Liddell Coal Operations Pty Limited v Hector

1. [1]

   BASTEN JA: As explained by Gleeson JA, no error in point of law, as required by s 142N of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW), was established. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

2. [2]

   GLEESON JA: From June 2004 to September 2017, Mr Andrew Hector worked in or about a coal mine as a technician or supervisor of a Coal Handling Processing Plant (CHPP) commonly referred to as a “washery”, except for a period between October 2009 and early October 2010. He brought proceedings in the District Court against three employers during that period claiming weekly benefits and lump sum compensation for a work injury within the meaning of s 4 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) (the WC Act). It was common ground that the WC Act has retained certain more favourable rights to compensation for “coal miners”.

3. [3]

   The trial judge (Neilson DCJ) found a compensable injury in terms of s 4(b)(ii) of the WC Act on the basis that Mr Hector’s employment with the appellant was a contributing factor to the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration of a disease, identified as osteoarthritis in his right knee: Hector v Thiess Pty Limited [2020] NSWDC 228.

4. [4]

   The judge awarded weekly benefits of compensation commencing from 18 September 2017, lump sum compensation pursuant to s 66 of the WC Act of $39,690 in respect of 40 per cent permanent loss of efficient use of the right leg at or above the knee, lump sum compensation of $20,000 in respect of pain and suffering pursuant to s 67 of the WC Act and ordered the appellant to pay Mr Hector’s reasonably necessary medical expenses pursuant to s 60 of the WC Act.

5. [5]

   The appellant, Liddell Coal Operations Pty Limited, has appealed to this Court from the decision of Neilson DCJ. The appeal is brought pursuant to s 142N of the District Court Act which is limited to an appeal “in point of law or on a question as to the admission or rejection of evidence”. The appellant relies upon asserted errors in point of law.

6. [6]

   For the reasons that follow, error in point of law has not been demonstrated in respect of his Honour’s determination of Mr Hector’s claim for compensation. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Background

1. [7]

   Mr Hector was first employed in the coal mining industry by Thiess Pty Limited (Thiess) at the Mount Owen Mine near Ravensworth in the upper Hunter Valley from 21 June 2004 to 23 October 2009, initially as a CHPP technician up until July 2006, and thereafter as a CHPP supervisor. Prior to commencing with Thiess, Mr Hector underwent a full medical and functional assessment. Between October 2009 and early October 2010, he was employed by Pacific National. The judge found that the work at Pacific National was managerial in nature, essentially done from a desk: at [18].

2. [8]

   Mr Hector was employed at the Liddell CHPP near Ravensworth by Liddell Coal Preparation Plant Pty Limited (LCPP) from 5 October 2010 to 1 December 2011, and then by the appellant, from 1 December 2011 to 15 September 2017. He worked as an electrical technician up until 17 November 2011 and thereafter as an electrical shift supervisor until his services were terminated on 15 September 2017. He has not worked since that date.

3. [9]

   The judge accepted Mr Hector’s evidence that his work at the Liddell CHPP was similar to the work at the Mount Owen CHPP: at [19]. As a technician, Mr Hector’s work involved wearing a heavy belt on which he carried tools, and also required him to carry a toolbox on a sling over his shoulders that weighed some 25 kgs. The layout of the CHPP at Liddell was similar to the CHPP at Mount Owen; there was the usual configuration of stairs, walkways and ladders over six levels. As a technician, Mr Hector was frequently moving from level to level and along levels, walking up stairs made essentially of metal chequered plates and along walkways of a similar nature. He was required to walk along the conveyers which averaged about 200 metres in length to attend to any breakdown or to inspect them. Often there were spillages of coal on the conveyers and the spillages needed to be cleaned away, either with shovels or by the use of hoses. On each shift, Mr Hector would climb between six and eight times up to the control room and on three to four occasions each shift he would climb to the top of the structure up all six floors. In addition, there were often materials to be carried to a site where repair work needed to be done, such as drums of oil which weighed about 20 kgs.

4. [10]

   Although Mr Hector’s work as a supervisor at the Liddell CHPP involved managerial work and was less physically taxing than the work of a technician, he was still involved in physical exertion, including inspections of the plant and climbing ladders, walking the walkways and walking along the conveyers. His supervisory work required him to assist during a breakdown of the plant and physically demonstrate to others how to perform work which was required of those whom he supervised.

5. [11]

   Mr Hector had previously undergone an arthroscopic procedure upon his right knee at the Royal Darwin Hospital on 11 May 1998, following a diagnosis by Dr Steve Baddeley of patellofemoral arthritis. He said that he had no issues following that procedure. The judge accepted that evidence and found that no problems were noted with Mr Hector’s right knee after June 1998, and that there was no damage to the medial meniscus at that time: at [28].

6. [12]

   Mr Hector next noticed problems with his right knee in late 2010 whilst working at the Liddell CHPP. He gave evidence that after walking up and down stairs, and being on his feet carrying heavy objects, he was “a little bit sore at the end of the day, and that gradually got – and, that did subside overnight and I was fine the next day. It got to the point where the pain was continuing into the next day, and that’s when I decided to go and have it looked at.”

7. [13]

   On 11 July 2011, Mr Hector consulted his general practitioner, Dr Samy, concerning a history of knee pain of approximately 12 months, and that “3 weeks ago [he] had a big day at work which made it wirse (sic).” The judge found that the history of pain of 12 months was, more likely, a reference to a period of 9 months as Mr Hector’s evidence was that the problems with his knee occurred only after he commenced work with LCPP in October 2010, and the symptoms were not present while employed by Thiess.

8. [14]

   Mr Hector underwent an arthroscopy performed by Dr Young, an orthopaedic surgeon, on 10 August 2011, who found wearing of the patellofemoral joint and a tear in the body of the medial meniscus. The posterior horn of that structure was excised. Following an MRI scan on 6 February 2012, Dr Young reported on 22 February 2012 that the scan showed further tearing of the medial meniscus and moderate osteoarthritic wear.

9. [15]

   In late-August 2015, Mr Hector again saw Dr Samy about his right knee, who organised an X-ray on 8 September 2015. The X-ray report concluded: “Degenerative changes are noted. These being most severe in the medial weight-bearing compartment.”

10. [16]

    In September 2015, Mr Hector consulted Dr Richard Verheul, an orthopaedic surgeon, who advised against further investigative surgery or joint replacement surgery and recommended that Mr Hector continue anti-inflammatory medication.

11. [17]

    On 1 August 2016, a further X-ray of Mr Hector’s right knee showed that all three compartments of his right knee were affected by osteoarthritis. This led to Mr Hector undergoing a total right knee replacement performed by Dr Verheul on 17 November 2016. Dr Verheul later performed a resurfacing of Mr Hector’s right patella and revision of the right knee replacement on 5 October 2017.

12. [18]

    Mr Hector returned to work in early 2017 and was placed on “light” duties, office-based, and on average three days per week. Liddell terminated Mr Hector’s employment effective 15 September 2017, on the basis that he could no longer perform the inherent requirements of his role, specifically his limited ability to climb stairs.

13. [19]

    Mr Hector’s case in the District Court was that he had received injuries to his neck, right knee, left knee and his shoulders arising out of or in the course of his employment, each being a relevant injury as defined by s 4 of the WC Act, which provides:

14. [20]

    Specifically, Mr Hector alleged against the appellant that the nature and conditions of employment, or alternatively, a disease of gradual process, or aggravation of a disease of gradual process arising from the tendencies, incidences and characteristics of his employment, caused him an injury to his neck, right knee, left knee and his shoulders.

15. [21]

    Given the scope of the award of compensation by the judge, it is only necessary to refer to the medical evidence relating to Mr Hector’s right knee. This consisted of notes and reports of Dr Samy, records of the Royal Darwin Hospital from 1998, reports of Dr Young, X-rays and MRI scans of the right knee, and reports of Dr Verheul. There were also a number of medico-legal reports directed to this issue, amongst others: Dr Alan Hopcroft (general surgeon), Dr Joseph Ghabrial (orthopaedic surgeon), Dr John Harrison (orthopaedic surgeon), and Dr Anthony Schwarzer (rheumatologist), who were called by Mr Hector, and Dr Neil McGill (rheumatologist) and Dr Roger Rowe (orthopaedic surgeon), who were called by the appellant.

16. [22]

    The essential medical issue at trial was whether the osteoarthritis in Mr Hector’s right knee was related by cause or aggravation to his employment. Dr McGill and Dr Rowe were of the view that it wasn’t; Dr McGill considered that Mr Hector suffered from idiopathic osteoarthritis. Dr Hopcroft, Dr Harrison and Dr Schwarzer were of the view that Mr Hector’s work and the nature of his duties contributed to the aggravation, acceleration and exacerbation of the osteoarthritis in his right knee. Dr Ghabrial considered that the problems with Mr Hector’s knees were a result of his heavy work activities during his employment in the mining industry.

The District Court decision

1. [23]

   After referring to Mr Hector’s work history, the nature and conditions of his employment in the coal mining industry since 2004 and the medical treatment of his right knee, the judge addressed the cause of Mr Hector’s symptoms that led to him undergoing the arthroscopy in August 2011, finding at [30]-[31]:

2. [24]

   The judge rejected the possibility raised by Dr McGill that the meniscal damage identified in 2010 (in fact, 2011) was related to “a specific injury”, finding that Mr Hector had never reported any injury whilst working for Thiess, nor did he make any claim for compensation or suggested that he had an onset of symptoms whilst working for LCPP leading to the arthroscopy performed on 10 August 2011. At no time did he report an injury to LCPP. He did not make any claim for compensation against his employers prior to the termination of his services with the appellant: at [32].

3. [25]

   The judge accepted the evidence of Dr Harrison, finding his answer to a specific question “helpful”: at [66]. Dr Harrison’s answer to question 14, relevantly, included:

4. [26]

   Dr Harrison had obtained the following history from Mr Hector:

5. [27]

   Subject to one minor qualification which is not presently relevant, the judge accepted the evidence of Dr Schwarzer, and reproduced at [67] a lengthy passage from his report under the heading “Pathological process” which included:

6. [28]

   Dr Schwarzer had obtained the following history from Mr Hector:

7. [29]

   The judge observed at [68] that the opinion of Dr Schwarzer must be compared with that of Dr McGill, who after referring to certain epidemiological studies which showed no evidence of a causal link between joint loading and the natural progression of knee osteoarthritis, expressed the opinion which the judge reproduced, including:

8. [30]

   Although not referred to by the judge, in response to Dr McGill’s conclusion that Mr Hector suffers from idiopathic osteoarthritis, Dr Schwarzer also said:

9. [31]

   The dispositive reasons of the judge are set out in full:

10. [32]

    The judge concluded, relevantly, with respect to injury to Mr Hector’s right knee at [82]:

11. [33]

    It is common ground that this was a finding of injury within the definition in s 4(b)(ii) of the WC Act.

Grounds 1-3

1. [34]

   Each of grounds 1, 2 and 3 relies upon a similar “no evidence” assertion. Ground 1 contends that there was no evidence entitling the judge to accept and act upon the opinion of Dr McGill in finding for Mr Hector.

2. [35]

   Ground 2 contends that there was no expert medical evidence in support of the judge’s finding at [30] that “[i]t seems likely to me, therefore probable, that the symptoms [Mr Hector] was complaining of since shortly after starting work with [LCPP] were mediated by the tearing of the medial meniscus”.

3. [36]

   Ground 3 contends that there was no medical evidence to support the judge’s conclusion at [31] that “the only way one can definitely know that there was such tearing leading to rupture is symptoms”.

4. [37]

   It is well-established that a “point of law” includes making findings for which there is no evidence: Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Limited (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32 at [59]; Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139 at 149, 151.

5. [38]

   In a case such as the present where the appellant is seeking to impugn the finding of fact in favour of a person bearing the onus of proof, the relevant question is whether the evidence on the point is sufficient, in the sense that it is evidence which if fully accepted could properly base the finding of fact: Ambulance Service of New South Wales v Daniel (2000) 19 NSWCCR 697; [2000] NSWCA 116 at 56 (Hodgson CJ in Eq, Sheller and Beazley JJA agreeing), citing Glass J in Azzopardi at 156.

6. [39]

   In oral argument, Mr L King SC for the appellant identified the essential complaint as being that whilst Dr Harrison and Dr Schwarzer expressed views which, if acted upon by the judge could have justified the result, the judge’s reasons disclose that he did not act upon those views and instead acted upon a finding as to the mechanics of the aggravation, acceleration or exacerbation of the degenerative condition in Mr Hector’s right knee that is significantly different to the opinions of Dr Harrison and Dr Schwarzer. According to the submission, the judge acted upon the opinion of Dr McGill and made a finding of a specific injury to the right knee which was not pleaded nor established by the evidence. The submission continued that whilst the surgery to Mr Hector’s right knee in 2011 may have contributed to the aggravation of the disease of osteoarthritis in the right knee, there was no evidence that the employment of Mr Hector with the appellant was a contributing factor to the aggravation of the degenerative condition in his right knee.

7. [40]

   In my view, the appellant’s submissions involve a misreading of the judge’s reasons.

8. [41]

   The premise of ground 1 is that the judge accepted and acted upon the opinion of Dr McGill. That is not so. After recording Mr Hector’s submission, relying on the statement in Dr McGill’s report that if Mr Hector had a “specific injury in 2010” (in fact 2011) that was relevant to Mr Hector’s subsequent right knee progressive osteoarthritis, the judge rejected the concept of a “specific injury”, expressly finding at [30] that there was no “specific injury”, and no event of injury either pleaded by Mr Hector in his statement of claim or described by him in his evidence.

9. [42]

   The only other reference in the judgment to the opinion of Dr McGill is at [68], where the judge observed that the opinion of Dr Schwarzer must be compared with that of Dr McGill and extracted some passages of Dr McGill’s report, including the two highlighted passages referred to at [29] above. Read in context, the passages from Dr McGill’s report were reproduced by the judge solely for the purposes of comparing Dr McGill’s opinion with Dr Schwarzer’s opinion. The judge’s finding on the question of injury was based on his preference for the opinion of Dr Schwarzer (and also Dr Harrison) over the opinion expressed by Dr McGill.

10. [43]

    Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, the judge did not accept and act upon Dr McGill’s opinion in finding for Mr Hector. The evidence of the assessment by Dr Harrison and Dr Schwarzer of the medical and injury history of Mr Hector, which the judge accepted, was sufficient to properly base the finding of injury within s 4(b)(ii) of the WC Act. No error in point of law is demonstrated in these circumstances.

11. [44]

    Grounds 2 and 3 are connected and it is convenient to deal with them together.

12. [45]

    With respect to ground 2, the appellant submitted that there is no medical evidence to establish that the symptomatic complaints of pain in Mr Hector’s right knee were caused by the tearing of the medial meniscus. According to the submission, the judge provided his own medical opinions or conclusions, which cannot fairly be extracted from the qualified medical evidence adduced at trial and all parties had not agreed that the judge’s stated understanding on that matter was correct.

13. [46]

    With respect to ground 3, the appellant submitted that there was no medical evidence to establish that the symptoms reported by Mr Hector are the only likely indication of tearing leading to rupture of the medial meniscus. The submission continued that the finding that it was probable that a complete tearing of the right medial meniscus occurred three weeks before 11 July 2011 is not supported by any opinion from the medical evidence.

14. [47]

    I do not consider that the “no evidence” complaint has any merit.

15. [48]

    The judge made factual findings at [31], and repeated at [70], based on an acceptance of Mr Hector’s evidence of symptoms of pain in his right knee from late 2010 occurring at the end of the day that subsided overnight which gradually got worse and ultimately symptoms of pain continuing into the next day: see [12]-[13] above. That evidence was supported by Dr Samy’s notes of the history he had obtained from Mr Hector, concerning the timing and circumstances of the symptoms of pain in his right knee commencing within a few months of starting at the Liddell CHPP in October 2010, followed by some acute symptoms following “a big day at work which made it [the pain] worse”, about three weeks before July 2011.

16. [49]

    Given the timing of the report by Mr Hector of some acute symptoms of pain in his right knee about three weeks before 11 July 2011 relative to the identification by Dr Young on 10 August 2011 of the tear in the medial meniscus, there was evidence supporting the judge’s finding of either a rupture or tear or break of the medial meniscus, at about the time of the acute symptoms reported by Mr Hector. That finding did not involve the judge acting as his own expert. The finding was based on the symptoms of acute pain reported by Mr Hector and the report by Dr Young of his findings upon performing the arthroscopy.

17. [50]

    The finding of pain as a result of internal disruption of the knee, such as may occur with a meniscal tear, was also supported by the opinion of Dr Schwarzer who, when describing the consequences of loss of integrity of the meniscus as a result of a tear, referred to loss of normal cushioning of the joint surfaces and resultant pain in the joint capsule, synovium and subchondral bone: see [27] above.

18. [51]

    No error in point of law has been demonstrated.

19. [52]

    Ground 4 contends, in the alternative to the previous grounds, that if the judge found that there was evidence before him of a specific injury, he failed to identify the evidence and the injury and give reasons for doing so, and if the judge made such a finding based on Dr McGill’s expression “a specific injury”, the judge gave no reasons for so holding.

20. [53]

    A failure to provide adequate reasons involves a “point of law” where they reveal a “constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction” as a result of failing to identify and determine critical issues in dispute: Goodwin v Commissioner of Police [2010] NSWCA 239 at [40], [42]; Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at [24], [88].

21. [54]

    Ground 4 was not mentioned in oral argument and it may be taken not to have been pressed. If I am wrong in that regard, the short answer to this ground is that the premise – that the judge found a specific injury was suffered by Mr Hector – is incorrect. As indicated, the judge made no such finding. The judge found that Mr Hector had been suffering from a degenerative condition, osteoarthritis, since at least 1998: at [28]. The judge addressed and determined whether Mr Hector’s employment with the appellant contributed to an aggravation, acceleration or exacerbation of a disease, being osteoarthritis in his right knee. The judge did not fail to identify and determine the critical issue of whether Mr Hector had suffered a work injury within s 4(b)(ii) of the WC Act.

Conclusion

1. [55]

   In my view, error in point of law has not been demonstrated in respect of his Honour’s determination of Mr Hector’s claim for compensation.

2. [56]

   I propose the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Appeal dismissed.

   2. (2)

      Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs.

3. [57]

   McCALLUM JA: I agree with Gleeson JA.