offence for which he was arrested, as well as other offences. As specified in the court attendance notice, Mr Carvana was required to appear before a magistrate in the Local Court to answer those charges but, in the meantime, was released on conditional bail. SC Rae’s intention at the relevant time can be inferred from his relevant conduct.

In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that at the time of arresting Mr Carvana SC Rae intended to take him before an authorised officer to be dealt with in relation to the offence for which he was arrested and, thus, s 99(3) of the LEPR Act was complied with.

As each of the relevant requirements has been met, in my view, Mr Carvana’s arrest on 18 October 2017 was lawful. It follows that, in this case, Mr Carvana was not falsely imprisoned on that day and his claim for false imprisonment must fail.

In light of that conclusion, it is not necessary to consider at this point the operation of s 43A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), upon which the State relied in the alternative. It can be noted, however, that in State of New South Wales v Madden [2024] NSWCA 40, the Court of Appeal recently held that s 43A did not apply in a case involving false imprisonment, because s 3B(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act was engaged by virtue of the fact that intent to deprive a person of their liberty involved an “intent to cause injury” within the meaning of that paragraph.

In order to be successful in his claim of malicious prosecution, Mr Carvana must prove on the balance of probabilities each of the elements of that tort.

The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution were identified in A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; [2007] HCA 10 (A v NSW) as follows at [1]:

Once again, I shall deal with each element in turn.

It was not in dispute that the criminal proceedings against Mr Carvana instituted by CAN H65336205 were proceedings of the type to which the tort of malicious prosecution applies and I accept that this is so.

From the fourth amended statement of claim, it appeared that Mr Carvana’s case was that SC Simpson, SC Rae and Sgt Minns or one or more of them was “the prosecutor”, that is the person who initiated and, if relevant, maintained the proceedings.

It was evident from the CAN itself that SC Simpson was nominated as the “prosecutor” in respect of the four charges, sequences 1, 2, 3 and 4 listed in the CAN, which have been set out above. In addition, the State has accepted that it will be vicariously liable in respect of any tortious liability of SC Simpson as a result of her involvement in the relevant events on 18 October 2017. Based on my findings as to what occurred on that day and the description of SC Simpson as “prosecutor”, I am satisfied that SC Simpson was the prosecutor who initiated the proceedings. As to SC Rae, while he was listed as the apprehending officer and the first of the arresting officers on CAN H65336205, his involvement appears to have been more indirect or peripheral in issuing and serving the CAN. In those circumstances, I was not satisfied that he was relevantly the prosecutor who initiated the proceedings or, in so far as it may be relevant, maintained them. As to Sgt Minns, his only role in relation to Mr Carvana was as custody manager after taking over from A/Sgt Elliott and, in my view, he should not be held to be the prosecutor in respect of the charges in the CAN.

In any event, if I am wrong in that regard and SC Rae or Sgt Minns or both of them should also be considered to be a prosecutor, there was no dispute that the State would be liable for any tort those officers may have committed as a result of that involvement.

For these reasons, I am satisfied that SC Simpson, one of the persons in respect of whom the State was vicariously liable, was relevantly the prosecutor and thus the first element of the cause of action for malicious prosecution has been made out.

As noted above, in the Local Court Mr Carvana pleaded guilty to sequence 3, the intimidation charge and, on that plea being entered, sequence 1, the common assault charge, sequence 2, the obstruct police charge and sequence 4, the destroy or damage property charge were withdrawn. In respect of sequence 3, the Magistrate dealt with it under s 10(1)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (Sentencing Procedure Act).

Section 10(1)(a) of the Sentencing Procedure Act provides:

It follows from the terms of s 10(1)(a) and the Magistrate’s decision that Mr Carvana must have been found guilty of the offence of intimidation to which he pleaded guilty but, notwithstanding that finding, the relevant charge was dismissed without proceeding to conviction.

The State submitted that:

The High Court has held that any termination of criminal proceedings that does not result in conviction is favourable to the plaintiff for the purposes of the tort of malicious prosecution: Beckett v New South Wales (2013) 248 CLR 432; [2013] HCA 17 (Beckett) at [6] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.). At [6], their Honours explained that the requirement that the prosecution has terminated favourably to the plaintiff avoids the possibility of conflict in the decisions of the court trying the criminal charge and the court trying the civil action and they expressly adopted what was said by Professor Salmond: [42]

It does not appear that, in stating the principle in Beckett in those general terms, the High Court had in mind the situation that arises if a charge is dealt with under s 10(1)(a) of the Sentencing Procedure Act and there is, thus, a judicial determination of guilt but no conviction. Nor does it appear that the Court’s attention was drawn to a judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria which held that where an offence is found proved but no conviction is recorded, under a provision similar to s 10(1)(a), that will not amount to a favourable termination of the proceedings for the purposes of malicious prosecution: Cameron v James [1945] VLR 113 at 117 (Herring CJ and Gavin-Duffy J) and 121 (Martin J). [43]

The relevant consequences which might flow from the fact that the intimidation charge was dismissed under s 10(1)(a) and that the withdrawal of the three other charges was conditional on Mr Carvana pleading guilty to the intimidation charge were not the subject of specific submissions before me. Given the reasoning of the High Court in Beckett, it appears to me that the three charges which were withdrawn should be held to have terminated favourably to Mr Carvana. Nonetheless, in the absence of specific submissions and in light of my other findings, it is not necessary for me to determine those issues. Consequently, I shall proceed on the basis that it will be assumed, without deciding, that the second element of the cause of action for malicious prosecution has been established.

The requirement of malice, in relation to the tort of malicious prosecution, relates to the purposes for which the proceedings were commenced or maintained. In this context, malice can be described as acting for purposes other than a proper purpose of instituting criminal proceedings and such malicious purposes include, but are not limited to, purposes of personal animus, to punish the plaintiff or to stop the plaintiff bringing a civil action against the defendant: A v NSW at [55] and [92] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). A proper purpose of a prosecution is to carry the law into effect: A v NSW at [40].

Furthermore, the improper purpose must be the sole or dominant purpose of the prosecutor: A v NSW at [91]. Malice can be proven by inference, but conjecture or suspicion will not be sufficient to prove malice: A v NSW at [93].

In the present case, the State observed that, despite the requirement in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), r 15.4 that a pleading that alleges any condition of mind including malice must give particulars of the facts on which the party pleading relies, Mr Carvana’s fourth amended statement of claim did not contain such particulars nor were particulars of malice provided in any other form, despite the State pointing out the deficiency to Mr Carvana.

The fourth amended statement of claim:

Accordingly, as I understand Mr Carvana’s case, it was that malice on the part of SC Simpson, SC Rae and Sgt Minns or one or more of them affected the initiation or commencement of the proceedings and should be inferred from the totality of each of the police officers’ conduct in relation to him on 18 October 2017.

I have set out above my findings in relation to what occurred on 18 October 2017.

Given the respective involvement of each of the officers in the events of 18 October 2017 and the terms of the CAN H65336205 as explained above, I found that SC Simpson was the prosecutor who initiated the proceedings but SC Rae and Sgt Minns were not.

Based upon a consideration of my findings and the evidence as a whole, there was, in my view, no proper foundation for inferring that SC Simpson (or either of other two police officers), was otherwise known to Mr Carvana or was acting out of personal animus. Nor was I satisfied that she (or the other two officers) instituted the proceedings to punish him rather than carrying the law into effect by requiring him to face the charges listed on the CAN before the Local Court, which is a proper purpose for instituting criminal proceedings. [44] Furthermore, I could identify no other improper purpose which could be said on the evidence to be the sole or dominant purpose for SC Simpson (or either of the other officers) initiating the criminal proceedings by the issuing and service of the CAN. In reaching these conclusions, I was mindful of the fact that an allegation of actual malice is grave and this is one of the matters which must be taken into account in deciding whether the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities, under s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (which reflects the common law principle referred to in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34).

For these reasons, I was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that SC Simpson (or either of the other two officers) acted with malice in instituting the criminal proceedings against Mr Carvana by issuing CAN H65336205.

I was confirmed in this conclusion by a consideration of the material available to SC Simpson (and the other officers) at the time of the issuing and service of the CAN which included: the information provided over the police radio concerning the two 000 calls; the information provided in Ms Fawcett’s police statement; what was depicted in the video recordings viewed by the officers in Mr Carvana’s office; and what was observed and experienced at Mr Carvana’s office and the parking area and driveway by the two officers, including as recorded in their police statements and the COPS event report. It appeared to me that this information provided a more than sufficient basis for SC Simpson to charge Mr Carvana with the offences on the CAN. Consequently, malice could not be inferred from any alleged absence of support for the offences charged. Similarly, most, if not all, of this information was also available to SC Rae and Sgt Minns at the time of the issuing and service of the CAN and when they took any other relevant actions. As a result, there was no absence of evidentiary support for the charges which could have provided a basis for an inference that either of those two officers acted in any way with malice.

Furthermore, there was no evidence of other events that occurred between the service of the CAN and the hearing before the magistrate which would provide a basis for concluding that, even if the proceedings were initiated without malice, they were maintained as a result of malice (if contrary to my understanding of Mr Carvana’s case, he contended that the proceedings were maintained with malice).

For all of these reasons, I do not accept that the third element of the tort of malicious prosecution has been made out.

As to the fourth element that the proceedings were initiated or maintained without reasonable and probable cause, the High Court has held that an action for malicious prosecution does not lie where the material before the prosecutor at the time of initiating or maintaining the charge both persuaded the prosecutor that laying a charge was proper, and would have been objectively assessed as warranting the laying of a charge: A v NSW at [56].

The notion of “reasonable and probable cause” involves “both an objective and a subjective aspect”: A v NSW at [61]. Thus, “the material available to the prosecutor must be assessed in two ways. What did the prosecutor make of it? What should the prosecutor have made of it?”: A v NSW at [58]. Further, the inquiry has a “temporal dimension” requiring consideration of what material was available to the prosecutor at the time the prosecution was commenced or maintained: A v NSW at [59]; see also Beckett at [4].

Consequently, in order to satisfy the fourth element, Mr Carvana was required to show, on the balance of probabilities, either: [45]

As to the first, subjective element, because SC Simpson did not give oral evidence and there was no evidence that she lacked a belief that the material on which she relied did not provide a proper case or basis for prosecution, Mr Carvana had to rely on an inference that SC Simpson did not honestly believe that to be the case: see A v NSW at [61]. SC Simpson, like SC Rae, had personal knowledge of the police officers’ interactions with Mr Carvana, had heard the radio messages relating to Ms Fawcett’s 000 calls, had seen the video recordings of the interactions between Mr Carvana and Ms Fawcett and had read Ms Fawcett’s police statement, because they had participated in taking that statement. In addition in SC Rae’s case, it was not put to him in cross examination that he did not believe that the same information available to him provided a proper basis for those charges. Subsequently, SC Simpson and SC Rae briefed Sgt Minns and prepared their own statements and SC Simpson prepared CAN H65336205. In addition, there was no evidence which suggested that SC Simpson (and if relevant SC Rae) did not actually believe that there was a sufficient basis for the initiation of the proceedings as a result of the information available to them. In all the circumstances, I do not accept that Mr Carvana established on the balance of probabilities that SC Simpson, and if relevant SC Rae, did not honestly conclude that the material on which they acted in issuing the CAN provided a proper case for prosecution. Indeed, the evidence as a whole led me to infer that SC Simpson (and SC Rae) did believe that there was a proper basis for the prosecution.

In so far as it may be relevant, I note that it was not put to Sgt Minns that he did not honestly believe that there was a proper basis for the prosecution of the charges in the CAN. Moreover, I am satisfied that, if Sgt Minns were found to be a relevant prosecutor (contrary to my conclusion above), there was no sufficient evidentiary foundation for an inference that he did not honestly believe that the prosecution initiated by the CAN were not justified on the information available to him, which included his briefing from SC Simpson and SC Rae, the statement of Ms Fawcett, the video recording of the incidents and the COPS event report. All of that information and his conduct would lead me to infer on the balance of probabilities, if it were relevant, that he held the honest belief that the prosecution initiated by the CAN had a proper foundation.

As to the second, objective element, in my view Mr Carvana failed to establish that the material available to SC Simpson, and if relevant SC Rae and Sgt Minns, did not provide a proper foundation for the prosecution initiated by CAN H65336205. On the contrary, in my view:

For these reasons, in my view it was not established that the criminal proceedings initiated by the issuing and service of the CAN were brought without reasonable and probable cause and, thus, the fourth element of malicious prosecution was not made out.

Since Mr Carvana failed to make out the third and fourth elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, his claim on this basis fails.

On 18 October 2017, Mr Carvana’s mobile telephone was handed to SC Simpson so that she could watch the video recording and thus she obtained possession of it but it was not returned to him, despite his demands, until 26 October 2017. The case was conducted on the basis that, if SC Simpson’s seizure and retention of Mr Carvana’s mobile telephone was not lawful, the State would be liable for trespass to goods.

It is possible that the cause of action could more appropriately have been framed as one in detinue on the basis that Mr Carvana voluntarily gave possession of the telephone to SC Simpson but she unreasonably refused to return it on demand. [46] SC Simpson’s refusal would have been unreasonable, if she was not lawfully entitled to refuse to return the telephone at the time of the demand. Given the way in which the case was conducted, I have proceeded on the basis that Mr Carvana was claiming for trespass to goods and would be successful in such a claim unless it could be established that SC Simpson’s seizure of his telephone was lawful. Nonetheless, since there would have been no difference in the factual enquiry involved, I also accepted that if SC Simpson’s seizure of the telephone was unlawful and she was not entitled to retain it, the tort of detinue would have been made out in the circumstances of this case.

The State contended that the seizure of the mobile telephone was lawful on two, alternate bases:

I shall deal with each of these bases in turn.

It was accepted that in the present case SC Simpson and SC Rae did not attend or carry out any functions at Mr Carvana’s premises pursuant to a warrant.

In these circumstances, s 21 of the LEPR Act may be applicable. That section relevantly provided, as at 18 October 2017:

A “relevant offence” for the purposes of s 21(1)(b) included an indictable offence: LEPR Act, s 20(a).

In addition, as at 18 October 2017, s 202(1) and (2) of the LEPR Act, which applied by virtue of s 201(1)(a) of that Act to the exercise the power of search under s 21, required an officer exercising the power to search to provide, as soon as reasonably practicable, to the person subject to the exercise of the power the following:

The State submitted that the officers had authority to search Mr Carvana under s 21(1)(b) because, by the time they saw the video recording, if not before, they suspected on reasonable grounds that Mr Carvana had in his possession the telephone which was “used in, or in connection with. the commission of a relevant offence, vis [sic] intimidation of Ms Fawcett” and intimidation within s 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act was a serious indictable offence.

There is a problem with this submission. Even if the officers were authorised under s 21(1)(b) to search Mr Carvana that would not, by itself, have provided lawful authority to seize his telephone. It appeared to be implicit in the State’s submissions, but was not expressly stated, that the seizure of the telephone was said to be lawful under s 21(2)(b) because it was:

If, however, either of those conditions was not met, reference to the authority to search under s 21(1)(b) as a justification for seizure of the telephone would be misconceived.

Furthermore, in relation to the exercise of the power of search under s 21(1)(b), the State accepted “that SC Simpson did not state that she was going to stop, search or detain [Mr Carvana] at or about the time she seized his phone” but it was submitted that this did not render the seizure unlawful. [47] There is also a problem with this submission. If SC Simpson was exercising her power of search and in so doing seized Mr Carvana’s telephone, she was not required to state merely “that she was going to stop, search or detain [Mr Carvana]”. Rather, given that she was in uniform, she was required, under s 202(1) and (2), “as soon as reasonably practicable”, to tell Mr Carvana her name and her place of duty and the reason for the exercise of the power of search and seizure. Even though SC Simpson may have given Mr Carvana her name and police station when they first arrived and she informed him that she was seizing his telephone because it contained evidence of the alleged offences, she did not tell him the reason for the exercise of the power of search.

These two problems reflect a more fundamental difficulty for the State in making good the proposition that the seizure of the telephone was authorised under s 21 of the LEPR Act. That difficulty is that it was far from obvious that the police officers did exercise, or purport to exercise, the power to search under that section. What occurred was that the police officers, when they arrived and spoke to Mr Carvana, indicated that they wished to interview him concerning the incident earlier on 18 October 2017 but he insisted they go into his office where he voluntarily showed them a video recording on his telephone, which was handed to SC Simpson but which she refused to return when Mr Carvana demanded it back. The State submitted that: [48]

There is no definition of “search” in the LEPR Act, although there is a definition of “strip search” in s 3(1) which states:

Perhaps of more assistance is the fact that s 21 is found in Pt 4 of the LEPR Act and in Div 4 of that Part, there are “Provisions relating generally to personal searches” which include ss 29, 30 and 32. Those sections relate to searches, other than strip searches, and provided, at the relevant time:

These provisions provide content and context to the use of the word “search” in s 21. Furthermore, and although only limited guidance can be obtained from dictionary definitions of terms used in statutes, [49] the dictionary definitions of “search” relevantly include: [50]

In my view, given the text of s 21, its context (including Div 4 of Pt 4 and the definition of “strip search”) and the purpose of the legislation being to regulate the exercise of powers by law enforcement personnel and “to set out the safeguards applicable in respect of persons being investigated for offences”, as disclosed in the preamble, “search … a person” in s 21 should be construed relatively narrowly and consistently with ss 29, 30 and 32 as referring to examining carefully a person, including his or her outer clothing or other body covering found on the person but not body cavities, for things which are concealed or not obviously apparent. Merely locating something because it is handed to the relevant person when there is no such examination does not amount to a search within the meaning of the section.

SC Simpson and SC Rae did not examine Mr Carvana’s person or look carefully through anything that he was wearing. They did not do any of the things described in s 30 of the LEPR Act. In my view, there was no conduct by the police officers that could amount to a “search” of Mr Carvana within s 21(1) of the LEPR Act. Nor was there any attempt to exercise or any purported exercise of the power to search under s 21(1). Furthermore, the officers did not locate his telephone as a result of looking for it or for anything else on Mr Carvana. It was handed to them. Thus, in my view, the telephone was not “found as a result of a search under [s 21]” and the requirement in the last clause of s 21(2) was not satisfied.

I am confirmed in these conclusions by the fact that neither SC Simpson nor SC Rae gave Mr Carvana the information they were required under s 202 to give if they were conducting, or purporting to conduct, a search under s 21(1) and they did not comply with s 32(2) and (3) of the LEPR Act in relation to information to be given or co-operation to be sought when conducting a search. The absence of those steps being taken can be contrasted with SC Rae’s careful compliance with s 202 when he was exercising the power of arrest, later in the driveway. The clear inference is that if they had intended to conduct a search of Mr Carvana or thought they were conducting a search of him, the steps required by ss 202 and 32(2) and (3) would have been taken by SC Simpson or SC Rae.

The fact that there was no search has the consequence that the seizure of the telephone was not authorised under s 21(2)(b) because it was not “found as a result of a search under [s 21 of the LEPR Act]”.

In light of these conclusions, it is not necessary to consider the State’s other submissions as to why the exercise or purported exercise of the power of search under s 21(1) meant that the seizure of the telephone was not unlawful in the present case.

For these reasons, in the circumstances of the present case the seizure of Mr Carvana’s telephone was not authorised by s 21 of the LEPR Act. No other provision of the LEPR Act was said to authorise the seizure of Mr Carvana’s telephone.

The State submitted that, if the Court did not accept the State’s contention that the seizure of the telephone was authorised under the LEPR Act, the seizure was authorised under common law. The State relied upon the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693 (Ghani) and submitted that the circumstances in the present case satisfied the requirements for lawful seizure set out in that Ghani. It was also submitted that the principle in Ghani continued to apply and had not been abrogated by the LEPR Act.

In Greer v Commissioner of NSW Police [2002] NSWSC 356; 128 A Crim R 586 (Greer) at [17], Bell J summarised the circumstances in which the principles in Ghani may apply as follows:

The relevant portion of the Master of the Rolls’ judgment in Ghani at 708-9 was as follows:

Thus, where there is no warrant and no person has been arrested or charged, the five principles set out in Ghani govern the common law power of police to seize articles in connection with an investigation.

Ghani has been accepted in New South Wales as relevantly stating the law, not only in Greer, but also in a number of other cases including G H Photography Pty Ltd v McGarrigle [1974] 2 NSWLR 635 at 640 (Mahoney J) and the cases there referred to; Tye v Commissioner of Police (1995) 84 A Crim R 147 at 151 (Studdert J); and R v Elomar and Ors (No 11) [2009] NSWSC 385 at [54]-[55] (Whealy J). In addition, Ghani has been relied upon in the High Court on a different but related issue, without adverse comment in relation to the principles referred to above: Smethurst v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (2020) 272 CLR 177; [2020] HCA 14; 94 ALJR 502; 376 ALR 575; 280 A Crim R 356, for example at [118] (Gageler J), and [274]-[275] (Edelman J). The relevant principles in Ghani also appear consistent with earlier statements of the law including what was said by Wright J in R v Lushington, ex parte Otto [1894] 1 QB 420 in which it was held at 423-424: [51]

Nonetheless, Ghani has not always been held to be the law in the Federal Court or the Victorian Supreme Court. [52] Most recently, differing views in relation to the principles in Ghani have been expressed by the three members of the South Australian Court of Appeal in Middlin-Hannah v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 112. At [63], Kourakis CJ said:

Whether or not the weight of authority in Australia is for or against recognising the principles in Ghani, that case has been consistently followed in New South Wales by a number of judges at first instance and I accept that I should do so as well, especially as I am not convinced that it is plainly wrong.

