Mansour v The Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Parramatta

HIS HONOUR: In this matter the plaintiff makes a claim against the defendant, the Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Parramatta, alleging he suffered sexual abuse by three named alleged perpetrators whilst he was a student of the school then known as St Paul's College. The alleged perpetrators are named in the Statement of Claim as Brother Dominic, Brother Anthony and Brother Joseph. The matter is set down for hearing on 23 March 2026.

By Notice of Motion dated 2 March 2026, the plaintiff now seeks orders enabling the solicitors for the plaintiff to contact identified persons for the purposes of ascertaining their willingness to provide statements or other information relevant to the plaintiff's claim.

The context of the identity of those persons is as follows. A Notice to Produce was issued by the plaintiff to the defendant in June or July of 2025. The time for compliance with that Notice to Produce was, by consent, extended to 30 November 2025. Production was made by the defendant some 46 days after that time, so late but nevertheless production was made. Documents were produced on 16 January 2026. I am told that 1500 pages of documents were produced and this included 195 pages of documents which had redactions. Those redactions were not made by the defendant but were made by the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (2013–2017). The diocese produced the documents in their redacted form in accordance with its understanding of the appropriate legal position. No criticism is made of the diocese in that regard.

The matter came before me on 20 February 2026 where I made orders of the type commonly called "Storer orders" (see Storer v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1043). Those orders allow access to unredacted copies of the documents by the solicitors and counsel for the plaintiff. Those orders included restrictions on use of those documents pending further order or leave of the Court. Those restrictions generated the current motion.

The plaintiff relies upon an affidavit of his solicitor, Mr Jonathan O'Riordan. Mr O'Riordan has indicated in a table the names of persons whom he says he would like to interview by reason of the fact that they may be able to give relevant information in support of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. Such evidence or information would include evidence or information relating to the three alleged perpetrators and other matters.

Ms Waugh, solicitor for the defendant, has helpfully provided the Court with additional information with respect to certain details of those identified persons. From that information, I do not intend to allow the plaintiff's solicitor to speak to the person whose initials are “CN”, who appears in paragraph (c) of the orders sought in the motion. I am not satisfied, on the material that has been provided by the plaintiff or the additional information provided by Ms Waugh, that “CN” could give evidence or information relevant to the plaintiff's claim.

I am also not satisfied that the person with the initials “DE”, who appears at paragraph (g) of the orders sought in the notice of motion, could give relevant evidence or information. Ultimately, Mr Isackson of counsel, did not press for leave to speak to that person.

I have anonymised the names of those persons for the purposes of this judgment because some of those persons may give evidence of alleged abuse against themselves or about having seen or heard other matters which might be relevant to the plaintiff's claim that he was abused. As I have said, Mr O'Riordan has set out in a table form the names of the relevant persons. Those names are reflected in the notice of motion. He has also set out the information relevant to an assessment of the nature of the assistance those persons may give with respect to the plaintiff's claim.

Of course, I cannot accurately assess the actual relevance of information that may be given by those persons. Such a task could only be undertaken once the plaintiff's solicitor has spoken to those persons and, if they are willing, they have provided statements or information to the solicitors.

I am satisfied that the persons, other than the two persons I have previously identified, are persons who may be able to give information to the solicitors for the plaintiff that may be relevant to the plaintiff's claim. I will therefore grant leave to the solicitor for the plaintiff to contact those persons for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not those persons are willing to provide statements or other information relevant to the plaintiff's claim.

I will limit the persons from the plaintiff's solicitors who can contact those persons to Mr Jonathan O'Riordan, the solicitor acting on behalf of the plaintiff. Such a limitation is necessary so that there are not a significant number of persons contacting the identified people. It will lead to consistency in Mr O'Riordan's approach to those persons, he having knowledge of the plaintiff's claim being the solicitor on the record.

The defendant, who neither consents nor opposes the relief sought, has been of assistance and prepared an affidavit of Ms Dimento‑Haigh which has been read. The defendant also seeks an order that, at the time of contact by Mr O'Riordan with the persons named, they be told that the leave that is granted by the Court does not oblige them in any way to speak to or communicate with the plaintiff's solicitors.

Such a condition was made by Garling J in a similar matter: see WJT v The Trustees of the Marist Brothers; GAC v The Trustees of the Marist Brothers; WXC3 v The Trustees of the Marist Brothers [2024] NSWSC 1612. In my opinion, it is appropriate to require the solicitors for the plaintiff to identify that condition to the persons. It may be that, absent that condition, those persons on being told of leave having been granted by the Court would assume that they are obliged to speak to the solicitors for the plaintiff when that is simply not the case. It may well be they have good reasons, including embarrassment, stress or other reasons, as to why they would not want to discuss with the solicitors for the plaintiff, or anyone, the subject matters the solicitor will seek to speak with them about.

In all of the circumstances, therefore, the orders I make are as follows: