Skybridge Financial Pty Ltd atf the MTP Unit Trust v Buckpitt (No 2)

The background of this matter is set out in my judgment of 16 August 2024. [1] I shall use the same abbreviations here.

Now, by Notice of Motion filed on 22 November 2024, Mr Buckpitt seeks to bring a cross-claim against the Skybridge parties arising out of the contract referred to in my earlier judgment, being a “Deed of Sale and Purchase” dated 1 July 2022, and also under a “Contractor Deed” made on or about the same day between many of the same parties.

The Skybridge parties object to Mr Buckpitt and his interests bringing that cross-claim, primarily on the basis of the delay in the bringing of the application. Thus, on 27 November 2024, Skybridge’s solicitors wrote to Mr Buckpitt’s solicitors:

It is true that there has been a delay by Mr Buckpitt in bringing this application to bring a cross-claim.

That delay is, however, explained to some extent by Mr Buckpitt’s solicitor, who has deposed that, at least as to some aspects of the proposed cross-claim, it was not until he received accounting evidence from the Skybridge parties that he felt able to conclude that there were reasonable grounds to bring the cross-claim.

In any event, the fact is that Mr Buckpitt could bring what is proposed to be in the cross-claim as separate proceedings. Were that to happen, it is inevitable that Mr Buckpitt would, by notice of motion in the proceedings, seek an order that those new proceedings be heard together with these proceedings, and that evidence in one be evidence in the other. I think it would be antithetical to the just, quick and cheap resolution of all the issues between these parties to require Mr Buckpitt to take that step.

Mr Lees, for the Skybridge interests, also offered a number of criticisms of the form of the proposed cross-claim. It is not necessary that I deal with them. I do not think any of them, either themselves or in combination, would justify the leave sought being refused.

I make an order in accordance with par [1] of the second and third defendants’ Notice of Motion of 22 November 2024.

As to costs, Mr Lees submitted that Mr Buckpitt and his interests should pay the costs of the motion, and that they should be assessed as a gross sum costs order and be payable forthwith. Mr Lees pointed to the fact that, in my judgment of 16 August 2024, I imposed those terms on his clients as a condition of them having leave to amend the Summons and List Statement.

However, the circumstances here are quite different. The appropriate order of costs in relation to Mr Buckpitt’s Notice of Motion today is that there be no order as to costs.