The Adoption of Sarah-Rose Elizabeth Ford

This case concerns an application by summons filed 8 May 2025 by the Secretary of the New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) seeking that Sarah-Rose Elizabeth Ford (now 7 years of age) be adopted by the proposed adoptive parent, Adrian Finn, by order of this court pursuant to s 23 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (Adoption Act).

The Secretary also seeks:

In this judgment, I will refer to each of the family members and other individuals involved by their first names for convenience and without intending any disrespect. In the published version of this judgment, all persons referred to have been assigned pseudonyms in keeping with s 180 of the Adoption Act.

The central issue I am required to decide is whether an adoption order is in the best interests of Sarah-Rose.

The adoption orders sought in the present case are in favour of Sarah-Rose’s long-term foster parent, Adrian, with whom Sarah-Rose has been living since 17 February 2020, when she was just over 12 months old. The adoption orders are not supported by Susan and Jack; however, neither of them has filed a notice of appearance in the proceedings despite repeated requests by the DCJ that they do so and neither of them have appeared in court on any occasion.

For the reasons set out below, I have determined to order that Sarah-Rose be adopted by Adrian; make an order dispensing with the consent of each of Susan and Jack; approve the proposed change of name for Sarah-Rose; hold that the maternal adoption plan is appropriate in the circumstances and in Sarah-Rose’s best interests; register the maternal adoption plan; grant leave to provide a copy of the maternal adoption plan to Susan and Margaret; hold that the paternal adoption plan is appropriate in the circumstances and in Sarah-Rose’s best interests; and grant leave to provide a copy of the paternal adoption plan to Jack.

Sarah-Rose was born on 31 January 2019 in Wollongong Hospital, New South Wales and is presently 7 years old. She is an Australian citizen and has English and Dutch heritage. She is not of Aboriginal descent.

On 6 March 2019, Sarah-Rose was assumed into the care responsibility of the Secretary. On 17 February 2020, Sarah-Rose was placed with long-term authorised carer, Adrian. Sarah-Rose has since resided with Adrian full-time and they currently live together in a four-bedroom rented house in New South Wales.

Sarah-Rose is a good-natured, happy and well-mannered child with an easy personality. She is relaxed, good-humoured and has well-moderated behaviour.

Sarah-Rose is currently enrolled in a local Catholic primary school and is completing Kindergarten. In preparation for school in 2025, Adrian arranged a “ready for school” assessment to be completed for Sarah-Rose in November 2023, which concluded that Sarah-Rose was developing well across all areas. Her language development was described as both expressive and socially adept. She could speak in complete sentences while maintaining eye contact, reflecting a strong command of language and effective communication skills.

Sarah-Rose is developing well physically and on track for her age, with a mix of emerging skills and areas where she is already demonstrating control and confidence. Her cognitive development has been robust, encompassing numerical, literacy, memory and problem-solving skills.

Sarah-Rose exhibits a well-rounded social skill set and demonstrates empathy, positive emotional connection, an affectionate attitude and cooperation in her interactions with others.

Sarah-Rose enjoys going to school and maintains positive social relationships with her teachers and peers. She has formed many close friendships at school and gets invited to birthday parties almost every weekend. She likes to complete her homework and is very fond of reading. No academic concerns have been reported for Sarah-Rose. Adrian has also arranged additional tutoring for her for academic enrichment.

Outside school, Sarah-Rose loves participating in horse riding competitions, soccer games, swimming classes and dancing.

Sarah-Rose is generally very healthy. She has regular check-ups with the family general practitioner, dentist and optometrist. She was prescribed glasses in 2024 to correct short-sightedness and she enjoys wearing her glasses. She eats well and her diet is varied and good. She has no issues sleeping and follows an established bedtime routine.

In August 2025, Sarah-Rose was diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) by her paediatrician and has been prescribed Ritalin to assist with her concentration and focus during school hours.

Due to Sarah-Rose’s young age, she has limited understanding of the concept of adoption. However, she expresses a strong desire to continue associating herself with Adrian and his family. Sarah-Rose has often stated, “we are the same”, while referring to her being called “Finn”. Similarly, she has said to Adrian, “when I grow up, I want to be a Finn like you”. While responding to a photograph of herself as a baby in Adrian’s arms, Sarah-Rose said to Adrian, “that’s when I became your Sarah”.

Adrian has maintained open and age-appropriate conversations about adoption with Sarah-Rose. When she asks questions about her adoption, Adrian explains to her that “adoption means that we are a family forever. It’s not something that changes—it’s a promise that you are loved, protected, and always belong”.

The proposed adoptive parent is Adrian. He was born on 16 February 1986 in Wollongong Hospital, New South Wales, and is currently aged 40 years. He is an Australian citizen, and his cultural background is Maltese-Australian.

Adrian has completed six years of secondary education, finishing Year 12 in 2005 in New South Wales.

Adrian is currently employed as an agency nurse and works in high needs National Disability Insurance Scheme homes.

Adrian identifies with the Catholic religion and “usually attends the main Church services such as Easter and Christmas”. He is also raising Sarah-Rose in the Catholic faith.

Adrian has resided in New South Wales for most his life. However, he lived in Melbourne for three years when he was 18 to 20 years old and in the United Kingdom when he was 20 to 22 years old. He returned to live in New South Wales full-time when he was 23 years old.

On 17 February 2020, Adrian became the long-term authorised carer for Sarah-Rose pursuant to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) (Care Act).

Adrian is not married and has no other biological or adopted children. He intends to adopt Sarah-Rose as a single parent.

As stated above, Adrian currently lives with Sarah-Rose in a rented house in New South Wales. It is a four-bedroom house with two living spaces and three bathrooms. The house has an outdoor area with a fully fenced pool and yard. The house is close to Sarah-Rose’s school and the other places she is required to travel for her medical needs and participation in sports.

Adrian is currently in the process of constructing another house, which he calls his and Sarah-Rose’s “forever home”.

Adrian has been medically examined and is currently in good health.

Sarah-Rose’s birth mother is Susan who was born on 8 November 1996 and is presently 29 years old. Susan resides in Albion Park, New South Wales.

Sarah-Rose’s birth father is Jack who was born on 9 July 1996 and is presently 29 years old. Jack also resides in Albion Park, New South Wales.

Susan and Jack are not currently in a relationship together. It is unclear precisely when their relationship commenced and ended.

Jack was incarcerated from 20 August 2020 to 29 November 2023 at Goulburn Correctional Facility over his conviction for assault against Susan.

Apart from Sarah-Rose, Susan and Jack have another child together, Colin-Albert Peter Ford, who was born on 28 March 2020.

Susan has four other children, Sarah-Rose’s maternal half-siblings, from other relationships:

Oscar and George-Albert are under the parental responsibility of the New South Wales Minister for Families and Communities until they attain the age of 18 years. When their placement broke down in November 2021, Adrian offered to care for them and they briefly lived with Sarah-Rose until a placement could be found. In January 2022, Oscar began his placement and commenced residing with authorised carers in Noosa, Queensland. On 15 December 2023, George-Albert also joined this placement.

Colin-Albert, Leo and Oliver remain in the care of Susan.

Sarah-Rose’s maternal grandmother is Margaret, her maternal grandfather is Edison Webster (who passed away on 28 February 2021), her maternal aunt is Eva Webster, her maternal great-grandmother is Sofia Page and her maternal great-grandfather is Charlie Page. Sarah-Rose’s maternal cousin is Daisy Black (Eva Webster’s daughter).

Sarah-Rose’s paternal grandmother is Grace Ford and her paternal grandfather is Tommy Ace, who resides in Queensland. The paternal grandparents are separated. Sarah-Rose’s paternal aunts are Rihanna Ford, Charlotte Jackson and Phoebe Jackson. Sarah-Rose’s paternal uncles are Ronnie Ford and Isaac Baker (Rihanna Ford’s husband). Sarah-Rose’s paternal cousins are Jacob Baker and Mia Baker.

