Taylor v Parole Authority of New South Wales

1. [1]

   Pursuant to an application filed on 31 July 2025, the plaintiff seeks that directions be given to the Parole Authority of New South Wales (“the Authority”) that the information on which the Authority relied to make its decision revoking his parole on 4 June 2025 was misleading, false or irrelevant.

2. [2]

   Following the filing of the application, the second defendant filed a submitting appearance and the matter was listed for hearing today, 11 December 2025.

3. [3]

   The plaintiff appears in person. He is currently in custody.

4. [4]

   The second defendant is represented by counsel.

5. [5]

   I was provided with a joint Court Book. The plaintiff acknowledged that all of the evidence on which he relied was in that Court Book except that he wished to rely on three further emails which he provided, and which were admitted into evidence, being emails of 22 June 2025.

Background to the application

1. [6]

   The plaintiff is currently serving a term of imprisonment of 10 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 7 years and 3 months. The sentence commenced on 13 November 2017 and expires on 29 May 2028. The non‑parole period expired on 28 February 2025.

2. [7]

   On that day, the plaintiff was released on parole in accordance with an order made by the Authority dated 20 December 2024. When released on parole the plaintiff was subject to conditions of parole. He was placed under the supervision of Community Corrections.

3. [8]

   At the time of his release the plaintiff was provided with information as to the standard conditions of parole.

4. [9]

   On 27 May 2025, a Community Corrections officer prepared a breach of parole report. As set out in that report, it was suggested that the plaintiff had failed to comply with two conditions of parole being:

   1. (1)

      A failure to comply with all reasonable directions from a Community Corrections officer about participating in programs, treatment, interventions or other related activities; and

   2. (2)

      A failure to comply with all reasonable directions about electronic monitoring, including scheduling.

5. [10]

   In that report, a detailed history is provided as to the dealings and negotiations between the plaintiff and the Community Corrections officer regarding the plaintiff attending for examination and treatment by a forensic psychologist and then issues relating to the plaintiff’s compliance with his schedule of movements and electronic monitoring.

6. [11]

   Suffice to say that the plaintiff was given warnings about non‑compliance with those two conditions. At least according to the Community Corrections officer, the response to supervision and compliance with those conditions by the plaintiff was unsatisfactory. Indeed, according to the breach report and as evidenced by some of the submissions made by the plaintiff today, the plaintiff was resistant to some of his conditions of parole and was disinclined to agree to or accept them.

7. [12]

   Following receipt of the breach report, a revocation order was made on 4 June 2025.

8. [13]

   The revocation order that was then subject to a review by the Authority pursuant to s 174 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) (“the Act”). The plaintiff was legally represented at that time. As is evident from the transcript of the hearing, the plaintiff’s lawyer accepted that the plaintiff had been in breach of the conditions of parole.

9. [14]

   Following the hearing, the Authority declined to rescind the revocation order.

The nature of the application

1. [15]

   The application pursued by the plaintiff could only be brought pursuant to s 176 of the Act which is in the following terms:

2. [16]

   As is apparent from s 176, an offender, in this case the plaintiff, may apply to the Supreme Court for a direction to be given to the Authority as to whether the information was false, misleading or irrelevant. The information when referred to in s 176(1) of the Act is the information that formed the basis of the decision of the Authority, in this case to revoke parole.

3. [17]

   The power to give a direction is limited to circumstances where it is satisfied on the evidence before it that the information on which the Authority has acted was false, misleading or irrelevant.

4. [18]

   Further, there is a threshold as set out in s 176(3) of the Act which requires that the application only be considered by the Court if and only if it is satisfied that the application is not an abuse of process and there appears to be sufficient evidence to support the application.

5. [19]

   As set out in s 176(4) of the Act, the Court does not, under s 176, have the jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Authority’s original decision other than on the grounds set out in subsection (1).

6. [20]

   Importantly, the Court is not hearing an appeal from the Authority’s decision. It is not reviewing the merits of the Authority’s decision. It is not considering whether the Authority could have made a different decision based on different information. The Court can only give a direction to the Authority if it is satisfied that the information previously provided to the Authority was false or misleading in substance (see Wainwright v Parole Authority of New South Wales [2017] NSWSC 1019; Blanch v New South Wales State Parole Authority [2014] NSWSC 835; Townsend v Parole Board [2001] NSWCCA 379; Sutton v NSW State Parole Authority [2011] NSWSC 935).

7. [21]

   In support of his application, the plaintiff relied on both written and oral submissions. Included in the joint Court Book are a number of handwritten letters from the plaintiff in which he sets out the basis of his application. I have had regard to all of that material.

8. [22]

   The defendant says that the application should be dismissed on the basis that it is misconceived and, further, that the plaintiff has not provided evidence to substantiate any assertion that the information provided to the Authority was misleading or false.

Determination

1. [23]

   The plaintiff presented as an articulate man. He was certainly able to address the Court today to express his views and arguments.

2. [24]

   In general terms, he sought to bring to the attention of the Court a number of matters which I will summarise as follows:

   1. (1)

      Before entering prison, he was a healthy man. He was an active sportsperson and a very good golfer. Since entering prison, he has become very sick and unwell. He is now disabled;

   2. (2)

      He has been mistreated in prison. He has been assaulted and has not been provided with proper medical care;

   3. (3)

      He sent emails to the Authority which he says were not considered. He believes they were not received;

   4. (4)

      He says he is not guilty of the offences for which he has been convicted. He says he was duped into pleading guilty to the offences of which he was convicted. He says he thought that he would not be going to prison if he pleaded guilty; and

   5. (5)

      He maintains that he was precluded from attending the review hearing. He was only granted access by AVL. Although there is a form which notes that he consented to appearance by AVL, he maintains that that form was not completed by him. Having said that, he agreed during oral submissions that he had instructed his lawyer to admit to the breach of the parole conditions. His point about not being able to attend is that if he had been able to attend, he might have been able to vary those instructions in some way depending on what was happening in the hearing.

3. [25]

   In a sense, the matters to which I have referred about which the plaintiff spoke at length are matters of background and context. The plaintiff is plainly aggrieved at his treatment at the hands of the criminal justice system, and maintains, as I understand it, that he should not be in prison at all. He is aggrieved that his parole has been revoked, citing the matters to which I have just referred.

4. [26]

   However, it is important to bear in mind that the power that I have is limited by the terms of s 176 of the Act, that is, the power to give a direction to the Authority as to whether the information on which the Authority relied was false, misleading, or irrelevant.

5. [27]

   In that regard, it is necessary to consider the two grounds on which the Authority was satisfied that parole should be revoked. As set out in the breach report, they are:

   1. (1)

      that the plaintiff had failed to comply with a direction given by the Community Corrections officer to engage with forensic psychology. He was required to attend on a psychologist and seek advice and treatment; and

   2. (2)

      a failure to comply with the schedule of movements and electronic monitoring conditions.

6. [28]

   As stated in the breach of parole report, the plaintiff was given a verbal warning as to his deviations. Despite that warning, further information was received from the electronic monitoring room to indicate that the plaintiff had again deviated from his schedule and attended an unapproved activity.

7. [29]

   As further set out in the breach report, the Community Corrections officer described the plaintiff's response to supervision as being unsatisfactory. It is apparent that the plaintiff had been engaged in a process of negotiation with a Community Corrections officer in terms of his compliance with parole conditions, and at least according to the breach report, became aggressive when being asked to comply with the conditions.

8. [30]

   The essential problem with this application is that, far from putting forward any information which might be viewed as false, misleading, or irrelevant, the plaintiff tends to acknowledge that he was in breach but seeks to justify or explain those breaches.

9. [31]

   In respect of his refusal to attend on the psychologist, he maintains that he should not have been required to do so because he would have been required to disclose a history with which he did not agree, and he would have been required to breach his right to privacy.

10. [32]

    In respect of the breaches relating to the schedule of movements, he acknowledges that there were breaches, but says that they were minor, and because of the very strict conditions imposed upon him, he needed to deviate to obtain food.

11. [33]

    Whether any of that which the plaintiff says is correct is not for me to determine on this application.

12. [34]

    Whatever justification or reason the plaintiff had for failing to comply with the conditions of parole, that was a matter for the Authority.

13. [35]

    To be clear, so as the plaintiff understands (as I am giving this judgment on an ex tempore basis so he hears it) my power is limited by the terms of s 176 of the Act. I am not today reviewing the terms of his parole, reviewing or reconsidering whether his parole should have been revoked, or even further considering whether he should ever have been convicted.

14. [36]

    In the end, the plaintiff has not adduced any evidence which would suggest that the information relied upon by the Authority was false, misleading, or irrelevant. To the contrary, he has rather confirmed that the information relied upon by the Authority was correct and accurate. It is just that he does not consider that it provided a proper basis for the revocation of parole. In other words, he considered that he was justified and entitled to respond to his parole conditions in the way that he did. Again, it is not my function to determine that today.

15. [37]

    In my view, there is not sufficient evidence to support the application. In that sense, the application might be dismissed as an abuse of process, or I might refuse to hear the application. It seems to me that the better course is, that having heard the application and having afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to present his arguments and evidence, I deal with the application on its merits. I have done so.

16. [38]

    In my view, there is no basis for the application. In those circumstances, the application is dismissed.

17. [39]

    With respect to any non-publication order, existing non-publication orders remain in place in terms of the nature of his offending and other matters.

18. [40]

    This judgment does not refer to the nature of the plaintiff’s offending or any details about the plaintiff. In those circumstances, I accept the Crown's submission that there is no need for a further non-publication order in respect of these proceedings, but again caution anyone who might be reporting of the existing non-publication order.

19. [41]

    I make the following order:

    1. (1)

       Application dismissed.