HA v R

1. [1]

   STERN JA: The applicant seeks leave to appeal, pursuant to s 5(1)(b) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), from his convictions of two offences, contrary to s 66A(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (as in force at the time of the offending) of sexual intercourse with a person under 10 years of age. These were counts 3 and 4 of an indictment which comprised nine charges, spanning the period 1 June 2013 to 17 June 2019. The applicant was convicted following a trial in the District Court constituted by a Judge and jury of 12. The jury returned verdicts of not guilty on counts 1-2 and 5-9 of the indictment. The applicant was sentenced on 23 August 2022, on each of counts 3 and 4 to concurrent terms of 9 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 5 years and 6 months. The applicant also seeks leave to appeal against his sentence under Criminal Appeal Act, ss 5(1)(c) and 6(3).

2. [2]

   As the complainant was a child at the time of the events to which her evidence relates, s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), prevents publication of her name, or any matter which could identify her. Section 578A of the Crimes Act prevents publication of the complainant’s name or any matter which would, or would likely, identify her. I will thus not refer to the complainant in these reasons, and will not disclose any matter, including the name of the applicant, which could identify her. For this reason, I will refer to the applicant as the applicant or “HA”, as it is apparent that disclosure of his identity would be likely to lead to identification of the complainant. For the same reason I will also refer to her family members without reference to their names.

3. [3]

   The complainant was born in 2005 and is the sister of the applicant’s wife. The applicant was born in 1980. Each of the first five charges on the indictment related to the period of time 1 June 2013 to 20 October 2015. During that period the complainant was aged between seven and nine years old.

4. [4]

   The charges on the indictment, and the jury verdicts, are summarised in the following table:

5. [5]

   Counts 1-2 were alleged to have been carried out during what I will describe as the “first incident”. Counts 3-4 were alleged to have been carried out during what I will describe as the “second incident”. Count 5 was alleged to have been carried out during what I will describe as a “third incident”. As set out above, each of these incidents was alleged to have occurred during the period 1 June 2013 to 20 October 2015. Each of counts 6-9 were alleged to have been carried out on separate incidents. The evidence of the complainant as to each of the charges comprised two interviews with the police, conducted respectively on 17 June 2019 and 27 September 2019, and oral evidence given by the complainant provided on 10 and 11 March 2022 during a prior trial which had aborted. Each count depended upon the complainant’s evidence, but there was also, to some extent, corroborating evidence.

6. [6]

   The applicant pleaded not guilty to each charge.

7. [7]

   The applicant appeals on two grounds.

   1. (1)

      The verdicts of guilty are unreasonable as they are inconsistent with the not guilty verdict.

   2. (2)

      The sentencing judge breached the De Simoni principle by taking into account as an aggravating circumstance that the victim was under the applicant’s authority at the time of the offending conduct.

8. [8]

   Leave is required as regards ground 1 as the proposed ground involves questions of mixed fact and law: Criminal Appeal Act, s 5(1)(b). By s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act, an appeal against conviction is to be allowed if (relevantly) this Court is of the opinion that the conviction “is unreasonable or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence”, or that, “on any other ground whatsoever there was a miscarriage of justice”. Leave is also required for ground 2: Criminal Appeal Act, s 5(1)(c). By s 6(3) of that Act, on an appeal against sentence, the court, if it is of opinion that some other sentence, whether more or less severe is warranted in law and should have been passed, shall quash the sentence and pass such other sentence in substitution therefor, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal.

9. [9]

   The applicant submits that reasonable doubt about the guilt of the applicant in respect of counts 1-2 and 5-9 must have been based upon the reliability of the complainant and that equal doubt about her reliability (and thus the applicant’s guilt) ought to have properly flowed through to the jury’s consideration of counts 3 and 4.

10. [10]

    The applicant submits that this is particularly so for counts 1-2 and 5 as these occurred during the same time frame as counts 3-4, and all revolved around a trip with the applicant in the complainant’s mother’s car, during which he sexually assaulted and physically assaulted her then took her to McDonald’s and drove her home. Further, as regards each of counts 1-5, there is some corroborative evidence from the complainant’s mother of bruising.

11. [11]

    For the reasons set out below, leave to appeal should be granted. The appeal against conviction should be dismissed but the appeal against sentence should be allowed. It therefore falls to this Court to resentence. The sentence that should be imposed for counts 3 and 4 is an aggregate term of 8 years and 3 months, with a non-parole period of 5 years.

Ground One

1. [12]

   The principles that apply to a complaint that a verdict is unreasonable are well established. As set out in the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ in M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 492-493; [1994] HCA 63:

2. [13]

   Most recently in Dansie v R (2022) 274 CLR 651; [2022] HCA 25 at [12], the High Court confirmed the continuing authority of M v The Queen as the test for unreasonableness. In the joint judgment at [7]-[8] it was held that:

3. [14]

   Where, as here, the ground of appeal relies upon an alleged inconsistency between guilty and not guilty verdicts, the burden of establishing inconsistency rests on the applicant. As held in MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348 at 367; [1996] HCA 35 (Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ) (“MacKenzie”), the test is one of logic and reasonableness:

4. [15]

   As was recognised in MacKenzie at 367, juries are regularly, and properly, directed that each count must be considered separately and with respect to the evidence that supports (or otherwise) that count. Juries are also routinely, and properly, directed that it is open to them to accept some parts of a witness’s evidence and to reject other parts: KBT v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 417 at 424; [1997] HCA 54 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, Kirby J agreeing).

5. [16]

   In a case where, as here, there were allegations of multiple sexual assaults against a single complainant, Spigelman CJ observed in R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; [2001] NSWCCA 290 at [34]:

6. [17]

   In MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53 at [34], Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Callinan JJ observed:

7. [18]

   Further, as held by Hoeben CJ at CL in Walker v R [2019] NSWCCA 4 (Rothman and Price JJ agreeing):

8. [19]

   As stated by Simpson J (McClellan CJ at CL and Latham J agreeing) in TK v R (2009) 74 NSWLR 299; [2009] NSWCCA 151 at [128]:

9. [20]

   These principles have regularly been followed: see eg Walker v R at [110]; Collins v R [2020] NSWCCA 198 at [13]-[14]; NW v R [2023] NSWCCA 134 at [36]-[39].

10. [21]

    As held by Basten JA in Ganiji v R [2019] NSWCCA 208 at [13] (Button and Lonergan JJ agreeing):

11. [22]

    As is apparent from the authority set out above, consideration of ground 1 of the applicant’s appeal requires this Court to consider for itself all of the evidence to determine whether there is an explanation for the acquittals of the applicant on counts 1-2 and 5-9 without resort to such doubts about the complainant’s credibility that the convictions on counts 3-4 are unreasonable. Attention must be given not merely to the complainant’s evidence, but also to the evidence of surrounding circumstances, to determine whether, having regard to all of the evidence, it was open to the jury to accept her evidence with respect to counts 3-4 but not to have convicted on the other counts.

12. [23]

    I have carefully reviewed all of the evidence before the trial judge. Below I set out key matters within that evidence that are of particular significance, and my conclusions having regard to the evidence as a whole.

13. [24]

    The first incident, to which counts 1 and 2 relate, was described by the complainant as having occurred on the night of a party to celebrate the engagement of her sister and the applicant. The evidence before the Court was that that party took place on 17 October 2013. The complainant’s evidence was at the time when the abuse occurred, the complainant was living with her and her family. She thought this was in the beginning of 2014. She said that on that night there was a barbeque but that she didn’t “really eat barbeque”. The applicant had said that she should come with him to McDonald’s. She said that it would have been “like 8:00pm and up”. She said that her mum trusted him and she let them go. He then drove her in her mother’s car, a really big car with seven seats, a “Toyota Prado or something”, to a parking lot at a big oval in Minchinbury in front of an IGA where he then undressed her. He would either punch and slap her and tell her that if she told her mum he would either hurt her or kill her mum. After the incident he took her to McDonald’s then took her home.

14. [25]

    In her first interview, the complainant said that the applicant put his finger in and licked her vagina. In her second interview, she mentioned the applicant putting his finger in her vagina but did not refer to him licking her vagina.

15. [26]

    During her cross-examination, the complainant said that there was another celebration of the engagement of her sister and the applicant after the October 2013 engagement party and she was not sure which celebration was occurring at the time of the first incident.

16. [27]

    The complainant’s sister’s evidence was that she recalled two instances when the applicant took the complainant to McDonald’s. They were in the afternoon and from what she remembered the applicant drove the complainant in the white Prado. She observed that the complainant did not seem happy after those trips and that she went straight to her room. The complainant’s mother did not recall the complainant going to McDonald’s with the applicant in 2014 but she did recall that he took her to McDonald’s in 2015. The complainant’s wife said that the complainant did not ever go to McDonald’s with the applicant.

17. [28]

    The complainant’s aunt’s evidence was that she was at the engagement party and she had “no idea at all” of the applicant taking the complainant away to McDonald’s on that occasion. She also said that there was “no way anyone” could have gone out during the engagement party. The complainant’s aunt also attended the signing of the marriage contact in January 2014 and had no recollection of seeing the applicant take the complainant to McDonald's on that occasion. She said that the food at the engagement party was traditional food ordered from a restaurant. A number of other family members described the food at the engagement party as Arabic cuisine.

18. [29]

    As to the date of the wedding, the evidence before the Court (from the complainant’s uncle by marriage) was that the marriage contract was signed in January 2014. His evidence was that the applicant did not move into the complainant’s family’s house until after the marriage contract was signed.

19. [30]

    Transport for NSW records in evidence before the Court showed that the complainant’s family lived at Minchinbury from 9 September 2013 until 23 June 2015. The complainant’s mother’s evidence was also that they lived at Minchinbury from 2013 up until 2015. The Transport for NSW records also showed that the complainant’s mother owned a Prado from 3 February 2015 until 25 March 2015. The complainant’s mother’s evidence was that she did not have a car in 2013, that she had a Prado in 2014, and that she registered the Prado within days of getting it. She said that sometimes she would give the Prado to the applicant to drive. She also said that before the Prado she had a white Mazda seven seater four-wheel drive and the applicant used to take it. She said that sometimes she asked the applicant to take the complainant to McDonald’s.

20. [31]

    Records tendered before the Court also showed that the applicant got his learner’s driver licence on 10 February 2014 and his driver licence on 6 August 2014.

21. [32]

    Counsel for the applicant at trial, in his closing address, submitted that there were a number of problems with the complainant’s account of the first incident. He referred to a number of matters including the date of purchase and registration of the Prado, the unlikelihood of the applicant taking the complainant to McDonald’s during the engagement party, the fact that the complainant only referred to the possibility of a second engagement party during cross-examination, that there was no evidence that anyone saw the applicant leave the engagement party with the complainant or that he took her to McDonald’s during that party, and that the evidence was that the food at that party was traditional and not barbeque. He then submitted that “the fundamental problems with [the complainant’s account] would have to create a reasonable doubt about whether that incident occurred” and would also have to “create doubts about her reliability, her accuracy and her truthfulness, and you would have to keep that general concern in mind when you go and consider the other accounts [sic] on the indictment”.

22. [33]

    Having regard to the matters set out above, I have concluded that a logical explanation for the jury acquitting the applicant of counts 1 and 2 is that there were a number of inconsistencies going to matters which were the essence of the complainant’s account of the first incident. That is particularly so given the inconsistencies referred to above, and the fact that the applicant did not get his driver licence until August 2014. Conscious of its obligation to scrutinise the evidence with care, and to consider each count individually, those inconsistencies could well have led the jury to have reasonable doubt as to whether the events that were the basis of counts 1 and 2 occurred. Whilst that might have led the jury to be cautious about accepting the complainant’s evidence if not corroborated, it would nonetheless have been open to the jury to accept the applicant’s evidence in circumstances in which corroborative evidence was available.

23. [34]

    In her first interview the complainant said that the third occasion, which involved digital penetration, occurred in 2017. This was charged as count 5. She thought that this happened in 2017, because there was a “long period from 2016, like from the second time. There was a long period where we didn’t talk”.

24. [35]

    The complainant said that the third occasion occurred when she was living in Mount Druitt. She said that they were first at the applicant’s house and then he took her out to McDonald’s. She didn’t know where it was that they parked, and the abuse occurred, but it was a long drive between that place and the McDonald’s that they then went to, it was “like a 30 minute” drive. This was a “different” McDonald’s from the previous occasions. She said that the abuse occurred in the same car as the previous occasions, even though the applicant had his own car by then. Her evidence was that the applicant was very violent on this occasion. He took out all his anger on her. On the way to the place where they parked, he asked her about music, but after the abuse she was crying the whole way.

25. [36]

    She explained that she was in the passenger seat and then he took her out of the car. She said that she “was about to run away, but he ran faster”. She said that he “gripped on me, he carried me on his, like, on his left shoulder”. He opened the back seat and pushed her. She said that she hit her head and “had like a concussion for like 2 days after that”.

26. [37]

    The complainant described the applicant grabbing her thighs on this occasion and her mother seeing these marks and asking her about them. She described these marks as being like finger marks caused by his fingernails digging into her skin. She explained these marks to her mother as being from sport.

27. [38]

    She said that when they returned home “my mum was like suspicious, she was like why did you guys take long? And then he made…an excuse…they were so busy. And then there wasn’t any hamburgers left so we went on the other McDonald’s. The other McDonald’s was on the same highway…but further down”.

28. [39]

    The Transport for NSW records indicated that the complainant’s family were living in Mount Druitt between June 2015 and October 2017.

29. [40]

    In his closing address, counsel for the defence submitted that the complainant’s evidence was that this occasion occurred in 2017 but the charge related to a period between 1 June 2013 and 20 October 2015. He also relied in closing address upon the fact that there was no evidence of any family member giving evidence of the complainant being away with the applicant for some two and a half hours.

30. [41]

    In my judgment, a logical explanation for the jury having acquitted the applicant on count 5 is that the complainant’s evidence was that this occurred outside of the charge period. That conclusion would not involve any rejection of the credibility or reliability of the complainant’s evidence as a whole. A further logical explanation for the acquittal on count 5 relates to location. The charge was that the offence occurred in Minchinbury. The complainant’s evidence was, however, that she did not know where the abuse occurred but that it was a long drive from there to the McDonald’s that they then went to.

31. [42]

    The incident that was charged as count 6 was alleged to have occurred between 1 June 2013 and 31 March 2014. The complainant described this incident in her second interview. She said that when she was living with her family at Minchinbury the applicant exposed himself to her around midnight. She said this happened at a time when she slept in a room with her sister. The complainant took out his penis when he was in the doorway of her bedroom. There was no evidence corroborating the complainant’s account of this incident

32. [43]

    I have concluded that the jury’s acquittal on count 6 is consistent with the jury taking a cautious approach to the complainant’s evidence in circumstances in which there was no corroborating evidence at all.

33. [44]

    The fourth incident, which was charged as count 7, was alleged to have occurred on a day between 1 April 2014 and 31 July 2014. The complainant said the applicant licked her vagina and that this incident was the last time that it happened. In her first interview she said this happened in “2015-ish, 16, 2015 and 16”. She said on three occasions during this interview that it happened between 2015 and 2016. In evidence in chief, however, the complainant said that this incident occurred in 2017.

34. [45]

    The complainant said that when the applicant and his wife moved to a “brand new apartment” in Liverpool (“the unit”) “[t]hey put their boxes in the garage”. One night, the applicant told the complainant and her sister “to come down to help him get the boxes up”. She said that that night the applicant’s wife and kids were upstairs in the unit. She said that there was about “20 metres between the garage and the unit”.

35. [46]

    She said that the applicant made her sister carry a “really heavy box” so that she would take longer to go upstairs and come back. When her sister left, the applicant turned on the light and got the complainant undressed and took off her pants. She said the applicant “licked me again, he fingered me again”. Later in the same interview she said the applicant “started licking me again”. She said he heard her sister, who “kind of made a noise”. She said that five seconds before her sister came in, the applicant dressed her again and then turned off the light “and like pretended like nothing happened”.

36. [47]

    The complainant’s account was to some extent corroborated by her sister, who said that she recalled moving boxes from the car when the applicant moved into the unit. She said they drove from the old house, using his car, to the unit. She said that she would carry boxes up from the car to the unit and that the applicant’s wife was in the kitchen. The complainant was with her when she helped with the move. However, her evidence was that the boxes were moved from the car to the unit. She did not mention a garage. She also said that the complainant and the applicant were in the car outside at the time. She said the applicant was getting boxes out of the car “in the street”.

37. [48]

    The applicant’s wife gave evidence that when the applicant moved to the unit a friend with a van helped him move and that the applicant’s “stuff” was moved from the van into the apartment. She said her sisters were never there to help with the move. A friend of the applicant also gave evidence about the move. He said that, together with two other persons, he had helped to move the applicant into the unit. He said the belongings were put into the unit and no one other than the four men unloaded the boxes at the unit. He said that on that occasion they moved all the stuff that had to be moved.

38. [49]

    The Transport for New South Wales records before the Court had the unit recorded as the address of the applicant from 23 May 2014. In closing submissions, counsel for the Crown suggested that the applicant may have moved in before that date. As set out above, however, the applicant did not have his driver licence until August 2014.

39. [50]

    It is my view that there are numerous logical explanations for why the jury may have acquitted the applicant of count 7. First, the date given by the complainant for this occurrence was well beyond the date range for this offence. Second, the evidence of the applicant’s friend as to the move suggested that there would not have been boxes in the garage. Third, the complainant’s sister’s evidence did not involve the complainant and the applicant being in the garage, but rather involved a move from a car in the street into the unit. These matters may well have been sufficient to cause the jury to have some doubts as to the reliability of the applicant’s evidence in relation to this incident, without casting such doubt upon her credibility as to reject her evidence as to other incidents. Again, the jury’s acquittal of count 7 is logically consistent with it taking a cautious approach where there is no corroboration of the complainant’s account.

40. [51]

    Count 8 was an allegation of indecency which was alleged to have occurred on a day between 1 October 2018 and 31 October 2018 at Fairfield.

41. [52]

    The complainant described the incident that was charged as count 8 in her second interview. She said that it happened in the applicant’s house at Fairfield. She said that she was sitting on the couch and it was “shaped this way, so I could see the bedrooms and the other bedroom and the bathroom”. She said that the applicant came home from work and had a shower. The applicant’s wife was cooking in the kitchen with the kids. After he finished his shower, the applicant opened the door a little bit and saw that the complainant was the only one sitting on the couch. She said that he opened the door and looked at her and she stared at her phone and ignored him. She said that she just “focused on my phone. I tried so hard not to look up, because he was there”. She said that he came out with his robe open and exposed himself. She said he then went to his room and locked his door. She said he then opened the door and stared at her and that she tried to ignore him. She said that she then moved and went to the other side of the living room, onto the other couch. She said that on the other couch she could see the kitchen only. She said that he came to the kitchen, opened his robe again, touched his penis “to make me see” and then he closed his robe. She said that she called out to her sister, the applicant’s wife, asking what was for dinner and then “he covered himself, and went to the bedroom to change”.

42. [53]

    The applicant’s wife provided a floor plan of their house at the time when they lived there. During her evidence in chief she was taken through it by counsel for the defence. He asked her to mark up the placement of the rooms and items of furniture relevant to the complainant’s account, including the placement of the sofa and the bedroom. Counsel for the defence, in closing submissions at the trial, submitted on the basis of this marked-up floor plan that, contrary to the complainant’s evidence, there wasn’t a sofa in the loungeroom that could be shaped so that a person on the sofa could see both the bathroom and the two bedrooms. One of the sofas had no direct line of sight to the bedroom as there was a long hallway which would block the bedroom from view. In order to see a bedroom from the other of the sofas would require the complainant to have been sitting with her head turned 90 degrees to the left, that is “if [she] was actually already looking in the direction of the bedroom”. The complainant could not have seen the applicant’s bedroom from that sofa if, as she said in her evidence, she was on her phone. He submitted that it was not possible to know where the complainant was sitting because she was not asked to explain this in her evidence. Thus, it was not possible to test whether she might have had a line of sight to a bedroom at all.

43. [54]

    There was no corroboration of count 8. The matters raised in the submissions of the applicant’s counsel at trial, as set out above, were not put to the complainant. In my view, the jury may well have felt, in these circumstances, that there was reasonable doubt as to whether the matters the subject of count 8 occurred as charged. That would logically explain the acquittal on count 8 but does not suggest any overarching rejection of the credibility of the complainant’s evidence.

44. [55]

    Count 9 charged stalking or intimidation on a day between 1 June 2019 and 17 June 2019. The trial judge, in her summing up, explained to the jury that, as regards this charge, the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant stalked the complainant and that he had the intention of causing her to fear physical or mental harm.

45. [56]

    The complainant described this incident as involving the applicant coming to the front of her school and staring at her. She said that he had done that a couple of times. The last time he had done that was the Wednesday before the complainant’s interview with the police on 17 June 2019, the same day that she finally told her counsellor about the abuse. She said that the applicant had been coming to her school, looking at her and that every time her saw her he would stop again and stare for five seconds and then turn around again. In cross-examination, the complainant said that at the time of this incident she had seen the applicant in front of a little village shopping centre around her school. This happened at 8:00am. The applicant was in a silver or white car.

46. [57]

    A police officer, Detective Wallace, gave evidence that the complainant had told him that she saw the applicant in a silver car at the shopping centre across the road from the school on the date that she disclosed the allegations to her school counsellor, being 12 June 2019. Detective Wallace had, however, obtained CCTV footage of the relevant area and there was nothing in that footage that showed the applicant either inside a car or outside of a car.

47. [58]

    In closing submissions, counsel for the defence submitted that common sense suggested that bottle shops would not be open at 8:30am. He also queried why statements had not been taken from any school mates notwithstanding that the complainant’s evidence was that two school friends had also seen the applicant that morning.

48. [59]

    In my view, again, the jury’s acquittal of the applicant on count 9 is consistent with the jury taking a cautious approach to the complainant’s evidence where it was not corroborated and there was some evidence that was inconsistent with her account of the incident. The acquittal on count 8 can thus be explained on that logical basis. That does not involve a rejection of the credibility of the complainant’s account more generally.

49. [60]

    The complainant gave various accounts as to the timing of the second incident, which was the subject of counts 3 and 4. She initially said that it happened a few weeks after the first occasion, then said she thought it happened a few days later. She said that he did the same things that he had done to her on the first occasion but that the “talking was a bit different”. As with counts 1 and 2, in her first interview she described the applicant putting his finger in her vagina and also licking her vagina but in her second interview she only mentioned the digital penetration.

50. [61]

    The complainant said that when the applicant got into the car on the day of the second incident he asked her if she was excited and said “[p]lease don’t tell me that you’re going to do the same thing. Then he’s like, I will, but this time it’ll be more playful”. He asked her whether she watched porn movies and when she said she wasn’t interested he said “Ok, then I’ll teach you in real life”. She also said that she asked him “don’t you already do that to my sister” and he replied “oh, but your sister gets pregnant easily”. He then said “[y]ou won’t get pregnant. You’ll be fine”. She said that she had tried to talk to him after the abuse and asked if he was ok because she knew at that time he was having a fight with his wife. She also described undressing herself on this occasion.

51. [62]

    She said that the applicant parked at a different place on the second occasion because at this time the place where he had parked on the first occasion was being renovated. She said that on this occasion they parked “still around that area, but it was just like more closer to the IGA”. She said that the abuse occurred around 9:00pm on a weekday and that they were in the Prado. He said to her that if she told anyone he would kill her and her mother. He pushed her, choked her, and got really mad. She said that after this occasion she had bruises all over her body and her mother saw her bruises. She said that her mother asked about the bruises and she “always blamed it on sport ‘cause I used to play netball”. She said that she had bruises on her leg “because of like, he would like move me” and “he done that like really hard, to like try and open my legs and then he moved my hand”. She also said he slapped her on the left side of her face. In her second interview she described how he had hit and squeezed and elbowed her inside thighs.

52. [63]

    Again after the abuse he took her to McDonald’s and then took her home. She said it happened during Eid.

53. [64]

    An employee of Blacktown Council gave a statement that there were two car parks at Minchinbury oval, one known as car park 138 and the other known as car park 145. The records did not show that there was any work done to the car parks between 2013 and 2014, however there were works done on the car parks in 2015. The first works were done on car park 318. These commenced on 20 March 2015 and were completed on 14 April 2015. The second works were car park 145. These commenced on 9 March 2015 and were completed on 14 April 2015. These periods overlapped with the period when the complainant’s mother owned the Prado.

54. [65]

    There was also evidence from the complainant’s mother, referred to above, that she recalled the applicant taking the complainant to McDonald’s in 2015.

55. [66]

    Significantly, the complainant’s mother also gave evidence that when she used to bath the complainant, she noticed some marks on her thighs, her hand, on her face, and also that sometimes she had black eyes, “like darkness under her eyes”. She said she saw a blueish area on both thighs. She did not honestly remember but thought it was when the complainant was seven to eight years old or maybe nine, she didn’t know exactly. She said that the blue marks were on the inside of the complainant’s thighs. She also saw marks on her arms on another occasion. When asked how often she saw a mark or marks on the complainant’s arms she said “[h]onestly, I don’t remember exactly, but on may [sic] occasions I noticed things”. She said that when she asked about the marks on the complainant’s thighs, the complainant said “it was from this kind of game at the playground”. She also said she noticed something on the complainant’s face once which was redness and said it “was different. Not normal thing”. This occurred when they lived in Minchinbury. The complainant’s mother also gave evidence that the complainant was “very fearful to go to her sister’s house”, meaning the house where the applicant lived with his wife.

56. [67]

    In my judgment, it is significant that in relation to the second incident there is evidence from a number of sources corroborating the complainant’s account. First, the complainant’s mother’s evidence of noticing the marks on the complainant’s inner thigh, hand and on her face is highly material evidence corroborating important aspects of the complainant’s account. The location of the bruises to the complainant’s inner thighs is corroborative of them being caused during abuse as described by the complainant in relation to counts 3 and 4. The complainant’s mother’s evidence of having asked the complainant about this bruising and how the complainant explained away the marks also corroborates the complainant’s account of this incident. Whilst the bruises on the inner thigh are also consistent with the complainant’s account of count 5, and as regards that incident the complainant gave specific evidence of her mother noticing bruises on her thighs whereas in relation to counts 3 and 4 her evidence was simply that her mother “saw my bruises”, it was open to the jury to find that the complainant’s mother’s evidence of identifying bruises on her inner thighs corroborated her account of counts 3 and 4. The complainant specifically described bruising to the inner thigh in respect of both the second and third incidents.

57. [68]

    Second, the evidence from the employee of Blacktown Council established that there were renovations on a car park in the broad location where the complainant described them in her account of this incident. This was at a time when the complainant’s mother owned the Prado.

58. [69]

    Third, the complainant’s mother gave evidence that she recalled the applicant taking the complainant to McDonald’s in 2015. This also corroborates the complainant’s account of the second incident, if it is accepted that this occurred at the time of the renovations in the relevant area.

59. [70]

    In my view, it would also have been open to the jury to find that the complainant’s evidence of what was said by her and by the applicant during this incident had the ring of truth. By way of example, the applicant having asked the complainant if she was excited, or his comment about why he did not do these things to his wife, were both matters that the jury could well have considered to be so unusual that it was highly unlikely that they would have been made up by the complainant. The same is true of the complainant’s evidence that she undressed herself on this occasion.

60. [71]

    Having reviewed the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that it was open to the jury to accept the complainant’s evidence as to the second incident, and convict on counts 3 and 4, notwithstanding the jury having not been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the other counts. This is so notwithstanding that there was clearly an inconsistency in the complainant’s evidence as to timing, in that the second incident could not have occurred within days or weeks of the first incident as described by the applicant. It would have been open to the jury to find that an inconsistency as to timing of such an event is of no real significance given the complainant’s age at the time of the incident and the period of time between the incident and the complainant reporting it and being asked to give an account of it.

61. [72]

    It would also have been open to the jury to reject the applicant’s wife’s evidence that the complainant never went to McDonald’s with the applicant, having regard to her mother’s evidence that she did recall him taking her to McDonald’s in 2015, in addition to the evidence of the other sisters who also recalled that the complainant was taken by the applicant on trips to McDonald’s.

62. [73]

    Having regard to the analysis set out above, it was open to a jury acting reasonably to convict on counts 3 and 4, notwithstanding the acquittals of the applicant of the remainder of the counts. As submitted by the Crown on the appeal, other than as regards the date on which the incident occurred, there was no evidence which stood against the second incident occurring as the complainant said. There were also matters, as set out above, that corroborated this account. By contrast, there were matters relating to the other charges of sexual intercourse, being counts 1, 2, 5 and 7, that could properly have led the jury to have had reasonable doubt as to whether the incidents occurred in the manner alleged by the complainant. It was open to the jury to accept that the complainant’s evidence was at least in part credible, but to have had concerns about accepting her evidence as establishing the applicant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the absence of any corroborating evidence. That provides a logical explanation for both the acquittals in circumstances in which the jury convicted the applicant of counts 3 and 4.

63. [74]

    In the light of those matters, the acquittals on counts 1, 2, 5 and 7 do not leave me with any doubt as to the applicant’s guilt of counts 3 and 4.

64. [75]

    In these circumstances, ground 1 should be dismissed. The verdicts on counts 3 and 4 were not unreasonable.

Ground 2

1. [76]

   The sentencing hearing proceeded before her Honour Judge Harris on 19 August 2022. Both parties relied on their written submissions but supplemented those submissions with brief oral submissions.

2. [77]

   In the Crown’s written submissions, under the heading “Objective Seriousness”, the Crown set out “factors common to both counts” to support its contention that “the objective seriousness relating to both offences falls squarely within the mid-range”. Under the sub-heading “Age Difference” the Crown stated that:

3. [78]

   Under the sub-heading “Coercion” the Crown submitted that “[t]he offender exploited the age difference between himself and the victim and the authority he held over her. Additionally, the offender used the victim’s love of McDonald’s to engage her and then used threats to render her voiceless.”

4. [79]

   The Crown then made the following submissions:

5. [80]

   The written outline of submissions on sentence on behalf of the applicant, also contained in the context of submissions on objective seriousness, included the following:

6. [81]

   At the time of the offending, s 66A of the Crimes Act relevantly provided:

7. [82]

   Section 21A(2)(k) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“Sentencing Act”) provides:

8. [83]

   On Tuesday 23 August 2022, Judge Harris delivered her remarks on sentencing, having heard brief submissions on sentence on 19 August 2022 (the preceding Friday).

9. [84]

   In the context of considering the objective seriousness of the offending, her Honour made no reference to s 21A(2)(k), but said the following:

10. [85]

    The applicant submits that it is apparent from these remarks that the applicant was sentenced for the offence under s 66A(2) of the Crimes Act (as it was at the time of the offending), namely of sexual intercourse with a person under 10 years of age in circumstances of aggravation, rather than for the offence under s 66A(1), with which he was charged. As set out above, one circumstance of aggravation, under s 66A(3)(d), was that the alleged victim was (whether generally or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged offender. The offence under s 66A(2) carried a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life, whereas the offence under s 66A(1) carried a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years.

11. [86]

    The Crown’s written submissions before the sentencing judge, under the heading “Coercion” within a section of the submissions dealing with objective seriousness, included that:

12. [87]

    As set out above (see at [79]), the Crown’s written submissions before the sentencing judge also included, under the heading “Aggravating Factors”:

13. [88]

    The applicant’s written submissions before the sentencing judge included the following:

14. [89]

    Neither the Crown nor the applicant made any oral submissions as to trust or authority. Both relied upon their written submissions.

15. [90]

    The applicant submits that in this regard the submissions of both the Crown and the applicant simply recognised that the applicant’s objective criminality was aggravated by the breach of trust, and that trust and authority are two different concepts. By contrast, it is submitted, in relying upon both the applicant being in a position of trust and the complainant being under his authority at the relevant time, the sentencing judge fell into De Simoni error: The Queen v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383 at 389; [1981] HCA 31 (“De Simoni”). The Crown submits that there was no such error. Rather, that on a fair reading of the judgment as a whole and read in the context of the Crown’s submissions, the sentencing judge was not making a finding that the aggravating circumstance of breach of authority under s 66A(3)(d) of the Crimes Act was made out.

16. [91]

    In R v Wickham [2004] NSWCCA 193, Howie J considered the “limits upon the use” to be made upon the factors of aggravation in s 21A of the Sentencing Act. Relevantly, the “second limitation” was that found in s 21A(4) which provided that “[t]he court is not to have regard to any such aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing if it would be contrary to any Act or rule of law to do so”: at [23]. His Honour, at [26], found that one of the ways that limitation operated, consistent with the intention of Parliament to replicate the common law, was to:

17. [92]

    The principle established by De Simoni at 389 (Gibbs CJ, Mason and Murphy JJ agreeing) is that:

18. [93]

    There are a number of cases in which this Court has found that there is no analogous De Simoni error in the sentencing judge taking into account that an offender was in a position of authority or trust in relation to the victim.

19. [94]

    In Rainbow v R [2018] NSWCCA 42 (“Rainbow”) the offender pleaded guilty to an offence of aggravated sexual intercourse with a child between the ages of 14 and 16 years, the circumstance of aggravation being that the victim had a cognitive impairment, contrary to (the then) ss 66C(4) and (5)(f) of the Crimes Act. Before the sentencing judge the Crown submitted (as recorded in the judgment of Hidden AJ at [23]):

20. [95]

    In determining objective seriousness, the sentencing judge found (as recorded in the judgment of Hidden AJ at [21]) that there was:

21. [96]

    The offender submitted on appeal that the objective gravity of the offence was encompassed within the circumstance of gravity specified in the charge, being the victim’s cognitive impairment, and that the sentencing judge had erred in finding that there was a breach of trust by the offender. In rejecting this ground of appeal Hidden AJ held:

22. [97]

    In Cordeiro v R [2019] NSWCCA 308 (“Cordeiro”) the complainant was a casual employee of the offender. He was convicted of a single count of sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to (at the relevant time) s 61I of the Crimes Act. The offending occurred after he provided the complainant with alcohol and she fell asleep. The sentencing judge said, as recorded in the judgment of Harrison J at [128]:

23. [98]

    For the purpose of the more serious offence of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent under s 61J, a circumstance of aggravation was that the victim was “under the authority” of the offender. The offender submitted that the sentencing judge erred in taking into account that he was in a position of authority with respect to the victim as that involved a breach of the De Simoni principle. In rejecting this ground of appeal, Harrison J, with whom Simpson AJA and Johnson J agreed, held at [135]:

24. [99]

    In Burr v R [2020] NSWCCA 282 (“Burr”), the offender pleaded guilty to the offence of persistent sexual abuse of a child contrary to (at the relevant time) s 66EA of the Crimes Act, with the constituent offending being sexual intercourse with a child between the age of 14 and 16 years contrary to s 66C(3). The offender was in a relationship with the victim’s mother. The Crown submitted before the sentencing judge that the aggravating feature in s 21A(2)(k) of the Sentencing Act was not made out, but that the offender had taken advantage of the victim’s youth and his position within the family in circumstances in which there was a clear power imbalance between the offender and the victim: at [119]-[120]. As recorded in the judgment of Johnson J at [76], the sentencing judge said in ex tempore sentencing remarks:

25. [100]

    One circumstance of aggravation for the purpose of the more serious offence under s 66C(4) was that the victim was “under the authority” of the alleged offender. The offender submitted on appeal that by finding that he was in a position of authority, the sentencing judge had made a finding breached the principle in De Simoni.

26. [101]

    Johnson J, with whom Leeming JA and Rothman J agreed, found at [124] that the sentencing judge neither made a finding of an aggravating feature under s 21A(2)(k) of the Sentencing Act nor made a De Simoni error. Johnson J was satisfied that the sentencing judge had adopted the uncontested Crown’s submission, set out in summary above, for the purpose of the sentencing remarks: at [119]. In that context, Johnson J held at [123] that the relevant passage in the sentencing remarks:

27. [102]

    Most recently, in Kilby v R [2023] NSWCCA 247 (“Kilby”), the offender was found guilty of a number of offences including sexual intercourse with a person aged between 10 and 14 years contrary to (the then) s 66C(1) (Count 2) and an act of indecency with a person aged under 16 years contrary to (the then) s 61N of the Crimes Act (Count 3). The victim was a friend of one of the offender’s daughters. At the relevant time, a circumstance of aggravation for the more serious offences under, respectively s 66C(2) and s 61O was, in each case, the victim being “under the authority” of the offender.

28. [103]

    The written submissions on behalf of the offender contended, in relation to s 21A(2)(k) of the Sentencing Act, that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the offender used any position of trust in a calculated way. In oral submissions before the sentencing judge counsel for the offender submitted that the “De Simoni issue” was a preliminary matter “that ought to be brought to bear in considering the question of whether s 21A(2)(k) is enlivened in the 66C charge. In my submission it cannot be.” It was conceded, however, that the Court would “invariably take into account” that the offences took place at the home of the offender and that the offender was the “adult in charge” and that it was open to the sentencing judge to make a finding such as was made in Rainbow as part of the instinctive synthesis: at [32]. The Crown did not assert any matters of aggravation for counts 2 and 3.

29. [104]

    When assessing objective seriousness, the sentencing judge said:

30. [105]

    The offender contended on appeal that the sentencing judge fell into De Simoni error by finding that the offender had abused a position of authority when committing the offences in counts 2 and 3. Davies J (Leeming JA agreeing and Wilson J agreeing giving additional reasons) rejected that ground of appeal. Davies J referred at [43] to the judgment of Harrison J in Cordeiro at [135] (set out above at [98]) and found at [44] that the position in Kilby was “no different”. Further, his Honour noted that, as in Burr, the sentencing judge made no mention of s 21A(2)(k) of the Sentencing Act. Also, counsel for the offender had conceded that the sentencing judge could have regard to the issue of authority as part of the instinctive synthesis rather than under s 21A(2)(k). Having regard to these matters, and to the fact that the sentencing judge used the expression “aggravating feature” rather than the terminology of “aggravating and mitigating factors” which is found in s 21A(2)(k), Davies J held that the De Simoni error was not established.

31. [106]

    Wilson J (with whose reasons Leeming JA agreed) found that it was apparent from an exchange between counsel and the sentencing judge (extracted by Davies J at [32]) that the sentencing judge was clearly alive to the need for caution in approaching the factual feature that the offender was looking after children at the relevant time so that it was not treated as a feature that made out the more serious form of the offence under s 66C(2), or as establishing the feature of statutory aggravation: at [50]. Wilson J found, further, that the reference to the offender being in a “position of authority” was clearly distinguishable from either feature: at [52]. Her Honour further cautioned as to the importance of reading the sentencing judgment as a whole in the context of the cases placed before the sentencing court by the Crown and applicant: at [53].