In relation to the interaction between the LEPR Act and the common law, s 4(1) of that Act relevantly provides as follows:

Thus, the terms of the LEPR Act make it clear that the common law continues to apply, unless excluded expressly or by implication. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Tamcelik [2012] NSWSC 1008; 224 A Crim R 350, Garling J held in effect that Pt 6 of the LEPR Act by implication excluded the operation of the common law principles in Ghani. Part 6, which consists of ss 81-87, deals with search, entry and seizure powers in dwellings in relation to domestic violence offences. It was not suggested that Pt 6 has any application in the present case. Garling J’s conclusion was explained at [94]-[96] as follows:

In my view, similar considerations do not apply when dealing with s 21 of the LEPR Act. The powers conferred by s 21(1) and (2) are general in nature and are expressed to be powers which “may” be exercised by police officers, in relation to the whole range of offences identified in s 20, which includes indictable offences generally. Moreover, the ancillary powers referred to in ss 21 and 22 are also powers which “may” be exercised by police officers in certain specified circumstances. Section 21 does not on its express terms apply to items voluntarily provided to police officers without a warrant during an investigation and not found as a result of a search under that section. Nor do any other sections of the LERP Act apply in those circumstances. In my view, there is nothing in the text of s 21 or any related provisions which indicates that the public interest of the type identified in Ghani was intended by the legislature to be given no effect in circumstances where s 21 does not apply. Nor was there any basis in the context of s 21 in the LEPR Act or the scope or purpose of that Act for concluding that s 21 was intended to contain an exclusive regime for the seizing of items relevantly associated with the commission of an offence when police officers were not executing a warrant.

Accordingly, in my view, by virtue of s 4(1)(a) of the LEPR Act, the common law principles in Ghani continue to apply in New South Wales in circumstances where Pt 6 of the LEPR Act does not apply, there is no warrant, a police investigation is being conducted but no one has yet been arrested or charged.

Those circumstances arose in the present case because the seizure occurred in connection with an investigation being carried out by SC Simpson and SC Rae, there was no search warrant or other relevant warrant and Mr Carvana had, at the time of the seizure, not been arrested or charged. Furthermore, there was no entry into a dwelling in circumstances which would attract the operation of Pt 6 of the LEPR Act.

Therefore, I now turn to consider whether or not the requirements of each of the five principles in Ghani have been satisfied so that the seizure of the telephone was lawful at common law.

“First: the police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that a serious offence has been committed”: - As explained above, in my view, SC Simpson (and SC Rae) had information from the police radio broadcast, the video recordings on Mr Carvana’s telephone and Ms Fawcett’s police statement which provided reasonable grounds to believe that the offences of intimidation, assault and damaging property had been committed. Intimidation contrary to s 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for five year or 50 penalty units or both. Assault contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act has a maximum penalty of imprisonment for two years and intentionally or recklessly damaging property contrary to s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act attracts a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 5 years. These maximum penalties indicate that the offences potentially involved were not inherently trivial. In addition, intimidation or assault of a female by a male, which caused the victim to fear physical violence, is in my view a relevantly serious offence. Thus, I am satisfied that the first requirement has been made out.

”Second: the police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that the article in question … is material evidence to prove the commission of the crime”: – The video recordings on the telephone were manifestly material evidence which could prove or significantly assist in proving the commission of the offences and thus the second requirement was satisfied.

“Third: the police officers must have reasonable grounds to believe that the person in possession of it has himself committed the crime”: - Mr Carvana had possession of the telephone which contained the video recordings when he handed it to SC Simpson so that she could view the recordings. These depicted Mr Carvana releasing air from the tyre and interacting with Ms Fawcett in a manner which was consistent with her being caused to fear physical harm or violence and included Mr Carvana’s distinctive voice. In my view, this material provided grounds for a reasonable person to believe that Mr Carvana had committed the relevant offences. In these circumstances, I was of the view that the third requirement had been satisfied.

“Fourth: the police must not keep the article, nor prevent its removal, for any longer than is reasonably necessary to complete their investigations or preserve it for evidence. If a copy will suffice it should be made and the original returned.” As noted above, the telephone was the subject of Cellebrite downloading of relevant contents and was returned to Mr Carvana, through his solicitor, on 26 October 2017, shortly after the Cellebrite downloading was completed. While Mr Carvana did offer to have a copy of the video recordings made and provided to the officers, this offer was not taken up. The evidence disclosed that allowing Mr Carvana or his staff to make a copy and provide it to the police officers was not acceptable to them for three reasons, which I accept were genuinely held by the police officers. First, SC Simpson was concerned that Mr Carvana did not want her to see him deflating Ms Fawcett’s tyre on the recording and she believed he might attempt to remove that part of the video if the telephone were returned to him. Secondly, in his oral evidence, which I accept, SC Rae explained his more general understanding of the two reasons why an item such as the mobile telephone was seized and retained in the circumstances: [53]

“Finally: the lawfulness of the conduct of the police must be judged at the time, and not by what happens afterwards.”: - On the bases set out above in respect of the preceding requirements, I am satisfied that those requirements were met at the time when Mr Carvana demanded the return of his telephone but SC Simpson refused to return it. Thus, judged at the time of the seizure of the telephone, all the relevant conditions for lawful seizure were satisfied.

For these reasons, I have concluded that SC Simpson’s seizure of Mr Carvana’s telephone in the circumstances of this case was authorised under the common law and its seizure and retention until shortly after the Cellebrite downloading was completed were lawful.

It follows, given the basis on which the parties conducted the proceedings, that the State is not liable for trespass to goods, because Mr Carvana’s telephone was lawfully seized.

For all of the reasons given above, Mr Carvana has been unsuccessful in establishing any of the causes of action on which he relied. As a result, there should be judgment for the defendant, the State.

The State submitted that if it were successful, it wished to be heard on the question of costs. In these circumstances, it is appropriate for the parties to be given the opportunity to make written submissions and put on any relevant evidence as to costs within a short period, such as two weeks each. The question of costs can then be dealt with on the papers, subject to either party seeking to have an oral hearing on that question, if they so wish. If an oral hearing on costs is sought, the parties may apply to my Associate to obtain a suitable date for such a hearing.

Since Mr Carvana has been unsuccessful in respect of each of the causes of action relied upon for the reasons given above, he is not entitled to any award of damages. As a general rule, however, a judge should determine all issues before him or her even if that is not necessary to determine the proceedings. This is to be done in order to assist the appeal process and to obviate recourse to a new trial if an appeal is successful: PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2021] NSWCA 312 at [15] (Leeming JA, Basten JA and Simpson AJA agreeing) and the cases there cited.

For this reason, I shall address the relevant issues raised in relation to damages, on the assumption that, contrary to my conclusions above, Mr Carvana succeeded on one or more of his claims of false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and trespass to goods.

At the outset, it is useful to note how Mr Carvana pleaded and particularised his claims for damages.

Mr Carvana’s pleading of his claim for damages was contained in pars 35-40 of his fourth amended statement of claim as follows:

The fourth amended statement of claim did not include a claim for, or particulars of, aggravated or exemplary damages.

Mr Carvana’s claim for damages being limited to psychological injury was confirmed by his statement of particulars which was in the following terms:

Once again, there was no claim for, or particularisation of the facts and circumstances which might support, aggravated or exemplary damages.

Mr Carvana’s evidence in his statement concerning the loss and damage he claimed was largely consistent with the pleading and particulars and was as follows:

The evidence relied upon by Mr Carvana in relation to the loss and damage which he claimed also included:

In relation to Mr Carvana’s claim for psychological injury, he did not rely on any report from a psychiatrist or psychologist but did, however, rely on a large number of medical or psychological records produced on subpoena relating to his treatment mostly covering the period from about 2001 to 2022. [54] On the other hand, the State adduced evidence from Dr Doron Samuell, a clinical and forensic psychiatrist. Dr Samuell’s two reports, dated 12 December 2022 and 9 February 2023, [55] were in evidence and he gave oral evidence on 10 July 2023.

From the pleading, particulars and evidence, it appeared that Mr Carvana’s principal claims in damages related to consequential loss suffered as a result of psychological injury and his resulting inability to continue to perform his duties in relation to the labour hire business of Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd, his accounting practice and his interests in the properties at 37 Princess Highway and 17 Cambridge Avenue, Fairy Meadow which, in turn, were alleged to have led to substantial financial loss and damage as well as family distress and marriage breakdown.

There are at least two difficulties with Mr Carvana’s claims for such consequential loss and damage.

First, consequential loss and damage suffered as a result of intentional torts, such as those relied upon by Mr Carvana in the present case, are limited. The principles which govern recovery of consequential loss in such cases were discussed in State of New South Wales v Spedding [2023] NSWCA 180 (Spedding) and reiterated in State of New South Wales v Madden [2024] NSWCA 40. In Spedding, Bell CJ, Ward P and Adamson JA explained at [291] that, in cases of intentional torts in order to be entitled to damages for consequential loss flowing from physical or mental harm, a plaintiff is required to prove that:

In relation to the first requirement, for the reasons set out in more detail below, I was not persuaded that Mr Carvana proved on the balance of probabilities that he suffered any physical injury or any discrete psychological injury beyond a temporary increase in his symptoms of anxiety, as a result of the subject incident. Nor did I accept the increase in anxiety symptoms caused him to reduce his workload or any reduction in his earning capacity.

As to the second requirement and even if it be assumed, for the purposes of consideration of this point, that the tortious act or acts in the present case caused Mr Carvana psychological harm and this had the consequences for his business, professional and property interests which he claims, neither the facts that I have found nor the evidence as a whole provide, in my view, any significant basis for an inference that SC Simpson, or SC Rae or Sgt Minns actually intended to cause Mr Carvana any psychological harm of the type allegedly suffered, or any other mental or physical harm, or any harm to his business, professional or property interests or any harm to his family relations.

Furthermore, I do not accept that the evidence as a whole supports the inference that the natural and probable consequence of Mr Carvana’s being arrested, taken to Wollongong police station, charged and released on bail after approximately four and a half hours was that he would suffer psychological injury of the nature or extent alleged or that he would suffer loss, as claimed, to his business, professional and property interests as well as to his family relations.

Moreover, I was not satisfied that SC Simpson, SC Rae or Sgt Minns intended to cause a temporary increase in Mr Carvana’s anxiety symptoms. Nonetheless, it did appear to me that a temporary increase in Mr Carvana’s symptoms of anxiety was the natural and probable consequence of the relevant tort or torts, assuming that contrary to my conclusions above one or more torts had been established.

It is useful to note at this point that the damages for psychological injury are distinct from general, compensatory damages which may be awarded for the hurt or injury to the person’s feelings including mental suffering, disgrace or humiliation as a result of the torts in question. This aspect of damages is dealt with later in this judgment.

For these reasons, in my view, none of the types of consequential loss claimed by Mr Carvana apart from a temporary increase in anxiety symptoms should sound in an award of damages, if it is assumed that he should succeed on one or more of his tortious claims in this case. I shall deal with the quantification of such damages for the temporary increase in anxiety symptoms below.

Secondly, the evidence adduced in these proceedings relating to the issue of psychological injury did not, in my view, support the awarding of the consequential damages claimed (assuming such were recoverable), except for a limited award of damages in relation to a temporary increase in anxiety symptoms. Mr Carvana did not allege that he had suffered any physical injury and, on the evidence as a whole, I would not find that there was any such injury.

As to psychological injury, I was not persuaded that there was any medical evidence sufficient to establish on the balance of probabilities that Mr Carvana suffered any discrete psychological injury as a result of any of the relevant conduct of any of the police officers or that any psychological injury actually suffered by Mr Carvana caused him to be unable to perform his duties in respect of the labour hire business or the accounting practice or property interest such that:

I gave particular consideration to the medical and psychological records tendered by Mr Carvana because this was the principal, if not the only, evidence relating to his psychiatric or psychological condition which he put before the Court. I noted the medications, diagnoses and opinions referred to in those records and the apparent history and information provided at various times by Mr Carvana as recorded by the doctors and the psychologist. In my view, taken overall, those records were consistent with, and provided support for, the opinions of Dr Samuell who was called by the State.

As noted above, the only expert psychological or psychiatric evidence adduced in the present case was that of the clinical and forensic psychiatrist, Dr Samuell, who assessed Mr Carvana by AVL on 29 November 2022. Although Mr Carvana sought to raise questions concerning the doctor’s expertise or competence based on internet reviews of his professional performance, I do not accept that anonymous comments left on a website or websites concerning Dr Samuell constitute credible or reliable material upon which I could base a conclusion that the doctor lacked the required expertise to express the opinions that he did or that his evidence should be rejected as unreliable. Dr Samuell holds degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery and is Fellow of the Royal Australian College of Psychiatrist and I accept that he is suitably qualified to express opinions concerning Mr Carvana’s psychological or psychiatric conditions. I observed the doctor give evidence and there was nothing in his demeanour, presentation or answers which caused me to form any adverse view of his honesty or reliability. Indeed, I formed the view that his evidence was measured, credible and supported, where appropriate, by the observations and material which he identified. In particular, I accept his observations of Mr Carvana and the manner in which he interacted with Dr Samuell during their AVL consultation. In addition, in my view, the assumptions upon which Dr Samuell’s opinions were based, including the matters set out in the medical and psychological records which he reviewed for the purposes of preparing his two report, were supported by the documentary and oral evidence before me (which I have referred to in more detail in the confidential appendix to this judgment), and his conclusions were adequately explained in his reports and in his oral evidence. For all of these reasons and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I accepted Dr Samuell’s evidence as a whole.

I have set out my more detailed consideration of the medical and psychological evidence in relation to Mr Carvana’s claim of psychological injury in an appendix to this judgment which I propose not to publish on Caselaw or otherwise publicly disclose until the parties have an opportunity to consider whether disclosure should be permitted or restricted. This is because the evidence involved sensitive matters, the disclosure of which might adversely affect the mental health or safety of a person.

My specific consideration of the evidence and my findings in relation to psychological injury are set out in the confidential appendix. In addition to finding that it was not established on the balance of probabilities that he suffered any discrete psychological injury as a result of the subject incident, I also accept Dr Samuell’s opinions that there was no psychological impediment to his earning capacity arising from the incident on 18 October 2017 and that Mr Carvana did not have future treatment needs resulting from the subject incident. These conclusions were well supported by the medical and psychological records, relevant portions of which are referred to in the confidential appendix.

Dr Samuell’s opinions included that while there was a possible earlier onset of increased anxiety symptoms than would otherwise have been the case, this possibility was to be viewed in light of the fact that at around the time of the subject incident, Mr Carvana’s anxiety was already difficult control and there were concurrent stressors in relation to his daughter, his wife, his business and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). Notwithstanding the other factors referred to by Dr Samuell, based principally on the medical and psychological reocords relating to the relevant period, I accepted that on the balance of probabilities what occurred on 18 October 2017 and the prospect of a subsequent Local Court hearing did cause a temporary increase in Mr Carvana’s anxiety symptoms, largely commensurate with the duration of his counselling sessions with the psychologist, Ms Veleski.

For that increase in symptoms and the treatment required, I would assess damages at $10,750, being $10,000 for general damages and $750 for out-of-pocket expenses incurred for the treatment, if such damages were otherwise recoverable.

In my view, however, it was not established on the balance of probabilities that the increase in his anxiety symptoms resulting from the subject incident was such that he was thereby rendered incapable of working for any period or that his earning capacity was reduced or that he suffered consequential loss or damage as claimed. In my view, Mr Carvana’s other conditions, stressors and circumstances would have caused the problems he experienced after the subject incident, with or with the temporary increase in anxiety symptoms referrable to the subject incident.

Having regard to the findings in the confidential appendix and on all the evidence, I find that after the incident in October 2017, Mr Carvana was capable of working and had continued involvement in the provision of financial services to clients and has worked as a manager and in house accountant for a different labour hire business operated by Bizvis Pty Ltd for some time and probably to a greater extent than he was prepared to accept or concede in evidence.

Some aspects of Mr Carvana’s evidence in these regards led to confusion rather than clarity. For example, during cross examination Mr Carvana was asked questions about a website said to be current at February 2023 for an entity called “David Carvana Financial Services”, [57] about which the website stated:

Next to the words “Meet the Team” on that website, Mr Carvana’s photograph was displayed, along with the photographs of three other team members, and Mr Carvana is described as a “Principal” of David Carvana Financial Services. Also on the website, David Carvana Financial Services Pty Ltd is said to have the ABN 30623364134 and to be a “Corporate Authorised Representative … of iPraxis Pty Ltd” which is said to hold a nominated Australian Financial Services Licence.

During cross examination of Mr Carvana, that website was referred to in the following passage: [58]

Subsequently, Mr Carvana provided an Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) extract in relation to a company called “Lifestyle Financial Services Wollongong Pty Ltd” which indicated that: the ABN of that company was 30623364134; it had been registered on 12 December 2017; it was originally known as David Carvana Financial Services Pty Ltd; but, it had been deregistered on 20 June 2021. [59]

In addition, there was evidence of a facebook post by Mr Carvana on 29 March 2021, which he accepted that he had written. [60] The post stated that Mr Carvana would be presenting live videos, possibly seminars and interactive podcasts “advising of my proposed Senior Consultant role in the fields I have previously excelled in Tax Consulting, Financial Advising, Negotiating deals & Property/Investments views, to name a few.”

This evidence indicated that Mr Carvana’s business affairs since the incident on 18 October 2017 involved some complexity. Without clear and detailed evidence as to what occurred, when and why in relation to his accounting practice, it was not possible for me to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that what transpired in relation to that practice after the incident was caused by any injury that he suffered as a result of the incident. Furthermore, the medical and psychological records referred to in the confidential appendix do not support a conclusion that Mr Carvana suffered any inability to work or diminution in earning capacity as a result of the subject incident.

The picture in relation to Mr Carvana’s employment, especially after what was described as the merger of his accounting practice, remained obscure. In cross examination concerning his working and his accounting practice and its tax returns, there was evidence as follows: [61]

As this evidence indicated, Mr Carvana did not provide documentation which could have assisted to establish whether any injury he may have suffered had any relevant adverse impact on the labour hire business of Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd or on his accounting practice. The documentation relating to Mr Carvana’s employment and professional and business activities, before and after the subject incident, which Mr Carvana chose to put into evidence, was far from comprehensive.

In addition, there was other evidence which tended to suggest that Mr Carvana’s dealings with his accounting practice and the liquidation of Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd were not caused by injury suffered in the subject incident. For example, on 13 February 2018, after the incident and before the Local Court hearing, Mr Carvana’s general practitioner, Dr Wilkinson noted that during a consultation with Mr Carvana he informed him that “he has elected to sell his business and wants a lifestyle change”. In cross examination, Mr Carvana denied that the reason he wanted to sell his business at that time was that he wanted a lifestyle change. [62] It appeared to me that Mr Carvana perceived that this evidence did not assist his case and accordingly denied, in effect, what the doctor recorded. I did not accept that, on the balance of probabilities, this denial should be treated as accurate. Overall, I was left in some considerable doubt as to whether Mr Carvana’s subsequent dealings with his accountancy practice were relevantly related to any injury suffered as a result of the incident rather than a desire for a change of lifestyle or some other business approach. The medical and psychological records, however, provided a clearer picture and established, in my view, that the subject incident did not cause any inability to work, even in the fortnight after the incident, [63] or any diminution in earning capacity.

In addition to the absence of medical evidence supporting his claimed loss and the lack of documentation concerning Mr Carvana’s employment and professional and business activities and the unsatisfactory evidence that he did give, there was also no evidence sufficient, in my view, to establish on the balance of probabilities the quantum of his claimed losses in relation to the labour hire business operated by Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd, his accounting practice David Carvana & Associates and the properties at 37 Princess Highway and 17 Cambridge Avenue, Fairy Meadow, said to have been suffered because of any inability to work as a result of the subject incident (if contrary to my conclusion, such an inability had been established on little evidence).

As to Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd, the company went into liquidation on 24 May 2019 and was deregistered on 14 June 2021. The evidence adduced by the State and put to Mr Carvana in cross examination established that Mr Carvana beneficially owned 100 ordinary shares and 1 founder’s share in Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd, one other person beneficially owned 100 shares and a third person owned 50 shares other than beneficially in that company. There was no significant evidence that the company was put into liquidation because of Mr Carvana’s inability to work, nor was there evidence as to what happened in relation to the liquidation. Moreover, from Mr Carvana’s evidence in cross examination, I was also satisfied that Bizvis Pty Ltd, which also operated a labour hire business, was incorporated at about the time Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd went into liquidation in 2019 and was owned by Mr Carvana’s sister and brother-in-law, who have also been directors, and had its registered office at David Carvana & Associates and operated out of 37 Princess Highway, Fairy Meadow, for some time. [64] I infer that a labour hire business of the type previously carried on by Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd could have been, and probably was, carried on subsequently by Bizvis Pty Ltd. Mr Carvana worked in that business. In my view, Mr Carvana did not establish on the balance of probabilities that the liquidation of Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd was relevantly caused by any inability on his part to work because of any psychological injury suffered as a result of the subject incident.

As to his accounting partnership before or after the subject incident, not only were there no tax returns or other documents in evidence giving financial details relating to that practice, there were also no documents evidencing any transactions involving David Carvana & Associates, such as a merger or Mr Carvana leaving or being “thrown out” of the practice, as claimed by Mr Carvana. His evidence in cross examination included: [65]

Given this type of evidence, I was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that transactions involving the accounting practice involved Mr Carvana suffering any proven loss, or that any loss was caused by any inability on Mr Carvana’s part to work because of any psychological injury suffered as a result of the subject incident.

As to Mr Carvana’s interests in real estate, there was no evidence as to any actual transactions in relation to those properties at 37 Princess Highway and 17 Cambridge Avenue, Fairy Meadow said to have led to any losses and whether those transactions were related to the subject incident.

Furthermore, there was little or no reliable documentary evidence:

The absence of such evidence in these regards was made more significant because of Mr Carvana’s other evidence in cross examination was unclear in the extreme. [67] This included, by way of just one example, the following question and answer: [68]

I found this type of evidence and the absence of documentary or forensic accounting evidence which clearly set out what how Mr Carvana’s economic loss claims were to be made out made out difficult to understand in light of his qualifications and experience as an accountant.

While Mr Carvana did provide some personal tax returns for the years 2015/16, 2016/17, 2017/18, 2020/21 and 2021/22, and there was a marked diminution in income disclosed between the 2016/17 tax return and the 2017/18 tax return, I was not prepared to conclude on the balance of probabilities that this diminution was caused by any psychological injury suffered as a result of the subject incident, in light of Dr Samuell’s opinions and the information in the medical and psychological records, and the general lack of clarity concerning not only Mr Carvana’s involvement in his business, professional and property interests but also his reasons for engaging in various transactions relating to those interests during the relevant period.

In summary, in all the circumstances I formed the view that I could not be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Carvana had suffered any of the losses claimed in relation to his business, practice or property interests, whether as the result of a psychological injury caused by the subject incident or otherwise.

For all of these reasons, in my view, Mr Carvana was not entitled to recover damages for consequential loss as claimed, even if it were assumed that he had successfully established that the State was liable in respect of the torts upon which Mr Carvana relied. The only recoverable damages for consequential loss were limited, in my view, to $10,750 for the temporary increase in his symptoms of anxiety and the treatment required for that increase, as explained above and in the confidential appendix to this judgment.

As noted above, there were no particulars, identified as such, given in the fourth amended statement of claim or in the statement of particulars of any facts and circumstances said to provide a foundation for a claim of aggravated or exemplary damages, as required by rr 15.7 and 15.8 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).

In any event, in my view, neither aggravated nor exemplary damages would have been justified or appropriate in the present case. [69]

Aggravated damages are a form of general damages, given by way of compensation for injury to the plaintiff, which may be intangible, resulting from the circumstances and manner of the wrongdoing: New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; [2006] HCA 57 (NSW v Ibbett) at [31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Heydon and Crennan JJ). Relevant injury to the plaintiff for these purposes includes injury to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like: Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1 at 8 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ); [1987] HCA 47.

While aggravated damages are compensatory in nature and focus on the injury suffered by the plaintiff, exemplary damages are not compensatory and are awarded to mark the court’s disapprobation of the conduct and to punish the wrong-doer and to deter and, thus, they are punitive in nature and focus on the conduct of the person causing the harm: State of New South Wales v Cuthbertson (2018) 99 NSWLR 120; [2018] NSWCA 320; at [87]-[88] (Beazley P); NSW v Ibbett at [35].

In light of my findings, which have been set out above, I was not satisfied that there was any relevant conduct on the part of the police officers on 18 October 2017 which caused injury to Mr Carvana’s feeling as a result of humiliation or insult beyond that which is ordinarily involved in torts of the type relied upon by Mr Carvana and which would be encompassed in an award of compensatory damages for such torts. [70] Mr Carvana’s response to the relevant events appears to have involved overreaction on his part to various situations, including perceived sternness or harshness of the police officers. In my view, any sternness or harshness perceived by Mr Carvana was caused either by his surprising and unreasonable conduct, such as blocking the officers’ exit by lying down on the driveway, or by his flippancy and antagonistic attitude, while at the police station. Thus, any additional feelings of humiliation or insult perceived by Mr Carvana were not caused by the officers’ actions but by his exaggerated reactions which, in the circumstances, were not justified, especially in light of his conduct which precipitated the officers’ actions.

For similar reasons, I was not satisfied that there was conduct on the officers’ part which should attract the Court’s disapprobation or would justify punishment in order to deter.

Thus, there should be no award of aggravated or exemplary damages in the present case, even if it were assumed that Mr Carvana had succeeded in one or more of his tortious claims.

With those conclusions in mind, I now turn to consider the assessment of damages in respect of each false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and trespass to goods, on the assumption that my conclusions on liability are wrong.

Since Mr Carvana was a litigant in person, the State in its submissions implicitly assumed, and I accept, that he intended to claim, in addition to the consequential loss and damage pleaded and particularised, damages for interference with his personal liberty, his dignity and reputation, feelings of distress or humiliation or his right to possession and use of his property as a result of the torts on which he relied.

I shall deal with the assessment of damages in those regards, on the assumption that liability had been established, separately in respect of each cause of action.

In relation to damages that may be awarded for false imprisonment, it is to be recognised that this tort is a form of trespass to the person, it is actionable per se, regardless of whether the victim suffers any harm, and it protects and vindicates a person’s right to freedom from interference with personal liberty as a fundamental legal right: Lewis v Australian Capital Territory (2020) 271 CLR 192; [2020] HCA 26 at [45] (Gordon J); State of New South Wales v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 662; [2017] NSWCA 194 (Smith) at [153] (McColl JA, Leeming JA and Sackville AJA generally agreeing). Furthermore, compensatory damages for false imprisonment reflect not only the interference with personal liberty but also the adverse impact upon the person’s dignity and reputation and may be assessed by reference to, inter alia, the duration of the deprivation of liberty and the hurt or injury to the person’s feelings including mental suffering, disgrace or humiliation: Smith at [154] citing French J in Goldie v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2004] FCA 156; (2004) 81 ALD 422 at [14].

Compensatory damages for false imprisonment cannot, however, be computed on the basis that there is some kind of applicable daily rate since a substantial proportion of the ultimate award must be given for what has been described as “the initial shock of being arrested”: Smith at [155].

If it is assumed that Mr Carvana was falsely imprisoned because his arrest was not lawful, he would be entitled to compensatory damages for interference with his personal liberty, the adverse impact upon his dignity and reputation and hurt or injury to his feelings as a result of his being detained for the period of approximately four and a half hours between his arrest and his release on bail. As I have explained above, there was, in my view, no excessively demeaning or humiliating conduct on the part of the officers involved such as to attract aggravated or exemplary damages.

Examples of compensatory damages awarded in other cases of false imprisonment with some similarity to the present case include:

In all the circumstances of the present case and if it is assumed that Mr Carvana were found to have been falsely imprisoned, I am of the view that compensatory, general damages for that false imprisonment should be assessed at $8,000.

I have already found that Mr Carvana would not be entitled to any damages for consequential loss as a result of psychological injury or consequent loss and damage to his business, professional, property, personal or family interests, except for the $10,750 for the general damages and out-of-pocket expenses attributable to the temporary increase in his anxiety symptoms in the period immediately after the subject incident.

For these reasons, in my view, if Mr Carvana had been successful in his claim for false imprisonment, his damages should be assessed at $18,750.

In relation to malicious prosecution, it is necessary to note that, since this tort is an action on the case, in addition to the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution identified above, proof of actual damage is required: Rock v Henderson [2021] NSWCA 155 (Rock) at [109] (Wright J, Bell P and Brereton JA agreeing). In Rock, the Court of Appeal reiterated, at [14] (Brereton JA, Bell P agreeing) and [109], that the types of damages that might be recovered in malicious prosecution proceedings are:

In addition, as held in Rock at [14], once damage under any of those three heads is proved:

I have already found that Mr Carvana did not establish on the balance of probabilities that he suffered, except for a temporary increase in his anxiety symptoms, any psychological or other injury to life or limb as a result of what occurred on 18 October 2017 or his prosecution in the Local Court or that he suffered any loss to his business, professional, property, personal or family interests as a result of such an injury. Thus, no damages should be awarded under those heads, even if Mr Carvana had been successful in his claim for malicious prosecution, except for the amount of $10,750 explained above. Similarly, I have already explained that aggravated and exemplary damages should not be awarded.

As to other heads of damage, for the mental distress and injury to reputation inherent in facing criminal charges of the types in sequences 1, 2 and 4 in the CAN and any resulting injury to liberty prior to Mr Carvana being released on bail, I would assess the damages at $10,000 in the circumstances of the present case, on the assumption that Mr Carvana was successful in his claim of malicious prosecution.

Finally, in relation to Mr Carvana’s costs of defending the proceedings, he has particularised his claim as “LOSS $30,000 (guessing but could have been more)”. While there was no specific evidence on this topic, the evidence established that Mr Carvana was represented by counsel and solicitor in relation to the Local Court proceedings. Even in the absence of specific evidence about the costs actually incurred, I am prepared to allow damages by way of out-of-pocket expenses of $15,000 for the costs of defending the Local Court proceedings.

Accordingly, in my assessment, damages for malicious prosecution should be assessed in the sum of $25,000, on the assumption that Mr Carvana had been successful in that claim. If such damages had not already been the subject of an award of damages in respect of another tort, the damages awarded should also include $10,750, for the temporary increase in his anxiety symptoms and the treatment required.

On the assumption that the seizure of his telephone was unlawful and the State is liable to Mr Carvana for trespass to goods, which is a wrong to possession, the damages recoverable should reflect the fact that, unlike many cases of trespass to goods, the goods were not said to have been damaged or destroyed. In those latter types of cases, the measure of damages has been explained in Fleming’s The Law of Torts (11th edition, Thompson Reuters, 2024) at par 4.40 as follows:

As I have already noted, Mr Carvana’s claim in respect of his telephone may have been framed as a claim in detinue, rather than trespass to goods in that, although Mr Carvana voluntarily gave possession of the telephone to SC Simpson, she refused to return it on demand, assuming for these purposes that her retention of the telephone was unlawful.

This may have some significance because the categories of damages recoverable for trespass to goods have been held to be different from the heads of damage available for detinue: Pargiter v Alexander (1995) 5 Tas R 158; [1995] TASSC 62; (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-349 (Pargiter) (Zeeman J), which has been cited with approval in Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342 at [173] (Allsop P). In Pargiter, it was explained as follows:

In Williams v The Pell River Land and Mineral Company Limited (1886) 55 LT 689 (which was quoted in Pargiter). it was held in relation to damages for detinue as follows:

For the purposes of assessing damages on the assumption that Mr Carvana was successful in establishing trespass to good, I have proceeded on the basis Mr Carvana’s damages in this regard should be assessed as if it were a claim in detinue. This was because his claim could, without any prejudice to the State, have been formulated as a claim in detinue and damages assessed for detinue would be more favourable, or at least not less favourable, to Mr Carvana than damages for trespass to goods.

Furthermore, I note that the proceedings were apparently conducted on the basis that the telephone was owned by Mr Carvana and not by Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd or some other entity and I am prepared to proceed on that basis for the purposes of assessing Mr Carvana’s damages for trespass to goods or detinue.

I would assess damages for detinue, including not only the infringement of his right to possession but also for the cost of hiring a replacement telephone for a potentially indefinite period from 18 October 2017, because Mr Carvana did not know when it would be returned, in the sum of $1,000.

In so far as damages for other harm claimed by Mr Carvana as a result of being deprived of the use of his mobile telephone for approximately eight days were claimed (and it was not clear if they were), there are difficulties. Mr Carvana asserted that he needed his mobile telephone to call his solicitor and to conduct the labour hire business operated by Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd.

As to the first matter, it was not proved, on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Carvana suffered any loss as a result of not being able to use his telephone to call his solicitor, who in any event attended the police station within three quarters of an hour of Mr Carvana arriving there.

As to the effect on Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd of Mr Carvana being deprived of his telephone, if some business was lost to the company as a result of Mr Carvana not having his mobile telephone between 18 and 26 October 2017, that loss was suffered by the company and not by Mr Carvana himself. The company was not a party to the proceedings, having been deregistered, and nor was the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, [71] and that loss could not be recovered by Mr Carvana directly in these proceedings.

In addition, the particulars of loss relevant to this company which were given were to the effect that it “was formed in April 2004 and purchased a Labour Hire business for $200,000. Traded extremely well and employed up to almost 100 casuals per year. Voluntary liquidation without much debt in April 2019 – could have been sold easily for $500,000”. It was not suggested that this alleged loss was actually caused by the fact that Mr Carvana’s telephone was unavailable for eight days as opposed to Mr Carvana’s inability to perform his duties because of his alleged psychological injury, which I have already found was not established on the balance of probabilities.

Further and in any event, there was no evidence that any particular business was actually lost to the company as a result of Mr Carvana not having access to his mobile telephone for those eight days. In that regard, it can also be noted that, on the photograph of the signage relating to Emplus Solutions Pty Ltd at the premises, [72] a landline number, and not Mr Carvana’s mobile number, was given as the telephone contact number for that company.

In these circumstances, Mr Carvana’s damages for trespass to goods or detinue, on the assumption that SC Simpson’s refusal to return the telephone was unlawful, should be assessed at $1,000.00.

For all of these reasons, the orders of the Court are: