Advantaged Care Pty Ltd v Yehuda

By a Notice of Motion filed 21 January 2025, the Plaintiff seeks that summary judgment be entered in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant with respect to prayers 5 and 6 of the Plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim.

The applicable principles to be applied in applications of this kind are not in dispute. Briefly, the level of certainty required as to the outcome of the proceedings is high: Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales; Batistatos v Newcastle City Council (2006) 226 CLR 256 at [46]. It is not sufficient that the prospects of success are slight: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91. The Plaintiff must show that any asserted defence is “so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed” or is “manifestly groundless”: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128-129.

The Amended Statement of Claim in these proceedings was filed on 31 October 2024. It is alleged that the Plaintiff is the operator of an aged care facility, that one of the residents of that aged care facility was the late Mr Danny Yehuda, who was the brother of the Defendant, and he resided at the facility from December 2016 until his death in April 2024. Mr Yehuda’s residence in the facility was governed by a residential agreement which provided for the payment of various fees, and which was the subject of a personal guarantee by the Defendant. Those fees were not, for a period before the resident's death, paid, such that it is alleged that there is a debt of at least $292,852.43 (before interest) that is owing.

The residential agreement includes terms as follows:

The Amended Defence was filed on 4 March 2025. Most relevantly, [7F] of the Amended Defence pleads as follows:

Having regard to the clauses of the residential agreement set out above, I am not satisfied that in the event that [7F] of the Amended Defence is made out, that the Defendant's defence is so hopeless as to warrant summary judgment.

Resolution of the matter will no doubt require close consideration at trial. However, it seems to me that if the matters pleaded at [7F] are made good, there is a reasonably arguable defence to the claim in debt.

There was further argument about whether or not there was substantial performance, such that the doctrine of substantial performance may be engaged, but I am satisfied that that question, if it arises, would raise questions of fact that are not apt to be addressed in an application of this kind.

For those reasons, I propose to dismiss the application.

I order that the application is dismissed and that the Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant’s costs of the Notice of Motion on and from 21 February 2025 and that there otherwise be no order as to costs.