32. [107]

    In my judgment, there are a number of matters which, together, distinguish the present case from the circumstances before the Court in each of Rainbow, Burr, Cordeiro and Kilby. First, and most importantly, the sentencing judge here found that the victim was “under the offender’s authority” at the time of the offending. Her Honour thereby made a finding in the precise terms of the circumstance of aggravation under s 66A(3)(d) of the Crimes Act. In that respect, the sentencing remarks in the present case are materially different from those considered in Rainbow, Burr, Cordeiro and Kilby. In both Cordeiro and Kilby, in finding that there was no De Simoni error, the Court relied upon the fact that the sentencing judge had not made a finding in terms of the circumstance of aggravation for the purpose of the more serious offence. In Cordeiro (cited with approval by Davies J in Kilby at [43]) Harrison J at [135] found that the concept of the offender being “in a position of authority over the victim” was different to that of the victim being “under the authority of the offender”. Here, the finding of the sentencing judge was unequivocally the latter rather than the former.

33. [108]

    Second, the sentencing judge made findings both as to the applicant’s “position of trust and the special relationship between the offender and the victim” and as to the complainant being “under the offender’s authority at the time” of the offending. Her Honour described these two things as “both aggravating features albeit that there is an overlap between them”. It is thus clear that the primary judge took both matters into account when sentencing the applicant.

34. [109]

    Third, here the Crown’s written submissions before the sentencing judge relied upon the aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(k) that the “offender abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim”. The written submissions on behalf of the applicant accepted, under the heading “Statutory aggravating factors”, that the applicant was in a position of trust or authority in respect of the complainant, and specifically referenced s 21A(2)(k). The sentencing judge’s findings went beyond these submissions in the two significant respects identified above. In these circumstances, and by contrast to the position in Burr, the sentencing judge’s findings cannot be read merely as an adoption of the submissions of counsel.

35. [110]

    Fourth, by contrast to the circumstances identified by Hidden AJ in Rainbow at [31] (adopted by Johnson J in Burr at [123]) the sentencing remarks cannot be construed as merely reflecting a finding, in ordinary parlance, as to the applicant having been in breach of a position of trust. In particular, the sentencing judge’s finding that an aggravating feature additional to the applicant’s position of trust was that the complainant was under the authority of the applicant at the time of the offending goes well beyond that.

36. [111]

    Finally, by contrast to the circumstance relied upon by Wilson J in Kilby, there is nothing in the transcript of the sentencing hearing that demonstrates that on this occasion the sentencing judge was, when sentencing the applicant, directed to the need for caution to avoid making any finding as to a circumstance of aggravation for the purposes of s 66A(2) of the Crimes Act.

37. [112]

    In these circumstances, I have concluded that, in finding that the complainant was “under the offender’s authority at the time” in addition to the applicant being in a position of trust, the sentencing judge relied upon matters which fell within the more serious offence under s 66A(2) of the Crimes Act, of which the applicant was neither charged nor convicted. The sentencing remarks cannot, in my judgment, be read consistently with any other conclusion. It necessarily follows that the applicant has succeeded in showing that the sentencing judge erred.

38. [113]

    As the applicant has demonstrated error it is necessary for this Court to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh in accordance with the principles stated by the High Court in Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37 at [42]. The Crown submits that if this ground of appeal is made out, having undertaken afresh a separate and independent exercise of sentencing discretion and taking into account the full range of factors, this Court would not form the opinion that a less severe sentence is warranted in law. The applicant submits that a lesser sentence is warranted.

39. [114]

    The approach to be adopted by this Court is that set out by Beech-Jones J (as his Honour then was) in RO v R [2019] NSWCCA 183 at [87]-[89]. It includes putting aside the sentence imposed at first instance. This Court may, however, adopt the sentencing judge’s findings of fact where, as here (subject to the De Simoni issue identified above), those findings are not disputed: Turnbull v R [2019] NSWCCA 97 at [44] (Simpson AJA).

40. [115]

    In those circumstances I have proceeded on the basis of the unchallenged factual findings made by the sentencing judge and also had regard to relevant evidence of post-sentence conduct: DL v R (2018) 265 CLR 215; [2018] HCA 32 at [9]. I have, however, put to one side the sentencing judge’s finding that the complainant was “under the offender’s authority” at the time of his offending.

41. [116]

    The applicant was arrested on 18 June 2019.

42. [117]

    He relies upon his affidavit filed on 16 August 2023. He sets out that he has been making efforts to improve his English language skills in custody. He also sets out that his wife and children are only able to contact him by telephone and at a weekly AVL session (as his children are not permitted to visit him in person), that his wife has to look after their three children on her own, and that he is unable to see his parents who live in Turkey. He also gives evidence of the difficulties he faced whilst incarcerated during the COVID pandemic. He describes how he had to spend 14 days in his cell (either alone or with a cell mate) as a quarantine measure on three separate occasions. He has spent a total of 100 days in a locked down state due to circumstances among the inmates.

43. [118]

    The applicant has had his Australian Visa cancelled. This prevents him going between areas within the correctional centre or going out of the correctional centre for outdoor activity or to take part in various programs offered. It also precludes him from getting a job whilst in custody or undertaking courses around Australian citizenship that he had been interested in participating in.

44. [119]

    He also describes what he interprets as racism towards him which he believes is due to his background and Islamic faith. He says he is fearful that others in the correctional centre will discover the nature of his conviction and that this will lead to violence towards him.

45. [120]

    The applicant says in his affidavit that whilst in prison he has been diagnosed with high blood pressure, cholesterol, diabetes, alopecia and schizophrenia. He says he experiences symptoms of hearing voices that follow him and give him instructions. He has not adduced any medical evidence as to these matters.

46. [121]

    Some of the matters raised in the applicant’s affidavit reflect evidence already before the sentencing judge. Thus, a letter of 1 August 2022 from the applicant’s wife, which was before the sentencing judge, speaks to the difficulties for the applicant’s wife and children arising out of his incarceration. She says that the applicant was an emotionally attached parent who had been taking care of his household with love and compassion. Reports dated 9 April 2020 and 29 August 2021 from Dr Andrew Ellis, also before the sentencing judge, identify as a matter of generality the impact the COVID pandemic was likely to have on the mental health of prisoners. These reports identify anticipated limits on access to exercise, training and education within prisons, reduced access to visitors and the impact of prisoners being kept in quarantine to reduce spread of the virus.

47. [122]

    At the sentencing proceedings the applicant also relied upon a psychological assessment report dated 27 July 2022 from Andrew Wong, psychologist. Mr Wong described that the applicant became teary when discussing his children. He diagnosed the applicant as suffering from F43.8 Other Specified Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder. This was caused by the significant pressure and stress caused by the separation from his family, the criminal proceedings, and the possibility of his deportation. Mr Wong’s opinion was that the applicant’s health is vulnerable by reason of his poor command of the English language, which leads to social isolation and an inability to assert his needs. His inability to work and provide for his family adds to his vulnerability, due to his knowledge that his family is struggling financially. Mr Wong also records that the applicant was, at age 21, diagnosed with high cholesterol due to stress and that he showed him receding facial hair patches and bald patches on the side and top of his head which he said had only commenced after his incarceration.

48. [123]

    In McKinnon v R [2020] NSWCCA 106 at [32] (Payne JA, Beech-Jones and N Adams JJ agreeing), this Court noted that an absence of social and family visits due to the COVID-19 pandemic is a relevant consideration in the sentencing exercise:

49. [124]

    The two offences contrary to s 66A(1) of the Crimes Act each carry a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment with a standard non-parole period of 15 years. The facts as found by the sentencing judge are fully set out in her Honour’s remarks on sentence. As these are not challenged I will adopt, but not repeat, those facts for the purpose of resentence.

50. [125]

    The following is intended merely as a summary of key matters and not as a comprehensive account of the facts that form the basis of resentence.

51. [126]

    First, the two counts are part of a single incident.

52. [127]

    Second, the digital penetration continued for about 15 minutes. During this time the complainant told the applicant that he was hurting her and he slapped her telling her that she was giving him a headache and to shut up. The applicant punched her arm and left a bruise after her leg hit his nose. The applicant threatened to kill the complainant and her mother if she told someone what he was doing. The offences thus involved the actual or threatened use of violence, an aggravating feature under s 21A(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act.

53. [128]

    Third, this occurred at about 8:00pm on an evening between 1 June 2013 and 20 October 2015 when the complainant was aged between the age of seven and nine years.

54. [129]

    Fourth, the applicant was plainly in a position of trust in relation to the complainant. He abused that trust. That is an aggravating feature under s 21A(2)(k) of the Sentencing Act.

55. [130]

    Fifth, the applicant is approximately 25 years older than the complainant who was aged close to the age threshold for this offence.

56. [131]

    Sixth, there was some evidence of planning as the applicant orchestrated a trip to McDonald’s in the complainant’s mother’s car but the planning was far from sophisticated.

57. [132]

    Seventh, as the sentencing judge found, this was not an isolated incident of offending against the complainant. This finding was not challenged before this Court.

58. [133]

    The applicant’s offending was plainly serious. As set out in DH v R [2022] NSWCCA 200 at [33] (Harrison J, Fagan J agreeing, Yehia J agreeing, with additional comments at [58]-[59], [62]) the Court is not obliged, when sentencing, to indicate where on the scale of objective seriousness each offence falls when dealing with offences, such as these, that carry a standard non-parole period. In this case, as in DH v R, nothing can be gained from any further characterisation of relative seriousness.

59. [134]

    As did the sentencing judge, I find that the applicant’s moral culpability is high.

60. [135]

    I have also had regard to the complainant’s victim impact statement dated 18 August 2022. This demonstrates how she felt terrified and trapped for a long time before she informed her school counsellor in 2019 of the abuse. She also describes her fear, ongoing nightmares and anxiety.

61. [136]

    The applicant has one previous offence of driving with a mid-range level of alcohol in his blood in 2014 for which he was fined and disqualified. There are also letters from a migration agent and from the applicant’s wife speaking positively of his character. However, as set out above, this offending was not an isolated incident. In these circumstances, the applicant is entitled to some, but not significant, leniency on account of prior good character.

62. [137]

    I have also had regard to the subjective features as identified by the sentencing judge and to the report of Mr Wong referred to above. In addition, I have considered the more specific evidence in the applicant’s affidavit of the impact upon him of incarceration during the COVID pandemic, his perceptions of racism, his ongoing health issues (albeit that his evidence of being diagnosed with schizophrenia, high blood pressure and diabetes is not supported by medical evidence and can thus be given little weight) and the restrictions on his activity and employment opportunities associated with his immigration status. I have also taken into account that he has taken steps to improve his language skills whilst in custody and that he has completed courses on “Working Safely: A Guide to Safe Working Practises” and “Theory in Hygiene Operations”.

63. [138]

    The applicant has not expressed any remorse and there is nothing before the Court which suggests that he has any insight into his offending. That is not an aggravating feature but it is well established that remorse, if established, can be relied upon as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing. He has not proffered any explanation for his offending. There is no evidence before the Court addressing his prospects of rehabilitation. There are factors suggesting a motive not to re-offend, being his family relationships and his appreciation of the hardship which his incarceration has caused. I agree with the sentencing judge’s assessment, however, that his prospects of rehabilitation are no higher than reasonable.

64. [139]

    He is also entitled to a finding of special circumstances, on account of his mental health problems.

65. [140]

    Having regard to all of the matters set out above, including the matters incorporated by reference to the sentencing remarks of the sentencing judge, I have arrived at a lesser sentence than that imposed by the sentencing judge. The sentence imposed on the applicant should thus be set aside. The two offences involve distinct offending, albeit that they occurred on the same occasion. They form part of one incident of sexual assault, and have common factors, but they represent two discrete acts of criminality. It is appropriate in those circumstances that the Court impose an aggregate sentence reflecting the criminality of the two separate offences, as discussed by Howie J in Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1; (2007) 168 A Crim R 41 at [27]. In determining the appropriate aggregate sentence, I have had regard to notional accumulation, concurrency, and totality. I have had regard to the requirement that the aggregate sentence reflect the total criminality involved: Aryal v R [2021] NSWCCA 2 at [50] (R A Hulme J, Johnson and Wilson JJ agreeing); Noonan v R [2021] NSWCCA 35 at [33], [41] (Beech-Jones J, Bathurst CJ and Wilson J agreeing).

66. [141]

    In lieu of the sentence imposed by the primary judge, I propose that the applicant be sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 8 years and 3 months to commence on 5 April 2022, with a non-parole period of 5 years. The non-parole period will expire on 4 April 2027, with the balance of the term expiring on 4 July 2030. The individual sentences that I would indicate in accordance with s 53A of the Sentencing Act, including the indicative non-parole periods, are as follows:

    1. (1)

       Count 3: s 66A(1), Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) – 7 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.

    2. (2)

       Count 4: s 66A(1), Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) – 7 years with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months.

Conclusion

1. [142]

   For the reasons set out above I would propose the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Grant leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence.

   2. (2)

      Dismiss the appeal against conviction.

   3. (3)

      Allow the appeal against sentence.

   4. (4)

      Quash the sentence imposed by Judge Harris and in lieu thereof impose an aggregate sentence of 8 years and 3 months, with a non-parole period of 5 years. Sentence commences on 5 April 2022 and expires on 4 July 2030. The non-parole period will expire on 4 April 2027.

2. [143]

   HARRISON J: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the thorough reasons for judgment of Stern JA. I agree with her Honour’s conclusions and with the orders that she proposes.

3. [144]

   N ADAMS J: I agree with the orders proposed by Stern JA for the reasons provided by her Honour.