Lees v State of New South Wales

After an urgent hearing on 9 February 2026, I made orders in this matter as follows:

My reasons for making those orders are as follows.

The plaintiff, Mr Lees, and the Palestine Action Group or PAG whom he represents, have been organising protests concerning Israel’s activities in Gaza since about 2012. Immediately after the well-known events in October 2023 in Israel and Palestine, the PAG organised protests on a week-by-week basis but, as the situation in Gaza developed, it was decided to protest every weekend. These protests every weekend continued until February 2025 when PAG decided to stop holding weekly rallies and moved to holding them roughly every two to four weeks.

There has, in recent years, been an increase in antisemitic incidents in New South Wales and elsewhere in Australia. More particularly, however, on 14 December 2025, at Bondi Beach 15 people were killed including 13 Jewish people who were targeted and shot while celebrating a Jewish religious festival.

In the wake of the events of 14 December 2025, the Governor General invited the President of Israel, Mr Isaac Herzog, to visit Australia. The purpose of President Herzog’s visit is to honour and remember victims of the Bondi antisemitic terrorist attack and provide support for Jewish Australians and the Australian Jewish community. The Prime Minister also stated that the purpose of the visit was also to bring “unity” to Australia. The visit is taking place from 9 to 12 February 2026 and includes the President being in Sydney during that time.

The PAG wished to hold a public assembly and march against the visit of President Herzog and its plan was to hold this protest in the Sydney CBD on Monday, 9 February 2026 at 5:30 pm to coincide with President Herzog’s visit to Sydney. In general terms, it was proposed that those participating in the protest would attend at Sydney Town Hall where a public assembly with speeches and chanting would be held and then it was proposed that the protest would march to Parliament House in Macquarie Street and thereafter disperse.

On 3 February 2026, the Commissioner of Police extended a Public Assembly Restriction Declaration (PARD) made under s 23B(2) of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW) for a further 14 days, under s 23C(1) of that Act. As a result of that extension and under s 23B(2), the area specified in the PARD, by the shaded area on a map, was “an area in which the authorisation of the holding of public assemblies is restricted”. It can be noted that the shaded area encompasses the areas proposed as the assembly place, the route for the march and endpoint of the proposed protest against the visit of President Herzog. Further, by virtue of s 200(5) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), those involved in such a protest against President Herzog may not be entitled to the benefit of s 24 of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) or the exemption from being the subject of directions under s 200 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act. This was no challenge to the PARD in these proceedings.

On 5 February 2026, the Minister responsible for the Major Events Act 2009 (NSW) received a briefing note concerning whether President Herzog’s visit should be declared a “major event” for the purposes of that Act. The briefing note recommended that the Minister:

The analysis in the briefing note included the following:

After noting the effect of the existing PARD, the briefing note included that the Minister may recommend the making of the Regulation to declare the Israeli Presidential Visit to be a major event only if the Minister was of the opinion that:

In relation to consideration of the public interest, the briefing note included:

On the question of whether the event was a “major event at an international, national or State level”, the briefing note contained the following:

As to the making of an order under s 4B of the Major Events Act in relation to the “major event area” and the powers to be available to be exercised, the briefing note included:

The briefing note also included under the heading “Criticism of the government”:

On 5 February 2026, the Minister approved the recommendations in the briefing note including approving and recommending the making of the Major Events Amendment (Israeli Presidential Visit) Regulation 2026 and the making and signing of the Major Events (Israeli Presidential Visit) Order 2026.

On 6 February 2026, the Governor with the advice of the Executive Council, made the Major Events Amendment (Israeli Presidential Visit) Regulation 2026 (the Regulation) under the Major Events Act. Relevantly, this Regulation declared the visit of President Herzog, described as “the Australian Government’s Guest of Government visit by the Israeli President, Isaac Herzog, and other Israeli dignitaries, in the aftermath of the 14 December 2025 Bondi terrorist attack” as a “major event” for the purposes of the Major Events Act and specified that the visit was taking place in Sydney from 9 to 12 February 2026 and that the Commissioner of Police was designated the “responsible authority” for the visit.

In addition, on 6 February 2026, the Minister for Jobs and Tourism made the Major Events (Israeli Presidential Visit) Order 2026 under ss 4B(1), 5A(1)(a), (b) and 13 of the Major Events Act (the Order). This included:

One relevant effect of the Regulation and the Order was that the proposed protest against President Herzog for the evening of 9 February 2026 would be subject to restrictions and the exercise of police powers additional to any which would flow from the PARD.

On 7 February 2026, the Premier and the Minister issued a media release which stated, inter alia:

On the same day, at a press conference which included the Premier and the Minister for Jobs and Tourism, the Premier stated:

During that same press conference, the Minister stated:

The plaintiff filed his original summons on Sunday 8 February 2026 at a specially convened urgent hearing before N Adams CJ at CL. The defendants are the State of New South Wales and the Minister. At the hearing on 8 February 2026, the matter was listed for hearing before me the following day.

An amended summons was filed in court on 9 February 2026. In the amended summons, the plaintiff sought relief against the defendants as follows:

The grounds relied upon by the plaintiff can be summarised adequately for present purposes as follows:

The plaintiff’s submissions included the written submissions and supplementary written submissions, both signed by Mr Robinson SC, Ms Graham and Mr McManus and dated 8 February 2026. At the hearing on 9 February 2026, Mr Lange SC appeared with Ms Graham and Mr McManus. Mr Lange did not abandon any of the written submissions but in his oral submissions sought effectively to refine the submissions in relation to ground (1)(a) and (b). I shall deal with both the plaintiff’s written and oral submissions.

In relation to ground (1)(a), the plaintiff submitted that the types of event which could be declared to be major events for the purposes of the Major Events Act could be gleaned from the objects which included in s 3(a) events “of a sporting, cultural or other nature”. The plaintiff expressly relied on the ejusdem generis rule of construction to submit that political events were not intended to be caught in the categories of events to which the Act could apply.

This construction was submitted to be supported by a review of the Second Reading Speech which spoke of “major events” such as the Olympics, Rugby World Cup, World Youth Day and events that “increase tourism, create jobs and can contribute millions of dollars to the New South Wales economy.”

It was then contended that the visit of President Herzog should be characterised as a political occurrence which may involve specific political events. It was accepted that, while there may be “cultural” aspects relating to providing solace to the members of the Jewish community in the wake of the Bondi terrorist event, that did not fundamentally change the political nature of the event. The plaintiff referred to previous events which had been the subject of a declaration under the Major Event Act.

It was also submitted that the principle of legality does not support a construction which applied the Major Events Act to political events since such events generally raise fundamentally different questions regarding basic rights, including the right to protest and assemble, freedom of movement and freedom from arbitrary search. It was said: “A liberal democracy does not treat as like a tennis tournament and the most controversial visit of an international political figure.” The “practical consequences” of the Regulation and the Order were said not to be that protestors who choose to participate in the planned protest at Town Hall would be breaking the law by attending the meeting but rather that they would not have the ordinary protections that would be afforded to a peaceful protestor in NSW. This is because of the availability to police of the powers in Pt 4, Div 5 of the Major Events Act, including for example s 43(1)(a), (b), (c) and ss 46 and 48 as well as the fact that any persons within the major event area must comply with the “personal conduct” provisions of s 44 and may be excluded from the area if they do not comply with a search request.

In addition, it was submitted that even if President Herszog’s visit was an event of the type to which the Major Events Act could apply, it was not a large scale public event and was “an occurrence” but not itself an “event”. This was said to be borne out by the lack of detail of the visit and was contrasted with previous regulations which gave information concerning meetings, summits and conferences.

This submission was developed orally by Mr Lange, who submitted in effect that the principle of legality required a narrow construction of the word “event” in s 5(1) of the Major Events Act in light of provisions such as those in Div 5 of Pt 4 of the Act which potentially permit the “responsible authority”, which in the present case is the Commissioner of Police, to restrict to a significant degree persons’ freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and freedom from search without warrant or judicial authorisation in relation to a declared major event. Such a narrow construction of “event” was submitted to be limited to an “event” which was specific as to time, place, participants and one having one or more characteristics relevant to provisions of the Act, such as ss 46 and 47.

