Perpetual Corporate Trust Ltd atf the Ascendas Longbeach Trust No. 10 v Larapinta Project Pty Ltd atf the Kiora Trust (No 2)

On 17 March 2026, I delivered my reasons in this matter, following a final hearing on the primary issues in dispute, in Perpetual Corporate Trust Ltd atf the Ascendas Longbeach Trust No. 10 v Larapinta Project Pty Ltd atf the Kiora Trust [2026] NSWSC 204 (“principal reasons”). I deal now with outstanding disputes as to the appropriate final orders including costs. I refer to my principal reasons for an explanation of expressions that I use in these reasons.

The parties agree that I should order judgment for Perpetual against Larapinta for the Coupon Amounts, in an amount of $648,433.10, comprising $497,290.57 by way of principal and $151,142.53 by way of pre-judgment interest pursuant to s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).

The parties agree the commercial list summons should be otherwise dismissed.

As to the cross claim, the parties are in dispute as to whether I should make an order granting declaratory relief, as foreshadowed in my principal reasons at [94]. Perpetual contends that I should not grant the declaratory relief because my reasons for refusing Perpetual’s claim are sufficiently clear and declaratory relief would accordingly lack utility.

Larapinta contends it will serve the practical utility of avoiding, or reducing the risk of, further disputes about this matter, both as regards the parties and as regards their privies.

I am satisfied it is appropriate to grant declaratory relief to quell the controversy as to the parties’ respective rights in relation to the so-called Rent Guarantee. In my view, there is real utility in granting a declaration to avoid the risk of further disputation, including in circumstances where there may need to be an accounting between the parties of various amounts that are payable in one direction or the other following the completion of the project and the resolution of these proceedings.

Larapinta proposed a declaration in the following terms:

Perpetual made no submissions against the form of the declaration proposed by Larapinta. However, the introductory words proposed by Larapinta appear to me to be unnecessary. I propose simply to declare that the amount of the Rent Guarantee payable by Larapinta is limited to $50,000.

Subject to granting that relief, it is common ground that the cross claim should be otherwise dismissed.

As to costs, each party seeks a costs order in its respective favour.

Perpetual contends that its success in respect of the Coupon Amounts means that Larapinta should pay its costs of the proceedings. Perpetual rightly points out that Larapinta resisted the claim for the Coupon Amounts and did not confirm its non-opposition until the beginning of the final hearing.

I accept that this last-minute capitulation means that Perpetual should be regarded as enjoying substantial success on the issue of the Coupon Amounts, but I am unable to accept that this means Perpetual should have its costs in respect of the whole of the proceedings.

I consider the claim in respect of the Rent Guarantee and the Leasing Costs to have been a more substantial part of Perpetual’s claim, reflected in the amount at stake and in the length of Perpetual’s written submissions, prepared before Larapinta capitulated on the question of the Coupon Amounts. I recognise the evidence I have received which indicates significant discovery was directed towards the Coupon Amount claim, and a significant volume of evidence was directed towards that claim, but there was also a substantial volume of evidence for the issues on which Perpetual was unsuccessful.

The issues regarding the Rent Guarantee and the Leasing Costs have been more significant from the start, and occupied the whole of the final hearing. Larapinta succeeded on those issues. It is also appropriate to reflect in the costs order the fact that Larapinta conceded the Coupon Amount claim at the beginning of the hearing.

I propose to order Perpetual to pay 25% of Larapinta’s costs of the proceedings, save that Larapinta should have the whole of its costs of the hearing day itself, 4 March 2026. So far as the costs of consequential submissions are concerned, both parties have enjoyed a modicum of success, but Larapinta has enjoyed a greater degree of success, such that adopting a broad brush my order as to 25% of the costs should apply to costs incurred after the hearing date itself, 4 March 2026.

I make the following orders: