Young & Young v Attorney General of New South Wales

The plaintiffs wish to give legal effect to their objection to being part of civil society under the rule of Australian law. If there is a way by which that can be done, they have not found it. For the reasons which follow, on the application of the defendant Attorney General (AG) each proceeding will be struck out with costs.

Each of the plaintiffs (to whom I shall refer without disrespect as Shaun and Kyle) has filed a summons naming the defendant as “His Majesty the King as represented by the Attorney General for the state of New South Wales”. By motion in each proceeding, the AG seeks orders that each summons be dismissed or struck out pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) Pt 13, r 13.4 or Pt 14, r 14.28. Save for referring to the applicable plaintiff, Shaun’s and Kyle’s documents filed in each proceeding (including in response to the AG’s motions) are identical. In these reasons I shall refer only to Shaun. However, each reference should be read as including Kyle.

The AG’s motions came before me in the Applications List. Each of the plaintiffs appeared for himself. Mr C Gardiner, a Solicitor Advocate in the Crown Solicitor’s Office, appeared for the AG and was the author of the AG’s submissions in support of the motions.

In accordance with directions which I made, each of the plaintiffs filed (identical) submissions in response to the AG’s submissions. The parties then agreed at a directions hearing on 15 March 2024 that I should determine the motion on the papers.

The starting point of Shaun’s case appears to be what he submits is the non-consensual effect of his registered birth certificate. In Aidan Llewellyn trading as the Trustee for the House of Llewellyn v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1250, I considered a similar claim. In that case it was asserted that a registered birth certificate was a form of security:

In this case, Shaun does not directly assert that his birth certificate operates as a “security” (although there are suggestions in his affidavit that he thinks that to be the case). In these proceedings his birth certificate is fundamental to his submission that the registration of the birth certificate created both a legal interest and served to “deposit” an equitable estate with the Crown.

The tenor of the relief sought in the summons (which includes references to the Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972 (NSW), the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW), the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW)) may be gleaned from the first prayer for relief (Exhibit EX-1 being an authenticated copy of his birth certificate):

Shaun’s complaint about the alleged effect of his birth certificate appears in this passage from his written submissions:

Shaun sets out this summary of his claim in his submissions:

“Gentilitious” is a seventeenth century word which means “of or pertaining to a gens or family” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed (1991)).

Finally, to understand Shaun’s claim I gratefully adopt as an accurate summary this extract from Mr Gardiner’s submissions:

What follows is derived from, and reflects an acceptance by the Court of, the AG’s submissions.

The “birthright estate” which appears to lie at the heart of Shaun’s claim is not an estate known to law or equity. It is certainly not something which is brought into existence by the act of registration of a birth or is evidenced by a birth certificate. In Llewellyn I determined that a birth certificate, either in and of itself or by its registration, does not create or evidence anything which the law would recognise as a “security”. Similarly, the Court finds that a birth certificate, either in and of itself or by its registration, does not create, evidence or alter any kind of property or right in property known to Australian law, whether in law, equity or otherwise.

Shaun’s claim is predicated upon the existence of an estate or interest in property of a kind that does not exist under Australian law. There is therefore nothing which can be the subject of the various estates or interests referred to in the summons.

It follows from the preceding paragraph that the requirements of both UCPR Pt 13, r 13.4 and Pt 14, r 14.28 are clearly satisfied. The Court finds that the summons discloses no reasonable cause of action within the meaning of either rule.

Pursuant to UCPR r 13.4(1)(b), in relation each of Shaun and Kyle’s proceedings, the orders of the Court are: