Carretero v Ioannidis

1. [1]

   FREE JA: The respondent, Maria Ioannidis (Ms Ioannidis), seeks orders for the short service and abbreviated times for return of three subpoenas for production that she wishes to issue. Ms Ioannidis is the respondent to appeal proceedings brought by Melissa Carretero (Ms Carretero). The substantive appeal is listed for hearing in the Court of Appeal next Tuesday, 24 March 2026 (that is, eight days from today), which provides the immediate context of urgency for the current application.

2. [2]

   The appeal concerns an award of damages in favour of Ms Ioannidis by the District Court (Ioannidis v Carretero [2025] NSWDC 258) arising out of an incident that occurred on 24 April 2020. Ms Ioannidis was walking her dog Lexi, an 11-year-old Shih Tzu along a street in Mortdale. Both Ms Ioannidis and Lexi were subjected to a vicious attack by a large Greyhound Staffordshire Bull Terrier cross, which was owned by Ms Carretero. Ms Ioannidis suffered physical and psychological trauma as a result of the incident. Lexi suffered egregious injuries, including having one paw ripped off at the joint. Lexi somehow survived the attack after emergency treatment.

3. [3]

   Ms Ioannidis sued Ms Carretero for damages under s 25 of the Companian Animals Act 1998 (NSW). The trial took place on 24 and 25 March 2025. Both parties were represented by lawyers at trial. Ms Ioannidis was represented by Shine Lawyers, who continue to act for her. Ms Carretero was represented by Veritas Law Firm. That law firm is no longer retained and Ms Carretero is not legally represented on the appeal.

4. [4]

   The trial judge awarded just over $100,000 in damages to Ms Ioannidis. Relevantly, the damages award included components for non-economic loss associated with psychological trauma and economic loss arising from interruption to the work performed by Ms Ioannidis.

5. [5]

   On 13 October 2025 Ms Carretero filed a notice of appeal containing seven grounds. Relevantly, ground 6 of the notice of appeal concerns what is said to be “fresh evidence” that Ms Carretero seeks to rely upon:

6. [6]

   The fresh evidence in question is set out in the affidavit of Ms Carretero sworn on 20 November 2025. It includes a number of articles and videos, published in 2024 and apparently obtained from publicly available sources online, which detail business activities of Ms Ioannidis. Some of those business activities concern a business known as Infamous Swim. By a notice of motion dated 26 November 2025 Ms Carretero formally seeks leave under s 75A(7) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) to rely on the fresh evidence contained in the exhibits to her affidavit of 20 November 2025. The notice of motion has been stood over for hearing with the substantive appeal on 24 March 2026.

7. [7]

   As reflected in the notice of appeal, and also in the grounds set out in the notice of motion seeking leave under s 75A(7), Ms Carretero recognises that in seeking to obtain that leave she will need to satisfy the Court that the evidence is “fresh evidence” because it was not available to her at the time of trial. Evidence is “available” in the relevant sense if it could have been obtained at that time if Ms Carretero had exercised reasonable diligence.

8. [8]

   In anticipation of needing to meet that test, Ms Carretero has asserted in her affidavit and notice of motion that because of her medical circumstances at the time of the trial, and because of the failure of Ms Ioannidis to disclose the relevant facts at the time, Ms Carretero could not have obtained the evidence at that time. Ms Carretero says the following in her affidavit at [8]:

9. [9]

   Ms Carretero goes on at [13]-[16] of that affidavit to describe the circumstances surrounding the trial and the material she now seeks to rely on:

10. [10]

    By way of support for these propositions, the exhibit to Ms Carretero’s affidavit contains a number of documents about her medical condition during the trial and in surrounding periods. Two letters from a healthcare provider in Hobart called “Tas Women by TasOGS” dated 6 September 2024 and 10 October 2025 are exhibited. Also exhibited is an email from a psychologist who had treated Ms Carretero at Family Services Australia Psychology in Shellharbour, concerning the state of distress that Ms Carretero experienced from March 2024 to March 2025.

11. [11]

    For reasons that will become apparent, it is necessary to mention another interlocutory step that has occurred. By notice of motion filed on 20 February 2026 Ms Ioannidis sought security for costs of the appeal. That motion was heard and dismissed on 2 March 2026.

12. [12]

    The notice of motion which is before me today was filed on 10 March 2026. It concerns three subpoenas for production which Ms Ioannidis seeks to serve.

13. [13]

    One is a proposed subpoena to Veritas Law Firm, which acted for Ms Carretero at trial. It contains ten substantive categories for production. The categories relate, in various ways, to research conducted about Ms Ioannidis and her business activities in particular. The apparent relevance of that material, as confirmed by Ms Vella who appeared at the hearing of this motion, is to test the proposition, implicit in Ms Carretero’s affidavit, that research of the kind that has now uncovered the supposedly fresh evidence was not done at the time of trial, or could not have been done. More specifically Mr Ioannidis wishes to test whether the documents in question were actually obtained at the time of trial.

14. [14]

    The other two proposed subpoenas are to Family Services Australia and TasWomen by TasOGS. They seek, in essence, to test the veracity of Ms Carretero's claims about the condition she was in by obtaining medical records from those treating organisations.

15. [15]

    The notice of motion on its face sought an order for abbreviated service of the subpoenas to 17 March 2026. As raised with Ms Vella this morning, and as properly acknowledged, that timeframe is no longer appropriate given this motion is being heard today, 16 March 2026.

16. [16]

    What Ms Ioannidis in substance seeks is an abbreviated time to serve the subpoenas and also an abbreviated time for the return of the subpoenas. That involves compressing what would be the usual minimum of five days between service of a subpoena and the return date. Compressing that time may work a potential injustice on the recipients of subpoenas in compressing the time for them to comply. In seeking to address that potential prejudice, Ms Ioannidis' legal representatives have made contact with the three proposed recipients of the subpoenas.

17. [17]

    The response from TasWomen has indicated an immediate willingness to upload the relevant documents, which it seems will be able to be put in place once the subpoenas are formalised. Family Services have acknowledged the inquiry and in substance indicated they will respond if and when a formal subpoena is served on them. There has been no response from Veritas Law Firm.

18. [18]

    After discussions in the course or argument today about the proposed timing, the proposal centred on this Thursday 19 March 2026, as the most realistic return date. It is at least two business days before the hearing of the appeal, which, while inconvenient, will give the parties some time to access the documents, and be aware of what has been produced before the hearing of the appeal, but still allows some time for the production of documents. That framed the issues in debate.

19. [19]

    Ms Carretero says that the Court should refuse the request for such truncation of the usual timeframes. She points out, with justification, that Ms Ioannidis has been aware of the issue about fresh evidence since last November and has left it until the last minute to seek to pursue these subpoenas. She also points out, again with justification, that the explanation put forward by Ms Ioannidis, in the affidavit of her instructing solicitor, is unsatisfactory. Ms Carretero submits that it was not appropriate for Ms Ioannidis to await the resolution of the security for costs motion before seeking the production of documents relevant to the fresh evidence issue. Ms Carretero submits that, at the very least, if that was going to be the approach, the motion for security for costs should have been pursued more expeditiously.

20. [20]

    An added complication, which Ms Vella appropriately and candidly acknowledged, was that once the security for costs motion had been resolved on 2 March 2026, if steps had been taken to issue the subpoenas more promptly, there would have been no issue with short service and no need for a special motion.

21. [21]

    Ms Carretero has also emphasised that she is very concerned about the sensitivity of the documents being sought, in particular her medical records and records of psychological consultations.

22. [22]

    While that is an understandable concern and a factor that I take into account, in circumstances where Ms Carretero has squarely put in issue, by her own evidence on the fresh evidence motion, her condition at the time of trial and her ability to conduct researches of the kind that have now produced this material, in my view, there is a legitimate forensic purpose for the subpoenas proposed to be issued to TasWomen and Family Services. The sensitivity of that material is not a reason to deny the short service or otherwise deny the issuing of the subpoenas.

23. [23]

    The other factors raised by Ms Carretero do tell, in the discretionary weighting exercise, against the present application. However, there are countervailing considerations. It is in the interests of justice for relevant evidence to be available to the parties and the Court, all other things being equal. That includes being satisfied that neither the parties to the appeal nor any affected third party is unreasonably prejudiced.

24. [24]

    In relation to TasWomen and Family Services, I am satisfied that the subpoenas are quite targeted in their scope and readily able to be answered within a short period of time. Ms Vella has properly proposed that the scope should be further refined in that the documents called for should be limited to the documents or records created since 24 April 2020. That is an appropriate concession and reinforces my conclusion about those subpoenas being properly targeted.

25. [25]

    The subpoena proposed for Veritas Law, however, is in a different category. It seeks documents across ten substantive paragraphs, as I have indicated, and responding to it would not be a straightforward exercise. It would require substantial searches, noting that it seeks not just particular identified documents but any file, document, note, correspondence, record or other material relating to attempts made to search for or research documents of that kind. I have real doubt about the practicality of Veritas responding within the timeframe, and the burden that would impose on them weighs against the application.

26. [26]

    There is also likely to be a substantial issue with privilege. Although, as Ms Vella observed, publicly available documents might not themselves be privileged, it seems clear on the face of the subpoena that it would catch a number of documents that one would expect to be privileged, including notes, correspondence, records or other material relating to those searches. Going through the exercise of trying to work out what is or is not privileged would be extremely burdensome, including for Ms Carretero, in the immediate days before the appeal.

27. [27]

    For those reasons, I am satisfied that orders for short service should be made in respect of the proposed subpoenas to TasWomen and Family Services, with the modification that Ms Vella has proposed, but I refuse the application in respect of Veritas Law.

Orders

1. [28]

   The orders of the Court are:

   1. (1)

      The subpoenas proposed to be issued to Family Services Australia and Tas Women, as annexed to the affidavit of Brittany Kristen Vella will be amended to:

   2. (2)

      Subpoenas to Family Services Australia by Tas Women, as so amended, to be served on those recipients by close of business today, 16 March 2026.

   3. (3)

      Costs of the respondent’s notice of motion filed on 10 March 2026 will be costs in the appeal.

   4. (4)

      The notice of motion is otherwise dismissed.