Senior Counsel noted, by way of example, the power under s 46(1) to compel the production of a ticket or permit by people in the major event area, indicating that the Act on its proper construction required there to be an identifiable group of participants or spectators who were capable of holding tickets or permits related to the event. With respect to s 47, reference to the “relevant area” being a playing field, other competition area, stage or other performance area, or an area for which accreditation was required, was submitted also to support a construction of the Act requiring particular geographic specificity.

It was then submitted that President Herzog’s visit was not an “event” on such a narrow construction, because it was not specific as to the place, time or location of any particular event. Nor did it involve ticketing or a permit for identified spectators to enter the “major event area” or a specified part of that area. Furthermore, President Herzog’s visit did not involve any commercial aspect or other potentially pertinent features identified as relevant to an “event” in other provisions of the Act and thus, it was contended that this visit could not be declared a “major event” under s 5(1) on the proper construction of the Major Events Act. It was submitted that as a consequence the Regulation and the Order were invalid.

Further, it was submitted that s 5(6) of the Major Events Act which provides that the regulations may not declare an industrial or political demonstration or protest to be a major event puts a clear limitation on the type of event that can be declared a “major event”. The plaintiff called in aid the Anthony Hordern principle and submitted that, although President Herzog’s visit was not itself an industrial or political demonstration or protest, the Act should not be construed so as to permit such a protest to be effectively quelled by a regulation under the Act.

As to ground (1)(b), the plaintiff submitted that the lack of specificity as to geographical location, event participants and time period taken together with the broad coercive powers under Div 5 of Pt 4 activated by the Regulation and Order, rendered the Regulation and Order not reasonably proportionate to the facilitation of major event, citing State of South Australia v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161 at 165.

It was acknowledged that, to an extent, grounds (1)(a) and (b) tended to coalesce in that the consequences of the lack of specificity regarding President Herzog’s visit, which the plaintiff contended rendered it not an “event” under the Act, also had the effect that the Regulation and Order amounted to an unreasonable exercise of power under s 5(1) and s 5A(1) because the purported specification of the major event period, the major event area and the provisions of Div 5 of Pt 4 made applicable were not sufficiently related to the visit.

As to ground 2, the substance of the plaintiff’s contention was that the Regulation and Order were made for an improper purpose in that they were made for a purpose other than one for which the power was conferred, namely facilitation of a major event. It was contended in effect that, as a matter of fact, the true purpose, or at least a substantial purpose, of the Regulation and Order was to adversely affect, prevent or supress the holding of public protests concerning the visit of the Israeli president in Sydney while he is in Australia.

In written and oral submissions, Ms Graham contended that the improper purpose was to be inferred from six key factual circumstances which can be summarised as:

Finally, it can be noted that the plaintiff expressly disclaimed any reliance on the implied freedom of political communication derived from the Commonwealth Constitution or any other ground of review based on the Commonwealth Constitution.

In written submissions, the defendants submitted that the plaintiff’s characterisation of President Herzog’s visit as “political” and the conclusion that it could not, therefore, be an “event” for the purposes of s 5(1) of the Major Events Act was flawed given the difficulty distinguishing “political” events from those kinds of cultural and other events captured by the statute. Further and in any event, it was submitted that by virtue of the context surrounding Mr Herzog’s visit and his role as head of state rather than government, his visit had both cultural and political aspects. It was also submitted that the words “sporting, cultural or other nature” were not capable of attracting the operation of the ejusdem generis rule of construction.

As to s 5(6) of the Major Events Act, while it was accepted that a political demonstration or protest could not be declared a “major event”, it did not mean that once there was a material possibility that an event may be attended by protest, that event could no longer be declared to be a “major event” or that the Act could have no application in relation to that event.

The defendants also submitted that the principle of legality is of little assistance in construing the provision given the Act’s specific contemplation of the regulation of the right of assembly and the interference with such rights will only be temporary given the need to specify a “major event period”, citing Kassam v Hazzard (2021) 106 NSWLR 520; [2021] NSWCA 299 at [80]-[89] (Bell P), [167] (Leeming JA).

On the question of the unreasonableness, vagueness or uncertainty of the description of the event in the Regulation and Order, the defendants submitted it would be unrealistic to suggests that a regulation under s 5(1) of the Major Events Act must separately identify each event on Mr Herzog’s visit as separate events, especially given the intention that the Act apply to events composed of component events at different times and places and the 2022 amendments to permit the coverage of a “major event area” instead of just specific venues or facilities. Further it was effectively submitted that the event period and geographic area were, in any event, clearly defined and there was no problem with uncertainty.

