Sanjiv v Shah

1. [1]

   HIS HONOUR: This is the determination of four notices of motion. Two were filed by the defendant to a statement of claim and the other two by the plaintiff. The defendant and plaintiff were formerly, respectively, husband and wife, having separated on 1 July 2014. The plaintiff commenced proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the Family Law Act) in the Family Court of Australia (the FCA), as it then was, on 16 October 2014 and filed a statement of claim in this Court on 23 April 2025 against the defendant, seeking damages in negligence for alleged breaches of orders made in the FCA in 2019 and 2020.

2. [2]

   The defendant’s first notice of motion, filed on 8 July 2025, seeks orders that the statement of claim be dismissed, estopped from proceeding without leave of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the FCFCOA), permanently stayed or subject to a security for costs order. In his second notice of motion, filed on 2 September 2025, he seeks orders that the statement of claim is a vexatious proceeding and that the plaintiff be prohibited from instituting proceedings against the defendant pursuant to ss 7(b), 8(1) and 8(4)(d) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) (the VP Act).

3. [3]

   In her first notice of motion filed on 26 September 2025, the plaintiff sought a referral to the Pro Bono Panel and leave to file an amended statement of claim (ASOC). On 3 October 2025, Fagan J dismissed the referral application because the statement of claim did not disclose a justiciable cause of action and was doomed to fail. In her second notice of motion, filed on 20 October 2025, the plaintiff again seeks a referral to the Pro Bono Panel and leave to file a second ASOC. Subsequently the plaintiff filed an affidavit that had attached to it a third ASOC, without a notice of motion.

4. [4]

   I have determined to dismiss the plaintiff’s statement of claim and refuse leave to file any of her proposed ASOCs and her further application for a pro bono referral. I also make a vexatious proceedings order against the plaintiff in respect of any further proceedings she may seek to commence, directly or indirectly, against the defendant and an order for costs in favour of the defendant. What follows is my reasoning for these orders.

5. [5]

   To better understand the substance of the issues raised by the four notices of motion, it is necessary to briefly trace the litigation between the parties in this Court, in 2014 and again in 2025, and in the FCA (and its continuing successor, the FCFCOA) from 1 September 2021) between 2015 and 2025, which I shall refer to as the family law proceedings.

6. [6]

   From 2023, the plaintiff also commenced various proceedings in this Court against a firm who were her legal representatives in the family law proceedings in 2018-19 and again briefly in 2022. The defendant relies upon some judgments in these proceedings to demonstrate that the plaintiff comes within the statutory definition of a vexatious person. The history of those proceedings is outlined, although ultimately, I determined to disregard that evidence.

The 2014 proceedings against the defendant in the Supreme Court

1. [7]

   On 22 October 2014, White J, sitting as the Equity duty judge, heard an application by the husband (the plaintiff in that case) for the appointment of trustees for the sale of the former matrimonial home in Epping (the Epping property). The summons was dismissed with costs: Shah v Sanjiv [2014] NSWSC 1535. His Honour noted that the wife (the defendant in that case) had commenced proceedings in the FCA for orders pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act adjusting their interests in the Epping property sale proceeds. His Honour observed that although this court could exercise cross-vested jurisdiction under the Family Law Act pursuant to the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth), there would need to be “some very good ground[s] for it to do so”, since “the [FCA] or the [FCFCOA] are ordinarily the courts in which matrimonial causes should be instituted.” His Honour concluded:

The family law proceedings

1. [8]

   In this summary of the family law proceedings (and only in that part of the judgment) I will refer to the parties by their previously-married status, that is, the wife and the husband, which is how they were identified in those proceedings.

2. [9]

   On 12 February 2015, consent orders were made whereby the husband was to pay maintenance to the wife (the 2015 maintenance orders).

3. [10]

   Orders as to the division of the property of the marriage were made by consent on 30 April 2019 (the 30 April 2019 consent orders). At the time, the wife was the sole registered proprietor and occupant of the Epping property. The orders required the wife to organise to have listed the property for sale by blind tender within 30 days. She did not do so.

4. [11]

   On 5 February 2020, the FCA made orders appointing the husband as the sole trustee for the sale of the property, and his solicitors to act on his behalf in relation to the sale. The wife was ordered to allow the husband unfettered access to the property to prepare the house and garden for inspection by prospective buyers. The sum of $5,000 was to be deducted from the wife’s share of the sale proceeds to pay the husband for the costs of the application (the 5 February 2020 orders).

5. [12]

   The husband continued with the engagement of real estate agents who the wife had (belatedly) engaged. They conducted a tender process which led to a sale being negotiated for $3 million with a 2-year deferred settlement. Contracts for sale were exchanged on 1 April 2020, and settlement was to take place on 1 April 2022.

6. [13]

   On 17 April 2020, the wife lodged a caveat on the title of the Epping property and, according to affidavit evidence by the husband’s solicitor, refused to vacate the property before settlement. The husband applied for enforcement and a variation of the 30 April 2019 consent orders and the wife filed an application that the husband be dealt with for contempt. Both applications were heard together in the FCFCOA by Beckhouse J. On 5 December 2023, Beckhouse J dismissed the wife’s contempt application and the following day made orders to enforce and vary the 30 April 2019 consent orders (the 6 December 2023 orders): Uttar & Rajendra [2023] FedCFamC2F 1609.

7. [14]

   In her judgment, [1] her Honour outlined the history of the matter from the wife’s filing of the caveat on 17 April 2020, leading up to the hearing, referring to the Epping property as the Suburb C property. The reference to Arch Law is to the firm of solicitors representing the husband:

8. [15]

   Beckhouse J varied the 30 April 2019 consent orders by adjusting the portion of the proceeds of sale of the Epping property held on trust to be paid to the husband. On 8 December 2023, the wife filed a notice of appeal against the orders made by Beckhouse J. On 22 May 2024, Christie J dismissed the appeal with costs (the 22 May 2024 orders): Uttar & Rajendra (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 89.

9. [16]

   On 18 January 2024 (while the appeal against the orders made by Beckhouse J was on foot), the wife filed an application for leave to appeal out of time against the 5 February 2020 orders. On 19 February 2024, the application for an extension of time was refused, with costs, by Appeal Judicial Registrar Cameron (AJR Cameron) (the 19 February 2024 orders). On 8 March 2024, the wife filed an application for judicial review of AJR Cameron’s decision. On 28 March 2024, that application was dismissed by Austin J with costs (the 28 March 2024 orders): Uttar & Rajendra [2024] FedCFamC1A 46.

10. [17]

    On 28 May 2024, the wife filed an enforcement application concerning the 30 April 2019 consent orders, as varied by Beckhouse J in the 6 December 2023 orders, submitting that the husband had not complied with various provisions in each of them. The application came before Neville J for hearing, who noted at [3]:

11. [18]

    The two applications (the wife’s application for an enforcement order and the husband’s application for a harmful proceedings order) were heard together, on 17 and 24 February 2025. Orders were made on 4 June 2025 (the 4 June 2025 orders): Sanjiv v Shah [2025] FedCFamC2F 647. The wife’s enforcement application was dismissed with costs to the husband, the husband was to pay the outstanding amount, inclusive of interest and GST, of $41,965.10. From that amount, a sum was to be deducted for three prior costs orders made against the wife and the costs of the instant applications, which in total came to the same amount. Neville J also made a harmful proceedings order, in these terms:

12. [19]

    On the same date, Neville J made further orders, granting leave to each party to provide a copy of her Honour’s orders and reasons for judgment to “any Commonwealth or State Court or Tribunal before which there are proceedings between the Applicant and the Respondent”, noting that any dispute between the parties as to whether the reasons for judgment should be received is a matter for the relevant judicial officer.

13. [20]

    On 2 July 2025, the wife filed a notice of appeal against the 4 June 2025 orders, which was dismissed by Schonell J on 17 July 2025: Uttar [2025] FedCFamC1A 21. His Honour found that the wife’s notice of appeal was vexatious as defined in s 102Q(1) of the Family Law Act, because it was devoid of merit and had no reasonable prospects of success, and dismissed the application as a result.

The 2025 proceedings against the defendant in this Court

1. [21]

   I resume referring to the parties as the plaintiff (the wife) and the defendant (the husband). The plaintiff commenced proceedings in this Court by filing a statement of claim on 23 April 2025, which was two months after the hearing before Neville J and two weeks before her Honour handed down judgment and orders concerning the two applications on 4 June 2025.

2. [22]

   The statement of claim seeks damages arising from the defendant’s application to be appointed the trustee for sale of the Epping property (the 5 February 2020 orders) and damages in negligence for breaches of duties of care owed to her by the defendant to exercise reasonable care and skill in relation to the execution of the 30 April 2019 consent orders. The plaintiff pleaded five particulars of the claim in negligence identifying specific clauses of the 30 April 2019 consent orders which the defendant was said to have breached, each resulting in the plaintiff suffering loss and damage, which concerned the following: the manner of acceptance of the highest offer; the maintenance of a line of credit; the disbursement of sale proceeds; non-compliance with two of the 30 April 2019 consent orders concerning costs; a payment to a superannuation fund; and the preparation of the contract of sale of the Epping Property.

3. [23]

   In an affidavit filed 21 August 2025, the plaintiff explained the bases of the five sets of particulars, effectively alleging that the defendant did not comply with the 30 April 2019 consent orders as to how the Epping property was to be sold, which resulted in a lower sale price. The terms of sale included an extended settlement period which was contrary to a consent order obliging the defendant to allow a 42 day settlement period, with the consequence that an order that he pay out a line of credit with the Commonwealth Bank could not be discharged, causing the plaintiff to be responsible for further interest. The defendant cancelled his guarantee of the line of credit, which deprived her of funds she says she needed to comply with the 30 April 2019 consent orders. The 30 April 2019 order involving costs required that, from the defendant’s share of the sale proceeds, there was to be a dispersal of a set portion ($10,000) in respect of the costs order made by White J and ($2,750) for costs ordered by Senior Registrar Campbell. Further, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to comply with one of the 30 April 2019 orders that required him to pay a sum of money ($4,000) into a superannuation account (SRI Services Superannuation fund) for the plaintiff’s benefit.

4. [24]

   As to the reason that she commenced proceedings in this Court rather than pursuing remedies in the FCFCOA, she referred to the terms of Neville J’s harmful proceedings order and stated:

5. [25]

   The defendant filed a defence on 8 July 2025 in which he denied having breached the 30 April 2019 consent orders and pleaded that the statement of claim was properly characterised as a claim or proceedings against the defendant under the Family Law Act and therefore was an abuse of process in view of the history of the family law proceedings in the FCA and the FCFCOA.

6. [26]

   In an affidavit in support filed the same day, the defendant’s solicitor, Keith Spencer, attached sealed copies of the 4 June 2025 orders.

The 2023 proceedings against the plaintiff’s former solicitors in this Court

1. [27]

   In Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1675, Meek J heard an application by the plaintiff’s former solicitors, Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (CGL), to strike out or dismiss a summons filed by the plaintiff on 30 September 2024 (the second summons) as an abuse of process. Meek J summarised the dispute as follows:

2. [28]

   Meek J referred to steps subsequently taken by CGL to recover its fees, including it obtaining a judgment in the District Court, and continued:

3. [29]

   Meek J noted that on 31 August 2023, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), seeking copies of trust account statements and all itemised invoices. On 8 September 2023, CGL emailed her a copy of each trust statement and itemised invoice, although they claimed to have previously done so. On 18 September 2023, the plaintiff withdrew her application.

4. [30]

   On 20 September 2023, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court by summons (the first summons), naming CGL as the first defendant and an employed solicitor of CGL, Karina Ralston, who had most of the carriage of her matters, as the second defendant. The plaintiff sought six orders:

5. [31]

   The matter was set down for hearing before Meek J on 26 September 2024. In early September, the plaintiff indicated that she would not press for orders 1 and 5. The evening before the hearing, CGL received an email from the plaintiff attaching a proposed amended summons, seeking eight orders, including all six orders previously sought, although order 1 was reframed so that a referee would make the determination sought.

6. [32]

   The hearing proceeded the following day. Meek J refused leave to file the amended summons and, at the time of Meek J’s judgment, the hearing to strike out the first summons was part-heard, the parties to indicate their availability for further hearing dates. The following day (27 September 2024) the plaintiff sent an email to Meek J’s associate, copied to CGL, that she was “making preparation” to relocate overseas permanently from January 2025.

7. [33]

   In her second summons, that was filed three days later (on 30 September 2024,) the plaintiff named CGL as the sole defendant and sought 10 orders. It came before Meek J for directions on 29 October 2024. Mrs Young appeared for CGL. His Honour made eight directions. Four concerned a filing timetable. The other four were:

8. [34]

   A notice of motion filed by CGL seeking that the second summons be struck out pursuant to r 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (the UCPR), “on the grounds the pleading has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings against the defendant or is otherwise an abuse of process”, was heard on the first date of the hearing (10 December 2024). Meek J permitted CGL to amend the notice of motion to include an alternative motion, to dismiss the summons pursuant to r 13.4, since r 14.28 relates to pleadings, which a summons is not. His Honour ordered that the summons be dismissed and made an order for costs against the plaintiff.

9. [35]

   The proceedings concerning the first summons, filed on 20 September 2023, were determined on 26 May 2025 by Meek J in a comprehensive judgment (574 paragraphs and 445 footnotes) in favour of the defendant with an order for costs against the plaintiff: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 528.

10. [36]

    On 29 May 2025, that is, three days after Meek J handed down his judgment concerning the first summons, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion seeking three orders:

11. [37]

    The notice of motion was dismissed with costs by McGrath J on 13 August 2025: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 908.

12. [38]

    On 2 April 2025, that is, about 8 weeks before Meek J’s judgment concerning the first summons, the plaintiff commenced fresh proceedings against CGL by way of a statement of claim in the professional negligence list of the Common Law Division of this Court. On 2 November 2025, Harrison CJ at CL struck out the statement of claim as an abuse of process: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1422. CGL had submitted, and Harrison CJ at CL found, that the Anshun estoppel doctrine operated to preclude the claim of negligence against CGL, because it was unreasonable of the plaintiff to not have raised that claim in the context of the proceedings before Meek J concerning the first summons. His Honour’s judgment was handed down two days after the hearing of the instant matter. The parties were given a timetable to make written submissions, if they wished, concerning the judgment.

13. [39]

    CGL also sought an order pursuant to s 5 of the VP Act that the plaintiff not be permitted to commence proceedings against the defendant arising from her prior retainer of them in relation to the family law proceedings. His Honour declined the prayer, explaining:

The hearing of the notices of motion

1. [40]

   On 8 July 2025, the defendant filed, with his defence to the statement of claim, a notice of motion seeking that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to r 13.4(1)(a) and/or (c) of the UCPR; further or in the alternative, that the plaintiff be estopped from carrying on with the proceedings; further or in the alternative, a declaration that this Court is “a clearly inappropriate forum” for the plaintiff’s claim to be determined, and therefore that it be permanently stayed pursuant to s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW); and, further or in the alternative, pursuant to r 42.21(1)(b) and/or (f) of the UCPR, that the plaintiff give security for the defendant’s costs and, in the event that she fails to do so within the time set by the Court, that the proceedings be dismissed.

2. [41]

   On 2 September 2025, the defendant filed a second notice of motion seeking, by way of substantive orders, a declaration that, pursuant to ss 8(1) and 8(4)(d) of the VP Act the proceedings are vexatious; that pursuant to s 8(7)(a) [2] of the VP Act the proceedings be stayed and that pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the VP Act the plaintiff be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales against the defendant.

3. [42]

   On 26 September 2025, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion seeking a referral to a member of the Pro Bono Panel and leave to file an amended statement of claim (the first proposed ASOC). In a brief affidavit filed on 26 September 2025, the plaintiff attached her first proposed ASOC. The proposed amendments are to add “SRI Services Superannuation Fund” as a second plaintiff, “breach of fiduciary duties” as a cause of action and particulars of the breach, as follows:

4. [43]

   I note that the reference in par 11 to “both defendants” suggests that either the plaintiff intended to add the superannuation company as a second defendant rather than as a second plaintiff, or mis-drafted (if not misconceived) the particulars.

5. [44]

   As noted, that motion, in respect of the relief sought by way of an order of referral to the pro bono scheme, was dismissed by Fagan J on 3 October 2025. In an ex tempore judgment Fagan J observed:

6. [45]

   Since the statement of claim would inevitably be dismissed, his Honour’ reasoned that it would be a waste of resources to involve a Pro Bono legal adviser. The balance of the notice of motion, seeking leave to file the first proposed ASOC, was stood over for hearing by this Court.

7. [46]

   On 20 October 2025, the plaintiff filed her second notice of motion, again seeking a referral to a member of the Pro Bono Panel and leave to file a different amended statement of claim (the second proposed ASOC).

8. [47]

   The plaintiff’s second notice of motion was supported by an affidavit filed on the same date. The plaintiff annexed the second proposed ASOC. It does not comply with r 19.5(2) of the UCPR in that the proposed amendments are not indicated and, in any event, it is effectively a complete re-draft. The plaintiff retains the proposal of a second plaintiff (SRI Services Superannuation Fund). The causes of action are identified as: “NEGLIGENCE (CIVIL LIABILITY ACT 2002 AND TRUSTEES ACT 1925) LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES, DAMAGES, RESTITUTION”.

9. [48]

   Contrary to timetable directions for the filing of affidavits made by the Registrar, the plaintiff filed an affidavit on 7 November 2025 annexing a third proposed ASOC, which is also a redraft with no indicated amendments. The plaintiff did not file a further notice of motion in relation to the third proposed ASOC.

10. [49]

    At the hearing of the notices of motion, the defendant indicated that he was not prejudiced by the plaintiff reading her affidavit dated 7 November 2025 and relying upon the third proposed ASOC. I directed that the plaintiff could do so.

The issues for determination

1. [50]

   In canvassing the filed material from both parties, I will not refer to their competing affidavit evidence and submissions as to whether the defendant complied with orders made in the family law proceedings and various other side-issues, beyond their relevance to the issues for determination.

2. [51]

   Rule 13.4(1) of the UCPR is as follows:

3. [52]

   The defendant submitted that, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s characterisation of the bases of liability pleaded by her in her statement of claim and various proposed ASOCs, it is a re-agitation of issues that have been settled in the family law proceedings. The pleaded breaches of the defendant’s alleged obligations as a trustee in those documents are in fact alleged breaches of orders made in the family law proceedings and therefore the statement of claim comes within all three limbs of r 13.4(1) of the UCPR.

4. [53]

   In oral submissions, the plaintiff said that she had not previously made a claim against the defendant as a trustee for a breach of duty and continued:

5. [54]

   In written submissions, the plaintiff maintained that the statement of claim, as she proposed to amend it, was a genuine attempt to recover loss suffered by her and the proposed second plaintiff and that this Court is the appropriate jurisdiction for breach of statutory duties under the Trustees Act 1925 (NSW). She stated:

6. [55]

   The plaintiff resisted the making of a security for costs order, making the following submission:

7. [56]

   The plaintiff sought the Court’s indulgence as she is self-represented, relying upon observations by Kirby J in Re Attorney-General (Cth); Ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321; [1996] HCA 4 at 323 to the effect that the submissions of a legally unrepresented party require “vigilance, not impatience”.

8. [57]

   Proceedings that attempt to relitigate issues that were determined in earlier judicial proceedings may give rise to an issue estoppel. The plaintiff’s claim that the defendant should not have been appointed a trustee for the sale of the Epping property is, effectively, an appeal against the 5 February 2020 orders. The application by the plaintiff on 18 January 2024 for leave to appeal the 5 February 2020 orders out of time was disposed of by AJR Cameron (19 February 2024 orders) and, on the appeal of that decision, by Austin J (the 28 March 2024 orders).

9. [58]

   The plaintiff has also previously challenged, in the family law proceedings, the defendant’s compliance with his obligations pursuant to the 30 April 2019 consent orders. Those challenges were dealt with to finality by Neville J (the 4 June 2025 orders). On the basis of issue estoppel alone, the statement of claim is an abuse of process. Accordingly, the statement of claim will be dismissed pursuant to r 13.4(1)(c) of the UCPR.

10. [59]

    The proposed ASOCs do not overcome the basis of dismissal. The first proposed ASOC, in which a further layer of apparent liability (“a fiduciary duty”) is added, does not address the issues I have identified with the statement of claim; it would still be dependent upon orders made in the family law proceedings that the plaintiff has previously challenged to finality, subject to any further application by her to seek leave to file an appeal in the family law proceedings.

11. [60]

    As noted, the second proposed ASOC is a re-write of the statement of claim. Regrettably, the paragraphs are unnumbered. The plaintiff pleads breaches of the defendant’s duty of care as a trustee to perform certain functions that, I note, coincide with the defendant’s obligations pursuant to the 30 April 2019 consent orders, as varied by the 6 December 2023 orders, and the 5 February 2020 orders. The plaintiff also pleads that the defendant had a duty of care to comply with the cost order made by White J “and Family Court Registrar” which coincides with the terms of the 30 April 2019 consent orders. However, the defendant’s liability for that costs order was incorporated into the 30 April 2019 consent orders. The amounts outstanding from those orders were the subject of the orders made by Neville J (4 June 2025 orders), so that the issue of its payment has been resolved in the family law proceedings.

12. [61]

    The third proposed ASOC (also with unnumbered paragraphs) is a more elaborate re-write which nevertheless ultimately depends upon alleged breaches of duties of care arising from orders made in the family law proceedings. The essence remains a claim that the defendant breached his duties in failing to comply with the terms of the 30 April 2019 consent orders. The third proposed ASOC also refers to the 2015 maintenance orders, seemingly pleading that the defendant did not comply with those orders as well.

13. [62]

    Accordingly, leaving aside procedural impediments to granting leave to amend, none of the three proposed ASOCs overcome the fundamental flaws with the statement of claim. It follows that the plaintiff’s renewed prayer for a referral to the pro bono scheme is dismissed.

14. [63]

    The logical next prayer to consider is the defendant’s application for relief in the form of a vexatious proceedings order, since acquiesce to those prayers, renders it unnecessary to consider a permanent stay.

Whether the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant

1. [64]

   Section 8 of the Act relevantly provides:

2. [65]

   “Proceedings” is defined broadly, in s 4 of the Act, as follows:

3. [66]

   “Vexatious proceedings” is also defined in s 6:

4. [67]

   In Attorney General for NSW v Singh [2024] NSWSC 449, I referred to authority as to how the provisions of the VP Act in an application for a vexatious proceedings order are to be applied, which I extract.

5. [68]

   The plaintiff submits that an examination of the proceedings relied upon, in particular some of the judgments delivered in those proceedings, establishes that they were vexatious and of such frequency (although not great in number) and persistence that a vexatious proceedings order is warranted.

6. [69]

   The plaintiff submitted in writing that she has only been declared vexatious on one occasion (the judgment of Schonell J), and that the proceedings before Beckhouse J and Neville J could not be characterised as “frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance or fanciful”, nor could it have been said of those proceedings that they “must fail”, because she was “partially successful” in both cases. She noted that in Vito Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; Nina Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317 at [197], Simpson AJA (McColl and Macfarlan JJA agreeing) noted that two cases would not ordinarily establish the necessary frequency for an order under the VP Act to be made.

7. [70]

   In his written submissions dated 22 September 2025, the defendant submitted that if the Court is minded to make a vexatious proceedings order, it should extend to a prohibition on the plaintiff instituting proceedings through or in the name of the trustee of SRI Services Superannuation Fund, through or in the name of any other entity controlled by the plaintiff or through a person or entity acting in concert with the plaintiff. In his submissions dated 3 December 2025, the defendant submitted that in view of the 2024 proceedings against the plaintiff’s former solicitors, such an order should be broader; it should extend to a prohibition on the plaintiff, or any person or entity controlled by or acting in concert with her, commencing or continuing with any proceedings against any person or entity in any way arising out of or connected with the plaintiff’s matrimonial property dispute with the defendant. The plaintiff did not respond to that submission.

8. [71]

   Beckhouse J’s judgment is not relied upon by the husband as being vexatious, although since the wife has raised it, I note that the wife’s submission that she was “partially successful” in that case is to be understood in the context that her Honour dismissed all four counts of her contempt application and upheld the husband’s enforcement and variation applications. Her Honour noted at [129] that “the husband has not been completely successful” because the wife correctly sought to be paid an additional amount for outstanding spousal maintenance and an outstanding costs order, however: “Whilst not contained in his initial application, the husband made this concession prior to the hearing.”

9. [72]

   The husband submits that the following family law proceedings come within s 6 of the VP Act. I make my determination in relation to each proceeding.

10. [73]

    In Uttar & Rajendra (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 89 on 22 May 2024, Christie J said that the wife “is plainly aggrieved by a number of matters which could never be addressed on appeal.” Her Honour identified those matters and continued:

11. [74]

    Her Honour referred to the absence of proper bases of appeal. The wife objected to a costs order made against her but had not pointed to any error in the process by which the discretion to make the order was exercised. As to a ground contending that the primary judge, Beckhouse J, made “jurisdictional errors” and “lacked jurisdiction”, Christie J was unable to determine from the wife’s submissions the basis of those assertions. As to a ground that the primary judge erred in failing to order on its own motion leave to take specific actions on her own motion, Christie J said: “This ground needs only to be articulated to be rejected.” Christie J described another ground, that contended that the primary judge “erred in all findings and conclusions and erred in making of all orders”, as a global assertion of factual error that was incompetent and would not be further considered.

12. [75]

    I am satisfied, on the basis of Christie J’s judgment, that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground: s 6(c) of the VPA.

13. [76]

    The wife advanced three grounds for an extension of time in which to file an appeal against the 5 February 2020 orders:

14. [77]

    In his judgment dated 19 February 2024 refusing the wife’s application, AJR Cameron noted that the first ground “is not a competent ground of appeal” since “[t]he issue of extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal against the primary orders is the subject of the application currently before the court. … Asserting that an appeal has reasonable prospects of success does not make it so.” AJR Cameron concluded: “This proposed ground of appeal has no prospect of success, is entirely devoid of merit and is doomed to fail.”

15. [78]

    As to ground 2, AJR Cameron observed:

16. [79]

    Ground 3 was similarly dismissed:

17. [80]

    AJR Cameron concluded:

18. [81]

    I am satisfied, on the basis of AJR Cameron’s judgment, that those proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground: s 6(c) of the VP Act.

19. [82]

    The appeal of AJR Cameron’s orders was in the form of a de novo hearing of the wife’s three grounds extracted at [76*].

20. [83]

    Austin J made the following observation of the wife’s application.

21. [84]

    As to the three grounds advanced before AJR Cameron and reconsidered de novo, Austin J said:

22. [85]

    His Honour concluded:

23. [86]

    I am satisfied, on the basis of Austin J’s judgment, that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground: s 6(c) of the VP Act.

24. [87]

    Neville J observed at the outset of his judgment that “This matter has had a long, complex and litigious history.” As to the wife’s position in respect of the husband’s application for a harmful proceedings order, Neville J recorded at [160]: “The wife contended that there is no need to make a harmful proceedings order, because she has no intention of returning to Court again in relation to property or any other issue.” Her Honour later concluded, somewhat presciently:

25. [88]

    The plaintiff submitted that she was “partly successful” before Neville J and therefore it was an inappropriate basis to find that the proceedings came within s 6 of the VP Act. I presume that she refers to the husband having conceded in the hearing before Neville J that there was an underpayment of $38,179.10 by him that arose from a double counting error and that he was liable for interest on that amount, as well. However, I note that the amount ($41,965.10) was completely offset by costs orders against the wife and the findings made against the wife by Neville J above and, as noted by Neville J at [206] of her judgment, had the wife accepted an offer by the husband to resolve the double payment, she would have been financially better off than she was by litigating the matter.

26. [89]

    I am satisfied, on the basis of Neville J’s judgment, that those proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground: s 6(c) of the VP Act.

27. [90]

    In Uttar [2025] FedCFamC1A 21, in refusing leave, Schonell J said at [41]:

28. [91]

    I am satisfied, on the basis of Schonell J’s judgment, that those proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground: s 6(c) of the VP Act.

29. [92]

    I have concluded that these proceedings, which are relied upon by the defendant, have marginal relevance to the current application for a vexatious proceeding order by the defendant and therefore I do not make a determination as to whether they are vexatious.

30. [93]

    In Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1675, in considering the relief sought in the new summons, Meek J said:

31. [94]

    In Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 908, McGrath J said:

32. [95]

    Finally, as noted above, Harrison CJ at CL found that the plaintiff’s statement of claim filed on 2 April 2025 in this Court was an abuse of process although he declined to make a vexatious proceedings order in favour of CGL.

Determination

1. [96]

   Although the statement of claim is the only proceeding that the plaintiff has commenced against the defendant in this Court, it was filed by her in anticipation of Neville J blocking her from continuing to litigate in the family law proceedings without leave. Indeed, she has conceded with candour that is why she filed the statement of claim.

2. [97]

   As to the first three steps that were identified in Zepinic, I have found that the defendant has repeatedly commenced family law proceedings against the defendant that have been determined to be devoid of merit and doomed to fail, so that the defendant has been put to unnecessary cost and stress. The instant proceedings in this Court may be characterised in the same way. They are a a continuation of the pattern of litigating against the defendant in respect of past orders made in the family law proceedings with no prospect of substantive success. Accordingly, pursuant to s 8(1)(a), I am satisfied that the plaintiff has frequently instituted and conducted proceedings that are vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and/or (c) and (d) of the VP Act.

3. [98]

   The defendant had submitted that some proceedings came within s 6(b) of the VP Act, that is, that they were instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose. There is a subjective element of intent to s 6(b) that is not made out on the balance of probabilities, although objectively, I have no doubt that the proceedings in question did in fact cause harassment, unreasonable annoyance, delay and detriment, and therefore that they came within s 6(d) of the VP Act.

4. [99]

   In so finding, I disregard the 2024 proceedings by the plaintiff against her former solicitors. In my view, they are only of tangential relevance since they do not involve the defendant and therefore do not directly inform the issues to be resolved in this application. Whether those proceedings warranted a vexatious proceedings order against the plaintiff was determined in the negative by Harrison CJ at CL, although his Honour did not have before him the family law proceedings or the 2025 proceedings against the defendant in this Court.

5. [100]

   I am satisfied that the defendant has established the necessary foundation for the plaintiff to be declared vexatious insofar as she may seek to commence further proceedings against the defendant.

6. [101]

   As to the fourth step identified in Zepinic, the terms of s 8(1) (“An authorised court may make an order under this section”) allow for a discretion to be exercised by the Court to not make an order, even though there is a proper basis to do so. In view of the plaintiff’s track record in the family law proceedings of commencing proceedings with no merit, filing her statement of claim in this Court two weeks before Neville J’s judgment was handed down and the flurry of proposed ASOCs over the three months before the hearing of the notices of motion, I have no doubt that in the absence of a vexatious proceeding order being made against her pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the VP Act, the plaintiff would continue to initiate proceedings against the defendant that, in essence, would revisit issues that have been settled in the family court proceedings.

7. [102]

   As noted, in her submissions resisting an order for security of costs in respect of her statement of claim, the plaintiff referred to her proposed second plaintiff (SRI Services Superannuation Fund) as having as strong a case as her and on an identical basis against the defendant. I am minded to accede to the defendant’s submission that the vexatious proceedings order should be expressed so as to exclude the plaintiff from attempting to circumvent it by effectively commencing a fresh action through SRI Services Superannuation Fund or another entity controlled by her.

8. [103]

   I note that the defendant seeks an order for indemnity costs and an opportunity to be head further on that application. I will make an order for costs. Whether there should be an order for indemnity costs will need to be heard separately.

9. [104]

   Accordingly, I make the following orders.

   1. (1)

      Pursuant to the defendant’s motion filed on 8 July 2025, the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff on 23 April 2025, is dismissed;

   2. (2)

      The plaintiff’s two notices of motion, filed on 26 September 2025 and 20 October 2025, are dismissed;

   3. (3)

      As to the defendant’s motion filed on 2 September 2025, the Court orders that pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), Rekha Sanjiv is prohibited from instituting proceedings in her own name or through or in the name of SRI Services Superannuation Fund or any other entity controlled by the plaintiff, in New South Wales, against Sanjiv Shah other than with leave of an appropriate court under that Act; and

   4. (4)

      The plaintiff is to pay the costs of the four notices of motion.