Raashed and Anor v Bangladesh Islamic Centre of NSW Inc

After an adjourned hearing on 6-9 March 2018 I finally heard this matter in May and June 2018, giving judgment in Rashid Raashed v Bangladesh Islamic Centre of New South Wales [2018] NSWSC 1001 on 29 June 2018 (principal judgment).

Due to a series of difficulties with legal representation, it took some time before the parties were heard on the final form of any orders or declarations sought given my judgment and on the question of costs.

On 2 November 2018 I heard both parties on the orders they sought and on the question of costs. In oral argument it became apparent to me that there was in substance no controversy over the appropriate orders to be made in this matter and I made declarations and orders on 2 November 2018 giving effect to my judgment.

This left the issue of costs outstanding, which this judgment addresses.

The proceedings were commenced by Dr Rashid Raashed (First Plaintiff) and Mr Md. Yunus Ali Mondal (Second Plaintiff) by way of Summons on 25 August 2017 seeking interlocutory relief restraining the Bangladesh Islamic Centre of NSW Inc (the Defendant) from holding its Annual General Meeting as scheduled for 27 August 2017 (principal judgment [1]).

On 25 August 2017 Pembroke J delivered ex tempore reasons and ordered an injunction restraining the Annual General Meeting until further order (principal judgment [3]).

On or about 22 September 2017 the Plaintiffs filed a Statement of Claim seeking the appointment of a receiver and manager to the Defendant (principal judgment [4]).

On 26 October 2017 the Defendant filed a Defence, and as I noted in my judgment this pleaded at some level of generality in paragraph 4(a)-(c) that neither Plaintiffs had standing to maintain their cause of action because they were not members of the Defendant, evidently based on the assumption the Plaintiffs were validly expelled in August 2017 (principal judgment [421]).

There was no Cross-Claim filed.

On 6 March 2018 the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Statement of Claim, which in addition sought declaratory relief in respect of the Plaintiffs’ life membership status with the Defendant (specifically at Prayers 1 and 2) (principal judgment [5]).

The matter was then part-heard during 6-9 March 2018. On 9 March 2018 I was informed by the Defendant’s counsel that the Defendant had withdrawn instructions in the matter (principal judgment [6]).

On 15 May 2018 solicitors for the Defendant, Executive Legal, wrote to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors, MIC Lawyers, setting out an offer to settle the proceedings. A copy of this letter was annexed to the affidavit of Mohammad Khan affirmed on 12 October 2018 (Calderbank Letter), which relevantly stated:

In his affidavit of 12 October 2018 Mr Khan said that he had not received a response to the Calderbank Letter.

With new counsel for the Defendant the matter was heard again on 28 May 2018 to 1 June 2018 with submissions on 5 and 20 June 2018 (principal judgment [7]).

As I have said I gave judgment on 29 June 2018 and made a number of findings.

First, I found that that neither Dr Raashed nor Mr Mondal had received letters purporting to expel them and therefore the resolution to expel them as of 16 July 2017 was of no effect and both were still life members of the Defendant (principal judgment [421]-[448]).

Secondly, I found that those deponents on behalf of the Plaintiff were not expelled by any purported rejection letters sent to them, because as per the Defendant’s constitution those letters simply provided a mechanism that held the outcome of their membership in abeyance until the holding of an Annual General Meeting (principal judgment [449]-[465]).

This meant that it did not strictly matter whether they did or did not receive the purported rejection letters, and simply their membership of the Defendant was held in abeyance. Those who are members are still members, and those who are not members are still not members (principal judgment [466]-[471]).

I was not satisfied there was evidence that the Executive Council of the Defendant had acted capriciously in this regard (principal judgment [472]).

Thirdly, I was not satisfied there were financial management issues with the Defendant that were symptomatic of any greater problem with the organisation. The problems with financial statements and insurance had been rectified (principal judgment [473]-[480]).

I concluded that the appointment of a receiver and manager or interim supervisor to the Defendant was not appropriate (principal judgment [481]-[486]).

With the above in mind there remains the issue of costs in the proceedings.

The Plaintiff’s submissions on costs are premised on the assertion that in these proceedings there were two separate “events” which require separate costs considerations.

The first “event” was the proceedings commenced on 25 August 2017 initially before Pembroke J to restrain the Defendant from holding its Annual General Meeting, on the basis that the Plaintiffs had been improperly expelled and membership applications had been improperly rejected. They submit they were wholly successful on this aspect of the case. They submit they were awarded an interim injunction by Pembroke J and successful on this point in the principal judgment, because I found the Plaintiffs were still life members and the twelve deponents’ memberships were in abeyance.

The second “event” was the further relief claimed for the appointment of a receiver and manager. The Plaintiffs accept they were unsuccessful on this event.

They therefore submit the costs of these two events should be set off against each other, although with a number of further factors to be considered.

First, they note the Defendant withdrew its instructions on 9 March 2018, causing the abortion of the hearing dates until May 2018. The Plaintiffs contend this resulted in wasted costs in preparing for hearing a second time, and the throwing away of the Defendant’s costs incurred in briefing for the first hearing. They state the Defendant should not be entitled to recover these costs as a result of withdrawing instructions part-way through a hearing.

Secondly, the Plaintiffs submit the costs of the contested interlocutory application for injunctive relief, being costs in the cause and upheld before me, should be paid by the Defendant.

Thirdly, the Plaintiffs assert the most substantial issue at hearing was whether the Plaintiffs had been validly expelled from the Defendant, and the related membership issues of the other applicants and deponents.

Weighing these factors into the balance, the Plaintiffs submit the Defendant should be ordered to pay 50% of their costs of the proceedings.

The Defendant’s submissions on costs rely squarely on the Calderbank letter sent to the Plaintiffs on 15 May 2018.

Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ submission, the Defendant contends that the basis of the interlocutory application before Pembroke J was not solely membership disputes, but failures to allow inspection of books and records, failure to appoint an independent auditor, failure to disclose certain debts, and allowing cash donations to be received by Mr Elzamtar.

The Defendant submits that the original Statement of Claim dated 22 September 2017 related entirely, in some way or another, to the appointment of a receiver. It sought four main substantive issues:

Shortly thereafter, the Defendant submits the Plaintiffs’ filed the majority of their evidence, which made it clear that the Plaintiffs would press all four of the above issues. However, it contends that it was only at the opening of the first hearing in March 2018 that it became apparent that the Plaintiffs would need to re-plead, in order to seek declaratory relief in respect of the Plaintiffs’ life membership status.

The Defendant denies costs were “thrown away” by the withdrawal of instructions during the March 2018 hearing, because Executive Legal was later re-appointed as the solicitors of the Defendant and costs of counsel were not entirely “thrown away”.

The Defendant contends that whilst the Plaintiffs were successful on the life membership issue (and whether or not Dr Raashed and Mr Mondal received letters) they were unsuccessful on the above four substantive issues. Further, the life membership issue only consumed very little time at the hearing. Even further, the issue of whether or not the Plaintiffs’ deponents had or had not received letters rejecting their membership applications turned out to be a useless exercise, as my judgment determined it was not strictly necessary to determine this issue (principal judgment [449], [467]-[469]). It suggests this should factor into my assessment of costs.

In addition, the Defendant submits the central issue before Pembroke J was whether the balance of convenience favoured interim relief staying the Annual General Meeting and election, and as the Defendant has succeeded at trial in respect of the substantive relief sought, costs reserved by Pembroke J should be awarded against the Plaintiffs.

With the above factors in mind, and with reference to the 15 May 2018 Calderbank letter, the Defendant seeks indemnity costs from 15 May 2018 on the basis that the relief obtained by the Plaintiffs placed them in a “worse position” than had they accepted the offer of $30,000.

The Defendant seeks the following orders as to costs:

Section 98(1)-(4) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) provides:

Rule 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) provides:

Rule 42.2 of the UCPR provides:

Indemnity costs are provided by r 42.5 of the UCPR, as are offers of compromise as defined by the rules determined by rr 42.13-42.17 of the UCPR.

With respect to Calderbank letter of compromise, in SMEC Testing Services Pty Ltd v Campbelltown City Council [2000] NSWCA 323 Giles JA said (at [37]):

Giles JA’s statement above was quoted with approval, for example, by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Bartlett v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) (2016) 92 NSWLR 670; [2016] NSWCA 142 at [24].

As is clear on the authorities with respect to Calderbank letters and indemnity costs, the question is whether the offeree’s failure to accept the offer in all the circumstances warrants departure from the ordinary rule as to costs. The touchstone, although not solely definitive, is whether the offeree has ended up worse off in the outcome of the proceedings than if they had accepted the offer contained in the Calderbank letter. Above all, costs are at the discretion of the Court and are to take into account all the circumstances of the case.

In the Calderbank letter of 15 May 2018 sent by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs, the offer amounted to requesting a complete capitulation by the Plaintiffs and payment by them to the Defendant of $30,000.

In my view this was a wholly unreasonable offer in the circumstances of the case, and does not warrant a departure from the ordinary rule as to costs. This is because the Calderbank letter, if accepted, would have meant that the Plaintiffs would have conceded that they were no longer members of the Defendant. This would undoubtedly have been a very serious and unsatisfactory outcome for the Plaintiffs whose interest in their membership in the Defendant was plain to me throughout the proceedings. It must always be borne in mind by practitioners that there is no case that cannot be lost in part or indeed in whole.

In addition, the sum of $30,000 was not provided with any detailed reference to the costs and disbursements of the Defendant to date, save as to state “[t]he sum of $30,000 represents only part of the legal and other costs that the defendant has incurred, to date”. No basis for this calculation was provided in the Calderbank letter.

With respect to the touchstone of whether or not the offeree has ended up in a worse or better position at hearing than had they accepted the offer, the outcome of the case was that the Plaintiffs were successful in proving to me that they did not receive the letters purporting to reject them and were still life members of the Defendant (principal judgment [421]-[448]). Whilst this issue emerged out of amended pleadings, this was clearly not a complete loss for the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs also succeeded in the periphery issue of whether their deponents’ membership applications were validly rejected, as in the end I held these applicants and deponents simply had their membership held in abeyance (principal judgment [449]-[471]).

The Plaintiffs were not successful in proving to me that somehow the Executive Council had acted capriciously (principal judgment [472]), or that there were symptomatic financial management issues and insurance (principal judgment [473]-[480]). The Plaintiffs did not persuade me a receiver and manager or interim supervisor should be appointed (principal judgment [481]-[486]).

To this end, I do not think that the Plaintiffs are now worse off than had they accepted the Calderbank Offer. Rather than being forced to a complete capitulation, they have won on the important issue of their status as life members. The Calderbank Offer was in my view unreasonable and in all the circumstances does not warrant a departure from the ordinary rule.

Applying my general discretion as to costs, in my view the Plaintiffs’ membership status and whether or not they received letters occupied a substantial amount of time of the hearing. To this end, the Plaintiffs’ credit had to be challenged, which took some time. The Plaintiffs’ status as life members was also relevant because they had proposed and/or seconded a number of applications as was clear in their evidence (principal judgment [163], [206]).

In addition other corroborative material needed to be considered at trial, as to the sending of letters by the Defendant to applicants, leading me to conclude there was clearly some issue or problem with the Defendant’s sending of letters by post (principal judgment [466]).

I note that in closing there was an argument raised by the Plaintiffs that the letters dated 17 July 2017 addressed to them did not comply with clause 16(a)(i) and (ii) of the Amended Constitution. As a matter of fairness I was of the view it was however too late for them to rely on this line of argument (principal judgment [424]-[426]).

By comparison, the issue as to the appointment of a receiver and manager took little time at hearing. Likewise, the factual matrix surrounding this issue (such as those of insurance and the recording of claims by Mr Elzamtar and Mr Ahmed in the financial statements) comprised a comparatively small portion of the evidence. This is when that issue is compared to the intertwined issues of the Plaintiffs’ membership in the Defendant and the various deponents’ applications to membership.

In my view, the hearing was broadly taken up with two issues: (a) the Plaintiffs’ membership and related disputes; and (b) the largely uncontroversial factual matrix as to the appointment of a receiver and manager. The first of these issues took up a bulk of the time, and the Plaintiffs were largely successful on it.

Although Pembroke J did not provide extensive reasons on the interlocutory application, it seems his approach was pragmatically to maintain the status quo pending the resolution of the dispute, reserving the question of costs, and to that extent it was a victory in one sense. I am therefore of the view the costs of the interlocutory application should flow from my above reasons.

As to the alteration of pleadings and the deferral of hearing due to issues with instructions, this is a reality of litigation and in my view did not lead to any substantial costs thrown away. At no time was the Defendant prepared to concede the Plaintiffs were indeed life members of the organisation. Whilst there might be some criticism of the pleadings, each side’s respective arguments in detail only emerged in argument, as I observed in the hearing (principal judgment [421]-[423]). These issues therefore do not factor heavily in my reasoning and discretion as to costs.

Weighing these factors into the balance, in the exercise of my general discretion, the Defendant should be ordered to pay 50% of the Plaintiffs costs of the proceedings, including the costs of the interlocutory application before Pembroke J.