R v Walker (Sentence)

1. [1]

   HIS HONOUR: On the night of 9 April 1998 there were no doubt many children of an age similar to Arthur Haines excited to be going to the Sydney Royal Easter show the next day. Unlike those children, Arthur [1] did not attend the Easter Show. Nor did he have the opportunity to enjoy the remainder of his childhood or to fulfil his promise into adulthood. Instead, as a result of the offender throwing a Molotov cocktail into the backyard of the home in which he was sleeping, Arthur was trapped on an upper level of the house as it was engulfed in flames. He suffered severe burns before jumping in desperation from an upper level. He never recovered from his injuries. He died on 29 June 1998. Gregory John Walker, having pleaded guilty to the offence of manslaughter, now stands to be sentenced for his responsibility for Arthur’s death.

2. [2]

   The offender is guilty of manslaughter [2] on the basis that throwing the Molotov cocktail into the backyard of the premises was unlawful and dangerous in the sense that a reasonable person in the position of the offender would have appreciated that it was an act that exposed another person to a risk of serious injury.

3. [3]

   The offender has asked that in sentencing him for the offence of manslaughter, I take into account a further offence on a Form 1, under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (the Sentencing Act), of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm [3] on Nathaniel Barker on or about 19 April 1998. That offence will be taken into account.

4. [4]

   No sentence that I impose can right the wrong that has been done. No value can be put on the life of Arthur in terms of years of imprisonment or otherwise. What I am required to do, as best I can, to arrive at a result that does justice in the particular circumstances of this case, is to take into account all relevant matters having regard to the various purposes of sentencing as set out in s 3A of the Sentencing Act noting that, at times, those purposes will pull in different directions.

5. [5]

   In determining a sentence, to the extent that I make findings adverse to the offender, such matters are to be established beyond reasonable doubt. Matters relied on in mitigation are to be established on the balance of probabilities.

6. [6]

   As Arthur was a child at the time of his death there would ordinarily be a prohibition on publishing his name. [4] However, Arthur’s mother, Julie Szabo, has consented to the publication or broadcasting of his name, and the prohibition does not apply. [5] A number of other persons who are witnesses or are otherwise mentioned in these proceedings were also children at the time and cannot be named. That prohibition extends to any information that “is likely to lead to the identification of” [6] those persons to the effect that the parents of those children will also be anonymised. [7]

The sentencing proceedings

1. [7]

   The proceedings on sentence took place on 10 December 2025. Both parties provided written submissions and made oral submissions to the Court. The Crown tendered three bundles [8] comprising the indictment and the Form 1, a statement of agreed facts, the criminal and custodial histories of the offender, a Court of Criminal Appeal judgment in respect of the offender, the crime scene photographs, and a victim impact statement provided by Ms Szabo, which contained images of her and of Arthur. The Crown tendered, in addition, the statement of Detective Chief Inspector John Bamford, which discussed the requirement for protective custody for persons charged with offences similar to that here. The offender tendered one bundle [9] comprising an apology letter authored by the offender, a psychological report, affidavits of the offender’s solicitor and his ex-wife Sharon Dwyer, and nine references provided to the Court by persons known to the offender. The victim impact statement of Ms Szabo was read out to the Court by the Crown Prosecutor.

The agreed facts

1. [8]

   As I have said, a statement of agreed facts was tendered by the Crown at the sentence hearing. What follows is taken from those facts.

2. [9]

   In April 1998, JM lived in a three-level terrace at 132 Walker Street, Waterloo. The house had a rear garden which backed onto a laneway called Beaumont Street.

3. [10]

   JM lived at 132 Walker Street with her son AC, who was aged 10 at the time, and her daughter LM, who was not yet two years old. WJ, then aged 13, was friendly with AC and had moved in with JM some months prior to the fire. Arthur, who was also aged 13, was WJ’s best friend. The three boys, Arthur, AC, and WJ, were friends and would play in the neighbourhood together.

4. [11]

   JM’s immediate neighbours at 130 Walker Street were Faye Dwyer and her adult sons Robert and Troy Dockett. Ms Dwyer’s daughter, Sharon Dwyer, lived nearby with her partner, the offender, at 116 Walker Street. In about mid-1997, there was a falling out between JM and Ms Dwyer, from which time they each alleged the other had been abusive or threatening. An apprehended violence order was taken out against JM for the protection of Ms Dwyer. Residents of Walker Street took sides, aligning themselves with either JM or Ms Dwyer.

5. [12]

   On 8 April 1998, there was a verbal altercation between JM, Ms Dwyer and a friend of Ms Dwyer’s, a Peter Smith. Mr Smith threw a rock into the rear of JM’s house, breaking the glass of the rear sliding doors.

6. [13]

   About 8.00am on the morning of 9 April 1998, Ms Dwyer saw her daughter Sharon crying. Sharon Dwyer showed Ms Dwyer her car, which had red and black paint tipped over it. Other members of the neighbourhood, including the offender, were present and gathered around the car. Another altercation between JM and Ms Dwyer’s family occurred later that day, causing JM and Ms Dwyer each to attend the police station. JM was charged with breaching the apprehended violence order.

7. [14]

   On the evening of 9 April 1998, JM, her friend Correen Narkle, her daughter LM and the three boys, Arthur, AC and WJ, were staying at 132 Walker Street. Arthur had been dropped off at JM’s house between 5.00pm and 6.00pm by his mother, Ms Szabo and his stepfather, Jawed Akhtar. It was intended that Arthur would sleep over and that the three boys would attend the Easter Show the next day. That evening, the occupants of the house watched television in the living room. Ms Narkle and AC fell asleep on the lounge and Arthur went upstairs to sleep.

8. [15]

   Meanwhile, the offender drove to the rear of the premises at Beaumont Street. He retrieved a Molotov cocktail from his car, which he had constructed earlier in the evening. He lit it and threw it over the fence into the rear of 132 Walker Street. The fence was taller than the offender and he was unable to see where the Molotov cocktail had landed. The agreed facts state that the offender “threw it with the intention that it would cause a fire at the rear of the premises in the area of the outside verandah and in circumstances where he was not aware that anyone was home, but appreciated the risk to persons”. This act gives rise to the offender’s liability for manslaughter.

9. [16]

   JM heard a noise at the back of the house and entered the hallway. From there, she saw a projectile, on fire, land on the kitchen floor, from which fire gushed out. WJ also heard a loud bang and ran to the kitchen. Within about ten seconds, the fire had spread from the open floor area near the back door to the rest of the kitchen. JM roused Ms Narkle and AC and told them that there was a fire. Ms Narkle unsuccessfully tried to extinguish the fire with a blanket, which itself caught fire.

10. [17]

    AC and WJ ran out the front door and Ms Narkle and JM followed, holding LM. They went to a nearby residence at 122 Walker Street, where brothers Tai and Loc Nguyen resided. Loc Nguyen answered the door and allowed JM to use his telephone to call the fire brigade at 10.33pm. JM then realised they had forgotten Arthur was in the house. JM ran to the house and tried to re-enter the front door. A neighbour, John Pupuke, opened the front door and said something like “[i]t’s too hot” or “[y]ou’re not going in there it’s too dangerous”. At the same time, JM, WJ, AC and Loc Nguyen ran to the rear of the residence. They saw that JM’s rear door was open with black smoke coming from it.

11. [18]

    JM and others called out to Arthur and told him to jump, which he did. He was covered in black with smoke coming off his body. He crawled or walked in a crouched-over position towards Beaumont Street.

12. [19]

    Police, the fire brigade and NSW ambulance officers attended the scene. Members of the fire brigade attended at 10.38pm and pumped water into the front and rear of the residence. WJ and some neighbours came to Beaumont Street to help. During this time, a neighbour, Pamela Tarrant, hosed down Arthur with the help of Mr Pupuke. Ambulance officers attended the scene at 10.46pm and began to treat Arthur. At this point, Arthur had significant full thickness burns to both arms, the sides of his chest, his lower legs and feet, and the top of his head. He was, despite his injuries, fully conscious and able to converse.

13. [20]

    At 11.03pm, Arthur was conveyed to hospital by ambulance where he was treated and assessed as having burns to 60 per cent of his body’s surface. Arthur’s trachea was intubated and he was ventilated and given intravenous fluids. He was subsequently transferred to the Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children at Westmead where he remained. He was in severe shock for several days and lost fluids through his burns. He required ongoing resuscitation and the provision of fluids and artificial ventilation. He was administered various drugs including morphine, sedatives, antibiotics and adrenaline. The resuscitation phase of his treatment continued until his state of shock abated. Thereafter, Arthur remained critically ill. He underwent treatment over a period of six weeks comprising multiple surgeries to debride his burn wounds and skin grafting. During this period, Arthur remained intubated, artificially ventilated and heavily sedated, requiring large doses of powerful pain-killing drugs, blood transfusions, and close attention to his nutrition. On 1 May 1998, Arthur sustained a severe brain injury which was attributed to his shocked state and the large doses of opioid drugs administered to alleviate his pain.

14. [21]

    Arthur died on 29 June 1998. Medical opinion was that the extreme severity of Arthur’s burns led to his death. A post-mortem examination on 30 June 1998 found that Arthur had died as a result of complications, that is, bronchopneumonia and brain damage arising from burns sustained to 60 to 65 per cent of his body.

15. [22]

    Approximately a week after the fire, Nathaniel “Beau” Barker was at the Walker Street home of Paula Williams, with whom he was in a long-term relationship. The offender entered Ms Williams’ home and asked to speak with Mr Barker. They sat at the kitchen table and the offender said: “This is not a bad little place here if everyone would mind their own business”. Mr Barker replied, referring to the fire that led to Arthur’s death: “I know you’ve done it or had it done. I’m not going to go to the police, but you’ve got to live with it. It is a shit fucking go, now get out”. The offender said, “[i]f you think that was a big fire, wait until you see my next one” and walked out. As a result of this conversation, Mr Barker was concerned that the offender would set fire to Ms Williams’ house.

16. [23]

    The maliciously inflict grievous bodily harm offence occurred in the evening between 18 and 19 April 1998. Mr Barker was again at Ms Williams’ home. The offender entered the premises and punched Mr Barker to the back of the head. Mr Barker turned and saw the offender and they wrestled to the ground. The offender grabbed a sharp object in the hallway and stabbed Mr Barker to the left thigh. Mr Barker grabbed the offender’s shirt, pulled him up and punched the offender to the face as hard as he could. They fell to the floor, with the offender on his back and Mr Barker on top of him. Mr Barker told the offender: “Get out of this fucking house”. The agreed facts indicate that the following then occurred:

17. [24]

    Mr Barker was subsequently conveyed to hospital for treatment. There:

18. [25]

    It is to be kept clearly in mind that the offender is not to be sentenced for the maliciously inflict grievous bodily harm offence. That offence is to be taken into account in sentencing for the manslaughter offence.

Victim impact statement

1. [26]

   Ms Szabo, Arthur’s mother, provided a deeply moving victim impact statement. She described her life with Arthur, his struggle following the burns he received and his death. She spoke of the irrevocable change to her life as a result of her loss.

2. [27]

   The Crown sought that the victim impact statement be taken into account in determining the punishment for the offence as an aspect of the harm done to the community. [10] I accept that it is appropriate and I take the victim impact statement into account in that way. I do not suggest that one life is more or less valuable than another life. Rather, every life is valuable and its unlawful taking harms the community in some way, a matter which must be recognised when passing sentence. Arthur’s life was precious and the victim impact statement is illustrative of this. I thank Ms Szabo for preparing the victim impact statement and providing some insight into the life that has been lost and the effect of that loss on others. The Court extends its sympathies to Ms Szabo and all those who knew and loved Arthur.

Matters personal to the offender

1. [28]

   The Crown submitted that the offender has an “extensive criminal history” such that he is “disentitled to leniency”. The offender was first convicted as an adult on 24 December 1984 of two counts of malicious injury. Since that time, the offender has been convicted of assault in 1988, 1989, 1990 and 2006, with the 1990 offence occasioning actual bodily harm. The offender has been convicted (or admitted his guilt) in relation to dishonesty offences, including break enter and steal, goods in custody, possession of house breaking implements and stealing (in 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993). In 2001, the offender was sentenced to a period of 3 years and 6 months imprisonment for conspiracy to steal. In 2006, the offender was sentenced in Queensland to 3 years and 6 months imprisonment for an offence of demanding property, benefit or performance of services with threats. Additionally, the offender has been convicted of driving offences (1988 and 1991), damage to property offences (1988 and 1989), offensive behaviour or language offences (1988, 1989 and 1991) drug offences (1991, 2006 and 2013) and opening a bank account in a false name (2002).

2. [29]

   The Crown submissions note that the offence for which the offender received the lengthiest sentence was a 6 year term of imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years for armed robbery. The offender was on parole with respect to that matter, with approximately five and a half months remaining on that parole, at the time he threw the Molotov cocktail. The commission of the offence on conditional liberty, whilst not elevating the objective gravity of the offence itself, is an aggravating factor on sentence.

3. [30]

   While there was positive evidence of the offender’s character around the time of the offence, [11] he was nonetheless both before and after the offence engaged in serious crime. Subsequent to committing the present offence, the offender continued to commit offences including making demands with threats which resulted in a sentence of imprisonment in Queensland. That involvement with serious crime, however, abated. Following those offences in 2005 and 2006, the offender’s record is limited, consisting of relatively minor matters for which fines were imposed, and with no further offences recorded since 2014. Indeed, the offender’s last custodial period prior to the present comprised a nine month sentence in 2007. The change in the offender’s record corresponds with subjective material tendered on the offender’s behalf demonstrating his rehabilitation and positive contribution to the lives of a number of people, a matter to which I will return.

4. [31]

   While the offender had not committed any offence for some time prior to his arrest, it remains the case that he does have a number of convictions including for serious offences both prior to and subsequent to the present offence. In these circumstances, he cannot be treated as a person of good character with the attendant leniency that that would ordinarily attract. Nor, in the context of the offender’s prior character, can his conduct in committing the offence be regarded as an aberration, at least at the time it was committed. Had the offender been sentenced closer to the time of the offence, the need for specific deterrence would have loomed large.

5. [32]

   At the sentence hearing, the offender tendered a report of Tim Watson-Munro, consultant psychologist, dated 21 November 2025. Mr Watson-Munro canvassed the offender’s social history, together with his drug, alcohol and psychological history, and provided an opinion. Mr Watson-Munro said, based on the offender’s description, that the offender presented with:

6. [33]

   The offender was born in Sydney in May 1967. His birth mother was aged 15 when he was born. He has no knowledge of his father. The offender reported that until the age of 11 or 12, he believed his maternal grandmother was his mother and his birth mother was his sister, a matter confirmed by his biological aunt with whom he has a relationship as a sibling. The offender reported that his birth mother had two daughters and three sons to separate fathers. One of his siblings has overdosed and another has suicided. From an early age, the offender’s maternal grandmother had care of him in Adelaide. He reported drifting in with an adverse older peer group and leaving home at the age of 12, which coincided with the revelation as to his parentage. The offender lived an itinerant lifestyle for the next five years before returning to live with his grandmother who struggled with Alzheimer’s disease. His grandmother eventually died, having spent the last few years of her life in a nursing home. At some point, the offender recalls confronting his mother, who requested he continue to hold himself out as her brother. This resulted in the offender resenting her and resolving to have no further contact.

7. [34]

   The offender was married to Sharon Dwyer from 1987 until 2009 and has two children as a result of that marriage, who as at the date of the report were aged 27 and 34 years. With respect to the offender’s employment, he described being unemployed for a period after leaving school. He reported that he spent his time surfing and smoking cannabis. On his release from custody in 1996, he commenced employment with Randwick City Council and became involved with boxing. His aspirations of a career in boxing came to an end in 1998 when he sustained a serious shoulder injury. The offender eventually owned and managed a gymnasium and boxing training enterprise on the Gold Coast, which he did for many years prior to being incarcerated for the present offence.

8. [35]

   With respect to the offender’s drug and alcohol history, he reported that he began consuming alcohol at the age of 10 years and, by the age of 12, using amphetamines, marijuana and LSD. The offender stated that he had also used cocaine. The offender reported commencing heroin use at around the age of 21, but that he ceased using all illicit drugs at the age of 26. Following the offender’s shoulder injury and consequent inability to continue his boxing career, he described his alcohol consumption as escalating to the point of being “out of control”. With respect to the offence, the offender reported that he was consuming alcohol on the day and probably would not have committed the offence had he not been intoxicated.

9. [36]

   The offender reported that he continues to suffer immense guilt, remorse and shame regarding the death of Arthur. With respect to the offender’s remorse, Mr Watson-Munro said:

10. [37]

    With respect to his psychological history, the offender reported suffering longstanding symptoms of depression, anxiety and low self-esteem dating back to his formative years. Mr Watson-Munro opined that these symptoms were compounded by the offender’s revelation as to the identity of his birth mother as well as by Arthur’s death. The offender told Mr Watson-Munro that threats he had received, purportedly related to Arthur’s death, had aggravated his depression and anxiety. This is discussed further below. Ultimately, Mr Watson-Munro administered the Beck Depression Inventory, a self-reporting questionnaire, which confirmed his clinical impression of the offender as suffering from “Depressive Disorder (severe & recurring) … (bordering on extreme – Raw Score 57)”.

11. [38]

    It is also clear that, since the offender’s previous convictions for serious offences, he has effectively turned his life around. The letter of apology written by the offender speaks not only of his remorse but of his efforts to change his life through the not-for-profit gym started by him on the Gold Coast. He spoke of his motivation for doing so, being to help troubled young people going down the same path that he had taken.

12. [39]

    Tendered on the offender’s behalf were a significant number of references. A number of referees spoke of their regard for the offender, not exclusively but in particular as a result of the time devoted by him to help troubled young people through his gym. Some referees had maintained contact with people who had come into contact with the offender during a troubled youth, with the referees attesting that to this day they reflected positively on the offender’s role in changing their lives for the better. Two referees spoke directly of coming into contact with the offender at a troubled time in their youth. Both spoke of being on a path to wasting their lives. One was abusing drugs and alcohol. The other was going through a difficult time because of his family circumstances. Each spoke movingly of the influence of the offender on their lives. The offender trained one, Corey McConnell, to become a world champion boxer. According to the offender’s letter, Mr McConnell was one of three world champions trained by him. Adam McCormack in his reference spoke of how the offender’s mentorship and encouragement led to him resuming his education, having failed high school. Mr McCormack went on to complete tertiary education and has become a successful architect. I accept that the offender has made a valuable contribution to the lives of others. It appears that he has steered a number of young people away from the path he went down. A significant number of people travelled from Queensland to attend the sentencing hearing, demonstrating a level of support for the offender in the face of his crime which, in turn, demonstrates the level of their regard for him. I am aware that a similar number of people have attended today. Whilst the issue of remorse is complex, I accept that for the offender there is, in his positive contributions, an element of him attempting to make good on his past wrongs, including most seriously, Arthur’s death.

13. [40]

    Returning to the offender’s early years, the offender submitted, and the Crown concedes, that the offender grew up with a level of dysfunction and a lack of guidance, and this in turn impacted him in later life contributing to poor decisions including that leading to Arthur’s death. [12] While the offender was 30 years old at the time of the offence, and thus well into adulthood, it remains the case that the offender’s formative years leading to that adulthood were marred by the dysfunction to which I have referred. While there was a level of planning in the offences, the offender’s decision to respond to the situation in the way he did, and his ability to reflect on his planned course of action was likely affected by his compromised maturation the result of his unstable upbringing. While the offender remains responsible for his actions, the impact of his dysfunctional childhood, for which it hardly needs stating he was not responsible, must be taken into account in understanding his moral culpability.

14. [41]

    The offender was not arrested until 17 August 2022, some 24 years after the offence. The offender did not submit that this was a case in which the delay, of itself, warranted any particular consideration on sentence. That would appear to be an acknowledgment that this is not a case in which the offender was affected by any “uncertain suspense” up until the time of his arrest or that the offence could properly be regarded as a “stale crime”. [13] Any suggestion that the latter description was appropriate would be to ignore the nature of the crime and its enduring effect. While the passage of time, of itself, was not relied on by the offender, I accept that the ensuing years are relevant in that they demonstrate the offender’s rehabilitation. The offender’s progress over those years is reflected not just in the decline and then complete cessation of his criminal offending. It is reflected in his meaningful positive contributions to the community. While the ledger cannot be squared by the good done by the offender in more recent times, that contribution must be taken into account and given weight.

15. [42]

    Beyond the lapse of time prior to the offender being arrested, he has been in custody for over three years awaiting resolution of this matter. That is a long time to spend in custody with no certainty as to how long it will continue. I accept that that state, together with the conditions of his custody, a matter to which I will return, will have made the last three years a more difficult experience for the offender, beyond that of the ordinary prisoner.

16. [43]

    The offender submitted that he was remorseful and provided some evidence of this. As I have said, on sentence he tendered a letter of apology dated 20 November 2025. It would reflect a remarkable lack of humanity if the offender, having been responsible for the death of a child in the circumstances that presently pertain, was not remorseful. That said, the conduct and statements of the offender in the immediate aftermath of the event reflect a callous disregard for the enormity of what had occurred. I would, however, accept based upon what he has said to numerous persons, and from what is known of the offender’s character as it has developed in more recent years, that he is now remorseful. Further, I would accept that his remorse goes beyond the basal level I have described and includes some aspect of a desire to make amends evidenced by his positive contribution to the lives of young people.

17. [44]

    While accepting the offender is at some level remorseful, it is difficult to reconcile his assertions as to the depth of his remorse with his silence as to his responsibility for the fire over so many years, knowing over that time that Ms Szabo and others continued to live with the uncertainty of not knowing who was responsible or whether they would ever be brought to justice. Whilst in custody, the offender continued, until very recently, to maintain his complete innocence. A note from a Justice Health worker made in July 2024 stated that the offender was “confident that the facts as per the witness[es] are physically impossible and he will be exonerated”. [14] While accepting that the offender is remorseful, I would not unequivocally accept the extent of his remorse as expressed by him in his letter of apology.

18. [45]

    As I have said, the offender was arrested on 17 August 2022 and has remained in custody since that date. With respect to his conditions over that time, Mr Watson-Munro reported:

19. [46]

    The conditions, while severe, have been ameliorated somewhat by the offender’s employment as a sweeper for a total of 561 days or about 18 and a half months. [15] During this time, he has had limited contact with other prisoners (generally through the flap in a cell door), but presumably also had contact with prison staff. That period of employment represents in the order of half the time the offender has been in gaol. The offender’s employment and the absence of any prison infringements, it should also be noted, reflect the offender’s positive engagement in custody.

20. [47]

    I accept that the offender’s imprisonment has been more onerous than is ordinarily the case. While the Crown submitted that the offender himself elected to be placed in protective custody leading to his more onerous conditions, that does not change the fact of the conditions in which he has been held. There is, in any event, no basis on which I could find that the offender’s election was not regarded by him as necessary. The strictures of protective custody can be significant and would not be expected to be borne without there being some foundation for doing so. There was, in addition, evidence tendered at the sentence hearing that persons responsible for crimes such as the offender’s are “almost always held in protective custody”. [16] The offender’s conditions have impacted on his mental health resulting in the “severe and recurring Depressive Disorder” and anxiety as described by Mr Watson-Munro. This finding is supported by Justice Health notes which reported an episode of suicidality in 2023, with later entries suggesting his denial of concerns at the time were false. [17]

21. [48]

    Accepting that there is presently a need for the offender’s protection, some need to manage the offender to ensure his safety in gaol can be expected to endure for the length of his incarceration. While some allowance should be made for this circumstance, it cannot be assumed that the present level of restriction will remain. It is a matter of common understanding that, once sentenced, the offender will likely be able to progress through the Corrective Services classification system. This may lead to the offender’s transfer to a lower security gaol where, even if on protection, the restrictions in respect of his custody will be reduced. In this regard, the offender’s written request, made in October of this year, states that he wishes to remain on protection while at his then current gaol or “until a suitable location is found”, [18] suggesting that the offender himself believes there is a prospect of his protection status not being required, or not being required at the current level, in the event he is transferred to another gaol. It might also be hoped that the offender will have access to employment and, should he be interested, educational and personal development courses. It must be acknowledged that none of these prospects are certain.

22. [49]

    There is evidence that the offender and his family have been the subject of threatening behaviour. The offender relied on this circumstance as relevant, presumably on the basis that it comprises a form of extra curial punishment.

23. [50]

    On 18 November 1999, shots were fired into the house in Menai where the offender was living with his wife and family. In December 1999, the offender’s wife, Sharon Dwyer, travelled to her former home in Walker Street where she collected a gas cylinder which she placed in the boot of her vehicle. Later, as a result of gas escaping from the cylinder there was an explosion when Ms Dwyer lit a cigarette. She was severely injured.

24. [51]

    The offender put forward the above matters as evidence of retaliation for his suspected involvement in the fire that killed Arthur. In relation to the first incident, however, records from the time reveal that the offender reported the shooting to be in response to his disclosure of the name of a particular individual in the context of a criminal trial he was then undergoing. In relation to the second incident, there is no basis to conclude that the explosion was the result of the deliberate act of another, let alone that it was connected with the 1998 fire.

25. [52]

    I do not accept that the gunshots or the explosion amount to any form of extra curial punishment in relation to the present offence.

Objective seriousness

1. [53]

   The maximum penalty for an offence of manslaughter is imprisonment for 25 years. This maximum reflects the inherent seriousness of the offence. Any sentence must reflect the offender’s responsibility for unlawfully taking the life of another. While every case of manslaughter involves the felonious taking of a human life, the offence of manslaughter involves the greatest variety of circumstances affecting culpability. While there are different categories of manslaughter, there is no hierarchy of seriousness.

2. [54]

   It is necessary to make an assessment of the objective gravity of the offending in this case. Only by doing so is it possible to fix a sentence that is proportionate to the crime and to properly have regard to and balance the various purposes of sentencing.

3. [55]

   It is inherent in the offence that there was no intention to kill or inflict really serious injury. Had there been such an intention the offender would be liable to be sentenced for murder. It is not permissible to sentence him on the basis of facts that would have rendered him liable for murder given he has not been convicted of that offence. The agreed facts, in any event, make clear that there was no such intention.

4. [56]

   It is agreed that the offender intended the device to result in a fire at the rear of the premises in an area of the outside rear verandah in circumstances where he was not aware that there were residents in the premises at the time he threw the explosive device. In this regard, it is accepted that the height of the fence had the result that the offender could not see where the device landed. While that fact is supportive of the offender’s lack of intention to do greater harm, it also speaks to the dangerousness of his actions. In short, he threw an incendiary device into the rear yard of a home in a highly built-up area where he had little control over where it would land. As the facts acknowledge, he was aware that there was an appreciable risk to others in him doing so. His plea acknowledges that the act was objectively dangerous in that a reasonable person in the position of the offender would have appreciated that it was an act that exposed another person to the risk of serious injury. This was an instance of a particularly dangerous act. The results were catastrophic. Arthur was just 13 years old and suffered for over two months before his death. While Arthur’s was the only death, the act risked multiple lives.

5. [57]

   The offender’s act was in response to his belief that the occupants of the house, or persons associated with them, were responsible for pouring paint over his wife’s car some time over the previous night. It is unnecessary to make any finding as to who was responsible for the damage to the car. While I would accept that the offender had that stated belief, this does not assist him. The offender’s act cannot be justified by what had occurred that morning.

6. [58]

   The threats made by the offender subsequent to the fire and the facts underpinning the Form 1 offence are also relevant to place the offence in context. [19] Viewed together a picture emerges of an act committed to further the offender’s desire to use an extreme form of intimidation to assert authority over his perceived enemies in the neighbourhood. Viewed in this way, the motivation for the offender’s conduct adds to the seriousness of the offending.

7. [59]

   Related to what I have said, the offending, while it could not be said to be sophisticated, involved planning. The device, while not complicated, had to be assembled and transported. There was ample opportunity to reflect on the dangerousness of throwing an explosive device over a fence, in a medium density residential area comprising terrace houses, into an area the offender could not see.

8. [60]

   The offender, as I have said, claimed to Mr Watson-Munro that he was intoxicated at the time of the offence. That claim has not been tested. Certainly, he was not so intoxicated as to be unable to construct or deploy the device, nor to have driven to the premises. I am unable to find the offender was intoxicated at the relevant time. I note that, even if he was, it would not operate in mitigation in this case.

9. [61]

   Having regard to the circumstances I have recounted, I regard this as a very serious case of manslaughter.

10. [62]

    The offence on the Form 1 resulted in serious injuries to Mr Barker. The severed part of his right ear could not be reattached. The offence was committed in a context where, about a week after the fire, the offender made threats to Mr Barker to the effect that anyone who might get in his way by speaking, presumably to the police, would face retribution in the form of a bigger fire. The offender’s words were taken seriously by Mr Barker. The offence itself was committed nine days later by the offender intruding into the private home of Mr Barker’s partner. While the offender used a weapon to stab Mr Barker, he does not appear to have been armed with any weapon on entry, and the use of the weapon appears therefore not to have been premeditated. Not content with having stabbed Mr Barker to the thigh, and having severed part of his left ear, the offender completely severed part of his right ear. Grievous bodily harm necessarily involves really serious harm, and includes harm of the most severe kind short of death. While the injuries on this scale are a long way short of the upper end of the range, the offender’s motive, his intrusion into the home and the gruesome nature of the attack make this a serious offence.

The plea of guilty

1. [63]

   The indictment on which the offender pleaded guilty is dated 10 October 2025 and contained as count 1 the offence of manslaughter and, as count 2, the offence on the Form 1. On 22 October 2025 the offender entered a plea of guilty to count 1 which the Crown accepted in full satisfaction of the indictment (it having been agreed that count 2 would be taken into account on the Form 1). It is necessary to say something as to the events leading to this plea. The offender having been committed for trial, was arraigned on an indictment dated 16 October 2024 charging him with murder, damaging property intending to endanger life, [20] maliciously wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, [21] and maliciously inflict grievous bodily harm with intent to do so. [22] He pleaded not guilty to these matters and his trial was set to commence before me on 7 October 2025. The trial date was subsequently adjourned as a result of the late service on the offender (then the accused) of significant new evidence. The offender pleaded guilty in advance of the new trial date, as I have observed, on 22 October 2025.

2. [64]

   It was common ground that the plea of guilty was entered more than 14 days before the date set for trial. A question arose as to the discount to which the offender is entitled based on the utilitarian value of his plea. The issue is governed by Div 1A of the Sentencing Act and any discount prescribed by those provisions is mandatory, not allowing for rounding up or down. [23]

3. [65]

   The applicable discount is governed by s 25D, which relevantly provides:

4. [66]

   The offender contended that s 25D(3) applies and that s 25D(4) does not apply with the result that the discount is 25 per cent. [24] There is no suggestion that s 25D(4)(b) applies. Section 25D(4)(a) is in issue.

5. [67]

   The Crown contended that s 25D(2) applies and the discount is thus 10 per cent. The offender accepted that if he is wrong as to the application of s 25D(3)(a) or the non-application of s 25D(4), the discount will be 10 per cent on the same basis as submitted by the Crown.

6. [68]

   For the offender to succeed in his argument he must establish that the manslaughter offence is a “new count” offence and secondly, that the “facts or evidence that establish” the offence of manslaughter, are “substantially the same as those contained” in the brief of evidence leading to the committal for the trial of murder. The parties did not, sensibly, tender that brief. Rather, they proceeded on the basis that sufficient understanding of the case against the offender at committal could be established based on the material and submissions before me.

7. [69]

   A new count offence is defined as: [25]

8. [70]

   The offender did not suggest that the indictment was an “ex officio indictment”. He submits that the manslaughter count was inserted into the indictment by amending the earlier indictment. The indictment in its present form was the result of amendment by substitution of the original indictment with the current indictment. The question is whether the count of manslaughter was “inserted” into the indictment as a result of the amendment. I have serious doubts as to whether that is so. Murder and manslaughter are two descriptions of the one felony. [26] It was always open to the offender to plead guilty to manslaughter irrespective of whether it was included, in terms, in the indictment.

9. [71]

   I accept, however, that failing to distinguish between murder and manslaughter in this way may be, in a practical sense, artificial and potentially unfair. Lesser offences which are necessarily proved by proving the more serious offence are always available alternatives. Against that, manslaughter is clearly not an ordinary alternative in that, in some circumstances it will be the result of proof of the elements of murder and a failure to negate a matter raised by the accused or the establishment by an accused of a partial defence to murder.

10. [72]

    Ultimately, it is not necessary for me to decide the “new count” issue. That is because I am of the view that s 25A(4)(a) applies. Assuming the offence of manslaughter is a “new count”, and the offer to plead guilty was “recorded in a negotiations document as soon as practicable after” the amendment of the indictment, the facts or evidence that establish that offence are “substantially the same” as those that were relied on to prove murder. Indeed, all of the evidence relied on to prove murder is relevant to prove the lesser offence of manslaughter. The offender submitted that the new evidence leading to the plea was evidence of an admission of responsibility for the fire. This was the evidence which was served late and led to the adjournment of the trial. There was other previously obtained evidence of an admission of responsibility by the offender which the Crown proposed to lead at trial. The key difference in the new evidence was that, in addition to admitting responsibility, the offender claimed to his confidant that he did not know that there was anyone home at the time he set the house on fire. [27] The offender points out there was no evidence in the original brief as to this lack of knowledge. It was submitted that while there was other evidence of an admission to responsibility for the fire, the offender, while stating to the witness that he did not know that there were children present, did not go so far as to say that he did not know there was anyone present.

11. [73]

    The new evidence was, when viewed with the body of evidence to which it was added, not so much evidence that established the elements of manslaughter, but rather, evidence which made it more difficult for the Crown to establish murder. To prove murder in this case the Crown was required, in effect, to make out the elements to prove manslaughter and the additional element of intent in order to prove murder. The “facts or evidence that establish the elements” of manslaughter are, in my view, substantially the same as the evidence that was relied on to prove murder on the original indictment.

12. [74]

    The result of the above is the mandated discount is 10 per cent. [28]

13. [75]

    At the risk of further prolonging the time taken in this judgment to deal with the discount to be afforded for the utilitarian value of the offender’s plea, I would add the following. The strictures of Div 1A of the Sentencing Act have been the subject of criticism in this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal in cases where those strictures have worked clear injustice. [29] While the present case is different, determining the discount in this case pursuant to the terms of the Division rather than on a proper understanding of the practicalities of the situation, and engaging in the level of technical analysis required in the course of giving reasons for sentence, does not endear me to the provisions. Rather, the provisions seem to me to reflect a hubris in the belief that all possible situations can be dealt with fairly and without room for contest by inflexible legislative provisions. That hubris, it seems, has not been diminished by past experience.

Sentencing

1. [76]

   As I have said, the purposes of sentencing are set out in s 3A of the Sentencing Act. Punishment, retribution, deterrence, denunciation and the need to make the offender accountable for his actions and their consequences, all have a role to play, as does the rehabilitation of the offender. This is not a case where the protection of the community or specific deterrence have any real role. I am acutely aware of the harm to Arthur in the untimely loss of his life, as well as the resultant harm to the community generally.

2. [77]

   The maximum penalty of 25 years is relevant as a guidepost, though perhaps less relevant than for most offences given the broad range of manslaughter offences.

3. [78]

   I have been provided with a number of cases said to be relevant for comparative purposes. I have considered those cases, their facts and the sentences imposed. I have gained some, albeit limited, guidance from considering those cases. I do not propose to undertake an analysis of the similarities and differences the various cases present. Every case is unique and is thus decided on its own facts. I would make just one observation in relation to the submission that the sentences in some of the older cases did not reflect discounts for pleas of guilty. It is true that the reasons in some of the cases did not articulate a specific discount allowed for the plea of guilty. The reasons in each did, however, acknowledge the plea. Prior to the practice, or legislative mandate, of expressly indicating a discount for the utilitarian value of a plea of guilty judges were required to take a plea of guilty into account. Before the guideline judgment for pleas of guilty was promulged the pre-existing practice was to allow “discounts” for all matters associated with a plea (including matters beyond the utilitarian value of the plea) of up to 35 per cent. [30]

4. [79]

   In sentencing for the primary offence it is necessary to have regard to the offence on the Form 1. [31] The offender, as I have said, is not to be sentenced for this offence. The offence is to be taken into account in determining the weight to be given to specific deterrence and retribution in sentencing for the manslaughter offence. The facts of the offence are also relevant in providing additional context to the primary offence in the way I have discussed. In the present case, for the reasons I have given, specific deterrence is not required. That is not affected by the Form 1. Retribution, particularly having regard to the Form 1, should be given weight.

5. [80]

   It was accepted by the Crown that I could find special circumstances in this case for the purpose of setting a non-parole period that is less than 75 per cent of the total sentence.

6. [81]

   Having regard to the above, the appropriate sentence before the discount for the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty is 12 years. A discount of 10 per cent equates to 1 year 2 months and 13 days and results in a sentence of 10 years, 9 months and 17 days. While the amount of the discount is fixed, this is not a sensible figure for a sentence. It suggests a mathematical precision to which the subject matter does not lend itself. I round down the starting point such that, after application of the 10 per cent discount, the result is 10 years and 9 months. This sentence takes into account the purposes of sentencing to which I have referred.

7. [82]

   I will set a non-parole period of 6 and a half years. I acknowledge this represents a generous adjustment for special circumstances. In making this adjustment, while also relevant to the total sentence, I give particular weight to the offender’s conditions of custody and his rehabilitation. The former has the result of adding to the punishment experienced by the offender. The latter, which involves not only the cessation of offending, but also the offender’s positive contribution to the lives of others, warrants him serving a greater proportion of his sentence in the community.

8. [83]

   The sentence should commence on the day the offender entered custody which is 17 August 2022.

Sentence and orders

1. [84]

   I make the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Gregory John Walker, you are convicted of the unlawful killing of Arthur Haines.

   2. (2)

      For the offence of manslaughter, you are sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 10 years and 9 months commencing on 17 August 2022. I set a non-parole period of 6 years and 6 months commencing on that date and expiring on 16 February 2029. The balance of term is due to expire on 16 May 2033.

   3. (3)

      Pursuant to s 25C(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), I advise you of the existence of that Act and the fact that it applies to you and to this offence. I direct your legal team to explain the significance of this fact to you.