Spratt v Perilya Broken Hill Ltd; Spratt v Rowe

1. [1]

   McCOLL JA: I agree with Leeming JA’s reasons and the orders his Honour proposes.

2. [2]

   GLEESON JA: I agree with Leeming JA.

3. [3]

   LEEMING JA: Stripped of their factual and procedural complexity, these two proceedings reduce to a dispute whose essence may be stated concisely. Mr Nathan Spratt was injured at work by a motor vehicle driven by a fellow employee on 11 October 2011. He has made a claim for lump sum compensation under s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), one aspect of which has been determined, favourably to him, by the Workers Compensation Commission: it determined that Mr Spratt injured his cervical spine in the course of his employment on 11 October. Mr Spratt also made a claim under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), and a Medical Assessor determined that “[t]here was no likelihood of the cervical spine injury in the accident as described”. Mr Spratt has applied to the Proper Officer for review of that assessment, but his application has been refused. He has also applied to the District Court for a further assessment, but that application has been refused. In this Court, he challenges both decisions refusing those applications, on the basis that the determination by the Workers Compensation Commission resulted in an issue estoppel which bound the Assessor.

4. [4]

   There are two reasons why I have concluded that Mr Spratt’s challenges must fail. The first is a matter which only became clear following questions from the Court and the belated production of Mr Spratt’s District Court pleading. There was no issue estoppel. Mr Spratt’s motor accident claim is against the driver of the vehicle. His District Court action joins both the driver and employer, but the liability of the latter is purely vicarious. When this was raised by the Court, Mr Spratt conceded, properly, that the driver could not be regarded as a privy of his employer. As such, he could not be bound by any issue estoppel.

5. [5]

   The second reason is that even if an issue estoppel arose as to causation, it does not bind an assessor determining a medical dispute in accordance with Pt 3.4 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act.

Factual background

1. [6]

   Mr Spratt’s injury was suffered on 11 October 2011 at Broken Hill in far western New South Wales. According to a history given to one of the orthopaedic surgeons who examined him, the injury occurred as follows:

2. [7]

   The injury to Mr Spratt’s hand and arm was serious, and he was flown to Adelaide for treatment.

3. [8]

   Mr Spratt, by his solicitor, made a claim upon his employer’s workers compensation insurer for $65,750, comprising $35,750 with respect to 22% whole person impairment and $30,000 with respect to pain and suffering, pursuant to ss 66 and 67 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW). The insurer disputed the claim. It maintained that Mr Spratt’s whole person impairment was only 5%, and it disputed that any injury had been suffered to Mr Spratt’s cervical spine or that his claim for whole person impairment had arisen from an accepted workplace injury.

4. [9]

   Mr Spratt thereupon made an application to the Workers Compensation Commission, which identified the matter in dispute as “Lump sum compensation where liability in dispute”. The employer filed a reply confirming the position stated by its workers compensation insurer. It seems that there was an arbitration hearing held on 4 May 2015 before Arbitrator Perrignon constituting the Workers Compensation Commission. A document titled “Statement of Reasons – Extempore Orders” [sic] states that the Arbitrator used his best endeavours to bring the parties to an agreed resolution of the dispute, but that the parties were unable to come to an agreement. The document states that “the reasons for the orders set out below were given orally on 4 May 2015”, and that a sound recording of the reasons was available to the parties. However, the reasons given by the Arbitrator were not put into evidence. The “order” which is said to found this issue estoppel was the first order made on that occasion:

5. [10]

   A “Certificate of Determination” was issued by the Registrar, purportedly pursuant to s 294 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW). The certificate is irregular. Paragraph 1 repeats the “order” reproduced above. Paragraphs 2 and 3 repeat the procedural directions made by Arbitrator Perrignon. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 repeat, verbatim, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. Contrary to the requirement in s 294(2), the certificate does not attach a “brief statement ... setting out the Commission’s reasons for the determination”.

6. [11]

   Nothing turns on the absence of reasons or other irregularities referred to above. The parties proceeded on the basis that the “order” made by Arbitrator Perrignon amounted to a determination that the accident on 11 October 2011 caused injury to Mr Spratt’s cervical spine. I shall adopt the same approach.

7. [12]

   Mr Spratt’s lawyers wrote to Perilya’s solicitors on 4 February 2015 stating that unless they heard to the contrary within 14 days, they would proceed on the basis that it was not accepted that Mr Spratt exceeded the 10% whole person impairment requirement. That was a reference to the prohibition upon the award of damages for non-economic loss imposed by s 131 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act. On 24 February 2015, an application for assessment of a permanent impairment dispute was made by Mr Spratt to the Medical Assessment Service, attaching the letter to Perilya’s solicitors and a medical report concluding that Mr Spratt’s whole person impairment was 22%.

8. [13]

   That in turn led to an assessment by Assessor Schutz on 9 July 2015, who determined that no injury to the cervical spine had been caused by the motor accident. The Assessor certified that there was no injury caused by the motor accident that gave rise to a permanent impairment of greater than 10%. In the course of the reasons accompanying the certificate, Assessor Schutz said the following:

9. [14]

   Assessor Schutz stated that Mr Spratt had attended upon him for the purpose of medical assessment, and that he conducted a clinical examination, including of Mr Schutz’s cervical spine. The Assessor stated his findings in that respect as follows:

10. [15]

    The Assessor’s conclusions on the cervical spine were as follows:

11. [16]

    Mr Spratt subsequently made an application to the Proper Officer of the Motor Accidents Authority to refer his medical assessment to a review panel, pursuant to s 63 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act. The Proper Officer’s power to refer an assessment to a panel is available “only if the Proper Officer is satisfied that there is reasonable cause to suspect that the medical assessment was incorrect in a material respect having regard to the particulars set out in the application”: s 63(3). By decision made on 22 October 2015, the Proper Officer refused Mr Spratt’s application. The decision records the submission made by Mr Spratt that the assessment was incorrect in a material respect, “in that the Assessor made a finding in respect of the neck when he was not entitled to do so because there was an issue estoppel between the parties from a decision handed down in the Workers Compensation Commission on 4 May 2015”. The reasons of the Proper Officer were as follows:

12. [17]

    Speaking generally, Mr Spratt had, by reason of s 109 of the Act, three years to commence proceedings (there are significant qualifications to that proposition which I pass over). During the hearing in this Court it emerged that, by statement of claim filed on 5 September 2014 (shortly before the earliest possible expiry of that three year period), Mr Spratt had commenced proceedings against Mr Rowe and Perilya Broken Hill Ltd in the District Court seeking damages for negligence.

13. [18]

    Although less than perfectly drafted, on a fair reading of the statement of claim it emerges that Perilya is only said to be liable by reason of it having employed Mr Rowe and being vicariously liable for his negligent acts and omissions. I say that because although it is alleged that Mr Spratt’s injuries “were caused by the negligence of the Defendants”, there is no allegation of duty owed by Perilya, or breach of duty by Perilya, or particulars of negligence attributable to Perilya, while there is a positive allegation that Perilya employed Mr Rowe and “as such is vicariously liable for [his] negligent acts or omissions”. Ultimately, I understood Mr Goodridge, who appeared for the applicant, to accept that characterisation of the pleading.

14. [19]

    By notice of motion filed in the District Court action, Mr Spratt sought an order that he be referred under s 62(1)(b) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act for further assessment. The primary judge (Bozic DCJ) gave a reserved decision on 4 December 2015 refusing that application. His Honour gave four reasons for doing so. The first was that he was of the view that there was no prospect of any different outcome, because the question whether there was any issue estoppel was not an issue for a medical assessor to determine. His Honour said:

15. [20]

    Secondly, his Honour was of the view that if the Supreme Court determined that there was an issue estoppel, then the Proper Officer had made an error of law. Mr Stanton, who appeared for the respondents before the primary judge and on appeal, candidly conceded as much before this Court.

16. [21]

    Thirdly, his Honour was of the view that the Proper Officer was amenable to certiorari, in accordance with what was said in Rodger v De Gelder [2011] NSWCA 97; 80 NSWLR 594 at [70].

17. [22]

    Fourthly, his Honour observed that, as a matter of discretion, if the matter were to be sent back:

18. [23]

    In this Court, Mr Spratt seeks judicial review of the decision of the Proper Officer, and seeks leave to appeal from the interlocutory decision of Bozic DCJ. There are many infelicities in both originating processes, but in oral submissions it was made clear that, save for a matter to which I return at the conclusion of these reasons, the nature of Mr Spratt’s challenges was as summarised above. Mr Spratt also accepted the appropriateness of amending his summons so that Perilya Broken Hill Ltd rather than the District Court of New South Wales was the first defendant, so as to comply with Pt 59 r 59.3(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR).

There was no issue estoppel

1. [24]

   It was common ground between the parties that an issue estoppel may arise in a motor accident damages claim as a result of workers compensation proceedings between the same parties. That has consistently been held by appellate courts notwithstanding the considerable changes to the constitution of the body authorised to decide workers compensation disputes. However, the basis for the conclusion has varied.

2. [25]

   Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 285, the first High Court decision cited by the parties, turned on a narrower proposition. The employer had, by its third plea to the plaintiff’s declaration, raised estoppel, based on an award of Judge Rainbow QC sitting in the Workers Compensation Commission holding that the alleged injury to Mr Somodaj’s back was not suffered in the course of his employment. Mr Somodaj demurred to the plea. (It is to be recalled that the litigation pre-dated the judicature legislation in this State, and reflected the traditional mode of common law procedure.) Mr Somodaj submitted that the decision of Judge Rainbow could not raise any estoppel, and his first submission was that the Workers Compensation Commission was an administrative body. That submission was rejected by the Full Court (Owen J, Clancy and Walsh JJ concurring), and the joint judgment of the majority of the High Court (Kitto, Taylor and Menzies JJ) “respectfully agreed with the way in which [the Supreme Court] dealt with the contentions then raised”: at 296. Owen J had rejected the submission on a narrow basis, explaining that in hearing and determining the dispute between worker and employer, the Commission exercised judicial functions as a court, was defined as a court of record, its members had the status of a judge of the District Court, they took the judicial oath and they had power to summon witnesses and to punish for contempt. His Honour concluded, “Having regard to these provisions, I am of opinion that in hearing and determining applications for compensation the Commission is a court”: Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd [1961] SR NSW 305 at 308. (For clarity, I have omitted some of the procedural history of this litigation.)

3. [26]

   Likewise, in Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1990) 19 NSWLR 600, the decision which was held to give rise to an estoppel was that of the Compensation Court.

4. [27]

   Of course, the fact that a body is styled a “commission” or a “tribunal” does not prevent it being a court. The Dust Diseases Tribunal (which is a court of record) and the Upper Tribunal in the United Kingdom (which is a superior court of record) are examples. Moreover, a body may be a “court” for one purpose (Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW)) and not a court for another (s 77(iii) of the Constitution): see, for example, Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 101 at [68].

5. [28]

   The decision of Arbitrator Perrignon constituting the Workers Compensation Commission is not, in contrast to what was held in Somodaj and Egri, a decision of a court. However, it became clear no later than the reasons given by Gibbs J in The Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 453 that a non-curial decision could found an issue estoppel. His Honour there said that:

6. [29]

   That proposition has not thereafter been doubted: see for example Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34; 220 CLR 363 at [22].

7. [30]

   Finality is necessary in order for a decision to ground an issue estoppel: Maurice Blackburn Cashman v Brown [2011] HCA 22; 242 CLR 647 at [40]. Even so, as that decision reveals, it is not sufficient that a statute states that a decision is final. However, the breadth of s 350 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act is sufficient. Subsection (1) of that section made Arbitrator Perrignon’s decision “final and binding on the parties” save for the procedures for appeal and review under that Act, and subs (2) provided that it was not liable to be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called into question by any court.

8. [31]

   Hence, the parties were correct to proceed on the basis that the decision of the Workers Compensation Commission constituted by Arbitrator Perrignon could give rise to an issue estoppel, no differently from what had occurred in CSR Timber Products Pty Ltd v Weathertex Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 49; 83 NSWLR 433 at [14].

9. [32]

   In Kuligowski v Metrobus at [21], the High Court applied the requirements stated by Lord Guest in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 935 in applying the doctrine of issue estoppel:

10. [33]

    I am content to assume, favourably to Mr Spratt, that the same question arose in connection with his claims under the workers compensation and motor accident legislation (no submissions were directed to that point). It is the third requirement which is decisive. An issue estoppel can only bind the parties and their privies.

11. [34]

    Mr Rowe, the driver of the vehicle which injured Mr Spratt, was not a party to the decision of Arbitrator Perrignon. Nor was he a privy to Perilya. It is plain that he cannot be bound by Arbitrator Perrignon’s determination as to causation.

12. [35]

    Against this, Mr Spratt submitted that it could make no difference, because Perilya was a party to both proceedings. As it was put orally:

13. [36]

    I cannot accept Mr Spratt’s submission. Although Perilya is a party to both the proceeding in the Workers Compensation Commission and the action in the District Court, its liability in the District Court depends upon Mr Rowe being found to have breached a duty of care which was causative of loss to Mr Spratt. It cannot be that Perilya is vicariously bound to pay some heads of damages which Mr Rowe is not, or may not, be liable to pay.

14. [37]

    That is so irrespective of whether Perilya’s vicarious liability is based upon the liability of Mr Rowe or the conduct of Mr Rowe. It is unnecessary for present purposes to outline the lines of judicial and academic authority for these competing concepts (something which was not even touched on in this Court, but which has been succinctly summarised in Pioneer Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Columbus Capital Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 78 at [48]-[57]). It suffices to say that if, as Allsop P said in Kable v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 243; 293 ALR 719 at [52]-[54], the preferred view is that the employer is vicariously liable by reason of Mr Rowe's liability, then it is plain that the issue estoppel asserted by Mr Spratt cannot apply. However, even if the “conduct” theory be preferred, such that Perilya is liable not because of the liability of Mr Rowe, but because of Mr Rowe’s conduct, the issue estoppel on which Mr Spratt relies is inapplicable. Whether or not Mr Rowe’s negligence caused damage to Mr Spratt’s cervical spine cannot be predetermined by Arbitrator Perrignon's decision.

15. [38]

    In his subsequent oral submissions, Mr Spratt relied upon the fact (so it was said) that there was a single insurer defending both claims. It was said that the cause of action against Mr Rowe to which the issue estoppel did not apply was:

16. [39]

    Again, even assuming (favourably to Mr Spratt) that Allianz Australia Workers’ Compensation (NSW) Ltd is the insurer responding to Mr Spratt’s motor accident claim (whether that is so is not clear from the materials), the availability of an issue estoppel does not turn on that happenstance.

17. [40]

    To the extent that it might be thought that this is a somewhat technical answer to Mr Spratt’s contentions, two things may be said. The first is that Mr Spratt himself is seeking to rely upon a “technical” doctrine of the common law so as to cause the determination by Arbitrator Perrignon as to causation to displace the determination of the same issue by a qualified medical practitioner, who had the benefit of clinically examining Mr Spratt. The second is that, for the reasons given below, I have concluded that even if there were an issue estoppel, the Motor Accidents Compensation Act makes it clear that primacy is to be given to the determination of a medical assessor.

Any issue estoppel as to causation is inconsistent with the Motor Accidents Compensation Act

1. [41]

   As Gleeson JA said, with the agreement of Macfarlan JA and me, in Rodger v De Gelder [2015] NSWCA 211; 71 MVR 514 at [17]:

2. [42]

   The submission that the Medical Assessor is bound by an issue estoppel on the question of causation is inconsistent with that proposition. As the Proper Officer herself said, a consideration of causation is implicit (or inherent) in the assessment required by the statute.

3. [43]

   True it is that Rodger v De Gelder was not itself a case of issue estoppel. However, the first decision cited by Gleeson JA, Motor Accidents Authority of NSW v Mills [2010] NSWCA 82; 78 NSWLR 125, was factually similar and was at the forefront of the helpful submissions advanced by Mr Stanton on behalf of Perilya and Mr Rowe. In Mills there had been a trial before a District Court judge on questions of liability. The trial judge accepted the evidence of the plaintiff and found that the injury to Mr Mills’ back was causally related to the motor vehicle accident. His Honour referred the matter for further medical assessment pursuant to s 62. Eventually, his Honour made an order referring only “the question of the extent of [Mr Mills’] whole impairment and not the question of whether or not that impairment (or the injury giving rise to it) was caused by the accident the subject of these proceedings”.

4. [44]

   This Court allowed an appeal and concluded that causation could not be excluded from a referral to medical assessment under Pt 3.4 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act. The leading judgment was given by Giles JA. His Honour carefully analysed the scheme of the legislation, emphasising that the assessment conducted by a medical assessor was, except in exceptional circumstances, given the status of conclusive evidence of the issue of permanent impairment. His Honour observed (albeit in a passage which was obiter) that the composite phrase “the degree of permanent impairment of the injured person as a result of the injury caused by the motor accident” in s 131 of the Motor Accident Compensation Act included two elements: the degree of permanent impairment and causation of the degree of permanent impairment: at [59]. Essentially, because both issues were for the conclusive determination of an assessor, Giles JA held that the limited referral made by the District Court judge went beyond the power conferred by s 62. Tobias JA and Handley AJA agreed with Giles JA.

5. [45]

   Subsequent (minor) amendments to the legislation do not detract from the force of the reasoning in Mills, and Mr Spratt did not submit to the contrary.

6. [46]

   A number of matters flow from this Court’s decision in Mills. First, the ratio of Mills is that the Motor Accidents Compensation Act leaves, for the exclusive and conclusive determination by medical assessors, questions of permanent impairment and causation. The legislation has that effect notwithstanding the final determination of the Court following a conventional trial. It necessarily follows that the legislation abrogates common law issue estoppel to the extent that it would otherwise preclude a medical assessor from performing the tasks imposed on him or her by the Motor Accidents Compensation Act.

7. [47]

   Secondly, the final determination of causation by the District Court in Mills must have given rise to an issue estoppel. Although Mills was not argued on the basis of issue estoppel, acceptance of Mr Spratt’s submissions would mean that Mills was wrongly decided.

8. [48]

   Thirdly, the submission variously made by Mr Spratt to the Proper Officer, the District Court and in this Court that the Medical Assessor was bound to apply what had been determined by Arbitrator Perrignon was incorrect. The reasons given by the Proper Officer reproduced above correctly stated that a consideration of the causation of the claimant’s symptoms and impairments is a matter required to be undertaken by an assessor.

Clause 1.7 of the Permanent Impairment Guidelines

1. [49]

   Mr Spratt made a further submission, based on cl 1.7 of the “Permanent Impairment Guidelines” issued by the Motor Accidents Authority. It is convenient to reproduce that clause and the two which follow, with emphasis added to the words on which Mr Spratt placed reliance:

2. [50]

   Mr Spratt submitted that by reason of s 44, the Guidelines were binding upon the Medical Assessor. That is not so, although it is true that s 65 provides that medical assessments under Pt 3.4 are “subject to” relevant provisions of guidelines including the Permanent Impairment Guidelines. Mr Spratt’s principal submission was that the reference to “the common law principles that would be applied by a court (or claims assessor) in considering such issues” included a reference to the common law principle of issue estoppel. In that way, so it was said, the Motor Accidents Compensation Act indirectly caused the Assessor to be bound by the issue estoppel.

3. [51]

   There are a number of reasons why I cannot accept that submission, even if there had been an issue estoppel binding Mr Rowe and Perilya. The first is that there is no basis to conclude that either a guideline, or the obligation upon a medical assessor to comply with a guideline, could contradict an obligation imposed by the Act. If on its proper construction it did so, then it would seem likely that it was to that extent ultra vires. If there were a choice between two constructions, one of which led to invalidity, that would be a sound reason for preferring the alternative construction: see for example McKee v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWCA 163; 71 NSWLR 609 at [95].

4. [52]

   The second is that cl 1.7 of the Guidelines is, on its face, something less than mandatory. Clause 1.3 provides:

5. [53]

   It is clear that text which is not in bold is something less than a “directive”. Although I have emphasised the portion of cl 1.7 on which Mr Spratt relies, none of cl 1.7 in the Guidelines as published is in bold. I do not see how Mr Spratt’s submission as to the mandatory effect of cl 1.7 can be consistent with its not being a provision in bold which attracts cl 1.3.

6. [54]

   The third is that the language of cl 1.7 falls short of imposing a requirement that assessors should apply common law principles. In terms, it states merely that assessors “should be aware” of such principles. The non-obligatory language of cl 1.7 is in contrast with what immediately follows, notably, “it is necessary to verify” both of the factors stated in cl 1.8.

7. [55]

   The fourth is that I would regard the closing sentence of cl 1.7 as introductory to what is said about common law principles of causation which are summarised in the immediately following clauses. I do not consider cl 1.7 is directed to issue estoppel at all.

8. [56]

   For those reasons, Mr Spratt’s arguments are not assisted by cl 1.7 of the Permanent Impairment Guidelines.

9. [57]

   That is sufficient to dismiss both of Mr Spratt’s challenges. However, even if that were not so, there is no error whatsoever in any of the reasons given by the District Court refusing to order a further assessment. The appropriate course was to challenge the decision of the Proper Officer, as pointed out by Bozic DCJ, which Mr Spratt has done. For that reason, even putting to one side the serious deficiencies in the draft notice of appeal, I would not grant leave.

Other irregularities and deficiencies in Mr Spratt’s proceedings

1. [58]

   I turn to some less than satisfactory features of these proceedings. The first is the affidavit in support of Mr Spratt’s summons. The body of the affidavit was short, but it was accompanied by some 250 pages said (inaccurately) to be annexures. The affidavit was not paginated, which was a source of recurring embarrassment to counsel presenting Mr Spratt’s submissions, and a source of delay on the part of the Court in preparing for and conducting the hearing. The entire White Book should have been paginated: UCPR r 51.12(5)(f).

2. [59]

   Secondly, the summons seeking judicial review invoked this Court’s jurisdiction under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). It was directed both to the decision of the Proper Officer and to the decision of the District Court. It did not seek any orders setting aside either of those decisions, although plainly enough that was the primary relief sought by Mr Spratt. It contained some 13 grounds on which relief was sought, including ultimately, “such further or other grounds as may appear reasonable once transcripts including the transcript of judgment becomes available”. That ground was only abandoned at the conclusion of the hearing.

3. [60]

   Only one of the grounds was directed to a failure attributable to the District Court. That ground was expressed as follows:

4. [61]

   That ground, to the extent I understand it, does not correspond to any available ground of judicial review. Its gravamen is that there was a failure insofar as the medical assessment took place without proper evidence of the issue estoppel. For the reasons already given, there was no issue estoppel, nor if there was such an issue estoppel, could it impact upon the determination by the Medical Assessor of causation. But in any event, the failure to have “proper” evidence of that matter was attributable to those providing legal assistance to Mr Spratt, who had in their possession the determination of Arbitrator Perrignon, but permitted their client to attend the assessment without providing that document to him.

5. [62]

   Thirdly, after the completion of Mr Spratt’s oral submissions, he was asked whether he pressed grounds (k) and (l) which asserted a denial of natural justice by the Assessor. It is to be appreciated that a denial of procedural fairness, whether directed to a court or a tribunal, is a serious allegation. Eventually, and properly – no such submission having been put orally or in writing – those grounds were abandoned.

6. [63]

   Fourthly, it is necessary to say something of the remaining nine grounds because, notwithstanding an opportunity having been provided to Mr Goodridge to consider whether they were pressed, he insisted that they were. Those grounds were as follows:

7. [64]

   These grounds are embarrassing, both in their lack of clarity and in their repetition, and in their failure to identify the gravamen of Mr Spratt’s claim, which is that if he is right as to issue estoppel, there was an error of law on the face of the record of the decision of the Proper Officer.

8. [65]

   Although each of those grounds was pressed, in light of my reasoning above they may and should be disposed of concisely. To the extent that ground (a) goes beyond the points already identified, there is no question of any failure to have regard to relevant considerations or having regard to irrelevant considerations; the Proper Officer squarely addressed the submission advanced to her. In relation to (b), there was no suggestion in the evidence, or submissions, of any inflexible application of policy, while the inability on the part of Mr Spratt’s submissions to point to any authority cannot give rise to a ground based on giving undue weight to some factual matter. In relation to (c) and (d), it was no part of the Proper Officer’s task to articulate and apply principles of causation, or to permit “proper evidence” to be placed before the Medical Assessor; the question for her was that posed by s 63 of the Act, in relation to an assessment in which Mr Spratt’s lawyers had seemingly failed to ensure that he supplied the decision of Arbitrator Perrignon. There is no error as claimed in grounds (e) or (f) for the reasons already given. Grounds (g) and (i) amount to complaints concerning the Proper Officer’s conclusion, but neither grounds explain why it should be set aside. Finally, ground (h) is baseless, for the Proper Officer self-evidently, in the dispositive paragraph of her reasons, had regard to cl 1.7.

9. [66]

   Fifthly, much the same criticisms may be directed to the six proposed grounds in the draft notice of appeal. For example, grounds 5 and 6 were:

10. [67]

    Many of the grounds in the summons and the draft notice of appeal seem to have been drafted with a view to extending to any conceivable ground of judicial review, and fail to identify, for the benefit of the opposing side and the Court, the basis upon which the challenges are being advanced with requisite clarity and precision.

11. [68]

    Had the originating process in this Court been drafted by an unrepresented litigant, I would make no comment. However, this is not the only case where experienced counsel has advanced proceedings in the nature of judicial review with grounds drafted in an ambit fashion. Whatever be the practice of relying on standard form particulars of negligence in motor vehicle actions, it should not be translated to judicial review proceedings. To be quite clear about this:

    1. (1)

       if there is said to be an error of law on the face of the record, the error should be identified;

    2. (2)

       if relevant material (which is to say, material which statute expressly or impliedly requires the decision-maker to have regard to, failing which the decision is invalid) is said to have been ignored, the material should be identified;

    3. (3)

       if irrelevant material (which is to say, material which statute expressly or impliedly provides that a decision which has regard to it is invalid), is said to have been relied on, the material should be identified.

12. [69]

    Sixthly, the written summary of argument provided by Mr Spratt was unsigned and was – to put the matter neutrally – unilluminating in terms of the real issues sought to be agitated. In implicit acknowledgment of the limitations of the written submissions supplied in advance of the hearing, Mr Goodridge supplied at the commencement of the appeal a further document, to which he spoke, which was substantially different from that which had hitherto been articulated. The respondents made no complaint about the late notice of what emerged as the principal submissions advanced in this Court, but as has repeatedly been said, it is important for the efficient administration of justice, as well as for ensuring a process which is procedurally fair, that early attention be given, at the time written submissions are drafted, to the case which is sought to be advanced. As McColl JA said in Warth v Lafsky [2014] NSWCA 94; 66 MVR 445 at [80]:

13. [70]

    There is in my view much to be said for submissions which are unsigned and which self-evidently will not reflect the case sought to be advanced by counsel briefed in the matter to be returned to the lawyers who sought to rely upon them. The requirement that the written submissions be signed by the barrister or solicitor who prepares them (where the party is represented) in UCPR Pt 51 r 51.12(3)(b) and r 51.36(1)(d) is directed to ensuring a measure of discipline upon the legal representatives of the parties, fairness to the other side and efficient administration by the Court, and compliance by the practitioners with their obligations under s 56(4) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). In the present case, those rules were flouted. If the non-compliance had made it necessary for the matter to be adjourned, there may have been cause for a special costs order.

Orders

1. [71]

   For those reasons, I propose the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Amend the parties so that the first defendant is Perilya Broken Hill Ltd.

   2. (2)

      Dismiss the summons filed 18 January 2016 with costs.

   3. (1)

      Dismiss the summons seeking leave to appeal with costs.