Application of Miguela Macatangay

The applicant in these proceedings is the subject of an order made by Macfarlan JA, Sackville and Tobias AJA on 15 November 2012 pursuant to the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) s 8(7). Extracted from Macatangay v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 374, those orders were:

The applicant filed an application on 4 April 2017 pursuant to s 14(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) for leave to institute proceedings that would otherwise be prohibited by the above order.

In her application, the applicant states that she ‘is applying to this Court that she be allowed to maintain proceedings Matter No 2005/269316 and 2007/265877’. Her summons filed on 4 April 2017 seeks relief in the following terms:

In a document titled ‘Application for leave to maintain proceedings matter 2005/269316 and 2007/265877’, the applicant raises five grounds upon which she asserts leave should be granted:

It is clear that the relief claimed and the grounds raised in support of the application for leave amount to an attempt to further agitate issues that have already been determined.

In relation to the first order sought in the applicant’s summons, and all five grounds upon which the applicant relies in her application, it is helpful to refer to the analysis of Tobias AJA in Macatangay v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 108 at [9]–[12]:

See also the comments of Sackville AJA at [15]–[17]:

In relation to the second order sought in the applicant’s summons, I refer to the joint judgment of Macfarlan JA, Sackville & Tobias AJJA in Macatangay v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 341. There, the applicant sought leave to file a further application in the proceedings in relation to her claim against the department in prohibiting her working for it “in any capacity”. At [3]–[5], the Court stated:

The Court went on to foreshadow the orders later made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW). At [8]:

It is clear that the current application is an attempt to again agitate issues that have already been determined by the Court of Appeal. They are largely the issues that were the basis for the making of the orders pursuant to the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) by the Court of Appeal in November 2012.

Section 15 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) provides:

This application does not purport to institute new proceedings as envisaged by s 14 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW). This application is to “maintain proceedings” that have already been determined by the Court of Appeal.

For the purposes of s 15 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), I consider that the proceedings are vexatious proceedings within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) s 6(a), in that the proceedings are an abuse of process. I do not need to make findings in relation to ss 15(1)(a) or (c).

In finding that the proceedings are an abuse of process, I refer to the comments of Sackville AJA above. The substantive relief claimed in the applicant’s summons is based upon an alleged cause of action that has already been ruled unavailable to her, as confirmed by Handley AJA in Macatangay v State of New South Wales (NSWSC, Handley & Sackville AJJA, unreported, 20 September 2010).

Attempting to “maintain” or resume proceedings that were stayed by the Court of Appeal on the basis that those proceedings were an abuse of process is a further abuse of process.

I am therefore obliged to dismiss this application pursuant to the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) s 15.

I dismiss the summons filed 4 April 2017 in matter 2017/101486.