The defendants submitted that the plaintiff’s claim of improper purpose, being to adversely affect or suppress protest activity, should be rejected in principle given that the purpose of “affecting” or even “preventing” certain public protests concerning a major event was well within the scope of the Major Event Act’s purposes.

It was also submitted that, at the level of the facts, it could not be found that the purpose of the Regulation and Order were to “prevent” protests related to the visit.

In oral submissions, Mr Lim of Senior Counsel, who appeared with Ms Ryan for the defendants, submitted in effect:

Each of the grounds of review relied to a greater or lesser extent on the proper construction of the Major Events Act including in particular the word “event”.

The principles relating to statutory construction were not in dispute. They were recently summarised by the High Court in Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35 at [4] to [6] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ):

In relation to a New South Wales statute, s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) provides that a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. In addition, the use which can be made of extrinsic material is governed by s 34 of the Interpretation Act which sets out a non-exhaustive list of categories of material statutorily recognised to have potential to illuminate the statutory context.

Furthermore, it is well established that in construing a statute (or subordinate legislation) the principle of legality favours a construction, if one be available, which avoids or minimises the statute's encroachment upon fundamental principles, rights and freedoms at common law: North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569; [2015] HCA 41 (NAAJA) at [11] (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ). In that case, their Honours also stated at [11]:

That approach has been called "a working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted" and its longstanding rationale is that it is highly improbable that parliament would "overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness": NAAJA at [11].

In light of these principles, it was appropriate to start with a consideration of the text of the Major Events Act. The long title of the Act is “An Act to facilitate the holding and conduct of major events in New South Wales; and for other purposes.” Accordingly, I accepted that the principal purpose of the Act was to facilitate not only the holding but also the conduct or management of relevant events in this State.

The Act’s substantive application depends on there being a “major event”, which is defined in s 4(1) as meaning “an event that is declared under Part 2 to be a major event”.

Part 2 includes s 5 which establishes how events can be declared a “major event” and the requirements for doing so. Under s 5(1), “[t]he regulations may declare an event to be a major event”. The regulation making power in respect of the Major Events Act is found in s 72 and includes a general power in subs (1), which supports s 5(1), and in subs (2) a list of specific subject matters with respect to which regulations may be made, none of which is of particular relevance for the present case.

The power of the Minister to recommend the making of a regulation under s 5(1) is governing by s 5(2) which provides:

The requirement for the Minister to be of the opinion that it was in the public interest to make the regulation is protective and suggested that “event” should not be narrowly construed.

It was noted that there was no challenge in the present case based on the Minister not being properly of the opinion that it was in the public interest to make the Regulation. Nor was it submitted by the plaintiff that, if the Israeli President’s visit was an “event” to which the Act applied, it was not a “major event at an international, national or State level”. In the circumstances, this was a correct approach. In my view, the circumstances of the present case and the material in the ministerial briefing note as approved by the Minister, established that the Minister was properly of the opinion that it was in the public interest to make the Regulation and, if the Israeli President’s visit was an “event” within the meaning of the Act, it was “a major event at an international, national or State level”.

The challenge was, in effect, that the Minister could not be of the opinion that “the event in respect of which the regulation is to be made is a major event at an international, national or State level” because the Israeli President’s visit was not, on the proper construction of the Act, an “event” or was not an “event” to which the Act applied.

The noun “event” is in ordinary English a word of wide import. The definitions in the Macquarie Dictionary illustrate this point noting that the possible meanings include:

Generally, words of wide import take their statutory meaning from their context, including the object or purpose of the Act and the terms of other provisions of the Act.

The objects of the Major Events Act are specified in s 3 as follows:

The object in par (a) indicated that the events intended to fall within the application of the Act include those that have a significant number of participants or spectators and are of a “sporting, cultural or other nature”. Paragraph (a) is not, however, a definition of “event” for the purposes of the Act. Other types of events to which the Act may apply are referred to, explicitly or implicitly, in other paragraphs of s 3 and in other sections. Further, the parenthetical insertion “(whether of a sporting, cultural or other nature)” in par (a) only relates to the types of event mentioned in that paragraph. In all those circumstances, there was no satisfactory basis for construing the word “event” for the purposes of the Act as limited to events of a “sporting, cultural or other nature” as the plaintiff appeared to contend. Not being intended as a definition, those words in par 3(a) would not attract the operation of the ejusdem generis rule. Further and in any event, the words “sporting” and “cultural” do not identify a relevant genus which could then be taken to control or limit the meaning of the words “or other nature” under that rule. Section 3(a) does, however, suggest that the Parliament intended "event” as used in the Act to include not only sporting and cultural events but also other types of events that attract a significant number of participants or spectators.

Paragraphs (c), (e) and (f)(iii) of s 3 indicated that the Parliament intended that the events to which the Act applies could include those whose nature meant that:

The object in pars (d) and (f)(ii) refer to “commercial exploitation” and indicate that events which have a commercial element and which lend themselves to commercial exploitation are intended to be included in the events to which the Act may apply. Those paragraphs do not suggest, however, that every event to which the Act applies must have a commercial element or be susceptible to commercial exploitation.

None of the objects in s 3 purports to limit the types of events to which the Major Events Act applies rather they suggest that the Act was intended to cover various types of events including, in particular, cultural and other events which require management, coordination or regulation by relevant authorities in relation to, inter alia, safety of participants and spectators and crowd management.

Certain types of events are, however, explicitly excluded from the operation of the Act. Under s 4A, the Major Events Act does not apply to a motor race within the meaning of the Motor Sports Events Act 2022 (NSW) and, under s 5(6), an industrial or political demonstration or protest cannot be declared to be a major event. These express exclusions suggest that, absent such exclusion, those matters could amount to an “event” which could be declared a “major event” and that “event” was not generally intended to have a narrow or unduly confined meaning. [2]

The context of the word “event” in the Act also includes s 5(3) which provides:

These matters are not mandatory considerations since the subsection provides that the Minister “may have regard” to the listed matters. Nonetheless, they provided similar indications as to the legislative intent as were provided by the objects in s 3. The events intended to be able to be declared major events include relevantly those which are likely to have a significant number of spectators, attract media coverage or require operational organisation in view of the need for emergency management and security plans.

Further context is provided by:

Section 5(4) of the Major Events Act requires the event to be described in the regulation, thus an “event” must be capable of proper description. In addition, while s 4B permits but does not require the Minister to declare an area to be the major event area for a major event (but only if the Minister considers that the whole of the major event area is necessary to enable conduct of the event), the designation of the major event area may be necessary where other provisions of the Act, including sections such as ss 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, depend on there being such a major event area designated. This indicated that the Parliament intended that an event to which the Act could apply would be one which took place in a specific geographical location that would be capable of being identified clearly.

Similarly, s 5A(1)(a) permits but does not require the Minister to specify the “major event period” for which the declaration is in force. Since duration of the major event period determines when the relevant provisions of the Act apply, the Act as a whole indicated that the Parliament intended that a relevant event must be one with a definite and identifiable temporal duration.

Finally, the terms of s 3(a) and (c) and s 47 which refer to “participants” in the event and the types of facilitation referred to in s 3 and elsewhere in the Act indicated that the Parliament intended to include as occurrences which could be “events” within s 5(1), those which involved participants and attracted a need for facilitation of the types provided for by the Act.

This approach which requires an “event” falling within s 5(1) to be construed as one which is defined as to location, time, participants and need for facilitation, was supported by a consideration of the provisions of Pt 4 which may be engaged by being specified in the order, under s 5A(1)(b).

Part 4 of the Act, referred to in s 5A(1)(b), includes most relevantly for present purposes, Division 5, “Safety and crown management at major events”. The provisions of Pt 4 Div 5 enable the responsible authority which must be designated under s 6 (who is the Commissioner of Police in the present case) to be given extensive powers that may significantly detract from persons’ freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom from arbitrary search in certain areas and circumstances related to a major event. They may also impose additional personal conduct obligations on persons in a major event area. The relevant provisions of Pt 4 Div 5 in this regard include:

These provisions which have the potential to lead to significant interference with persons’ important freedoms, in my view, attracted the application of the principle of legality in the construction of the Major Event Act including in relation to the meaning of “event” and the application of the Act in relation to an “event”.