During a case planning meeting on 28 March 2019, Jack said that his paternal grandfather is Aboriginal, but that Jack only identifies as Anglo-Australian.

On 4 April 2019, an Aboriginal consultation occurred in which Jack expressed his wish to not identify as Aboriginal or have Sarah-Rose identified as Aboriginal. On the same date, a DCJ caseworker contacted Sarah-Rose’s paternal grandfather, Tommy Ace, who confirmed that he is of Dutch-Australian heritage and not of Aboriginal heritage. Tommy Ace also said that he did not know anyone in their family who would identify as Aboriginal.

On 28 October 2019, during an open adoption consultation meeting, it was confirmed by all DCJ caseworkers present that Sarah-Rose does not have an Aboriginal or multicultural heritage. Further, on 16 December 2019, Link Up NSW advised that Sarah-Rose’s paternal family is predominantly from England and her paternal great-grandmother, Bonnie Hall, was born in Holland.

Between 16 July 2018 and 4 March 2019, DCJ received seven Risk of Significant Harm (ROSH) reports regarding domestic violence perpetrated by Jack towards Susan, Jack causing harm to the family pet, alcohol misuse by Jack, Susan’s deteriorating mental health, Susan’s lack of attachment with Sarah-Rose and Susan’s incapacity to protect Sarah-Rose from harm given the maternal half-siblings’ care history (which is set out below in more detail).

On 3 March 2019, Susan called the police alleging Jack had perpetrated physical and verbal abuse as well as made threats to harm her with a knife in the presence of Sarah-Rose. Later that day, Susan sought to retract her statement, citing pressure from the paternal family to do so.

On 6 March 2019, Sarah-Rose was removed from Susan’s care due to the history of domestic violence perpetrated by Jack, the 3 March 2019 incident and Susan’s unwillingness to enforce the Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) against Jack that had been put in place by that time to protect her. There were also concerns regarding the untreated mental health and substance misuse issues of both Susan and Jack.

Between 21 November 2013 and 29 September 2017, DCJ received nine ROSH reports in relation to Oscar and George-Albert describing inadequate supervision, risk of physical and psychological harm, neglect, medical treatment not being provided and other pre-natal and post-natal issues. Further non-ROSH reports were received in relation to incidents of domestic violence by Oscar’s birth father and inadequate supervision of the children during this period. Susan disclosed having symptoms of post-natal depression following Oscar’s birth but she was unwilling to engage with services and receive treatment.

On 29 September 2017, Susan entered into a Temporary Care Arrangement (TCA) for a period of eight weeks as her mental health was unstable and she felt that she was unable to safely care for Oscar and George-Albert due to Oscar’s aggressive behaviour towards George-Albert. Both the children were restored to Susan’s care following successful progress of the TCA.

In late November 2017, the Secretary became aware of an ongoing criminal investigation in which Susan was assisting the police. As a result, in January 2018, Susan, Oscar and George-Albert could no longer safely reside in their accommodation and needed to move to various temporary emergency accommodation properties. In February 2018, Susan declined a further TCA as she had arranged for some family friends to care for the two children.

On 4 April 2018, Susan requested a TCA for Oscar to remain with the current family friend. George-Albert was to remain with another family friend under an informal arrangement; however, Susan also agreed to a TCA for him the next day.

On 28 June 2018, the Secretary filed a care application in relation to Oscar and George-Albert as Susan had not addressed the risk concerns during the TCA period.

On 30 August 2019, the Children’s Court of New South Wales at Port Kembla made final orders allocating parental responsibility for Oscar and George-Albert to the Minister for a two-year period. These orders were subsequently varied to extend until the children turn 18 years of age.

Between October 2019 and May 2025, DCJ received 35 ROSH reports in relation to Colin-Albert and Leo describing Susan’s mental health concerns, domestic violence, lack of supervision and non-engagement with support services.

On 21 June 2020, Jack was arrested by the police for assaulting Susan and unlawfully removing Colin-Albert. As stated above, Jack was convicted of assault and incarcerated from 20 August 2020 to November 2023.

Between 19 January 2024 and 2 October 2024, DCJ had an open case for Colin-Albert and Leo. DCJ closed the case with a referral to the Family Functioning Therapy (FFT) of MacKillop Family Services. However, by December 2024, Susan had disengaged with the FFT and MacKillop closed their file.

On 15 October 2024, DCJ received a ROSH report that Susan was homeless due to domestic violence perpetrated by Jack.

On 12 November 2024, DCJ received a further ROSH report in relation to more domestic violence concerns. The report noted that Colin-Albert had not had overnight contact with Jack since May 2024 due to concerns regarding exposure to drug use. Susan disclosed that she was five weeks pregnant with a new child and alleged that she felt forced into this pregnancy by Jack.

On 16 December 2024, DCJ received a ROSH report about Susan’s new pregnancy. Susan denied being in a relationship with Jack but confirmed that he was the father of the unborn child. There were allegations made that Susan and Jack are planning to marry and are in a happy relationship. However, there were concerns raised regarding Susan’s supervision of the children in her care and their medical neglect, Susan’s ability to cope with another baby, Jack’s controlling behaviour and the children being exposed to domestic violence.

On 23 January 2025, DCJ received a ROSH report concerning a risk of psychological harm to the children in Susan’s care.

On 13 March 2025, DCJ received a ROSH report regarding the safety of Leo and Colin-Albert in Susan’s care. The report noted that on 31 October 2023, Susan commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Law Court of Australia seeking a recovery order for Leo, who was in the care of his putative father, Max Clark, and his paternal grandmother at the time. Orders were made the next day and Leo was returned to Susan’s care. DNA testing was conducted; however, this was insufficient to provide a result as to the identity of Leo’s father. Max and the putative paternal grandmother discontinued their application in the court, and the matter was dismissed on 12 March 2025 as Susan disengaged from the proceedings. Concerns were noted for the safety of Leo and Colin-Albert due to the significant domestic violence between Susan and Jack and that Jack may be residing with them.

On 20 March 2025, updated information was obtained by DCJ from NSW Police pursuant to Chapter 16A of the Care Act in relation to Susan and Jack. An ADVO was served on 20 May 2021 on Jack and remains in force until 5 August 2026. The ADVO protects Susan and Colin-Albert from Jack by restricting him from contacting or approaching Susan or Colin-Albert or attending any place where they live or work. In February 2024 and November 2024, the Police contacted Jack to remind him of his obligations under the ADVO. No breaches of the ADVO have been recorded.

On 14 April 2025, DCJ received a ROSH report raising concerns for the safety of the children in Susan’s care due to Jack’s history of domestic violence and the impact of this on Susan’s mental health. Colin-Albert’ behaviour was reported to have regressed due to the circumstances in which he was being raised. Susan had disclosed that Leo had been abducted by his father (and there was now an ADVO in place), she had been forced into the current pregnancy, Jack’s house was in close proximity to Susan’s house and that she felt stalked by Jack. Susan alleged that she had fled to Queensland with Colin-Albert and Leo to escape harassment from Jack as he had come to her home and threatened her. The report raised concerns that Susan was isolated and had no immediate support.

On 1 May 2025, DCJ obtained, pursuant to Chapter 16A of the Care Act, Jack’s parole conditions from Corrective Services, which commenced on 19 November 2023 and expired on 19 February 2026. The additional conditions restricted Jack from contacting or communicating with Susan and consuming alcohol or illicit substances. Suspension conditions in place from 14 March 2025 require Jack to inform Wollongong Community Corrections of any address changes and prohibit him from leaving New South Wales or Australia.

On 2 May 2025, DCJ received a ROSH report regarding Sarah-Rose’s unborn sibling. The report alleged that Jack had been unwilling to leave the room for a domestic violence screening to occur in late January or early February 2025. On 13 April 2025, Susan disclosed being hit in the abdomen by a soccer ball in the morning and falling through a baby gate onto her abdomen later in the day. Susan stayed overnight at the hospital for monitoring but discharged herself against medical advice. Susan was reported to be feeling anxious and concerned about foetal movement, however, she declined all recommended additional monitoring and further support. The report raised concerns for Susan given her history of post-natal depression and lack of family support. It was noted that Jack had previously been incarcerated for assaulting Susan and that their relationship had resumed due to Jack’s attendance at Susan’s appointments. Susan did not attend her scheduled antenatal appointment on 2 May 2025, citing a sick child and ended the call with the medical clinic’s staff before her appointment could be rescheduled.

On 13 May 2025, this matter was allocated by DCJ’s Wollongong Community Services Centre to a caseworker to further assess Colin-Albert, Leo and the unborn child’s safety in Susan’s care.

On 6 March 2019, Sarah-Rose was assumed into the care responsibility of the Secretary and entered a short-term placement in lllawarra, New South Wales with authorised carers, Alice Young and Logan Young.

On 28 June 2019, Sarah-Rose was restored to Susan’s care at the Flourish Australia Women’s and Children’s Residential Program (Flourish Program). The restoration attempt was unsuccessful.

On 18 July 2019, Sarah-Rose returned to her short-term placement with authorised carers, Alice and Logan.

On 17 February 2020, Sarah-Rose was placed with her long-term authorised carer and the proposed adoptive parent, Adrian, and she remains in his care to date.

Adrian actively supports Sarah-Rose with maintaining regular contact and building relationships with her birth parents and extended birth family, including regular phone calls, in-person visits, dinners and FaceTime conversations with her siblings, maternal grandparents, great-grandparents and aunt. Adrian says that such interactions help Sarah-Rose feel connected and involved with her family members and promotes her emotional well-being.

Due to the complexities surrounding Susan and Jack, which are set out in detail above and below, Sarah-Rose’s communication with Susan and Jack primarily occurs through email due to safety concerns for Sarah-Rose and Adrian as well as on the recommendation of MacKillop and Penelope Haskins, an authorised independent adoptions assessor and the author of the court report for Sarah-Rose pursuant to s 91 of the Adoption Act (s 91 Report).

The overall nature of the contact between Sarah-Rose and Susan can be described as challenging, unpredictable and uncertain. Susan’s attitude towards Adrian has also consistently fluctuated from positive to negative and she generally blames Adrian’s attendance at her family time with Sarah-Rose and the “system” as reasons for her lack of attachment with Sarah-Rose.

Since 2020, the frequency of contact between Susan and Sarah-Rose has been: 2020 (12 occasions), 2021 (11 occasions), 2022 (nine occasions); 2023 (four occasions), 2024 (two occasions) and 2025 (three occasions, with a fourth occasion scheduled for December 2025 but not confirmed on the evidence).

All contact visits between Susan and Sarah-Rose have been supervised, some solely by Adrian and most others by both Adrian and MacKillop. The nature of the contact between Susan and Sarah-Rose was positive during the visits in earlier years; however, it has become negative over time.

There have been numerous negative incidents which have occurred before and during the contact visits with Susan from 2019 to 2025, including aggressive, insulting and inappropriate behaviour by Susan, principally directed at Adrian and sometimes towards Sarah-Rose. This includes occasions on which Susan has directed homophobic slurs towards Adrian and alleged that he is an unfit carer for Sarah-Rose because of his sexual orientation and being a single parent.

The overall nature of Jack’s contact with Sarah-Rose between 2019 and 2025 can be described as uncertain and unreliable. Some visits have been productive in building a relationship between the two, but most other visits have been unfruitful. Jack’s attendance has been inconsistent and no contact time was organised during his three-year incarceration from August 2020 to November 2023. Most recently, Jack has either failed to respond to emails sent to him by Adrian or has responded using a homophobic insult directed at Adrian.

On 11 March 2019, the Secretary filed an application and report initiating care proceedings in the Children’s Court, seeking orders allocating interim parental responsibility for Sarah-Rose to the Minister.

On 12 March 2019, the Children’s Court made a finding on a without admissions basis that Sarah-Rose was a child in need of care and protection pursuant to section 71 of the Care Act. The court also made interim orders allocating parental responsibility for Sarah-Rose to the Minister until further order.

DCJ records indicate that Susan was legally represented throughout the proceedings. Jack did not engage in the proceedings and was not represented.

On 7 May 2019, Children’s Court Clinician, Dr Liz Tong, recommended that Sarah-Rose be restored to Susan’s care over a period of six weeks. Dr Tong further recommended that Susan continue to work with her treating counsellor and psychiatrist as well as participate in the Flourish Program.

On 28 June 2019, Susan commenced the Flourish Program with Sarah-Rose for the purposes of facilitating Sarah-Rose’s restoration to Susan. On 15 July 2019, DCJ received a ROSH report that Susan’s mental health had deteriorated and she was being treated for daily suicidal ideation. Susan also reported not bonding with Sarah-Rose and declined all referrals to services.

On 18 July 2019, DCJ received a ROSH report that Susan had met up with Jack in contravention of the ADVO. Caseworkers removed Sarah-Rose from Susan’s care at the Flourish Program and placed Sarah-Rose with her previous authorised carers.

On 7 November 2019, the Secretary filed an amended Care Plan in the proceedings pursuant to ss 78 and 83 of the Care Act. The Care Plan noted the Secretary’s continued assessment that there was no realistic possibility of Sarah-Rose’s restoration to her birth parents. In terms of permanency planning, the Care Plan stated: “following extensive family finding, consultation and an FGC [Family Group Conference] that occurred on 1 October 2019 with family, no suitable family members have been willing or appropriate to care for Sarah long term”. As no suitable family member placement options could be identified, adoption was proposed to provide Sarah-Rose with the best sense of permanency and security given her young age. At the time, family finding had been exhausted, Sarah-Rose was in a short-term placement with authorised carers and her prospective adoptive parent had not yet been identified. A short-term care order was sought to facilitate the adoption. Susan agreed that adoption was the best available option for Sarah-Rose at the time; however, Jack wished for Sarah-Rose to be returned to his care.

On 29 November 2019, the Children’s Court made a finding that there was no realistic possibility of restoration of Sarah-Rose to either of her birth parents and made final orders allocating parental responsibility for Sarah-Rose to the Minister for a period of two years. The Secretary was also ordered to provide two reports to the Children’s Court after six and twelve months each pursuant to s 82 of the Care Act about the suitability of the arrangements for the care and protection of Sarah-Rose.

On 6 May 2020, the Secretary filed a report on the suitability of arrangements concerning parental responsibility for Sarah-Rose pursuant to s 82 of the Care Act. The report noted that Sarah-Rose had been placed with her long-term carer, Adrian, on 17 February 2020, was settled and that adoption was in the “pre-enquiry” stage with Adrian establishing and maintaining connections to Sarah-Rose’s birth family.

On 26 November 2020, the Secretary filed a second report on the suitability of arrangements concerning parental responsibility for Sarah-Rose pursuant to s 82 of the Care Act. The report noted that Sarah-Rose had developed a positive attachment to Adrian, he was meeting her needs and adoption remained in the “enquiry” stage. Adrian was also noted to be facilitating contact with Sarah-Rose’s birth parents, siblings and extended family.

On 9 March 2021, the Secretary filed an application for recission/variation of the care order under s 90 of the Care Act in relation to Sarah-Rose and her two maternal siblings, Oscar and George-Albert. The Secretary sought to extend the original order for Oscar and George-Albert as guardianship was no longer being pursued and the adoption criteria for Sarah-Rose could not be met within the two-year time period.

On 7 May 2021, the Children’s Court granted leave to hear the s 90 application.

On 21 July 2021, the Secretary filed a Care Plan in the proceedings pursuant to ss 78 and 83 of the Care Act, assessing that there remained no realistic possibility of restoration of Sarah-Rose to her birth parents and proposing that parental responsibility for her be allocated to the Minister until she attains 18 years of age. The Care Plan noted the difficult relationship between Susan and Adrian due to Susan’s mental health. It was also noted that Susan made unmanageable requests of communication and made “inappropriate comments” towards Adrian. The Care Plan outlined that Sarah-Rose would have 12 contact visits per year with Susan and that there were no contact plans in place with Jack due to his incarceration at the time.

On 3 August 2021, Susan filed her own application for recission/variation of the care order under s 90 of the Care Act, seeking to rescind the final orders made in relation to Sarah-Rose and her maternal siblings. Susan sought orders allocating parental responsibility of the children to herself, to the exclusion of Jack, until they attained 18 years of age. The Secretary opposed the granting of leave in relation to Susan’s application. The Secretary considered that Susan did not have capacity to care for all four children given that Colin-Albert was already in her care.

Prior to granting leave to hear the matter, the Children’s Court requested that Susan and Oscar’s birth father participate in a parenting capacity assessment.

On 29 November 2021, Children’s Court Clinician, Jenna McKenzie, provided an assessment in relation Susan’s capacity to care for Sarah-Rose and her siblings. Ms McKenzie determined that the restoration of Oscar, George-Albert and Sarah-Rose to Susan’s care was not in their best interests. In her report, Ms McKenzie recommended one-on-one contact occur between Susan and Sarah-Rose to facilitate a relationship and ensure that Sarah-Rose’s needs were met as those needs were most likely to be overlooked during the visits due to her quiet demeanour at the time.

It appears that the parental responsibility order lapsed on 19 November 2021 and a further interim order was not made until 16 March 2022. Sarah-Rose remained in Adrian’s care during this period.

On 28 January 2022, Susan withdrew her application to rescind the final orders in relation to Oscar, George-Albert and Sarah-Rose. The proceedings remained on foot due to the Secretary’s application to extend the care order.

On 21 February 2023, DCJ organised for a further private parenting capacity assessment to be completed by clinical psychologist, Dr Dee Neveling, to consider the restoration of George-Albert solely to Susan’s care. This assessment was completed privately rather than through the Children’s Court Clinic because of the prior two assessments by the Clinic (in 2019 and 2021). Dr Neveling did not recommend the restoration of George-Albert to Susan’s care. Additionally, Dr Neveling did not think it was beneficial to the children for Susan to have direct contact with the children’s respective carers due to the possibility of information being misconstrued and the children’s placement potentially being compromised. Bi-monthly contact for a period of two hours between Sarah-Rose, Susan and Colin-Albert was recommended to be closely supervised. Video calls could be fortnightly or less frequently as requested by Sarah-Rose. All gifts, letters and messages were recommended to be sent through a MacKillop caseworker. If Sarah-Rose were to be adopted, the report suggested that the carer could facilitate contact by engaging a consistent professional service.

On 26 May 2023, DCJ filed an amended Care Plan in the proceedings pursuant to ss 78 and 83 of the Care Act. Susan’s contact with Sarah-Rose was reduced from twelve to four times per year, with Adrian to be present during contacts to provide Sarah-Rose with reassurance and emotional support. The amended Care Plan noted that there is a strained relationship between Susan and Adrian due to Susan continuing to display inappropriate behaviour towards Adrian, which included unmanageable requests of communication and inappropriate comments directed at Adrian. No direct communication was to occur between Adrian and Susan due to the possibility of information being misconstrued and Sarah-Rose’s placement potentially being compromised. The amended Care Plan also noted that Adrian had provided Sarah-Rose with a safe and secure environment in which she has flourished and built a strong attachment. It was proposed that Sarah-Rose remain in Adrian’s care long-term, with adoption to be explored once the Children’s Court proceedings were finalised. Susan wished for Sarah-Rose to be returned to her care and did not understand why restoration was not supported given Colin-Albert was in her care. MacKillop noted that there continued to be concerns regarding Susan’s capacity to keep her children safe. Jack was agreeable to long-term orders but wished to seek Sarah-Rose’s restoration once he was released from custody.

On 2 June 2023, the Children’s Court rescinded the final orders made on 29 November 2019 (as detailed above) and made final orders allocating parental responsibility for Sarah-Rose, Oscar and George-Albert to the Minister until they attain 18 years of age. The Secretary was also ordered to provide two reports to the Children’s Court after nine months (on or before 2 March 2024) and after 18 months (on or before 2 December 2024) pursuant to s 82 of the Care Act, concerning the suitability of the arrangements for the care and protection of the children.

On 16 February 2024, the Secretary filed a report on the suitability of arrangements concerning parental responsibility for Sarah-Rose pursuant to section 82 of the Care Act. The report noted that in December 2023, Susan requested that one-on-one visits with Sarah-Rose resume (as they had ceased on 14 December 2022); however, MacKillop was reluctant to do so as Susan’s inconsistency may confuse Sarah-Rose. MacKillop noted that future contact would be guided by the adoption assessor. As Jack had been incarcerated until November 2023, the adoption assessor would also facilitate the development of a relationship between Jack, Adrian and Sarah-Rose.

On 17 December 2024, the Secretary filed a second report on the suitability of the arrangements. The report noted that Susan was struggling with her mental health and with her connection to Sarah-Rose, resulting in Susan disengaging from the adoption process.

On 8 May 2025, the Secretary filed the summons seeking adoption orders for Sarah-Rose.

On 20 May 2025, Susan was personally served with the adoption application documents, including the notice of application for adoption orders under s 88(1)(a) of the Adoption Act, the notice of intention to seek a consent dispense order under s 72(1) of the Adoption Act, the maternal adoption plan and information from Legal Aid on court proceedings concerning adoption.

On 23 May 2025, Jack was personally served with the adoption application documents, including the notice of application for adoption orders under s 88(1)(a) of the Adoption Act, the notice of intention to seek a consent dispense order under s 72(1) of the Adoption Act, the paternal adoption plan and information from Legal Aid on court proceedings concerning adoption.

On 19 June 2025, the Secretary filed the adoption matter summary form.

On 24 June 2025, these proceedings were listed before me for directions on 2 July 2025.

On 2 July 2025, a directions hearing was held before me at which I was informed by the counsel appearing for the Secretary that Jack intended to appear in court but chose not to do so without giving any notice and Jack had not yet filed a notice of appearance. I made orders adjourning the proceedings for further directions on 6 August 2025 and directing the counsel appearing for the Secretary to inform Jack that if he did not take any steps to appear at that listing, the court would proceed to deal with the adoption application on the papers.

On 6 August 2025, a further directions hearing was held before me, by which time neither Susan nor Jack had filed a notice of appearance and did not appear. I made orders directing the Secretary to file the Secretary’s submissions in respect of the adoption application and other orders sought by 15 August 2025, noting that the court proposed to determine the adoption application on the papers in chambers and directing the Secretary to inform Susan and Jack of these orders.

On 14 August 2025, the Secretary filed submissions as well as an updated adoption matter summary form.

On 7 November 2025, the Secretary filed a further amended adoption matter summary form.

There are several formal requirements or pre-conditions necessary to enliven this court’s jurisdiction to make an adoption order under the Adoption Act. I will address each of these formal requirements in turn. The more substantive matters about which I must be satisfied before making an adoption order pursuant to s 90 of the Adoption Act are considered in the next section of this judgment.

Section 23 of the Adoption Act provides:

Section 24(1) of the Adoption Act provides that an adoption order may be made in relation to a child who is less than 18 years of age as at the date of the application, or who is more than 18 years of age on that date but was cared for by the applicant(s) prior to attaining that age.

In respect of an application for adoption by one person, s 27 of the Adoption Act requires the following:

Section 90(1)(c) of the Adoption Act requires that proposed adoptive parent(s) must also be selected in accordance with the Adoption Act. Section 45F of the Adoption Act requires the proposed adoptive parent(s) to be assessed and determined to be suitable to adopt.

Section 59 of the Adoption Act requires the Secretary to ensure that a person whose consent to an adoption is needed is given the “mandatory written information” before that person consents or refuses to consent to the adoption.

Section 87 of the Adoption Act provides:

Section 88 of the Adoption Act states that this court cannot make an adoption order unless 14 days’ notice of the adoption application has been given to any person whose consent to the adoption is required under the Adoption Act.

Section 91 of the Adoption Act requires the applicant to provide a written report prepared by the Secretary or an authorised person.

In the present case, all of the formal requirements under the Adoption Act have been satisfied. Specifically:

I am satisfied that all of the formal requirements of an adoption application have been met.

In respect of adoption orders generally, s 90(1) of the Adoption Act stipulates that the court must not make an adoption order in relation to a child unless it is satisfied of certain matters. Section 90(1) of the Adoption Act relevantly states:

Section 90(2) of the Adoption Act provides:

Section 90(3) of the Adoption Act provides:

Determining adoption applications is an important part of the court’s work: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services v MB [2017] NSWSC 1087, Sackar J at [9].

An order for adoption is one of great magnitude, particularly because the legal and social consequences that flow from an adoption are far-reaching (for the child themselves as well as for the persons connected to the child) and involve a particular degree of finality: Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71, Hallen J at [157], citing Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239, Sir Thomas Bingham at 251G-H.

As observed by Hallen J in Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS at [150]:

Because of the seriousness and significance of the decision, and in line with ss 90(1)(a) and (b) of the Adoption Act, I must not make an adoption order for Sarah-Rose unless I am satisfied that her best interests will be promoted by the adoption, and that, as far as practicable and having regard to her age and understanding, the wishes and feelings of Sarah-Rose have been ascertained and duly considered.

I must have regard to Sarah-Rose’s best interests, both in youth and later life — this being the paramount consideration as stated in s 8(1)(a) of the Adoption Act. I must also have regard to the principles that adoption is to be regarded as a service for the child (s 8(1)(b) of the Adoption Act) and that no adult is entitled as of right to adopt the child (s 8(1)(c) of the Adoption Act).

In determining the best interests of a child, I must have regard to the matters contained in s 8(2) of the Adoption Act, which provides the following:

A fundamental consideration in matters of this kind, the presence or absence of which underlie many of the above-listed matters, is a child’s need for a sense of identity, autonomy, security and belonging. These are complex and core social, psychological, emotional and physical needs of humanity and it has been recognised in this court that any perceived absence or precariousness in this regard can have ongoing consequences for a child in care. The notion of providing a child in care with a sense of security as soon as possible to aid their development in the future was well-described in Re the Adoption of AJH [2017] NSWSC 1751, by Hallen J at [297]–[299] as follows:

The requirement in s 90(3) of the Adoption Act that the making of the adoption order must be clearly preferable in the best interests of the child rather than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to the care of the child “requires something more than a slight preponderance of considerations in favour of adoption over the alternatives” and “the requirement that the Court consider that an adoption order be “clearly preferable” is one that adoption be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law”: Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813, Brereton J at [14].

Consideration of whether adoption would promote the child’s best interests, and whether it is clearly preferable to any other order that could be made, involves identification of the likely effects of adoption, and of the various available alternatives, and examining their respective benefits and detriments from the perspective of the best interests of the child, so as to conclude whether adoption is, or is not, clearly preferable to all the others: Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680, Brereton J at [74].

The question of what is in a child’s best interests involves the making of a judicial evaluation and the balancing of many factors from which an overall conclusion must be reached. It will, inevitably, be impressionistic and inexact: Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 641, Lord Nicholls (with whom Lord Mackay, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Millett and Lord Rodger agreed) at [16], cited with approval in Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369, Hallen J at [90].

Having considered all the evidence before me, I have no doubt that the best interests of Sarah-Rose are best served by her adoption by Adrian. In reaching this determination, I have had regard to each of the matters contained in s 8(2) of the Adoption Act, which I will address in turn.

Sarah-Rose is seven years old and, in accordance with ss 54(2) and 55 of the Adoption Act, is unable to consent to her own adoption. Given her young age, she might not be in a position to fully understand the concept of adoption.

Nonetheless, she is a bright child with strongly developing cognitive and comprehension abilities, as evidenced in the “ready for school” assessment report and her subsequent performance and engagement at school. She has a well-rounded social skill set, including demonstrating emotional and inter-personal growth.

Sarah-Rose has consistently expressed a strong desire to continue associating herself with Adrian and his family. She has often stated to Adrian, “we are the same”, while referring to her being called “Finn”. Similarly, she said to Adrian on one occasion, “when I grow up, I want to be a Finn like you”. While responding to a photo of herself as a baby in Adrian’s arms, Sarah-Rose said to Adrian, “that’s when I became your Sarah”.

Adrian has maintained open and age-appropriate conversations about adoption with Sarah-Rose. When she asks questions about her adoption, Adrian explains to her that “adoption means that we are a family forever. It’s not something that changes—it’s a promise that you are loved, protected, and always belong”.

I also pay regard to Sarah-Rose’s evolving attitude towards Susan and Jack. During Susan and Jack’s contact visits with Sarah-Rose in the period of 2020 to 2025, which I have described in detail above, I discern an evolving pattern: Sarah-Rose has increasingly become distant and disconnected with her birth parents and feels naturally closer to Adrian, especially considering that she has lived with Adrian since she was just over 12 months old.

For example, Sarah-Rose has, on numerous occasions, declined Susan’s requests for hugs and kisses, Sarah-Rose always prefers to stay in close proximity to Adrian and feels uncomfortable without his presence, Sarah-Rose hesitates to call Susan her “mum” but finds it very easy to call Adrian her “daddy” and in a February 2023 school incident involving Sarah-Rose she said to Adrian, “thank you for coming back for me”, out of worry that Adrian might leave her one day—a worry that arose out of Sarah-Rose’s earlier interaction with Susan where she said to Sarah-Rose, “he [Adrian] wasn’t her daddy and wouldn’t be looking after her soon”. These facts and incidents strongly indicate Sarah-Rose’s clear desire and wishes that she would like to continue staying with Adrian and have him as her parent.

Sarah-Rose also gets along very well with Adrian’s family, which includes Adrian’s three sisters and their children. Sarah-Rose calls Adrian’s sisters her “aunties” and refers to their children as her “cousins”. The two children of Adrian’s youngest sister and Sarah-Rose go to school together and Adrian’s youngest sister is always ready to pick Sarah-Rose from school if Adrian is unavailable. Adrian’s younger sister has also agreed to provide care for Sarah-Rose should Adrian become sick or dies.

In the s 91 Report, Ms Haskins describes Sarah-Rose’s relationship with Adrian’s family and Adrian’s relationship with his family in a manner which recognises his very close friendships with his sisters, their close proximity to each other, the sharing of family celebrations and festive occasions, helping and supporting each other when either have sick children and describes Adrian’s sisters as being “the people Adrian will first turn to for advice and support in his parenting of Sarah”. The s 91 Report also describes the excitement that Adrian’s sisters have for the proposed adoption and that Sarah is a “much-loved family member” who sees her aunts most days and has her foster cousins as her closest peer friendships.

As a gay man, Adrian is acutely aware of the need to provide Sarah-Rose with female role models who are loving, familiar and safe. Adrian has ensured that his sisters play this role to her.

Sarah-Rose’s relationship with her birth parents, Susan and Jack, can be described as weak and distant.

Susan has expressed on numerous occasions how she does not feel a bond with Sarah-Rose and that she does not wish to see Sarah-Rose anymore. As stated above, Susan has had complicated contact with Sarah-Rose from 2020 to 2025. Sarah-Rose feels distant and somewhat uncomfortable around Susan. During visits, Sarah-Rose has refused requests for hugs and other forms of physical affection by Susan several times and Susan has ignored Sarah-Rose’s requests for attention. Sarah-Rose also finds it difficult to refer to Susan as her “mum” but finds it natural to refer to Adrian as her “daddy”.

In the s 91 Report, Ms Haskins noted:

I should emphasise that there was an attempted restoration of Sarah-Rose to Susan, starting on 28 June 2019, in accordance with the recommendations of the Children’s Court Clinician, Dr Tong. The restoration required Susan to continue working with her treating counsellor and psychiatrist for her mental health issues and participate in the Flourish Program. However, this restoration attempt was unsuccessful as DCJ received a ROSH report on 15 July 2019 that Susan’s mental health had deteriorated and she was being treated for daily suicidal ideation. Susan also reported not bonding with Sarah-Rose, declined all referrals to services and stopped attending the Flourish Program.

Jack has had much less contact with Sarah-Rose compared to Susan, partly due to his three-year incarceration. After being released from prison, even though he attempted to rebuild his relationship with Sarah-Rose, he has appeared to be unreliable and unpredictable as he would cancel several visits with her at the last minute, or would not show up at all to some of the booked visits, or rush to quickly end the visits that he did attend.

During the visits he did attend, Jack was not able to maintain conversations with Sarah-Rose or foster a bond with her; it was Adrian who had to steer the conversation between the both of them.

Ms Haskins noted in the s 91 Report the following from when she met with Sarah-Rose and asked her to list her family members:

Sarah-Rose does maintain a positive relationship with her biological siblings, and Adrian has ensured she spends time with them frequently. She is very close with her maternal brothers, Oscar and George-Albert, and is slowly building more familiarity and bonding with her remaining siblings.

Adrian has made sincere efforts to meet Sarah-Rose’s emotional needs and build her sense of identity and self-confidence. He maintains honest, age-appropriate and positive communication about Sarah-Rose’s foster care and adoption journey and gathers and preserves meaningful details about her family background, significant life events and milestones.

For example, Adrian has preserved for Sarah-Rose a jewellery box, ring and letter Susan gave to her when Sarah-Rose was younger. He also keeps photos and other keepsakes from events such as birthday parties, Christmas gatherings and other family events to help connect Sarah-Rose with her birth family and encourage conversations about her life story and journey.

Additionally, Adrian maintains a “Life Story book” for Sarah-Rose in which he collects photos, mementos and other personal anecdotes for her. Sarah-Rose loves going through this story book, points to photos and asks Adrian to tell her stories about them. This has allowed Sarah-Rose to develop pride in her story, reinforcing that she is deeply loved and that her past, present and future are all valued parts of who she is.

Adrian is particularly well-positioned to emotionally support Sarah-Rose as a foster care child who is currently going through the adoptions process because of Adrian’s own lived experience as a foster care child. On this, Ms Haskins says the following in the s 91 Report:

Adrian has satisfactorily arranged for Sarah-Rose’s education and extracurricular needs. She goes to her local primary school and receives extra tutoring for academic enrichment. She also attends horse riding competitions, soccer games and swimming classes. She is enjoying school and loves reading.

Adrian also regularly takes Sarah-Rose to her medical appointments with the family general practitioner, dentist and optometrist. He also assisted Sarah-Rose in receiving her ADHD diagnosis in August 2025.

Adrian has provided for Sarah-Rose a comfortable place to live and is currently constructing their “forever home”.

Adrian maintains sufficient financial circumstances to support Sarah-Rose.

Adrian has a good character and health status.

On Adrian’s police history, Ms Haskins notes the following in the s 91 Report:

I do not place much weight on this police history of Adrian, as helpfully outlined by Ms Haskins, because these incidents do not make any findings of misconduct or record any actual charges against Adrian. These incidents also occurred before Sarah-Rose was placed into Adrian’s care, after which Adrian has maintained his good repute and cleared all necessary checks.

Taking all the above matters into account, I consider Adrian to be suitable and with the appropriate capacity to provide for Sarah-Rose’s physical, emotional and educational needs, including fostering her sense of personal, family and cultural identity.

Adrian is the central adult figure in Sarah-Rose’s life. His attitude towards Sarah-Rose and the responsibilities of parenthood are characterised by commitment, warmth and a dedicated approach to her care. I am satisfied that he is devoted to providing Sarah-Rose with a nurturing, stable and loving home environment, while also recognising and supporting the importance of her continued connection with her birth family.

In the s 91 Report, Ms Haskins observed the following about Adrian’s relationship with Sarah-Rose and his parenting ability:

In the s 91 Report, Ms Haskins added the following comments about Adrian’s relationship with Sarah-Rose:

Ms Haskins in the s 91 Report says the following about Adrian’s understanding of, and attitude to, Sarah-Rose’s adoption:

Referees for Adrian described him as stable, supportive, patient, caring, nurturing, consistent, kind, loving and possessing all the qualities required to support Sarah-Rose’s development.

I also note that in the past several homophobic and inappropriate comments have been directed towards Adrian by both Susan and Jack. I wish to address directly the suggestion that Adrian would not be a suitable parent for Sarah-Rose because he is a single parent and a gay man.

I categorically reject such assertions and consider them to be utterly without any foundation. Parenthood is about love, responsibility and commitment. It is not, and should never be, about a person’s sexual orientation or marital status. Families can be biological or families can be chosen. In the case of the latter, it is the choice — a promise to love and choose each other every day — that provides those families with the same legitimacy and strength as any other family.

In the present circumstances, I consider that Adrian demonstrates a deep sense of responsibility and commitment to Sarah-Rose’s wellbeing and development. He prioritises her needs, aims to be a supportive and loving parent and ensures that Sarah-Rose is raised in an environment grounded in stability, empathy and respect for her identity and connections.

The wishes of Susan and Jack regarding Sarah-Rose’s adoption have been very inconsistent. Overall, it can be discerned to a reasonable extent that they both oppose Sarah-Rose’s adoption but have chosen not to file their notices of appearance, despite being requested by DCJ to do so on numerous occasions.

In November 2019, it was outlined in the amended Care Plan that Jack had expressed that he was not supportive of Sarah-Rose’s adoption and wished for her to be restored to his care, while Susan agreed that adoption was the best possible option for Sarah-Rose.

Since that time, Susan has been inconsistent about her views regarding Sarah-Rose’s adoption. Whilst Susan has at times commented positively about Adrian’s care of Sarah-Rose, she has also been unwilling to engage in discussions about her adoption other than to discuss the maternal adoption plan — a discussion that was also unfruitful. Ms Haskins noted in the s 91 Report that Susan indicated she knows “that adoption will happen for Sarah” but Susan understood that she could contest the application when it was filed and served. Ms Haskins noted it was unclear at that stage if Susan would contest the adoption application.

In August 2025, Susan indicated to a DCJ adoption caseworker, Sharne Dellit, that Susan continues to oppose Sarah-Rose’s adoption; however, Susan has not indicated an intention to contest the application since being served with notice on 20 May 2025.

