TP ICAP Management Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bradley Howell; GFI Australia Pty Ltd v Matthew Cotton

1. [1]

   HIS HONOUR: Sydney is a beautiful city which has a vast array of hotels, pubs, and restaurants, some in exquisitely scenic locations. This judgment does not require the Court to resolve any deep question of legal principle. It is essentially about the facts. But it does contain a travelogue (perhaps even a useful one) of the many Sydney hospitality establishments frequented by the protagonists.

2. [2]

   Inter-dealer brokers facilitate (or “broker”) financial transactions between financial institutions, often banks. They actively initiate and pursue transaction opportunities. A broker’s relationship with her or his clients is critical to their ability to do business. Common types of brokered transactions concern cash and fixed investments, interest rate swaps, foreign exchange, [1] commodities, equities, and derivatives.

3. [3]

   Brokers traditionally work on what is called the “desk”. Commonly, a group of brokers who operate in a particular area are said to be on a particular desk, such as, for example, the “Treasury Desk” (which covers interest rate swaps), [2] the “Foreign Exchange Desk”, or the “Fixed Income Desk”. Sometimes desks are divided into products of particular currencies, such as Australian dollars or New Zealand dollars (AUD or NZD). Some brokers conduct their business on the telephone using a loudspeaker, referred to as the “squawk box”. This is called voice broking.

4. [4]

   In 2017, two of the main inter-dealer brokers operating in Australia in the wholesale market (that is, where clients are institutions not individuals or small businesses) were companies operating respectively under the brand names “TP ICAP” and “GFI”. These brand names are globally known.

5. [5]

   These two competitors, via their Australian entities, are the true contestants in this matter. I shall refer to them respectively as ICAP and GFI. This is not the first time that they have been in conflict. Individuals have been drawn into the fray.

6. [6]

   What happened here is rather simple.

7. [7]

   In late-2017, ICAP’s then Chief Executive Officer for Australasia, Brad Howell (Howell), and fourteen successful brokers in ICAP’s Sydney office – including Divisional Director and Desk Head of the Swaps Desk, John (Jack) Kalaf (Kalaf) – were enticed to leave ICAP and join GFI by being offered large sums of money. Then, six of the brokers (the six), having signed with GFI, reconsidered and went back to ICAP.

8. [8]

   There are two sets of proceedings before the Court, being heard together.

9. [9]

   In the first set (the ICAP Proceedings), ICAP sues Howell, Kalaf, and GFI for damages. They sue Howell and Kalaf for breach of contract and breaches of equitable and statutory duties, and they sue GFI for interference with contractual relations and knowing participation in the breaches of duty.

10. [10]

    In the second set (the GFI Proceedings), GFI sues the six for breach of contract and it sues ICAP for interference with contractual relations. The six cross-claim against GFI for orders that the contracts they entered into with GFI are void or should be rescinded and they cross-claim against Kalaf for damages or an indemnity on the basis that he misled them into entering into contracts with GFI by conveying to them misleading information about counter-offers to stay made to them by ICAP.

11. [11]

    On 23 November 2018, Ball J made an order in the ICAP Proceedings, by consent, pursuant to rule 28.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), that liability be tried separately from and before all other issues. [3] On 12 April 2019, by consent I made the same order in the GFI Proceedings. For reasons which will appear later, during the hearing those orders emerged as impractical and unworkable. I rescinded them. With the parties’ co-operation, I ordered that a series of discrete questions be answered before any other questions in the proceedings. The questions appear later in this judgment.

ICAP

1. [12]

   In December 2016, what was then known as the ICAP group, was acquired by a United Kingdom listed company previously known as Tullett Prebon plc (Tulletts). After the acquisition, TP ICAP plc and its subsidiaries operated under both the ICAP and the Tullett Prebon banners. Although these two brands are ultimately owned by the same entity, operationally, they are managed separately.

2. [13]

   ICAP’s business is divided, for management purposes, on a regional basis into: Europe, the Middle-East, and Africa; Asia-Pacific (or APA, which includes Australasia); and the Americas. Sydney is the largest office in the Australasia sector. ICAP has offices in Brisbane, Melbourne, and Wellington. ICAP Australasia has its own CEO.

3. [14]

   The first plaintiff in the ICAP Proceedings (ICAP Management) is the service entity within the group. It formally employs the staff. The second plaintiff in the ICAP Proceedings (ICAP Brokers) is the entity which actually conducts the broking business in Sydney. ICAP Brokers earns the revenue. There are some respects in which it is necessary to distinguish between the two entities, which are elaborated upon later. Where it is not necessary to distinguish between them, I will refer to them collectively as ICAP.

4. [15]

   At all material times, the Sydney office had the following desks: Treasury; Forward FX; Futures; Fixed Income; NZD Rates and Futures; and Energy. References below to the Swaps Desk are, unless the context indicates otherwise, to the AUD Treasury Desk.

5. [16]

   Each desk had a designated “Desk Head” who reported exclusively to the CEO of ICAP Australasia. Some (but not all) Desk Heads had the designation “Divisional Director”.

6. [17]

   The Swaps Desk generated more revenue than any other desk. It dealt in “short-end” (or “short-term”) and “long-end” (or “long-term”) rates swaps.

7. [18]

   The brokers on the Swaps Desk worked in close physical proximity to one another. There were two break-out rooms next to the dealing room, which were available for small group meetings and private discussions.

8. [19]

   Brokers use a computer screen to facilitate trading (the screen). On it are published price midpoints of the products in which they trade. These midpoints are used by clients to gauge the market price for products. Obviously, the more accurate the screen is at assessing market prices, the more valuable a tool it is.

9. [20]

   ICAP had (and apparently still has) the benchmark screen for Australian swaps. The market perceives it as the “go-to” screen for pricing. Having the benchmark screen is a valuable business driver. Clients of the brokers’ own clients sometimes conduct business on the basis of midpoints published on the ICAP screen.

10. [21]

    At the time of the events which give rise to this dispute, Mr David “Clumpy” Casterton (Casterton), who resides in England, was the most senior representative of the ICAP branded section of the business. From December 2016, he was Co-Head of TP ICAP Global Broking, a role which he shared with Mr Nicolas “Nicko” or “Nico” Breteau (Breteau).

11. [22]

    In 2017, Casterton ceased being Co-Head of Global Broking and Breteau became the Head of Global Broking. Casterton retired on 30 September 2019. At the time of his resignation, his title was ICAP Vice Chairman.

12. [23]

    Casterton and Breteau reported to the Chief Executive Officer of the group, at that time, Mr John Phizackerley (Phizackerley).

13. [24]

    Casterton gave evidence. He was a credible witness, although it seems that in one material respect he was mistaken.

GFI

1. [25]

   GFI competes with ICAP in wholesale inter-dealer broking.

2. [26]

   GFI is owned by BGC Partners Inc. (BGC), which has head offices in New York and London. BGC was once known as Cantor Fitzgerald.

3. [27]

   In September 2017, GFI had a Swaps Desk in Australia but compared to ICAP it had only a small share of the Australian swaps broking market. By all accounts, ICAP had about 45% of the market and GFI had between 2 and 3%.

4. [28]

   At the time of the events with which these proceedings are concerned, Mr Colin Heffron (Heffron) was CEO of GFI and Mr Simon Prest (Prest) was Head of the Hong Kong Office and Deputy Head of GFI Asia. Heffron was based in New York and Prest was, as his position denotes, based in Hong Kong. Heffron’s immediate superior was Mr Shaun Lynn (Lynn), the BGC Group President. Lynn reported to Mr Howard Lutnick.

5. [29]

   Heffron and Prest both gave evidence. Overall, I found them to be credible witnesses. I have some reservations about aspects of their testimony but these reservations have little role to play in the outcome.

6. [30]

   Heffron is fast and loose. Prest is more measured. Heffron gave evidence that there was no formal recruitment plan or detailed written analysis about the proposed campaign. I believe him. He saw an opportunity which had arisen because of ICAP’s vulnerability and he took it.

7. [31]

   Each is a wily operator for whom revenue generation comes first and commercial morality runs a distant second (if it runs at all). They are adept and experienced in carrying out operations of the kind GFI carried out in this case. They were acutely conscious of the risks involved in such an operation, including those attendant upon keeping written records of potentially contentious dealings. They were also acutely conscious of the possibility of litigation.

8. [32]

   Prest was challenged on the fact that he disposed of a small notebook which recorded discussions with brokers. Little, if anything, turns on this. The evidence of what was said to brokers was laid out in detail in the proceedings.

HOWELL

1. [33]

   Howell has worked in the inter-dealer broking industry his whole professional life. He was employed by companies associated in one way or another with ICAP from 1992 to 2018. In 2003 he was employed by a broking firm, Prebon Yamane, as head of Treasury Desk and AUD Products Desk.

2. [34]

   For a few years before 2010, Howell was head of the Swaps Desk. He was appointed CEO of ICAP Australasia in October 2010. He reported to Mr Hugh Gallagher (Gallagher), CEO of ICAP Asia-Pacific. Gallagher resigned in 2017. Howell was then also appointed ICAP Head of Global Broking.

3. [35]

   On 29 October 2014, Howell signed a written employment contract with ICAP. I will refer to Howell’s contract with ICAP as the Howell Contract. The Contract comprises a letter agreement which incorporates a document entitled “Terms & Conditions”.

4. [36]

   In March 2017, Howell gave notice of resignation because, he says, he was unhappy about how ICAP was being managed in the wake of the Tulletts takeover. He says that morale in the office was quite low following the takeover.

5. [37]

   Howell, however, retracted his resignation after discussions with Gallagher in which it was agreed that he would have a “rolling contract” (being one not for a fixed period but which could be terminated by either party on six months’ notice – absent termination, it would roll on). On 20 April 2017, Howell signed a letter changing his employment term from fixed to rolling.

6. [38]

   In early April 2017, Phizackerley asked Howell to attend a meeting in London. He informed Howell that Gallagher had resigned and, Howell says, offered him the role as CEO of ICAP Asia-Pacific. This role, however, was given to Barry Dennahy (Dennahy). One fact which seems not to be in dispute is that Dennahy’s management style had few fans.

7. [39]

   As is recounted below, Howell signed up with GFI and gave notice to ICAP in September 2017. After a period of garden leave, [4] he started his employment with GFI six months later.

8. [40]

   In material respects, I did not find Howell to be a credible witness. His evidence was contrived to diminish the role he played in helping GFI recruit the ICAP brokers. His affidavit was constructed to make his role in every contact with ICAP personnel passive and to make his participation in the GFI recruitment drive limited to answering questions directed to him. He significantly downplayed his role in furthering GFI’s campaign because of an acute awareness that it was not appropriate to help GFI and in turn prejudice ICAP. An aspect of this is his evidence, which I found less than convincing, that he terminated many of his conversations by saying words such as, “You’ve got to weigh it all up,” and “Mate, you’ve got to make up your own mind.” Kalaf commented that he “wouldn't like to play poker against Mr Howell.”

KALAF

1. [41]

   Kalaf was the Desk Head of the Swaps Desk and a Divisional Director at ICAP. He specialised in long-end swaps. He has worked continuously as a broker in the wholesale financial market since 1987.

2. [42]

   In October 2005, ICAP acquired his then employer and he became employed by ICAP.

3. [43]

   He signed a written employment contract with ICAP on 20 June 2014, under which he was appointed as “Divisional Director – Treasury” (he was not a board member of ICAP). The contract was amended in October 2015 to extend his employment until 31 December 2018. I will refer to Kalaf’s contract as the Kalaf Contract.

4. [44]

   Kalaf’s main clients were the ANZ Bank and the National Australia Bank. He generated annual revenue in the order of $2.1 million from those clients.

5. [45]

   In early October 2017, he received an offer of employment from GFI which he accepted on 13 October 2017.

6. [46]

   On 15 February 2018, ICAP Australia terminated Kalaf’s employment for breach of the Kalaf Contract.

7. [47]

   Kalaf commenced working for GFI in August 2018.

8. [48]

   Kalaf was not a credible witness. I found his evidence on the extent and importance of his participation in assisting GFI unconvincing. He displays an air of restrained avuncularity, which should not be mistaken for credibility. He played a double game with ICAP, letting Casterton believe he was helping ICAP fend off GFI, when in truth he was consciously assisting GFI in its campaign. Kalaf was offered the position of CEO of ICAP Australasia, which he accepted orally but he did not formally take up the position. He led the brokers on the desk to believe that in either staying with ICAP or going to GFI they should stick together as a team when, in fact, he was negotiating for himself with GFI. He broke ranks without telling them of his intention to do so.

9. [49]

   An example of his downplaying his importance was his inaccurate evidence that he was never referred to as a Divisional Director. His own external correspondence referred to him as that. His written contract stated that he was employed in that capacity.

10. [50]

    Other respects in which I found his evidence to be unsatisfactory are referred to later.

11. [51]

    Kalaf’s evidence about his communications with the brokers is at odds with their evidence. Where his evidence conflicts with theirs, I prefer theirs.

THE SIX

1. [52]

   The Swaps Desk had 15 brokers. 14 signed with GFI. The six recanted. Eight stayed. One was not approached by GFI.

2. [53]

   By all accounts, the leading brokers at ICAP were Matthew Cotton, Angus McGilvray, and Oliver Temperton.

3. [54]

   All of the six gave evidence. They were untouched in cross-examination. I consider that they gave truthful evidence. In important respects, their evidence diverges from that of Howell and Kalaf in relation to the dealings that they had with them. Where, in a material respect, their evidence conflicts with that of Howell and Kalaf, I prefer the evidence of the six. Their evidence is supported by the contemporaneous circumstances and the inherent probabilities. They had individual dealings with Howell and Kalaf, which they plainly remember well. Kalaf’s evidence sits uncomfortably with the general course of conduct in which he engaged in furthering GFI’s campaign, and which succeeded to the point that the whole Desk signed up.

4. [55]

   Cotton commenced employment as a broker with ICAP in 2005. He specialised in Australian denomination derivatives, including interest rate swaps.

5. [56]

   He began working with Howell and Kalaf in 2003 at Prebon Yamane, an inter-dealer broker (which I infer has a connection with Tulletts). He worked there on the NZD Products Desk. Cotton and Howell joined ICAP in 2005. Howell was the head of the AUD Desk and Cotton reported directly to him.

6. [57]

   In 2005, when Cotton joined ICAP, Kalaf too joined ICAP as a broker on the Swaps Desk.

7. [58]

   In 2008, Cotton started working on the ICAP AUD Swaps Desk.

8. [59]

   In 2014, once Kalaf was appointed Desk Head of the Swaps Desk, Cotton reported to him.

9. [60]

   As of mid-2017, Cotton generated annual revenue in the order of $1,049,000.

10. [61]

    Ferris joined ICAP as a trainee broker in 2007. At the time, Howell was a broker on the Desk. Ferris worked under Kalaf as Desk Head. He describes Kalaf as his direct superior. He says Kalaf supported him personally and promoted his advancement as a broker at ICAP. He saw Kalaf socially on occasion.

11. [62]

    As of mid-2017, Ferris generated annual revenue in the order of $1,667,000.

12. [63]

    Gilbert worked for BGC or GFI from 2003 to 2009.

13. [64]

    Gilbert joined ICAP in 2010. As a broker, he has always worked in the swaps area (apart from one year working in shipping brokerage in Singapore). He specialises in long-end swaps. He reported to Kalaf.

14. [65]

    As of mid-2017, Gilbert generated annual revenue in the order of $2,131,000.

15. [66]

    McGilvray joined ICAP in 2004. He has always worked on the Swaps Desk.

16. [67]

    As of mid-2017, McGilvray generated annual revenue in the order of $3,572,000.

17. [68]

    From December 1989 to March 2016, when he joined ICAP, Pisani was employed by Tulletts. He originally worked in forward foreign exchange and then moved to swaps in late-2015. He arranged to leave Tulletts (his contract there was to expire in 2016). The takeover of ICAP by Tulletts occurred after Pisani had arranged to do so.

18. [69]

    As of mid-2017, Pisani generated annual revenue in the order of $1,252,000.

19. [70]

    From March 2007 until June 2012, Temperton worked for ICAP in London in AUD and NZD interest rate swaps. Before joining ICAP, he worked for Prebon Yamane. His expertise is in Australian swaps transactions between large banks.

20. [71]

    As of mid-2017, Temperton generated annual revenue in the order of $2,235,000.

THE BROKERS WHO WENT TO GFI AND STAYED

1. [72]

   Leaving aside Kalaf and Howell, seven brokers went to GFI and stayed. They are Matthew Blades (Blades), Mark Gardiner (Gardiner), Matthew Glendinning (Glendinning), Marshall Graham (Graham), Jason Howell (Jason Howell), [5] Mitchell Wieland (Wieland), and Scott Wilson (Wilson).

2. [73]

   Blades, Gardiner, Wieland, and Glendinning swore affidavits in the proceedings but they were not called.

3. [74]

   The trial occupied 17 hearing days and was conducted remotely. Casterton and Prest gave evidence from England. Howell gave evidence from Singapore. Heffron gave evidence from New York.

4. [75]

   Some thirty affidavits were read. Fourteen witnesses were cross-examined. A Court Book containing primary documentation running to well over a thousand pages was tendered.

5. [76]

   The case covers extensive dealings between late September and late October 2017 between ICAP management and the brokers, GFI’s representatives and the brokers, and between the brokers themselves. There are disputes, sometimes material ones, as to what was said.

6. [77]

   The exercise of assimilating the facts and recounting them in a substantially chronological fashion has been a significant one.

7. [78]

   I have taken all of the evidence into account, but it is not possible (and if it were, it would not be practical) to attempt to re-state all the dealings or to identify every respect in which the versions of the participants diverge. I have endeavoured to identify material disputes of fact and resolve them where factual findings are necessary.

8. [79]

   ICAP’s final written submissions run to 115 pages. GFI’s final written submissions run to 78 pages. Howell and Kalaf also provided comprehensive final written submissions.

9. [80]

   I have had regard to all the arguments but will not re-state them.

10. [81]

    I have referred earlier to the orders that liability be tried first. It is appropriate at this point to say a little more about that subject.

11. [82]

    It became increasingly clear during the hearing that the orders were unworkable for a series of reasons, not least of all because the parties had in mind not dealing with a number of issues which plainly go to liability, such as causation of loss and whether certain contractual provisions are unenforceable penalties.

12. [83]

    Correspondingly, it became increasingly unclear what precisely the Court was being called upon to decide. This situation demonstrated, yet again, the unwisdom of, and potential difficulties associated with, splitting off issues in complex proceedings other than in clearly appropriate instances.

13. [84]

    In an endeavour to salvage whatever benefit these proceedings may ultimately yield for the parties, I formulated a series of specific separate questions for determination which, after discussions with Counsel, were adopted by the parties. The questions are:

14. [85]

    To avert two of the dangers often associated with separate questions, I received assurances from the parties that none would appeal until the conclusion of the proceedings at first instance and none would object to me presiding over any subsequent hearing, even if I made findings of credit (which I have).

15. [86]

    I turn now to the facts.

16. [87]

    The idea that GFI would go on a campaign to recruit ICAP brokers seems to have been spawned by a perception (which appears to have accorded with the reality) that instability and disenchantment amongst ICAP staff had been festering since the Tullets takeover of ICAP at the end of 2016.

17. [88]

    GFI became aware that ICAP employees were aggrieved because they considered that employees from the Tulletts side of the takeover were being preferred over those from the ICAP side when it came to senior appointments. There was also disenchantment with the management style of some senior executives.

18. [89]

    One event which caused significant distress was a statement by Phizackerley at a meeting of ICAP brokers that, “We are going to pay you less, but you are going to earn more.” This reflected an attitude that the brokers’ remuneration should be reduced, something which did not go down well with them.

19. [90]

    Instability was exacerbated by the resignation of Gallagher, who was highly regarded.

20. [91]

    GFI saw an opportunity to take advantage of these circumstances and decided to take it.

21. [92]

    Heffron and Prest spearheaded the campaign. Their objective was to hire as many ICAP brokers as they could. They had all ICAP’s desks in mind as targets but it is probably fair to say that they saw the Swaps Desk, which was the biggest revenue earner at ICAP’s Sydney office, as the centrepiece.

22. [93]

    Both Heffron and Prest were acutely aware of the significant risk that litigation would result from the campaign. Heffron says that he knew ICAP was a litigious company that had brought claims against GFI in many jurisdictions around the world. This is perhaps unsurprising given that GFI openly went about targeting the whole of ICAP’s employment base in Sydney. Heffron and Prest were well aware that the ICAP brokers would have had contracts which prohibited them from divulging ICAP’s confidential information.

GFI’S RECRUITMENT OF HOWELL

1. [94]

   Howell was the first skittle to fall.

2. [95]

   In May or June 2017, Tony Warner (Warner), the managing director of BGC UK and Middle-East, called him. Warner had previously worked at ICAP with Howell. They had a number of subsequent conversations.

3. [96]

   On about 11 July 2017, whilst on annual leave from ICAP, Howell met with Warner and Lynn in Dubai. Howell paid for this trip, but GFI later reimbursed him.

4. [97]

   After Dubai, Howell had phone conversations with Warner and Mr Sean Windeatt (Windeatt), CEO of the BGC Group. It was conveyed to him that he was being offered the opportunity to manage the GFI brand in Asia. He met with Windeatt and Lynn in Hong Kong in early August 2017. Ironically, this trip was paid for by ICAP. Howell says that he was on business in Hong Kong for ICAP and Windeatt and Lynn came to meet him.

5. [98]

   They discussed a draft written employment agreement. Howell maintains that they said they did not want him to breach his contract with ICAP. They told him who they were “going after.” They told him that they were willing to spend what it took to get a team. They agreed to pay him a sign-on bonus, a guaranteed bonus for two years, an increase in his base salary, further compensation in the form of an incentive/bonus based on the best year’s results over a four-year period, and to guarantee his employment for six years.

6. [99]

   In late August 2017, Prest met Mark Webster, the Executive Managing Director and General Manager of BGC Partners, Asia-Pacific. Webster told Prest that there were a number of dissatisfied people at ICAP and suggested that they should “shake the tree at ICAP and see what falls out.” Gallagher’s departure was mentioned.

7. [100]

   In September 2017, Lynn contacted Heffron to tell him that Howell had been identified as a candidate for the role of GFI CEO for the Asia-Pacific region. He asked Heffron to meet Howell. Heffron called him.

8. [101]

   Heffron says that he told Howell that GFI wanted to do some hiring in Sydney but that Howell needed “to stay out of it.” This reflects his awareness of the potential for Howell to be placed in a position where he might breach his obligations to ICAP. Howell, however, did not stay out of it.

9. [102]

   By 10 September 2017, Howell had decided to leave ICAP and join GFI. He signed a written contract of employment with GFI on 14 September 2017. Lynn told Prest that Howell had been hired to run GFI’s business in the Asia-Pacific region.

10. [103]

    On 18 September 2017, Howell resigned from ICAP giving six months’ notice (as required by the Howell Contract).

11. [104]

    On the same day, he told Kalaf and Cotton that he had resigned and was joining up with a competitor.

12. [105]

    When he received Howell’s notice of resignation, Casterton called Howell immediately. Although Howell did not tell him that he was going to a competitor, Casterton had no doubt that this was the case. He thought it was most likely that he was going to work for the BGC Group. Casterton was concerned that Howell would try to recruit ICAP employees to a competitor or be used by a competitor to recruit ICAP employees. He thought it was obvious that a competitor would try to get a whole team of employees to leave ICAP. Casterton discussed this with Phizackerley and Breteau, and it was decided that Casterton and Breteau should go to Sydney as soon as practicable.

13. [106]

    They discussed a shortlist of potential candidates to replace Howell as CEO. Kalaf was at the top of the list.

14. [107]

    On 21 September 2017, ICAP’s solicitors, Herbert Smith Freehills, wrote to Howell (the Howell Letter) placing him on garden leave with immediate effect and drawing his attention to cl 9.3 of the Terms & Conditions of the Howell Contract. The letter stated, relevantly:

15. [108]

    The Howell Letter reminded him of his continuing obligations under the Howell Contract and his statutory and fiduciary obligations, amongst others, to discharge his duties in good faith, in the best interest of ICAP, and for a proper purpose.

GFI’S EFFORTS TO RECRUIT THE BROKERS

1. [109]

   On about 21 September 2017, Heffron arrived in Hong Kong, en route to Sydney. He told Prest that they would travel to Sydney the following week to approach ICAP brokers. The departure of Howell from ICAP had the potential to increase disquiet there and increase the likelihood of GFI successfully hiring ICAP people in Sydney.

2. [110]

   The next day, Heffron, Webster, Windeatt, and Tim Mallott (Mallott), Deputy General Manager of BGC Asia-Pacific, met at the Hong Kong Four Seasons Hotel. Both Webster and Mallott swore affidavits in the proceedings but neither was called.

3. [111]

   Prest says they compiled rough estimates of competitor market share based on general perceptions and made estimates of market size and each competitor’s market share, using these to estimate the revenue generated by each of the ICAP desks. They discussed, in broad terms, the contracts they would offer the ICAP brokers. They decided to offer five year agreements and sign-on bonuses, and to match whatever total compensation the brokers had received in the year prior at ICAP.

4. [112]

   Prest says they discussed prospective sign-on bonuses using the following “rule-of-thumb”:

5. [113]

   They identified the “big earners” as Kalaf, McGilvray, Ferris, and Blades. At this time, they had no specific or actual knowledge of what the ICAP brokers generated in revenue, how they were remunerated, or the quantum of their remuneration or bonuses.

6. [114]

   Later, Warner identified Cotton, Gilbert, Pisani, Graham, Gardiner, Wieland, and Temperton as targets.

7. [115]

   Heffron arrived in Sydney on 24 September 2017. Prest arrived in Sydney on 25 September 2017. They were both in Sydney until 29 September 2017. Upon their arrival, they went for a stroll around the city to locate possible venues to meet with the ICAP brokers, such as pubs, bars, and hotel lobbies. They decided on a rough order for contacting the brokers.

8. [116]

   They started calling brokers on 25 September 2017.

9. [117]

   Kalaf was first.

10. [118]

    In most cases, both Heffron and Prest were present at meetings with the brokers. Prest says that when they met a broker, their practice was to ask the broker how much business he wrote, what his current salary was, what his total compensation for last year was, and when his current contract ended.

11. [119]

    It will be readily apparent that these questions, if answered (which in most if not all cases, they were), would elicit information that was confidential to ICAP, and cause the brokers to breach their confidentiality obligations to ICAP. Heffron and Prest recognised this. However, ICAP makes no case against GFI for this conduct.

12. [120]

    On 24 September 2017, Casterton emailed Kalaf with thoughts for a running order the following day, and suggesting one-on-one meetings with all key staff.

13. [121]

    Before leaving London, Casterton obtained from Trent Rogers (Rogers), the Finance Director of ICAP, a schedule containing each broker’s remuneration and brokerage revenue, as well as details of each broker’s employment term.

MONDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER 2017

1. [122]

   Heffron called Kalaf on 25 September 2017 (it seems in the morning). A meeting was arranged at Harts Pub in the Rocks for that evening. According to Prest, Heffron told Kalaf that he was from GFI, was in Sydney, would love to have a chat with him, and asked him to meet.

2. [123]

   Prest and Heffron met with Kalaf as arranged. Prest says that they did not discuss remuneration or terms of employment. Kalaf told them that his father was not well. Prest says that he told Kalaf that they were certainly not inducing him or asking him not to comply with contractual obligations to ICAP, but rather that they wanted him to fully comply with them, that they did not want him or them to get into legal difficulties, and that they did not want or need any information he could give them. He maintains he said to Kalaf, “Keep your nose clean.”

3. [124]

   Kalaf’s version is that Heffron or Prest said that they were going to be approaching all of the brokers on Kalaf’s desk, that their discussion was confidential, that they were not asking him to help them and did not want him to speak to any of his colleagues on their behalf, that they did not need anything from him, and did not wish him to breach any of his obligations to ICAP.

4. [125]

   There is no contemporaneous note or document which records or supports this conversation. But whether or not these things were said, as will be seen later, Kalaf did help them, did not keep the discussion confidential, and did breach his obligations to ICAP.

5. [126]

   The first area of factual controversy between Kalaf on the one hand and members of the six on the other is whether Kalaf told them to expect a call from Heffron and gave words of encouragement for them to meet him.

6. [127]

   Cotton says that in the car, while driving to work with Kalaf the morning of 25 September 2017 at about 7:15am, Kalaf said, “I've been called. You can expect a call from Colin. You'll have to go and meet them. They'll be calling everyone.” Kalaf denies that he said this. I believe Cotton.

7. [128]

   Gilbert says that on about 25 September 2017, Kalaf said to him, “You may get a call from a New York number or mobile phone. Everyone will get a call. Answer it and see what they have to say.” Kalaf says he has no recollection of this conversation but says it could not have happened on 25 September 2017 because he was not aware until later that evening when he met Heffron and Prest that GFI intended to approach ICAP’s brokers. He does not deny that a conversation as deposed to by Gilbert happened. I believe Gilbert that this conversation occurred. It is not necessary to make a finding as to precisely when it did.

8. [129]

   McGilvray says that on 25 September 2017 at approximately 7:50am, Kalaf pulled him aside into an office and said, “I expect people will start getting some calls from a New York number.” He then said, “If you need to have time off the desk, feel free to go and listen to what they have to say. Do what you need to do.” Kalaf agrees that he had a conversation with McGilvray broadly as McGilvray says, but says that it took place on Tuesday, 26 September 2017. He denies saying to McGilvray, “Do what you need to do.” I prefer McGilvray.

9. [130]

   Casterton and Breteau arrived in Sydney that morning.

10. [131]

    First, they met with Rogers and Glenn McMurdy (McMurdy), Chief Operating Officer of ICAP, to go through key numbers of the Sydney business. Then they met with brokers in the ICAP office.

11. [132]

    They met with Kalaf in an empty office. They had further discussions with him throughout the day. They discussed with him how they could go about making counter-offers to brokers on the Swaps Desk to keep them with ICAP. They asked him who the “main guys” were who they needed to keep the desk, and how much they needed to offer by way of sign-on bonuses. Kalaf identified Cotton, Temperton, and McGilvray.

12. [133]

    Using the figures that had been provided and relying on Kalaf’s recommendations, they sorted the brokers on the Swaps Desk into three tiers, based on how important it was for ICAP to retain them and how much they were willing to offer them as a one-off bonus. Tier 1 was Cotton, Temperton, and McGilvray. Tier 2 was Gilbert, Ferris, and Blades.

13. [134]

    They went through the schedule which had been provided by Rogers.

14. [135]

    A sign-on bonus was allocated to each tier. Casterton says that Kalaf words to the effect, “I think that should do it, I think that’s about right. With those numbers, I will be able to get the whole desk to stay with ICAP.”

15. [136]

    Casterton says that he or Breteau said words to the effect, “Those figures are fine. We can make those offers no problem. You can go ahead and talk to the guys and make those offers to them.”

16. [137]

    Kalaf denies that conversations to this effect took place. He says that he did not have information that would have enabled him to offer an opinion as to what if anything would be needed to persuade the brokers to stay and that it was not his responsibility to get the whole desk to stay with ICAP. He denies that he was asked to communicate offers. I believe Casterton, not least of all because, as Desk Head, Kalaf, who had in previous years negotiated contracts with members of the desk and was their leader, was in a peculiarly good position to do so and the natural person to do what Casterton says they asked of him. I also believe Casterton that he relied on Kalaf for guidance on what should be offered to the brokers, and that Kalaf gave it. I do not accept that Kalaf, given his knowledge and experience, was not in a position to express a meaningful opinion as to what ICAP needed to do to keep the brokers.

17. [138]

    Over the next day or two, the tiers and amounts were refined. Casterton says that he or Breteau said to Kalaf words to the effect, “OK Jack, that is fine – we can offer those sign-on bonuses. You go and do what you think is appropriate to go and make those offers and persuade the brokers to stay, and finalise their agreement if they accept.” Kalaf denies this. Once again, I believe Casterton.

18. [139]

    Casterton says that in a later conversation that day, they raised the possibility that Kalaf might be offered the position of CEO ICAP Australasia.

19. [140]

    Not long after Casterton and Breteau arrived, Kalaf told them that Heffron and Prest were in town and were calling and meeting with brokers and handing out contracts to them. Kalaf said that he had not yet met with them but had accepted an invitation to meet. It is possible that Kalaf had already met Heffron and Prest.

TUESDAY, 26 SEPTEMBER 2017

1. [141]

   Temperton says that on the morning of 26 September 2017, he received a text message from Kalaf, which read “Got a tick?”. Shortly thereafter they met in a meeting room, where Kalaf said to him, “You may get a call from a New York number. Everyone will get a call. Answer it and see what they have to say.” Kalaf agrees that he had such a conversation.

2. [142]

   Temperton then received a call from Heffron and met him later that day at the Shangri-La Hotel in the Rocks. Heffron told him that they were looking to establish GFI in the Australian market and were looking for brokers. He asked him how much business he wrote a month, how much he was paid, and how much his base was. Temperton gave this information. Heffron then told him that based on that, they would pay him the same base amount with a sign-on of $1 million.

3. [143]

   Casterton and Breteau had lunch with Kalaf on 26 September 2017. Casterton says that he or Breteau said to Kalaf, “Jack, we would like you to take over from Brad as CEO of ICAP Australasia.” Casterton says Kalaf then said words to the effect, “Yes, I accept.”

4. [144]

   Kalaf denies it. He argues that he would not uncritically have accepted the role without details of the financial terms, bonus arrangements, reporting structures and responsibilities, and confirmation that his team had agreed to stay at ICAP. I do not accept this. After all, ultimately he broke ranks and signed with GFI without the team. He was the natural person to take over as CEO. He was intimately familiar with ICAP operations, and there would still have been room not to proceed with a formal appointment had he later decided against it. In any event, I believe Casterton.

5. [145]

   In the afternoon, before the market closed, McGilvray said he had a conversation with Kalaf in which Kalaf said about the GFI offers, “From what I am hearing it is about one million. We will have to have a chat about it after.” He says that later Kalaf pulled him aside and a conversation to the following effect took place:

6. [146]

   Kalaf disputes this version. He says he did not receive an offer from GFI until 27 September 2017, that there is no evidence that he knew what GFI had offered the brokers, and that he did not know what GFI were offering him. He also says that Casterton and Breteau were still finalising the numbers that ICAP were proposing to offer the brokers. He argues that he was not equipped with the information to make the comparison McGilvray asserts.

7. [147]

   I do not consider that what Kalaf says, even if correct, undermines McGilvray’s version. Kalaf had plainly been in discussions with GFI. On the same day, Heffron had mentioned to Temperton a sign-on bonus of $1 million. McGilvray says Kalaf talked of “about $1 million” and said that they would have to “chat about it after”, after which he says Kalaf and he had the conversation. The fact that Kalaf may have only received an offer on 27 September 2017 does not mean he had no inkling that one was coming.

8. [148]

   Additionally, McGilvray says that he was of the view that Kalaf would be acting as a conduit between the brokers and ICAP and McGilvray understood that he would be the point of contact to negotiate with ICAP and was going to make any ICAP counter-offers to the brokers.

9. [149]

   That afternoon, Casterton and Breteau held a “townhall-style” meeting at the ICAP office. [6] That evening, Breteau emailed Phizackerley, Dennahy, and Casterton saying, amongst others, that they were making good progress with Kalaf, “who has now agreed to take over running ICAP Sydney.”

WEDNESDAY, 27 SEPTEMBER 2017

1. [150]

   Rogers says Casterton told him that Kalaf had accepted the CEO role and asked him to arrange for Priscilla Ng (of the ICAP Human Resources department) to prepare Kalaf’s contract. Kalaf says Rogers should not be accepted because Casterton had earlier asked Melvin Tong, head of Human Resources for ICAP in the Asia-Pacific region, to prepare the paperwork for Kalaf. However, the fact that Casterton may have earlier asked Melvin Tong does not mean that he did not also ask Rogers to ask Priscilla Ng. Tong and Ng were part of the same department.

2. [151]

   The significant thing is that Casterton had plainly derived the understanding that Kalaf was to be CEO.

3. [152]

   Ferris says that on the morning of 27 September 2017, Kalaf called him into a side room and told him that he may or may not get a call from an “external person” and it was up to him whether he wanted to have a chat. Kalaf does not dispute this. Ferris presumed Kalaf was talking about an employment offer from a competitor.

4. [153]

   On 27 September 2017, Prest separately called Cotton, Ferris, and McGilvray and arranged to meet each of them in the lobby of the Sofitel Wentworth Hotel. Prest gave each of them a draft employment agreement and loan contract. The loan contract was a method of paying a sign-on bonus.

5. [154]

   At or about this time, Prest also met Temperton and gave him a draft employment agreement and loan contract.

6. [155]

   Prest and Heffron also met Pisani in the lobby of the Sofitel Wentworth Hotel where they had a discussion, during which Pisani says Heffron explained that he would “take a deal” to Phizackerley. Pisani says Heffron said:

7. [156]

   Pisani says that Prest asked him what his monthly brokerage was and Pisani told them it was $90,000. Prest then said they were offering a sign-on bonus of $750,000 and they would match his ICAP salary and guarantee his previous bonuses for two years. Prest believes Pisani gave a higher figure for his brokerage. Nothing relevant turns on this difference.

8. [157]

   The next day, Prest gave Pisani a draft employment agreement and loan contract after he had called Pisani and arranged a meeting at the front of the Chophouse Restaurant on Bligh St.

9. [158]

   On the evening of 27 September 2017, Kalaf met Cotton, McGilvray, and Temperton at the Centennial Hotel in Woollahra. This was after Kalaf had sent a text message asking the others to meet “somewhere off piste.” Kalaf arranged for Cotton and McGilvray to go in Cotton’s car. He and Temperton went in his car.

10. [159]

    Cotton, McGilvray, and Temperton’s versions of this meeting are broadly consistent.

11. [160]

    Cotton’s understanding was that everyone at the meeting had been offered a $1 million sign-on by GFI and that each of them knew this. He says that a conversation to the following effect took place:

12. [161]

    McGilvray says Kalaf said, “GFI are offering us $1m each as a sign-on bonus. ICAP have come back to me this afternoon. They were originally offering a $500k sign-on bonus to each of us but now they have stretched to offer $700k each. The rest of the desk would receive lower sign-on bonuses in staggered groups. What do you guys think we should do?” He says that they discussed the pros and cons of GFI’s offer and he said that a big con for going to GFI was losing the screen. He says either he or Temperton said words to the effect of, “Why would we want to shoot the goose that lays the golden egg? The current business we have is not worth losing for the potential upside of going to GFI, which isn't really that great. GFI are offering more but not so much more that we should leave.”

13. [162]

    He says that Kalaf said, “So then, do we all agree that we will stay with ICAP if we get a sign-on of $700k?” He says each of the others agreed. He says that Kalaf also said “Brad [Howell] is going to be a trusted manager at GFI.” McGilvray says he left the meeting thinking they were all going to stay at ICAP. He expected Kalaf, as the head of the desk, to communicate what they had discussed to the other brokers on the desk and to Casterton and Breteau.

14. [163]

    Temperton says that at this meeting, Kalaf said, “ICAP has given us a counter offer. They are giving me the amount of the whole of last year's bonus pool, to divvy up between everyone on the desk as a sign-on bonus to get everyone to stay.” Temperton’s bonus for the previous year was $700,000. Kalaf had been responsible for dividing up the bonus pool.

15. [164]

    Temperton says that during this meeting they discussed the pros and cons of both offers. He says that an exchange to the following effect took place:

16. [165]

    Temperton says that based on this exchange, he believed that Kalaf as the Desk Head would ensure that their position would be communicated to ICAP. He understood that Kalaf was acting as the intermediary.

17. [166]

    Kalaf’s version of this meeting differs in some respects from that of the others present. He denies that he used the words, “Okay. We all agree to stay as a team.” He does not appear to take issue with the agreement to stay which the others assert. He says that he did not say that he would be the go-between between the brokers and ICAP senior management. However, he does not appear to dispute that the others understood that this was the case. I think it is highly probable that Kalaf conveyed that they should stick together as a team. After all, they were in fact a team and he was the head of it. As is recounted later, the others were plainly aggrieved when Kalaf broke ranks without telling them first.

18. [167]

    Kalaf says that he told them that Casterton and Breteau had said that ICAP was prepared to pay each of them $700,000 to extend their contracts of employment for another three years and that ICAP was also prepared to pay extension bonuses to the other brokers in various tiers. On a practical level, there is no doubt that Kalaf assumed the role of intermediary between the ICAP brokers and ICAP management.

19. [168]

    Kalaf says that Cotton said, “See if you can get us a million.”

THURSDAY, 28 SEPTEMBER 2017

1. [169]

   Heffron and Prest met with Kalaf again on 28 September 2017 at the Wentworth Sofitel Hotel Bar. Prest says he has no specific recollection of the meeting but assumes that proposed financial terms were discussed. He does say that they did not discuss the brokerage of the ICAP brokers, their compensation, or the amounts that GFI should offer them. However, Prest gave the following oral evidence:

2. [170]

   It may be the case that Heffron and Prest did not discuss one broker’s brokerage compensation or proposed offer with another broker or brokers. But where they met a broker, they did discuss those matters with that broker.

3. [171]

   Heffron and Prest also met Blades at the Wentworth Sofitel Bar. Heffron said to Blades that he would guarantee him a $500,000 bonus for two years.

4. [172]

   There is in evidence a draft employment contract in letter form between GFI and Kalaf which bears the date 28 September 2017, together with a draft loan agreement under which GFI would lend Kalaf money (being the sign-on bonus). Casterton says that Kalaf gave him and Breteau a copy of this draft contract and told them it had been given to him by Prest and Heffron. To the extent that the discussion between Kalaf and Heffron was confidential, Kalaf breached that confidence.

5. [173]

   That evening, apparently when they were at a bar with ICAP brokers, McGilvray told Casterton that he had been told by Kalaf that ICAP was offering him a sign-on bonus of $700,000. McGilvray said that for that amount he was happy to stay, and they shook hands. (Later, the bonus offered to McGilvray was increased to $1 million.)

FRIDAY, 29 SEPTEMBER 2017

1. [174]

   According to Ferris, he had a conversation at his desk with Kalaf in which Kalaf asked, “Have you had your chat?”

2. [175]

   Kalaf does not recollect this conversation.

3. [176]

   Casterton, Breteau, and Kalaf had a meeting. Kalaf told Casterton and Breteau that he had told McGilvray, Temperton, and Cotton that ICAP was prepared to pay $700,000 and that they all wanted to stay but that ICAP was going to have to offer them $1 million. Casterton handed Kalaf a blue plastic sleeve containing draft letters addressed to the brokers.

4. [177]

   Kalaf’s version is that is that Casterton said, “Can I leave these with you until we get back next week?” What is plain is that Kalaf never distributed these offer letters.

5. [178]

   At the hearing, Kalaf tendered the blue plastic sleeve containing contracts. They were accordingly still in his possession. They have the date 27 September 2017. The offers to McGilvray, Temperton and Cotton were for $700,000.

MONDAY, 2 OCTOBER 2017

1. [179]

   2 October 2017 was a public holiday in Sydney.

2. [180]

   Casterton reported by email to Mr Donald McClumpha, the Chief Operating Officer of Global Broking ICAP, that he thought they were “winning hearts and minds but still no signatures”. He reported that, “Jack [Kalaf] is taking over the office and that is agreed.”

3. [181]

   Kalaf says he had not agreed to accept the CEO role. I do not accept his evidence.

TUESDAY, 3 OCTOBER 2017

1. [182]

   Mr Kalaf’s father, who had been ill, passed away on 3 October 2017. Kalaf says that he was not in the office on that day. Gilbert, Ferris, and Pisani gave evidence of a desk meeting on 3 October 2017. They appear to be mistaken as to the date. A meeting took place, but it is more likely that it was on 4 October 2017. Nothing relevant turns on this.

WEDNESDAY, 4 OCTOBER 2017

1. [183]

   Kalaf came into the office on 4 October 2017.

2. [184]

   The desk meeting went for only a few minutes. Gilbert, Ferris, and Pisani all gave evidence that Kalaf said words to the effect that the Swaps Desk should stick together.

3. [185]

   Gilbert says that at around this period he asked Kalaf if there was any counter-offer from ICAP. He says that an exchange to the following effect took place.

4. [186]

   Kalaf denies that he had such a conversation with Gilbert. He criticises Gilbert on the footing that Gilbert says that this conversation occurred on 3 October 2017 because Kalaf did not come into the office on that day on account of the passing of his father. He also says that there was no offer from GFI to which ICAP could make a counter-offer and no certainty that he would ever receive an offer from GFI.

5. [187]

   These criticisms are without force. Gilbert’s affidavit refers to the discussion having happened “around this period”. He accepted under cross-examination that it was not on 3 October 2017. I believe him as to the conversation. It is more likely that it happened on 4 October 2017. A day’s difference in timing is immaterial. The reference to “counter-offer” was no more than a colloquial reference to what ICAP was going to offer to beat GFI. It was plain that GFI was going to make offers. The significance of the conversation lies in Kalaf’s position that ICAP’s offer was not even worth showing.

6. [188]

   Casterton and Breteau met Cotton and Temperton for lunch at the Balcon Restaurant on Bligh St in the Sydney CBD on 4 October 2017. Cotton arranged the lunch. Casterton’s version of the lunch is the same, broadly, as that of Cotton and Temperton (although Temperton’s affidavit is not as detailed as the others on this occasion).

7. [189]

   The substance is that Casterton and Breteau told Cotton and Temperton that they were going back to London so as to give Kalaf some space, in light of his recent bereavement. In addition, McMurdy’s wife was ill and he too needed time off.

8. [190]

   They told Cotton and Temperton that ICAP was offering Cotton, Temperton, McGilvray, and Kalaf a sign-on bonus and would extend their employment for another two years.

9. [191]

   Cotton asked for some other assurances, including that McMurdy and the IT people were locked in for another two years, and that broker compensation be the same as it was at that time, with Kalaf to get a pool of funds to divide between them. They also wanted Kalaf to report directly to Casterton and Breteau, not to Dennahy. Breteau said they could achieve all of this, and Cotton and Temperton said that if they could achieve this, they had their word they would stay.

10. [192]

    Kalaf joined the lunch late. Casterton says they filled him in as to what had been said. Kalaf told them that his father’s funeral would be on Monday, 9 October 2017 and that he would be away from work until 10 October 2017.

11. [193]

    There is some confusion as to whether the discussed sign-on bonus that was being offered by ICAP was $700,000 or $1 million. I think it is more likely that the higher figure was under discussion. Kalaf says that this was his understanding. It is also consistent with Casterton’s evidence that ICAP had increased the sign-on bonus to these brokers because Kalaf had told him and Breteau that GFI had increased its offers to them. He says that he asked Kalaf what he thought ICAP needed to “jump up to” and Kalaf said, “Well, $1m is a round number. I think that would do it.”

12. [194]

    After the Balcon lunch, Kalaf sent the following email to Casterton captioned “The good faith plan – as discussed.”:

13. [195]

    “Glenn” is McMurdy. “Cam” is Cameron Ferguson (Ferguson) and “Jase” is Jason Corlett, both of whom worked in IT Development for ICAP. Kalaf typed the email from a note given to him by Breteau.

14. [196]

    According to Casterton and Breteau, before they left Sydney they were given hard copies of draft letters for all of the brokers on the Swaps Desk in a plastic sleeve. They showed the sleeve of draft letters to Kalaf in Howell’s former office, and Casterton says he said to Kalaf, “When you are back next week, go ahead and distribute them as you see fit.”

15. [197]

    Casterton says he gave Kalaf the plastic sleeve. He says Kalaf said words to the effect of, “Wouldn’t want to be walking around with these.” According to Casterton, Kalaf placed the letters in the sleeve in a drawer in a desk in what been Howell’s office for safekeeping.

16. [198]

    Kalaf has a different version. Kalaf denies having been given any documents on this occasion. As referred to earlier, he says that on 29 September 2017, Casterton gave him a blue plastic sleeve containing draft letters, which he says was the only occasion any such documents were given to him. There is agreement that on an occasion, Casterton handed a sleeve of contracts to Kalaf and that Kalaf locked them in a drawer.

17. [199]

    ICAP did not produce any offers dated later than 27 September 2017 despite being called on to do so. It offered the explanation that letters had been produced, handed to Kalaf, and the soft copies deleted from its computer system. There is no objective support for this proposition.

18. [200]

    Additionally, the ones in the blue plastic sleeve tendered by Kalaf, at least in relation to Cotton, McGilvray, and Temperton, were for amounts less than $1 million, which was the figure being talked about by 4 October 2017. This supports Kalaf that the letters were given earlier, and favours the probability that Casterton is mistaken about the time the conversation he recounts took place. Whilst I accept that Casterton genuinely believes that $1 million offers were handed over, the state of the evidence does not sustain a finding that they were.

19. [201]

    However, the fact that the letters were given earlier does not provide support for Kalaf’s denial that the documents handed over (whenever this happened) were to be distributed, in respect of which I prefer Casterton. There would be no logical reason for Kalaf to take delivery of these letters for safekeeping but never distribute them (and not give them back to Casterton). But I interpolate that whilst ICAP complains about Kalaf’s failure to distribute these letters as part of his general course of conduct, it does not allege that this in itself was a breach of any obligation.

20. [202]

    Either on Wednesday, 4 October 2017 or Thursday, 5 October 2017, Howell met Temperton at the Harbord Beach Hotel after lunch. Temperton says a conversation to the following effect took place:

21. [203]

    Temperton says that Howell was trying to pitch to him that the pros of accepting the GFI offer outweighed the cons.

22. [204]

    Howell says they first talked about family, sport, the property market in the Northern Beaches (where Harbord is), and rugby league, and then Temperton raised Howell’s resignation from ICAP.

23. [205]

    They are in agreement that the effect of the Tulletts takeover was discussed. Howell says that he said he was able to get comfortable that GFI would remain a separate brand from BGC, that they had high-quality IT systems, and were committed to building a quality business including interest rate swaps in Australian dollars. That is why he joined GFI.

24. [206]

    They are in agreement that they discussed losing the screen. Howell says that he said:

25. [207]

    Howell denies attempting to pitch to Temperton that the pros of joining GFI outweighed the cons and he denies having said the words to the effect, “I’ll look after you, I always will.” (Temperton’s version is “…I always have.”)

26. [208]

    I prefer Temperton. Howell’s version covers much the same ground but consists, in effect, of Temperton almost always asking a question and Howell providing answers. This, in my view, is a contrived attempt by Howell to distance himself from any suggestion that he was furthering the interests of GFI. His avowed approach was that he never volunteered anything, but if he was asked a question he would give his honest answer. I am unpersuaded that this is what actually happened.

27. [209]

    The reality is that Howell had an interest in persuading Temperton to leave ICAP and to join GFI. Other conduct of Howell reflects him acting consistently with this interest.

FRIDAY, 6 OCTOBER 2017

1. [210]

   On 6 October 2017, Prest called McGilvray and told him that they would increase his sign-on amount to $1.5 million. McGilvray says that later that day he approached Kalaf on the desk and told him that GFI had increased the offer and Kalaf responded, “Yes, I know.”

2. [211]

   Kalaf says he was not in the office that day. McGilvray says he recollects him coming in. There is no contemporaneous written material which favours either of these versions. Kalaf was, however, by all accounts, at the Swaps Desk meeting on 4 October 2017.

3. [212]

   On the same day, Prest also telephoned Cotton. They later ran into each other outside Martin Place Bar where Prest told Cotton that his sign-on bonus had been increased to $1.5 million. Cotton said, “You guys are making this difficult for us.” Prest replied, “On the contrary, we are making it quite easy.”

SATURDAY, 7 OCTOBER 2017

1. [213]

   McGilvray lives close to Howell. On the morning of 7 October 2017, Howell walked past McGilvray’s house with his dog. They had a conversation. They agree that surfboards were discussed. They agree that the screen was discussed. They agree that Howell said positive things about GFI. Their respective versions of the conversation differ in some respects. In particular, Howell once more frames the exchange as the other person asking questions and him answering them. Howell has McGilvray asking him “What do you think of GFI?” and “Why are they investing now?” McGilvray says they discussed the offer made by GFI and then Howell told him positive things about GFI.

2. [214]

   Ordinarily, little would turn on who asked and who answered. But in this case, in my view, Howell’s version once again reflects an attempt to portray his participation as passive.

TUESDAY, 10 OCTOBER 2017

1. [215]

   On 10 October 2017, the ICAP COO McMurdy resigned.

2. [216]

   Prest met Temperton in the lobby of the Wentworth Sofitel Hotel and gave him a draft employment agreement and loan contract.

WEDNESDAY, 11 OCTOBER 2017

1. [217]

   Kalaf returned to work on 11 October 2017. He and Temperton had lunch at Mr Wong, a restaurant on Bridge St.

2. [218]

   After lunch, Temperton arranged to meet Howell at the Harbord Beach Hotel in Freshwater for a second time.

3. [219]

   Temperton says a conversation to the following effect took place:

4. [220]

   Howell says this is neither an accurate reflection nor a complete record of the conversation. Howell says that they spoke about family, sport, and rugby league for about twenty minutes. He says that Temperton led the conversation and was asking most of the questions. Howell’s version is:

5. [221]

   Howell says that Temperton asked several other questions which he cannot precisely recall, nor his answers to them.

6. [222]

   He says he ended off the conversation by saying, “Mate, you’ve got to make up your own mind. Good luck.”

7. [223]

   Kalaf met Heffron on 11 October 2017 in the Wentworth Sofitel Hotel where he says a conversation to the following effect took place:

8. [224]

   He says that he did not expect GFI to agree to those terms and was amazed that they did so. The terms were “extremely attractive.” He was no doubt beguiled by the money.

THURSDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2017

1. [225]

   On 12 October 2017, Kalaf had lunch with Cotton, Blades, Paul Burke (Burke), the Desk Head of the Fixed Income Desk, and Paul Maddox (Maddox), the Desk Head of the Forwards Desk at the Tokonoma Restaurant on Bridge St.

2. [226]

   There is some divergence between the versions of Kalaf and Cotton, in particular whether Cotton said he was going to GFI, which Kalaf says Cotton said, and which Cotton denies. Cotton says when he left the meeting his understanding was that they were all going to wait to make a decision until Burke had the opportunity to speak with his team. Kalaf says he had not yet made up his mind to leave. He was, however, very close to making a decision, which (in fact) he did make the following morning.

FRIDAY, 13 OCTOBER 2017

1. [227]

   By the morning of 13 October 2017, Kalaf had decided to accept GFI’s offer. He signed that afternoon but did not tell Casterton or Breteau until 17 October 2017. His explanation for this delay is that he wanted to tell Casterton to his face. I do not accept this. I find that the true explanation for his procrastination was that he wanted to do what he could in the meantime to facilitate as many of the brokers going to GFI as could be achieved. Had he told Casterton or Breteau immediately, they would no doubt have taken urgent defensive steps necessitated by the fact that their trusted emissary had turned.

2. [228]

   In the afternoon, Kalaf accepted the offer in a meeting with Heffron at the Grand Hotel in Hunter St.

3. [229]

   Sometime during the week ended 13 October 2017, Gilbert told Kalaf that nobody from GFI had called him, and Kalaf said, “I’m on to it.” Kalaf called Heffron and told him.

4. [230]

   A couple of hours later, Kalaf whispered to Gilbert, “I know they have missed you. They've confused the two Ollies and made a mistake. [7] Col [Heffron] will be in contact.”

5. [231]

   Kalaf says he told Heffron words to the effect of:

6. [232]

   Kalaf gave the following explanation as to why he made the phone call:

7. [233]

   Heffron says he doesn’t recall the phone call from Kalaf about Gilbert but that he did recall a telephone conversation which led him to think that he was “dealing with a lot of egos,” and that someone was upset not to have received a call from GFI. Heffron was criticised in respect of this evidence, on the footing that he would have remembered this call. I find it unsurprising that he does not. It was a brief call and one of many calls in the campaign. It would have had no special significance for Heffron.

8. [234]

   On 13 October 2017, Gilbert received a call from Heffron and soon after met him at the Angel Bar in the CBD. Heffron asked him the usual questions.

9. [235]

   They were joined by Mr Prash Naik, the Chief Operating Officer of GFI. Naik left and returned with a draft employment agreement and loan contract which was handed to Gilbert. Gilbert says Heffron said, “I have to go now as I'm having lunch with Jack”, presumably referring to Kalaf.

10. [236]

    Gilbert’s draft loan contract provided for a sign-on bonus of $750,000 after tax.

11. [237]

    Gilbert encountered Kalaf when he got back to the office. According to Gilbert, Kalaf asked him much he was offered and said that he was talking to everyone on the desk to see what was offered. Kalaf told Gilbert that he knew what everyone was being offered. Gilbert told him that he had been offered $750,000.

12. [238]

    Kalaf denies saying that he was talking to everyone to see what was being offered, and that he knew what everyone was being offered. I prefer Gilbert.

13. [239]

    On 13 October 2017, Cotton, Temperton, Kalaf, and Blades had lunch at the Neptune Palace Restaurant in the Gateway Building near Circular Quay. Temperton says he invited Cotton at Kalaf’s request.

14. [240]

    Both Temperton and Cotton say that Kalaf said there were ongoing problems with the merger and noted that McMurdy had resigned. Cotton says part of the discussion was as follows:

15. [241]

    Cotton understood Kalaf's reference to the “merger” to be a reference to the acquisition of ICAP by Tulletts. His reference to “Barky” is a reference to Burke.

16. [242]

    In addition, Temperton says Kalaf said that:

17. [243]

    Simon Watkins ran one of the information technology (or IT) platforms at ICAP.

18. [244]

    Kalaf does not recall Cotton being at the lunch. He does not recall making these statements but says similar statements were made by the other persons at the lunch. He says that he did not make any comments for the purpose of persuading any of them to sign with GFI and not extend their employment with ICAP.

19. [245]

    That evening, Kalaf met Cotton at the Robin Hood Hotel in Charing Cross, near Bronte.

20. [246]

    Cotton says that a conversation to the following effect took place:

21. [247]

    Cotton says that he felt betrayed and was shocked. Kalaf denies that a conversation to this effect took place. I prefer Cotton. The following day, Cotton met Heffron at Bronte Beach for breakfast.

22. [248]

    Later in the evening, Kalaf called Temperton to tell him that he had signed. Temperton asked him if he had told Cotton and Blades. Kalaf said that he had told Cotton. Temperton says that he was very angry that Kalaf had signed contrary to his understanding that there was going to be a team decision. Kalaf maintains that it was never agreed that there would be a team decision. I do not believe him.

SATURDAY, 14 OCTOBER 2017

1. [249]

   On or about Saturday, 14 October 2017, Kalaf called Ferris. According to Ferris, a conversation to the following effect took place:

2. [250]

   Ferris says that up to this point he was not aware of any counter-offer being made by ICAP. From what Kalaf said, he understood that the counter-offer was not a very good one and did not ask Kalaf for details.

3. [251]

   Kalaf’s version of the conversation is:

4. [252]

   I prefer Ferris.

SUNDAY, 15 OCTOBER 2017

1. [253]

   In the morning, Kalaf picked up Temperton and Cotton and they drove to Freshwater (also on the Northern Beaches). They could not find a parking space. Kalaf suggested that they were near Howell’s house and they should see whether he wanted to join them. Kalaf called Howell and they went to his house. They sat in an outside area.

2. [254]

   Cotton reiterated his disappointment at Kalaf having broken ranks and signing with GFI.

3. [255]

   At some point McGilvray arrived. Kalaf told McGilvray that he had signed. McGilvray was surprised because he had been under the impression that there would be a team decision. McGilvray recalls Howell discussing the positives of the opportunity to move to GFI, including its IT capabilities and the ability to have time out of the market to freshen up.

4. [256]

   There was a discussion about concerns with respect to the latest drafts of the GFI employment agreement and loan contract. According to Temperton, Howell said:

5. [257]

   They went through amendments to the GFI drafts. Temperton wrote them down. Cotton and Temperton asked Howell questions about his contract with GFI. Howell went and got it in order to answer their questions.

6. [258]

   That afternoon, Temperton left for the United Kingdom with his family on holiday.

MONDAY, 16 OCTOBER 2017

1. [259]

   Kalaf met Pisani, at Kalaf’s request, at the Nook on Hunter St on the morning of Monday, 16 October 2017. He says that Kalaf said words to the following effect:

2. [260]

   Kalaf says he met Pisani because he owed him a personal explanation as to why he had signed with GFI. In his affidavit, Kalaf does not deny the conversation as recounted by Pisani. However, under cross-examination, Kalaf changed course. His evidence was that he did not think he had to explain himself at all. Rather, he wanted simply to inform Pisani that he had moved on, as opposed to telling him why. Kalaf’s later evidence is not worthy of belief.

3. [261]

   Kalaf arranged to have lunch with Gilbert at Spice Temple. According to Gilbert, a conversation took place which included the following statements from Kalaf:

4. [262]

   Kalaf denies that he said this.

5. [263]

   Gilbert says that Kalaf also said:

6. [264]

   Kalaf has no recollection of this.

7. [265]

   Gilbert says that later during the week he asked Kalaf what ICAP was offering him and Kalaf said words to the following effect:

8. [266]

   He recounts a further conversation that week to the following effect:

9. [267]

   Kalaf denies these conversations. I prefer Gilbert.

10. [268]

    Ferris signed with GFI on 16 October 2017.

11. [269]

    Between 12 and 16 October 2017, there were not less than 23 telephone calls or attempted telephone calls between Heffron and Kalaf. From the records which are in evidence, many of the calls are of such short duration that it cannot be inferred that any actual conversation took place. The following calls can be assumed to have involved some conversation:

    1. (1)

       12 October 2017 at 10:12am – Kalaf to Heffron (2 minutes and 2 seconds);

    2. (2)

       13 October 2017 at 09:02am – Kalaf to Heffron (43 seconds);

    3. (3)

       13 October 2017 at 02:51pm – Kalaf to Heffron (1 minute and 38 seconds);

    4. (4)

       13 October 2017 at 03:01pm – Kalaf to Heffron (58 seconds);

    5. (5)

       13 October 2017 at 03:52pm – Kalaf to Heffron (1 minute and 40 seconds);

    6. (6)

       14 October 2017 at 09:44am – Kalaf to Heffron (5 minutes and 52 seconds);

    7. (7)

       14 October 2017 at 10:50am – Kalaf to Heffron (1 minute and 38 seconds); and

    8. (8)

       16 October 2017 at 4:36pm – Kalaf to Heffron (38 seconds).

12. [270]

    The records in evidence include only calls from Kalaf to Heffron and missed calls from Heffron to Kalaf.

13. [271]

    ICAP’s theory is that this was a course of dealings between Kalaf and Heffron during which Kalaf was reporting to Heffron about what was going on in Sydney with the recruitment of the brokers. Both Kalaf and Heffron’s evidence on the subject was (I suspect deliberately) vague about these dealings. Heffron suggested that at least some of them concerned trying to arrange golf, which they never actually did (although a possibility that golf will be discussed at some point should never be totally discounted). Kalaf made no such suggestion, but could not remember the dealings.

14. [272]

    There appear to be no contemporaneous records of what was said during these conversations.

15. [273]

    There is little doubt that GFI had a strategy of not bringing records of its recruitment attempts into existence.

16. [274]

    Whilst not discounting the likelihood that the recruitment campaign was discussed, the evidence does not enable the Court with any degree of confidence to find what about that topic was discussed.

TUESDAY, 17 OCTOBER 2017

1. [275]

   Casterton and Breteau came back to Sydney in the early hours of 17 October 2017.

2. [276]

   They had breakfast with Kalaf at the Westin Hotel in Sydney. Kalaf told them that he was leaving ICAP.

3. [277]

   After breakfast, Casterton and Breteau went about trying to meet all of the brokers on the Swaps Desk. That day and the next day, Casterton says, they were trying to put before the brokers the offer letters they had thought Kalaf was going to put to them when Casterton and Breteau left Sydney on 4 October 2017.

4. [278]

   I do not doubt Casterton’s veracity with respect to what he says he understood, save that the evidence does not extend to establishing that there were offer letters given to Kalaf, apart from those dated 27 September 2017. I believe Casterton that he thought whatever offers Kalaf was aware of, Kalaf would have communicated to the brokers.

5. [279]

   Temperton signed with GFI in London in the very early hours of 17 October 2017, Sydney time (Monday afternoon in London).

6. [280]

   Pisani signed with GFI at around 8 am on 17 October 2017.

7. [281]

   McGilvray and Cotton signed with GFI later in the day on 17 October 2017.

WEDNESDAY, 18 OCTOBER 2017

1. [282]

   Gilbert signed with GFI on 18 October 2017.

THURSDAY, 19 OCTOBER 2017

1. [283]

   Mr Colin Gilbert (Colin) is Oliver Gilbert’s uncle. He worked for ICAP for many years and is an experienced inter-dealer broker. He retired on 30 June 2015.

2. [284]

   Casterton met Colin for lunch on 19 October at the Chophouse in the Sydney CBD. They discussed GFI’s recruitment of ICAP brokers. Colin offered his help.

SATURDAY, 21 OCTOBER 2017

1. [285]

   Colin received a communication from Howell and met him for coffee in Manly on 20 October 2017.

2. [286]

   Colin says that a conversation to the following effect took place:

3. [287]

   Howell’s version of the conversation is:

4. [288]

   Howell describes the conversation as casual. He says he did not think that Colin was interested in returning to Sydney (he had retired to Mudgee) or to full-time employment in the financial markets. He described his comments as being made in passing. I do not believe him. I find that he met Colin to offer him, and did offer him, a job with GFI.

5. [289]

   Shortly after Colin met Howell, he met Casterton and told him that his offer to help still stood. In addition, he told Casterton:

6. [290]

   Colin re-joined ICAP as Managing Director on 31 October 2017 after Casterton offered him that role, which he accepted on 27 October 2017.

TUESDAY, 24 OCTOBER 2017

1. [291]

   By this time, a number of the six were having doubts about their decision to sign with GFI. On the previous day, Cotton had expressed his own doubt to Kalaf and told him that others were uncomfortable as well. Kalaf responded to him, “It'll be good, you know. We won't lose the screen because we'll all be together.”

2. [292]

   Kalaf arranged for the Swaps Desk to have drinks at the Rockpool Bar & Grill on 24 October 2017.

3. [293]

   Kalaf told Cotton that he was arranging for a close friend and lawyer, Basil Scaffidi (Scaffidi) to attend the drinks. According to Cotton, Kalaf said:

4. [294]

   Cotton, McGilvray, Pisani, and Ferris gave evidence of Kalaf’s introduction of Scaffidi and what Scaffidi said. Kalaf introduced Scaffidi as a lawyer with experience in negotiating with teams. According to McGilvray, Scaffidi said words to the following effect:

5. [295]

   Cotton says that Scaffidi said:

6. [296]

   Pisani’s evidence is to the same effect, as is that of Ferris.

7. [297]

   Kalaf’s evidence is that Scaffidi did not make a speech and he says that Scaffidi was not paid. Kalaf’s evidence does not put in issue the material substance of what he and Scaffidi are alleged to have said. In any event, I believe Cotton, McGilvray, Pisani, and Ferris.

THURSDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 2017

1. [298]

   Cotton had lunch with Howell at Alpha Restaurant in the Sydney CBD. He said that he told Howell words to the effect:

2. [299]

   He says Howell replied with words to the effect:

3. [300]

   Howell has a different version. His version of the exchange is that it included the following:

4. [301]

   I prefer Cotton. Howell’s evidence reflects another attempt to limit and confine his participation in furthering GFI’s cause.

SUNDAY, 12 NOVEMBER 2017

1. [302]

   On Sunday, 12 November 2017, Kalaf met Cotton at the Clovelly Hotel. They had a discussion which they did not finish and arranged to meet the following day, which they did.

MONDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 2017

1. [303]

   On Monday, 13 November 2017, they met again. Cotton says he re-iterated his concerns about signing with GFI and Kalaf tried to assure him that he had made the right decision.

2. [304]

   Kalaf says Cotton arranged the two meetings and that he did not want to debate the issues that Cotton raised and he did not respond to him. He had decided to leave ICAP and made a commitment to join GFI and, as far as he was concerned, that was the end of the matter. Kalaf says he did not say anything to seek to persuade him to leave ICAP or to join GFI, and that, as far as he was concerned, it was entirely a matter for him what he did after that.

3. [305]

   I prefer Cotton. Kalaf had a distinct interest in Cotton coming to GFI. I consider his professed indifference to be improbable.

TUESDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 2017

1. [306]

   Howell met Cotton at Paradiso Café in Martin Place on 14 November 2017. Cotton expressed his concerns about signing a five-year contract with GFI. He says Howell replied to the following effect:

2. [307]

   Once again, Howell has a different version. His version is:

3. [308]

   I prefer Cotton. In my view, Howell’s evidence reflects, once again, an attempt to limit and confine his participation in furthering GFI’s cause.

FRIDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 2017

1. [309]

   Wieland told Pisani that he was meeting Howell after work and invited Pisani to join them. The meeting was at the St James Building in the Sydney CBD. Present were Howell, Pisani, Blades, Gardiner, Wilson, Wieland, and Glendinning. According to Pisani, Howell said the following:

2. [310]

   Once again, Howell has a different version. He says that Gardiner asked him questions about his reasons for leaving ICAP. He says he has a faint recollection of the following exchange with Pisani:

3. [311]

   Howell denies having said, “We all know that firms go in cycles. ICAP is on the way down, GFI is in the ascendency. GFI will be a good fit for us. There are plenty of guys lining up to replace anyone who does not want to work with us.”

4. [312]

   It will be observed that once again, Howell’s version consists of another person asking him a direct question and him answering it. I am unpersuaded that this was the case.

5. [313]

   I accept Pisani.

SUNDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 2017

1. [314]

   Temperton met with Howell at the Harbord Beach Hotel on 19 November 2017. Temperton says a conversation to the following effect took place:

2. [315]

   Yet again, Howell disputes a conversation between him and one of the six and yet again, he frames it as an enquiry of, and a response by, him. His version is:

3. [316]

   I prefer Temperton.

THE SIX RE-SIGN WITH ICAP

1. [317]

   On 22 November 2017, McGilvray and Gilbert extended their contracts with ICAP. McGilvray agreed to an extension bonus of $1.5 million as compared to his offered sign-on bonus of $1.75 million from GFI. Gilbert agreed to an extension bonus of $800,000 as compared to his offered sign-on bonus of $1 million from GFI.

2. [318]

   On 23 November 2017, Cotton, Temperton and Ferris re-sign with ICAP. Cotton agreed to an extension bonus of $1.5 million as compared to his offered sign-on bonus of $1.75 million from GFI. Temperton agreed to an extension bonus of $1.5 million as compared to his offered sign-on bonus of $1.75 million from GFI. Ferris agreed to an extension bonus of $500,000 as compared to his offered sign-on bonus of $650,000 from GFI.

3. [319]

   On 24 November 2017, Pisani extended his period of service with ICAP. Pisani agreed to an extension bonus of $700,000 as compared to his offered sign-on bonus of $750,000 from GFI.

4. [320]

   It is common cause that their contracts with GFI are no longer on foot.

THE CORPORATIONS ACT

1. [321]

   Section 181(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) provides:

2. [322]

   Section 182(1) of the Act provides:

3. [323]

   Section 183(1) of the Act provides:

4. [324]

   Section 9 of the Act defines “officer of a corporation”, relevantly, to mean:

5. [325]

   Section 79 of the Act provides:

6. [326]

   The Act contains provisions empowering the Court to order, amongst others, compensation and to declare the whole or any part of a contract between a person who suffered loss or damage and the person who engaged in conduct in contravention of the Act, or who was involved in it, to have been void ab initio. It is not necessary to set these provisions out for the purposes of this judgment.

THE COMPETITION AND CONSUMER ACT

1. [327]

   Section 139B of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the CCA) provides:

2. [328]

   The Australian Consumer Law (ACL) is set out in sch 2 of the CCA. Section 18(1) of the ACL provides:

3. [329]

   Section 31 of the ACL provides:

4. [330]

   Like the Act, the ACL contains provisions empowering the Court to make, amongst others, compensation orders and orders declaring the whole or any part of a contract between a respondent and a person who suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage is void ab initio. It is not necessary to set these provisions out for the purposes of this judgment.

THE HOWELL CONTRACT

1. [331]

   The Howell Contract comprises two components. First, a letter agreement component, and second, a set of standard “Terms & Conditions” which are expressly incorporated into the Howell Contract.

2. [332]

   The letter agreement component of the Howell Contract contains, relevantly, the following provisions:

3. [333]

   The “Terms & Conditions” component of the Howell Contract, contains, relevantly, the following provisions:

BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

1. [334]

   First, with respect to Howell, ICAP argues that in saying what he said to:

   1. (1)

      Temperton on 4 October 2017 or 5 October 2017 at the First Harbord Beach Hotel Meeting;

   2. (2)

      McGilvray on 7 October 2017 in the driveway conversation outside McGilvray’s house;

   3. (3)

      Temperton on 11 October 2017 at the Second Harbord Beach Hotel Meeting;

   4. (4)

      Cotton on 9 November 2017 at the Alpha Restaurant Meeting and 14 November 2017 at the Paradiso Café;

   5. (5)

      those present on 17 November 2017 at the St James Building Meeting;

   6. (6)

      Temperton on 19 November 2017 at the Third Harbord Beach Hotel Meeting; and

   7. (7)

      Colin on 21 October 2017 at coffee in Manly, which amounted to offering him a job with GFI,

2. [335]

   ICAP does not suggest that any of these alleged breaches led to any economic consequences and it claims no relief with respect to them other than declarations. ICAP did not submit that it should have an award of nominal damages.

3. [336]

   Second, ICAP argues that Howell, contrary to various of the obligations under the Howell contract, conveyed confidential information to GFI concerning the individual brokers’ earnings, the revenue generated by them on the Desk, and information about how much was needed to offer the brokers to entice them to leave ICAP and join GFI.

4. [337]

   This is the only breach of contract by Howell alleged by ICAP to have had adverse economic consequences for it.

BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTIES CLAIM

1. [338]

   ICAP alleges that by the same conduct, Howell breached his obligations under ss 181-183 of the Act to exercise his powers and discharge his duties in good faith in the best interests of ICAP for a proper purpose, not to improperly use his position to gain an advantage or cause detriment to ICAP, and not to improperly use his position to improperly use information to gain an advantage or cause detriment to ICAP.

BREACH OF EQUITABLE (FIDUCIARY) DUTIES CLAIM

1. [339]

   ICAP alleges that by the same conduct, Howell breached his equitable duty not to put himself in a position where his own interests conflicted with those of ICAP, or to use his position to profit himself or others, or to use confidential information obtained as a fiduciary to profit himself or others.

DISPOSITION

1. [340]

   I find that by doing what he did in furtherance of GFI’s recruitment campaign, Howell breached his contractual obligations under cl 10.1(c) of the letter agreement and cls 1.1(b), (d), (e), and 1.2(a) of the Terms & Conditions. In acting to assist GFI to recruit the brokers he knew that what he was doing was not in the best interests of ICAP but in conflict with them, and he acted contrary to his duty of good faith to ICAP in doing so. I include in this Howell’s provision of advice about a contract with GFI at his house on 15 October 2017 and his offer of a job with GFI to Colin Gilbert on 21 October 2017.

2. [341]

   I find that by contacting the brokers, he breached cl 9.1 by acting contrary to the direction given to him in the Howell Letter.

3. [342]

   But these breaches led to no economic consequences and they occurred more than two years ago, although these proceedings were instituted much closer to the time of the conduct complained of.

4. [343]

   Leaving aside deficiencies in their formulation (with which it is not necessary to deal), the declarations which ICAP seeks lack utility. They would not serve any legitimate purpose which is not already served by these findings themselves.

5. [344]

   This is hardly a case of one party being justified in complaining about another party’s commercial behaviour or lack of commercial morality, so as to justify the making of declarations at its instance. Commercial morality is a commodity which is in short supply on both sides of this divide.

6. [345]

   Howell argued that his obligations under the Howell Contract did not operate or were “attenuated” during his period of garden leave. He also argued that cl 9.1, at least insofar as it permitted ICAP to restrict his contact with employees, including his family, is unreasonable and an invalid restraint.

7. [346]

   I would not uphold these contentions. There is nothing in the Howell Contract which restricts his general obligations under it during the garden leave period.

8. [347]

   This case demonstrates that the provisions relied on by ICAP were reasonably necessary to protect ICAP’s legitimate business interests. Howell was a senior officer and employee with a significant degree of influence over the ICAP employees with an ability to damage ICAP’s interests profoundly.

9. [348]

   There is no direct evidence of Howell having conveyed confidential information to GFI, and the evidence does not give rise to any inference (let along a strong one) that he did. Moreover, both Heffron and Prest deny it and I believe them. Added to this, Heffron and Prest asked the individual brokers for this information and they gave it. Their evidence is consistent with Howell’s evidence that he never gave this information. In this respect, I believe him.

10. [349]

    Accordingly, ICAP has failed to establish that Howell breached any contractual duty in a manner which entitles ICAP to relief.

11. [350]

    Howell was:

    1. (1)

       a director of ICAP;

    2. (2)

       an employee of ICAP Australia; and

    3. (3)

       an officer of ICAP Brokers, being a person who made, or participated in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of ICAP Brokers’ business,

12. [351]

    But in engaging in the conduct complained of, Howell was not exercising any powers or discharging any duties as contemplated in s 181(1) of the Act, or using his position as a director, officer, or employee as contemplated by s 182(1) of the Act. He was still employed but was not exercising any powers or discharging any duties or acting as an officer or employee; he was away on garden leave.

13. [352]

    But even if he was, it is not suggested that the alleged breaches of ss 181(1) and 182(1) of the Act had any economic consequences.

14. [353]

    For the same reasons that I would not make declarations with respect to Howell’s contractual breaches, I would not make declarations as to these alleged breaches even if they had been made out.

15. [354]

    As to s 183(1) of the Act, I have earlier found that ICAP has not established that Howell imparted any confidential information to GFI. No question of compensation with respect to this alleged breach thus arises.

16. [355]

    Accordingly, ICAP has failed to establish that Howell breached any statutory duty in a manner which entitles ICAP to relief.

17. [356]

    I find that Howell breached his fiduciary duties by assisting GFI in its recruitment drive to the detriment of ICAP. For the same reasons as I would not make declarations with respect to Howell’s other breaches, I would not make declarations as to these breaches.

18. [357]

    Accordingly, ICAP has failed to establish that Howell breached any equitable duty in a manner which entitles ICAP to relief.

THE KALAF CONTRACT

1. [358]

   The Kalaf Contract is similarly made up of a letter agreement component and a “Terms & Conditions” component. The letter agreement component of the Kalaf Contract contains, relevantly, the following provisions:

2. [359]

   The “Terms & Conditions” component of the Kalaf Contract, contains, relevantly, the following provisions:

BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

1. [360]

   ICAP argues that:

   1. (1)

      in telling Gilbert that he was “on to it” (after Gilbert told Kalaf he had not been contacted by GFI) and in calling Heffron on 13 October 2017 to tell him that Gilbert had not been contacted;

   2. (2)

      in saying what he said to brokers about expecting to get a call, that is to Cotton on 25 September 2017, Gilbert on 25 September 2017, McGilvray on 25 September 2017, Temperton on 26 September 2017, and Ferris on 27 September 2017;

   3. (3)

      in saying what he said to Cotton, Temperton, and Blades on 13 October 2017 at the Neptune Palace Lunch, Ferris on 14 October 2017 on the telephone, Cotton and Temperton on 15 October 2017 at the meeting at Howell’s house, and Gilbert on 16 October 2017 at the Spice Temple Meeting; and

   4. (4)

      between 27 September and 17 October 2017, in failing to report accurately to Casterton and Breteau that Temperton, Cotton, and McGilvray were happy with $700,000 as an extension bonus to stay at ICAP, in failing to provide to brokers letters of offer handed to him on 4 October 2017, in failing to tell Gilbert, Ferris, and Pisani about what ICAP was offering to stay but telling them that the amounts on offer were so low as to not be worth discussing, and in failing to tell any of the other brokers what extension bonus ICAP was prepared to offer them,

2. [361]

   On 15 February 2018, by letter, ICAP Australia dismissed Kalaf from its employment, relying on the following of Kalaf’s conduct as justifying summary termination:

   1. (1)

      soliciting, or taking steps towards soliciting, employees of ICAP to take up roles with a business in competition with ICAP;

   2. (2)

      holding discussions with employees to encourage them to join a business in competition with ICAP during the course of his employment and during his normal hours of work with ICAP; and

   3. (3)

      using his position of seniority and influence to persuade and/or pressure employees who reported to him to leave ICAP.

3. [362]

   If the Kalaf Contract was validly terminated for breach, cl 11 of the letter component of the Kalaf Contract providing for liquidated damages (if not invalid) will apply.

4. [363]

   I find that ICAP Australia’s summary termination of Kalaf’s employment was valid and effective.

BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTIES CLAIM

1. [364]

   ICAP alleges that by the same conduct, Kalaf breached his obligations under ss 181-182 of the Act to exercise his powers and discharge his duties in good faith in the best interests of ICAP for a proper purpose, and not to improperly use his position to gain an advantage or cause detriment to ICAP. [10]

BREACH OF EQUITABLE (FIDUCIARY) DUTIES CLAIM

1. [365]

   ICAP alleges that by the same conduct, Kalaf breached his equitable duty not to put himself in a position where his own interests conflicted with those of ICAP, or to use his position to profit himself or others.

DISPOSITION

1. [366]

   It is important to keep in mind that Kalaf was formally employed only by ICAP Australia and not ICAP Brokers, although, under the Kalaf Contract, ICAP Australia can sue for relief on behalf of “Group Companies” and, in fact, he was an ICAP Brokers operative.

2. [367]

   Kalaf takes the point that ICAP Brokers has no standing to sue under the Kalaf Contract. This is strictly correct, but ICAP Australia can sue on its behalf, so far as the Kalaf Contract permits this. One respect in which the distinction makes a difference is that only ICAP Australia can claim liquidated damages under cl 11.2 of the letter agreement of the Kalaf Contract (assuming the provision to be enforceable). Another respect is that Kalaf is an employee of ICAP Australia for the purposes of s 182(1) of the Act, but not of ICAP Brokers. These distinctions may have a significant role to play if the stage of considering relief is ever reached.

3. [368]

   Kalaf was not an officer of ICAP Australia but I find that he was an officer of ICAP Brokers for the purposes of ss 181(1) and 182(1) of the Act because he made or participated in making decisions that affected the Swaps Desk, which was a substantial part of the business of ICAP Brokers within sub-paragraph (c)(i) of the definition of ‘officer’ in s 9 of the Act.

4. [369]

   Kalaf’s responsibilities as Desk Head included: determining strategy for the Swaps Desk; disciplining members of the desk; negotiating (subject to sign-off) employment terms, including broker remuneration; determining the manner in which the bonus pool was allocated to brokers on the Swaps Desk; approving leave for brokers; approving travel expenditure for himself and brokers on the Swaps Desk; and approving technology and project expenditure requests. No doubt, until he signed up with GFI without telling them, he commanded the respect and loyalty of the brokers on the Swaps Desk. He was on a base salary of $300,000 per annum plus bonuses. This was the equal highest salary of all brokers on the Swaps Desk.

5. [370]

   In addition, and albeit informally, he accepted the position of CEO of ICAP Australasia.

6. [371]

   The Swaps Desk was the largest revenue earner of the Desks. Whilst he was not a director (in the sense of being a member of its board) of ICAP Brokers, his designation was “Divisional Director”. This reflects his seniority and the fact that he was responsible for a division of the business. He made, or participated in making, decisions that affected that part of the business of ICAP Brokers, not least of all distribution of bonuses. Indeed, even though he had already accepted a position with GFI, on 29 November 2017 he wrote to Rogers claiming that he was entitled, without any interference, to direct how a retained bonus accrual fund should be distributed. Amongst others, he said, “As the Divisional Director of the Desk, it is wholly within my authority to direct the Company to release the accrual to the desk for allocation by me at my discretion.”

7. [372]

   With respect to the claims against Kalaf for breach of equitable duty, I find that he owed fiduciary duties to both ICAP Australia and ICAP Brokers. As to ICAP Australia, these duties are reflected in the express articulation of the obligations imposed on him in cl 1 of the Terms & Conditions of the Kalaf Contract. As to ICAP Brokers, his senior position brought with it the ability to make decisions and exercise discretions which could affect, significantly and adversely, ICAP Brokers’ interests. As this case shows, ICAP Brokers was vulnerable to things Kalaf was able to do because of the position he occupied.

8. [373]

   From the time Kalaf was contacted by Heffron and Prest on 24 September 2017, whom he learned were trying to recruit the whole Swaps Desk, he was in a position where his duties to ICAP and his own personal interests were in conflict.

9. [374]

   This conflict became acute when he decided, on the morning of 13 October 2017, to sign with GFI. The conflict intensified when he formally accepted GFI’s offer that afternoon. He had a personal interest, not only in receiving the significant amounts of money which GFI were promising, but in the movement of the whole Swaps Desk to GFI. Having regard to his prospective bonus incentives, Kalaf had a financial interest in GFI’s Swaps Desk generating as much revenue as possible in the future. He was aware that GFI’s interests were adverse to those of ICAP and he acted to favour GFI’s interests over those of ICAP. This included not communicating to the brokers how far ICAP was prepared to go to keep them and delaying telling Casterton about his decision to go to GFI until after the weekend, so that he would have the opportunity, as I have found, to do what he could, to get brokers to go with him over to GFI. For the same reason, he minimised what ICAP was prepared to offer.

10. [375]

    From 24 September 2017, he embarked upon a course of conduct which undermined ICAP’s interests and furthered those of GFI. Some of his conduct was active, some of it was passive. He:

    1. (1)

       smoothed the way for GFI’s calls to the brokers, including by acquiescing to the brokers taking time away from the Swaps Desk to speak with or meet Heffron and Prest;

    2. (2)

       responded to Gilbert’s communication that he had not been made an offer from GFI and called Heffron about Gilbert during work hours from the workplace;

    3. (3)

       made negative statements about staying with ICAP and about the Desk’s long-term prospects there without the management in place on 13 October 2017 at the Neptune Palace Lunch;

    4. (4)

       told Ferris over the phone on 14 October 2017 that ICAP’s offer was only a “band-aid solution” and that he did not think that “money [was] going to fix the issues” the brokers on the Desk felt like they had been having;

    5. (5)

       conveyed to Gilbert, Ferris, and Pisani that the amounts on offer from ICAP were so low as to not be worth discussing. I find that this was directed to discouraging them from staying at ICAP;

    6. (6)

       suggested to Temperton and Cotton that they go to Howell’s home on 15 October 2017. I find that this was directed to persuading them to go to GFI (to which Kalaf was already committed);

    7. (7)

       conveyed to Gilbert on 16 October 2017 at the Spice Temple Meeting that there had been problems stemming from the merger, that it was not looking good for them, and that Howell was going to be looking after them at GFI. I find that this was directed to persuading Gilbert to go to GFI;

    8. (8)

       delayed telling Casterton and Breteau that he had signed with GFI for the reasons I have earlier articulated;

    9. (9)

       arranged for the Swaps Desk to have drinks at the Rockpool Bar & Grill on 24 October 2017, and for his friend Scaffidi to attend to make a team-building speech in support of their decision to go to GFI. This is also the case with respect to his discussions with Cotton on 12 and 13 November 2017. I observe that the Rockpool Meeting was a substitute for the usual Monday Swaps Desk team meeting which Kalaf used for a non-ICAP purpose; and

    10. (10)

        did not convey to the brokers what ICAP was prepared to offer and did not making any real or reasonable efforts to get them to stay.

11. [376]

    I find that Kalaf:

    1. (1)

       was, at least from 13 October 2017, by reason of his signing up with GFI, connected with GFI’s business in contravention of cl 10.1(a) of the Kalaf Contract;

    2. (2)

       solicited, endeavoured to entice away from, or encouraged to leave ICAP at least the six in contravention of cl 10.1(c);

    3. (3)

       failed to serve ICAP faithfully and diligently and to the best of his ability in contravention of cl 1.1(b) of the Terms & Conditions;

    4. (4)

       failed to use all reasonable efforts to promote, develop, and extend the interests of ICAP in contravention of cl 1.1(c) of the Terms & Conditions;

    5. (5)

       failed to use all reasonable efforts to further the prosperity and enhance the reputation of ICAP in contravention of cl 1.1(d) of the Terms & Conditions;

    6. (6)

       failed to act in the best interests of ICAP in contravention of cl 1.1(e) of the Terms & Conditions;

    7. (7)

       acted in conflict with the best interests of ICAP in contravention of cl 1.2(a) of the Terms & Conditions; and

    8. (8)

       failed to act in accordance with the duty of good faith, trust and confidence owed to ICAP in contravention of cl 1.4 of the Terms & Conditions to act.

12. [377]

    I do not consider that what Kalaf did constituted working for, or performing services, for GFI as contemplated by cl 1.2(b) of the Terms & Conditions.

13. [378]

    As Desk Head, Kalaf:

    1. (1)

       improperly used his powers not in the best interest of ICAP Brokers and for an improper purpose in contravention of s 181(1) of the Act; and

    2. (2)

       improperly used his position to gain and advantage for himself and GFI in contravention of s 182(1) of the Act.

14. [379]

    I find that Kalaf knew that he was in a position of conflict and that he knew that what he was doing was:

    1. (1)

       not proper;

    2. (2)

       not in the best interests of ICAP;

    3. (3)

       in his own interests; and

    4. (4)

       in the interests of GFI.

15. [380]

    I find that Kalaf breached his equitable duties to ICAP Brokers by putting himself in a position where his own interests conflicted with those of ICAP Brokers and by assisting GFI in its recruitment drive to the detriment of ICAP.

16. [381]

    ICAP argues that GFI (via Heffron) knowingly procured and participated in Kalaf’s breaches of fiduciary duty, or was a person involved in Kalaf’s contraventions of ss 181(1) and 182(1) of the Act, by:

    1. (1)

       encouraging Kalaf to say what he said to the brokers about expecting to get a call, that is to Cotton on 25 September 2017, Gilbert on 25 September 2017, McGilvray on 25 September 2017, Temperton on 26 September 2017, and Ferris on 27 September 2017;

    2. (2)

       following up Kalaf’s intimation, in the week ended 13 October 2017, that Gilbert had been left out; and

    3. (3)

       encouraging Kalaf to speak to and assist in the recruitment of the eight brokers who signed during the period 13 to 17 October 2017.

17. [382]

    ICAP argues (in a one-line submission) that by the same conduct, GFI knowingly interfered with ICAP’s contractual relations with Kalaf.

18. [383]

    ICAP has fallen well short of proving these claims.

19. [384]

    It has not established that GFI played any part, let alone a knowing one, in Kalaf’s smoothing the way with the brokers on 25, 26, and 27 September 2017.

20. [385]

    GFI seeks to portray Kalaf’s communication to Heffron about Gilbert as trivial and isolated, and not lacking in probity. I disagree. It was part of a lengthy course of conduct on the part of Kalaf and was a conscious step taken to benefit another person or persons (Gilbert and GFI) to the potential detriment of ICAP.

21. [386]

    However, the difficulty for ICAP with respect to the Gilbert incident is that GFI played no part in Kalaf’s decision to call Heffron about Gilbert. Indeed, GFI had apparently confused him with Temperton. GFI merely received the communication. It had intended to offer Gilbert (as one of the brokers) a job anyway; his name was on Prest’s list of brokers who had been identified by Warner. This breach of fiduciary duty was on Kalaf’s own initiative and it cannot fairly be said that GFI knowingly participated in it.

22. [387]

    The evidence does not establish that GFI encouraged Kalaf to speak to and assist in the recruitment drive during the period 13 to 17 October 2017. There is simply an absence of evidence to establish this.

23. [388]

    Moreover, leaving aside the absence of direct evidence and ICAP’s need to rely on supposition, speculation, inexact proofs, and indirect inference, ICAP’s case is inconsistent with the evidence of Heffron and Prest, both of whom I believe with respect to the following matters:

    1. (1)

       that they told Kalaf that they did not want his assistance in their recruitment efforts (which of course does not mean that Kalaf did not do what he could – or thought he could – to assist their recruitment efforts);

    2. (2)

       that Prest told Kalaf to “Keep your nose clean” (which of course does not mean that Kalaf did keep his nose clean);

    3. (3)

       that they considered that they did not need Kalaf’s help to recruit the other brokers (which of course does not mean that Kalaf did not do what he could – or thought he could – to recruit the other brokers);

    4. (4)

       that Kalaf was not encouraged by them to facilitate the meetings with other brokers (which of course does not mean that Kalaf did not do so); and

    5. (5)

       that they did not ask Kalaf for, and he did not give them, confidential information about the brokers’ compensation, revenue, or sign-on amounts that needed to be offered.

24. [389]

    As Heffron pointed out, he was the global CEO of one of the major broking businesses in the world and had significant experience in conducting recruitment campaigns.

25. [390]

    GFI had significant amounts of money to offer the brokers, and the money talked.

26. [391]

    Kalaf no doubt took up the task of helping GFI with a degree of enthusiasm. He had his own interests in doing so, as was shown later by his betrayal of his friends and colleagues.

27. [392]

    For the same reasons, ICAP’s claim that GFI was a person involved in Kalaf’s statutory contraventions, and that it interfered with ICAP’s contractual relations with Kalaf, fails.

28. [393]

    As earlier mentioned, it is worthy of observation that on its own version of events, GFI induced the brokers to provide confidential information about their own remuneration and revenue earning on the Desk, upon which GFI plainly relied, but ICAP brings no claim based on this. [11]

29. [394]

    GFI sues the six for breach of their employment contracts with it, and it sues ICAP for interfering with its contractual relations with the six.

30. [395]

    ICAP correctly abandoned a manifestly untenable contention that it was justified in interfering with these contractual relations.

31. [396]

    Subject to the claims which the six make against GFI and Kalaf that they were misled and deceived into entering into contracts with GFI and that those contracts should be set aside, which claims are dealt with below, it is not in issue that the six have breached their contracts with GFI and that ICAP interfered in their contractual relations by inducing them to do so.

32. [397]

    The six bring claims against GFI and Kalaf on the basis that Kalaf engaged in conduct that was misleading and deceptive or likely to mislead and deceive by:

    1. (1)

       not telling the six that he was acting on behalf of GFI, but rather representing to them that he was acting on behalf of them in negotiations with ICAP;

    2. (2)

       failing to tell them of the “nature, extent, and details” of the offers ICAP was prepared to make them; and

    3. (3)

       making positively misleading statements about the offers ICAP was prepared to make.

33. [398]

    They say that as a result of this conduct they signed with GFI, which they would not otherwise have done.

34. [399]

    As against GFI, the success of these claims depends in the first instance on them establishing that in engaging in the conduct complained of, Kalaf did so on behalf of GFI within the meaning of s 139B(2) of the CCA, or at general law as its agent.

35. [400]

    For reasons articulated earlier, Kalaf did not act with the consent or agreement of Heffron, express or implied, of Heffron or Prest, but contrary to their instructions.

36. [401]

    It follows that the agreements between the six and GFI are not to be set aside.

37. [402]

    It also follows that insofar as Kalaf may be responsible, by virtue of his conduct, for the six entering into their contracts with GFI, GFI was not a person involved in that conduct. There is a cross-claim by the six against Howell, but nothing about it was said in the proceedings. I assume it is to be dismissed.

KALAF’S LIABILITY TO THE SIX

1. [403]

   The six contend that Kalaf acted in breach of ss 18 and 31 of the ACL by:

   1. (1)

      misleading them by not telling them that he was acting on behalf of GFI;

   2. (2)

      representing to them, contrary to the facts, that he was acting on their behalf in negotiations with ICAP; and

   3. (3)

      not accurately conveying to them what ICAP was prepared to offer.

2. [404]

   They say that but for this conduct, they would not initially have signed with GFI. They claim that Kalaf should be held liable to indemnify them in respect of, or to pay them compensation equivalent to, any liability they may have to GFI for breaching their contracts to GFI.

3. [405]

   Kalaf argues that s 18 of the ACL does not apply because his conduct was not in trade or commerce. He argues that s 31 of the ACL does not apply because the six were not persons seeking employment and the conduct complained of was not as to any matter relating to that employment.

4. [406]

   This claim against Kalaf is unsustainable.

5. [407]

   I am not persuaded that Kalaf’s conduct was either in trade or commerce or that it related to persons seeking employment as to a matter relating to that employment, as contemplated by s 31 of the ACL. His conduct was as an employee or officer of ICAP. He personally was not engaged in conduct in trade or commerce. The six were already employed by ICAP and they were not “seeking” employment from GFI. I do not consider that Kalaf’s conduct was “as to…a matter relating to the employment” which the six were seeking so as to bring it within s 31 of the ACL.

6. [408]

   As I have found earlier, Kalaf was not acting on behalf of GFI.

7. [409]

   Whilst Kalaf did convey to the six, and they did believe, that he was negotiating on their behalf with ICAP, as did Casterton believe he was negotiating with the brokers for ICAP, an additional difficulty for the six is that Kalaf was in fact negotiating with ICAP on their behalf, even if he was not doing it genuinely in their interests but only perfunctorily. But their complaint is not one about the quality of his negotiation.

8. [410]

   I think there is substance in the complaint that Kalaf did not convey to them in an open and accurate way what ICAP was prepared to offer and instead minimised it. I believe the six that had they been aware of ICAP’s true position, they would not have gone to GFI. Their subsequent conduct in leaving GFI for less money sufficiently proves this.

9. [411]

   The insuperable difficulty facing the six in this claim is, however, that once they had signed with GFI, it was a matter entirely for them whether they stayed there (for more money) or whether they succumbed to ICAP’s later blandishments to come back. The exposure of the six to GFI because they decided to go back to ICAP was not caused, looked at in a common sense and practical way, by Kalaf, but by themselves.

10. [412]

    It follows that Kalaf did not engage in conduct which gives rise to an entitlement by any of the six to damages or indemnity in respect of their liability to GFI as a consequence of the breach of their employment contracts with GFI.

11. [413]

    The exhibits may be returned.

12. [414]

    The answers to the questions have, it seems, the following consequences:

    1. (1)

       ICAP’s claims against Howell are to be dismissed;

    2. (2)

       ICAP’s claim against Kalaf can proceed to the next stage;

    3. (3)

       ICAP’s claim against GFI is to be dismissed;

    4. (4)

       GFI’s claim against the six can proceed to the next stage; and

    5. (5)

       The six’s claims against Kalaf and GFI are to be dismissed.

13. [415]

    I will stand the proceedings over to 30 July 2021 to allow the parties to consider these reasons and the future course of the proceedings, and to draw to my attention any matter required to be dealt with before the next substantive stage, if any, of this case.