In light of the potential application of those provisions of Pt 4 Div 5, the principle of legality required the Act to be construed in such a way that the interference with those important freedoms which may arise from declaration of an event as a major event was as confined as possible, consistent with the text and scope and purpose of the Act and the circumstances of the particular case. That would be achieved if an occurrence which amounted an “event” for the purposes of s 5(1) was required to be identified with specificity in relation to its elements of participants, temporal duration and geographic extent and these were as confined as reasonably possible having regard to the particular circumstances of each case.

Thus, I was of the view that it was appropriate to construe the word “event” in s 5(1) as applying to an occurrence:

Moreover, given the purpose of the Major Events Act expressed in the long title, being to facilitate the holding and conduct of major events in New South Wales, I was of the view that the construction of “event” set out above promoted that purpose rather than one which limited “event” to sporting or cultural events or one which would prevent an event being able to be declared a major event if by so doing the freedom of assembly, freedom of speech or freedom from search might be curtailed to any significant extent. In accordance with s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), therefore, I preferred the interpretation set out above.

Further confirmation, in accordance with s 34 of the Interpretation Act, that the word “event” should be construed as set out above was provided, in my view, by a consideration of the second reading speeches for the Major Events Bill 2009 [3] and the Major Events Amendment Bill 2022 [4] .

The 2009 second reading speech referred to the Olympic Games, the Rugby World Cup and World Youth Day as examples of the types of events that the Major Events Act was intended to apply to. All of these involved an occurrence or event with many sub-events at different times but within one specified period and at different geographic locations. I considered it unlikely that the proper identification of the event for the purposes of declaration under s 5(1) was intended to require each sub-event, location, time and participants to be identified and specified before events such as this could be capable of declaration. While it true that this second reading speech envisaged that relevant events would be of “a large scale”, it was expressly stated that this was only “[g]enerally” so.

The 2022 second reading speech explained that the insertion of s 4B permitting the Minister to declare by order an area to be the major event area was designed to accommodate events that are held in more than one venue or area. This tended to confirm that an event with various sub-events in different locations, such as the Israeli President’s visit, was not intended to be excluded from the meaning of “event” for the purposes of s 5(1) and the declaration of a major event area would not be insufficiently specific if it did not identify every event location separately.

This first ground involved the general contention that the Israeli President’s visit is not an “event” for the purposes of the Major Events Act and thus the making of the Regulation and the Order exceeded the powers granted under that Act.

The first aspect of this ground involved the submission that the visit of the Israeli President was not an “event” within the meaning of the Act because it was a political event and not a sporting or cultural event. I have already explained why, in my view, the ejusdem generis rule does not apply to s 3(a) of the Act as the plaintiff contended. The word “event” in s 5(1) on its proper construction is not limited an event of a sporting or cultural nature and may include events of other natures.

Further and in any event, even if on the proper construction of the Act, “event” were limited to sporting and cultural events and excluded political events, I accepted as a matter of fact that Mr Hertzog’s visit would properly be described as a cultural event. The purpose of the visit was to honour and remember victims of the Bondi antisemitic terrorist attack and provide support for Jewish Australians and the Australian Jewish community. The second reading speech made clear that events such as World Youth Day organised by the Catholic Church were intended to be included in the types of events which could be declared to be major events. Such events are religious and thus cultural in the sense employed in s 3(a). The President, like the Pope at World Youth Days, is a head of state, but Mr Herzog is not the head of government of Israel. While there may be political aspects to his visit, that is neither the dominant nor the defining nature of the visit. Thus, in my view, the Israeli President’s visit could be properly characterised as cultural.

A second aspect of this ground was that the Israeli President’s visit was not capable of meeting the requirements for an “event” because there was a lack of specificity as to participants, geographic location and duration.

I accepted that an “event” in s 5(1) was to be construed as requiring inter alia specificity as to participants, duration and location, as set out more fully above. Nonetheless, the degree of specificity required in respect of identifying participants, geographic location and temporal duration in order to establish that an occurrence is an “event”, on the proper construction of the Act, was a matter of fact and degree dependent on the circumstances of each case.

It was accepted by both parties that in identifying whether there was a relevant event in the present case, regard could be had to both the Regulation and the Order read together. I also had regard to the briefing note and the circumstances in which the visit of the Israeli President was to take place.

I was satisfied that the Israeli President’s visit was:

Given these findings, I was satisfied that the Israeli President’s visit was able to be sufficiently specifically identified so as to fall within the meaning of “event” in s 5(1) of the Major Events Act, on the proper construction of that Act and that the event was as reasonably confined as the relevant circumstances permitted.

Finally, I did not accept that s 5(6) of the Act, prevented the Israeli President’s visit from being an event which could be declared to be a major event. While as noted above, a political demonstration or protest cannot be declared a major event, the Israeli President’s visit was manifestly not a political demonstration or protest. The fact that the visit might be attended by such demonstrations or protests by non-participants in the visit does not, in the circumstances of the present case, have the consequence that the visit loses its character as an “event” within s 5(1). Indeed, the likelihood of demonstrations and protest may strengthen the need for facilitation of an event by way of promoting the safety of participants and safety and crowd management and thus make it more likely to be an event which can be declared a major event under the Act.

For these reasons, I concluded that the Israeli President’s visit did constitute an “event” which could be declared to be a major event under s 5(1) of the Major Events Act on the proper construction of the Act.

Accordingly, I rejected the plaintiff’s challenge based on ground 1(a).

The substance of ground (1)(b) involved the contention that the lack of specificity as to geographical location, event participants and time period coupled with the powers under Div 5 of Pt 4 activated by the Regulation and Order, which would permit significant interference with persons’ important freedoms, rendered the Regulation and Order too uncertain, unreasonable and not reasonably proportionate to the facilitation of major event so as not to be supported by the Major Events Act.

It was accepted that a, if not the, principal purpose of the Major Events Act was to facilitate the holding and conduct of major events in New South Wales.

The focus of submissions was on the factual issues relating to whether there was such a lack of specificity in relation to the participants, geographic and temporal aspects of the Israeli President’s visit that the Regulation and Order did not amount to a proper exercise of the regulation and order making power in the Major Events Act. The precise nature and formulation of the principles to be applied in this regard were not in contest and it is not necessary to consider them.

This ground was also acknowledged to overlap substantially with ground (1)(a).

For the purpose of considering this ground, the Regulation and Order can be read together. The Regulation identified the “major event” as “the Israeli Presidential Visit”, defined as “the Australian Government's Guest of Government visit by the Israeli President, Isaac Herzog, and other Israeli dignitaries, in the aftermath of the 14 December 2025 Bondi terrorist attack”. The “description of major event” was:

Thus, the Regulation identified, albeit in general terms, the nature of the event and significant participants as well as the temporal duration of the event. The Order, consistently with ss 4B and 5A, reiterated certain matters and specified other matters in relation to the Israeli President’s visit in the following terms:

The nature, significant participants, total duration and general location of the event were disclosed in the Regulation and Order. I accepted that the Regulation and Order did not set out detailed information as to the timing and location of, and participants in, sub-events in which Mr Herzog was to participate during his visit. This was explained by the need not to disclose those details because of security concerns given the current national terrorism threat level being “probable” and the degree of tension arising out of planned potential protests and demonstrations. Given that explanation, however, the non-disclosure of those details was not unreasonable and was justified. Non-disclosure in effect facilitated the conduct of the major event.

In those circumstances and relying also on the reasoning in relation to ground (1)(a), I was not satisfied that the Regulation and Order were so uncertain, unreasonable or not reasonably proportionate to the facilitation of a major event so as to conclude that the regulation and order making powers in the Major Events Act did not support the making of the Regulation and the Order in this case.

For these reasons, I rejected ground (1)(b).

Ground 2 involved the contention that as a matter of fact the Regulation and Order were made for an improper purpose namely to affect adversely, prevent or supress the holding of public protests concerning the visit of the Israeli president in Sydney while he is in Australia. This was said to be at least a substantial purpose of the Minister, if not the predominant or only purpose.

It is well established that when a statute confers a discretionary power, it is implied, if not expressed, that the power must be exercised for the purpose for which it was conferred and a power conferred in general terms is construed as conferring the power to be used only in accordance with the objects and policy of the Act: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 409 (Brennan J).

The principal object of the Major Events Act is to facilitate the holding and conduct of major events in New South Wales, as the long title makes abundantly clear. Section 3 of the Act can be seen as setting out subsidiary objects including making provision, inter alia, for safety and crowd management.

In the particular context of the present case, the purpose for which a declaration that the Israeli President’s visit as a major event could be made was to facilitate the conduct of that visit. It does not follow from this, however, that a purpose of affecting adversely, preventing or supressing the holding of public protests concerning the visit of the Israeli president in Sydney during the major event period was necessarily an improper purpose. If affecting or preventing protests was a reasonable means of facilitating the conduct of the visit for example by making provision for safety and crowd control, it is consistent with and part of the broader purpose of facilitating the conduct of the visit. In these circumstances there would be no impropriety of purpose and no invalidity.

On the other hand, if the Israeli President’s visit was declared a major event with the purpose of empowering police to prevent or suppress public protests without regard to whether that would facilitate the conduct of the visit, that purpose might well be extraneous to the purposes for which the powers were conferred and improper, depending on all the circumstances.

Ms Graham, on behalf of the plaintiff, relied on six evidentiary matters to contend that the purpose of making the Regulation and Order was to affect adversely, prevent or suppress the holding of public protests concerning the visit. One of those matters was the material before the Minister in the form of the briefing note. Another was what was said by the Premier and the Minister at a press conference on 7 February 2026.

The briefing note and the press conference, however, contained material which established, in my view, that the Minister’s purpose in recommending the making of the Regulation and making the Order was to facilitate the conduct of the visit, having regard to the security situation, the safety of participants and others and crowd management. That purpose was not a purpose which was extraneous to and inconsistent with the purpose and object of the Major Events Act.

The Minister’s consideration based on the briefing note involved a careful consideration and weighing of the public interest in facilitating peaceful protests in relation to the Israeli Presidential Visit, the public interest in ensuring the safety of President Herzog, a foreign dignitary visiting Australia on the invitation of the Governor-General and the public interest in ensuring that any public assemblies do not have the effect of harassing, intimidating or threatening the President or the people he is meeting with, which will include survivors of the Bondi attack and the families of victims which should be afforded solemnity and dignity. The briefing note continued:

Moreover, the media release and press conference contained information concerning the attempts by police to provide a satisfactory opportunity for protestors to protest while at the same time ensuring the safety of participants in the visit and other as well as appropriate crowd management. The following passages are particularly relevant in those regards:

There was no suggestion that these statements did not express genuinely held views and purposes of the Premier and the Minister or any other relevant person. Nor was there anything elsewhere in the briefing note, media release, press conference or other evidence which contradicted or called into question what was said in those passages quoted above.

In my view, this material demonstrated that there was no purpose on the part of the Minister or any other relevant person to suppress or prevent protest altogether in respect of the Israeli President’s visit. Nor was there a purpose of adversely affecting any protest or right to protest except to the extent reasonably appropriate to facilitate the conduct of the visit. This view was confirmed by the carving out of all of Hyde Park and the CBD south of Oxford Street and Liverpool Street from the major event area.

Nothing in the other circumstances relied on by the plaintiff, such as the timing of the making of the Regulation and Order, the fact that the major event area was essentially the same as the area referred to in the PARD, the nature of the powers in the provisions of Div 5 Pt 4 made applicable by the Order, the description of the Israeli President’s visit in the Regulation and Order or the lack of evidence that the location of the proposed protest would interfere with the President’s visit caused me to form a different view or conclude that the Regulation and Order had been made for an improper purpose extraneous to, and inconsistent with, the principal purpose of the Major Events Act.

Thus, the plaintiff’s second ground failed on the factual level and I rejected it.

Since the plaintiff was unsuccessful on all of its grounds of review, his amended summons was liable to be dismissed. Given the nature of the proceedings and the public interests sought to be defended by both the plaintiff and the defendants, my preliminary view was that there should be no order as to costs. As I had not heard the parties on costs, however, I considered it appropriate to all the parties to seek a difference costs order, if they thought appropriate and orders were made for that purpose.