In August 2023, Jack indicated that he was not in favour of or against Sarah-Rose’s adoption. After this time, in July 2024 and between October 2024 and May 2025, Jack disengaged for periods of time or was not contactable. Ms Haskins noted in the s 91 Report that Jack and the paternal grandmother do not want Sarah-Rose to be adopted, but they understood why it was being considered.

On 23 May 2025, when Jack was served with the notice of Sarah-Rose’s adoption application, he stated that he wanted to contest the application.

On 11 June 2025, Jack was advised that despite missing his 14-day period to file his notice of appearance, an extension of another seven days was being given to allow him to do so. Following this, the matter was listed before me for directions on 2 July 2025 and 6 August 2025 and DCJ made numerous attempts to engage Jack and assist him with engaging in the court process if he wished to do so. Since 2 July 2025, Jack has not spoken with Ms Dellit or responded to any emails or text messages about the current court proceedings.

Both Susan and Jack have had more than sufficient time and opportunities to file their notices of appearance to contest this adoption application, but have chosen not to, resulting in this application being dealt with on the papers in chambers.

As outlined in detail above, there is a concerning child protection history of Sarah-Rose and each of her other four siblings under Susan and Jack’s care.

Jack was convicted for assault against Susan and jailed for three years.

Susan’s inability to care for her children is also evidenced in the other numerous ROSH reports received by DCJ between 2013 and 2025 variously in relation to Oscar, George-Albert, Colin-Albert and Leo. The reports described significant parenting issues in relation to Susan, including inadequate supervision of her children, risk of physical and psychological harm and neglect, medical treatment not being provided, Susan’s mental health concerns, Susan’s post-natal depression, domestic violence and intentional non-engagement with support services.

Since Sarah-Rose was removed from Susan and Jack, both have made no real or serious efforts to improve their lives, behaviour and parenting abilities. Their engagement with their children, and in particular with Sarah-Rose, has been inconsistent and potentially damaging.

I consider that both Susan and Jack are unable to provide a safe and nourishing environment in which Sarah-Rose can grow and thrive. If Sarah-Rose is restored to their care, there is a very real possibility that she will be subjected to serious physical or psychological harm, including exposure to abuse, ill-treatment or violence.

It is clear from the evidence before me that Adrian is able to provide a safe, stable and nurturing environment that supports Sarah-Rose’s physical, emotional and psychological wellbeing. Sarah-Rose is physically, mentally and emotionally well in Adrian’s care, and no concerns about her welfare have been raised by any of her caseworker, medical practitioners or school teachers.

I have dealt with the alternatives to the making of an adoption order below in assessing whether adoption is clearly preferable in the best interests of Sarah-Rose.

I may not make an adoption order unless I am satisfied that such an order is “clearly preferable” in the best interests of Sarah-Rose, compared with any other legal measure that could be taken in relation to her care: s 90(3) of the Adoption Act.

I must therefore be satisfied that the balance weighs more than slightly in favour of the proposed adoption over other alternatives. The making of an adoption order must be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law. I must reach the degree of conviction in favour of the adoption commensurate with the gravity of the decision: Adoption of RCC and RZA, Brereton J at [14]; Adoption of NG (No 2), Brereton J at [74].

The alternatives to making an adoption order in respect of Sarah-Rose are:

I consider each of the above alternatives below.

Although both Susan and Jack have not filed their notices of appearance to formally contest Sarah-Rose’s adoption application, each has separately communicated on several occasions, albeit inconsistently, to MacKillop and DCJ caseworkers that they want Sarah-Rose to be restored to each of their respective care.

I am of the view that the restoration of Sarah-Rose to Susan or Jack is not a realistic possibility: it will not be in Sarah-Rose’s best interests and will subject her to an unstable and unsafe living environment.

As I have outlined in detail above, evidence strongly indicates that Susan and Jack are unable to provide care for Sarah-Rose. Their repeated patterns of domestic violence, disregard for their children’s well-being, substance abuse, mental health issues and lack of efforts to improve their lives for their children suggest to me that Sarah-Rose will not have a secure and nourishing upbringing under either or both of their care.

Sarah-Rose, having been raised primarily by Adrian since she was about 12 months old, is naturally very close to him. Ms Haskins in the s 91 Report describes Adrian as the “only family life she knows”. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Sarah-Rose is leading a high quality of life under Adrian’s care and that they share a close bond.

Further, I note that Ms Haskins concluded the following in the s 91 Report about the possibility of Sarah-Rose’s restoration to Susan and Jack:

Taking all these matters into account, I consider that Sarah-Rose should not be restored to the care of either Susan or Jack.

Making no order and maintaining the status quo of Sarah-Rose, which is that she would remain under the parental responsibility of the Minister until she reaches 18 years of age, would be highly detrimental to her. It would cause ongoing stress of instability, insecurity and uncertainty regarding her life and care with Adrian. Additionally, maintaining the status quo would also mean that she would remain a ward of the state until she attains the age of 18 years and that Adrian would be unable to make significant decisions in regard to her without the approval of the Minister’s delegate.

If I were to maintain the status quo and make no order, this would mean that Adrian would not be legally recognised as Sarah-Rose’s parent, despite him diligently fulfilling his duties as a parent, the provision of care in kind by him to Sarah-Rose since she was about 12 months old and the perception of him as her primary caregiver. It would also place additional pressures on Sarah-Rose’s placement, owing to the need for Adrian to seek consents and approvals regarding decisions about Sarah-Rose on an ongoing basis. An adoption order has the advantages of certainty and permanency. Making no order risks that Sarah-Rose may experience insecurity, uncertainty and ongoing trauma, or at least internal disquiet, arising, for instance, from the fact that she would continue to be the foster-child of Adrian rather than his daughter, at least so far as the law is concerned. Sarah-Rose is deserving of a more certain outcome.

I have also considered what Ms Haskins said about maintaining the status quo in the s 91 Report:

I find that maintaining the status quo will not be in the best interests of Sarah-Rose.

The same can be said for an order allocating long-term parental responsibility of Sarah-Rose to Adrian under a guardianship order. While achieving some of the functional aims served by an adoption order, a guardianship order lacks the symbolic and expressive value of a formal adoption order. Not only would such an order expire when Sarah-Rose attains 18 years of age, it also lacks the permanence and sense of ongoing belonging afforded by an adoption order. Such shortcomings were remarked upon in A Child Proposed for Adoption [2019] NSWSC 1653, by Slattery J at [165] as follows:

Ms Haskins concluded the following about the suitability of a guardianship order for Sarah-Rose in the s 91 Report:

Considering the above matters, I am of the view that a guardianship order will not be a suitable alternative for Sarah-Rose and her care.

An adoption order is the best and most appropriate pathway for Sarah-Rose to grow up with a full sense of security, safety, permanence and belonging with Adrian and his family.

In the s 91 Report, Ms Haskins said the following about an adoption order being the best alternative for Sarah-Rose:

I also give weight to Adrian’s views on why an adoption order in his favour will be the best outcome for Sarah-Rose:

For these reasons, together with those outlined in my consideration of each of the matters contained in s 8(2) of the Adoption Act, I am persuaded that the interests of Sarah-Rose are best served by an adoption order in favour of Adrian, and that this course is clearly preferable to the alternatives to adoption.

Pursuant to s 52 of the Adoption Act, and in conjunction with s 90(1)(d) of the Adoption Act, the consent of each of the child’s birth parents, and any person who has parental responsibility for the child, to the child’s adoption is generally required. However, parental consent may be dispensed with if the court so orders: s 66 of the Adoption Act. If consent is dispensed with by the court, consent is not required under s 52 of the Adoption Act: s 54(1)(a) of the Adoption Act.

Parental consent is therefore required unless:

If the child is 18 or more years of age, parental consent is not required for an adoption order: s 54(1)(d) of the Adoption Act. If a child is 12 or more years of age and of sufficient maturity to understand the effect of giving consent, he or she may give sole consent to his or her adoption by a proposed adoptive parent or parents if the child has been cared for by the proposed adoptive parent or parents for at least two years: s 54(2) of the Adoption Act.

Section 67 of the Adoption Act sets out the circumstances in which a consent dispense order may be made, providing:

Under s 72(1) of the Adoption Act, the court must not make an order dispensing with the consent requirement unless the person whose consent is sought to be dispensed with has received at least 14 days’ notice of that application. Dispensing with the consent of a parent is a serious step and not to be taken lightly: Adoption of RCC and RZA, Brereton J at [17].

There is no signed instrument of consent for Susan or Jack in regard to Sarah-Rose’s adoption by Adrian. I am satisfied that both Susan and Jack have been served with the requisite documents and are each on notice of the application to make a consent dispense order. Sarah-Rose is seven years old and therefore cannot consent to her own adoption. If an adoption order is to be made in relation to Sarah-Rose, it will be necessary for me to dispense with the consent of each of Susan and Jack.

Sections 67(1)(d)(i) and 67(1)(d)(ii) of the Adoption Act make clear that I may not make an order dispensing with the consent requirement unless I am satisfied that Sarah-Rose has established a stable relationship with Adrian as her authorised carer and that adoption by Adrian will promote the welfare of Sarah-Rose.

For the reasons outlined above, I am satisfied as to these matters. Sarah-Rose has lived with Adrian since 17 February 2020. She is secure and comfortable in Adrian’s care and shares a strong and affectionate relationship with him and his family. Sarah-Rose views Adrian as her parent and considers herself a part of the Finn family unit. Sarah-Rose is thriving in the care of Adrian, who provides a stable, nurturing and supportive environment that meets her emotional, developmental and physical needs. He is also committed to maintaining contact that supports Sarah-Rose’s ongoing connection with her birth family, as highlighted in detail above and reflected in the maternal and paternal adoption plans set out below.

Pursuant to s 67(1)(c) of the Adoption Act, I also consider that it is in the best interests of Sarah-Rose that I override the wishes of Susan and Jack who have separately opposed Sarah-Rose’s adoption on numerous occasions (despite not formally contesting her adoption application). As elaborated above, both Susan and Jack have consistently disregarded the welfare of Sarah-Rose and their other children. Should I not make the order dispensing with the requirement for their consent, there will be a serious cause of concern for the welfare of Sarah-Rose.

Having regard to the whole of the evidence before me, I am satisfied that dispensing with the consent of Susan and Jack to enable the making of an adoption order in favour of Adrian is in Sarah-Rose’s best interests.

Section 101 of the Adoption Act provides as follows:

The effect of s 101(2) of the Adoption Act is that I cannot make an order changing Sarah-Rose’s name without first considering her express wishes and any factors (such as her maturity and understanding) that I find relevant and the weight to be given to those wishes and factors.

The effect of s 101(5) of the Adoption Act is that I cannot make an order changing Sarah-Rose’s name unless I am satisfied that the name change is in her best interests.

The Secretary seeks approval for the name “Sarah Elizabeth Finn”. The proposed change would change the child’s first name from “Sarah-Rose” to “Sarah”, retain her original middle name as “Elizabeth” and change her surname from “Ford” to “Finn”.

Despite Sarah-Rose’s young age, as I have described above, I find she has expressed a strong desire to continue associating herself with Adrian and his family.

In the s 91 Report, Ms Haskins stated:

I also consider what Adrian said about the proposed name change for Sarah-Rose:

The Secretary submits that it is in Sarah-Rose’s best interests for the name “Sarah Elizabeth Finn” to be approved as this would both retain Sarah-Rose’s birth family connection and promote her sense of shared identity with Adrian and his family.

Susan’s views about Sarah-Rose’s name change are unclear. However, Jack has indicated that he does not want Sarah-Rose’s name to be changed post-adoption.

However, taking all evidence into account, I am satisfied that the proposed change of name to “Sarah Elizabeth Finn” is in Sarah-Rose’s best interests and should be approved.

The proposed name change reflects Sarah-Rose’s expressed wishes and her enthusiasm to share Adrian’s surname, “Finn”, and have her first name as “Sarah”, which is already used by everyone else around her, including Susan. Retaining Sarah-Rose’s middle name, “Elizabeth”, maintains her connection to Susan and her birth family. Sarah-Rose’s new name will therefore give formal legal recognition to the family life she shares with Adrian and his family, preserve her connection to her birth family, recognise her growth in the care of Adrian and affirm her full inclusion in the Finn family.

Section 46 of the Adoption Act provides as follows:

The Adoption Regulation 2015 (NSW) does not contain any requirements in respect of an application for registration of an adoption plan.

There is a maternal adoption plan and a paternal adoption plan prepared in these proceedings in accordance with the requirements in s 46 of the Adoption Act.

A maternal adoption plan was signed by Adrian on 25 May 2025, by Margaret on 21 May 2025 and by the delegate of the Secretary, Ms Biljana Musarevski (who is also the Manager of Client Services at Illawarra Shoalhaven Child and Family District Unit) on 14 May 2025. Susan has not signed or agreed to the maternal adoption plan.

On 24 September 2024, Ms Jacqueline Lee, a Permanency Support Coordinator at MacKillop, sent a copy of the draft maternal adoption plan, an assessment report and a Legal Aid brochure to Susan by registered post. Ms Lee also sent a text message to Susan and advised that the documents have been posted to her.

Ms Lee and a MacKillop caseworker met twice with Susan on 9 May 2025 and 20 May 2025 to discuss the maternal adoption plan. On both occasions, Susan refused to agree to and sign the maternal adoption plan.

In summary, the maternal adoption plan provides as follows:

Ms Musarevski regards the family time proposed in the maternal adoption plan to be proper in the circumstances because it is consistent with the current arrangements and provides for regular contact to occur which will allow Sarah-Rose to maintain her relationships with her maternal family. I also note that Susan has expressed satisfaction with the proposed religious upbringing of Sarah-Rose.

In accordance with s 90(2) of the Adoption Act, I consider that the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan are in Sarah-Rose’s best interests and proper in the circumstances, and that the maternal adoption plan should be registered.

A paternal adoption plan was signed by Adrian on 28 May 2025 and by the delegate of the Secretary, Ms Musarevski, on 12 June 2025. Jack has not signed or agreed to the paternal adoption plan.

On 25 September 2024, Ms Lee sent the draft paternal adoption plan, an assessment report and a Legal Aid brochure to Jack by registered post. Ms Lee also sent a text message to Jack and advised that the documents were posted to him.

On 23 May 2025, Ms Lee and a MacKillop caseworker met with Jack to discuss the paternal adoption plan. On 29 May 2025, a series of text messages were exchanged between Jack and Ms Dellit. The overall conclusion from these communications was the Jack did not agree with the paternal adoption plan and was unwilling to sign it.

In summary, the paternal adoption plan provides as follows:

Ms Musarevski regards the family time proposed in the paternal adoption plan as proper in the circumstances because it is consistent with the current arrangements and provides for regular contact to occur which will allow Sarah-Rose to maintain her relationships with her paternal family.

The Secretary does not seek to register the paternal adoption plan because Adrian has demonstrated his ability to facilitate contact when initiated by paternal family without conflict.

In accordance with s 90(2) of the Adoption Act, I consider that the arrangements proposed in the paternal adoption plan are in Sarah-Rose’s best interests and proper in the circumstances.

For the reasons given above, I make the following orders and notations: