Dimitrovski v Boland (No 4)

The Court has before it today a motion dated 2 June 2025 by the plaintiff, Mr George Dimitrovski, who appears for himself. For the reasons which are set out below, the motion will be dismissed with no order as to costs.

The orders sought in the motion are:

I have given leave today for the motion to be filed in Court and have made it returnable instanter. It is necessary to set out some of the procedural history to explain why that course has been taken and why I am proceeding to dispose of the motion today absence of the respondents to the motion (the first, second and fourth defendants, to whom I shall refer without disrespect as the Bolands).

In October 2023, the Court made orders for the hearing of a separate question in relation to this long-running dispute between Mr Dimitrovski and at the time his late sister and the defendants, primarily the Bolands: Dimitrovski v Boland [2023] NSWSC 1371. That separate question was determined adversely to Mr Dimitrovski by a judgment that I delivered on 6 February 2025: Dimitrovski v Boland (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 17. The earlier history of this matter is set out in [9] to [25] of No 2.

As a result of the outcome in No 2, it became necessary to consider what consequences should follow for the rest of the proceedings. After a further hearing in April and May 2025, the Court resolved the future of these proceedings in Dimitrovski v Boland (No 3) [2025] NSWSC 1527. These reasons should be read, and assume familiarity with, No 2 and No 3.

While No 3 was reserved, on 3 June 2025 Mr Dimitrovski emailed the motion to my Associate. In response, my Associate notified the parties:

In No 3, the Court refused Mr Dimitrovski leave to file a further amended statement of claim, dismissed the proceedings and made a number of other orders. Those orders, made on 16 December 2025, were:

Because the motion included a prayer that the judgment be stayed and restricted from publication, as a precaution I did not publish No 3 on NSW Caselaw.

As will be apparent from the orders that I made on 16 December 2025, and in the interests of saving further costs in this long running dispute, I invited Mr Dimitrovski to provide the Court and the Bolands with his evidence and submissions in support of the motion. The Court would then consider whether what had been provided demonstrated a sufficiently arguable case that it would be necessary for the Court to call upon the Bolands to respond.

Mr Dimitrovski has provided to the Court with the following material: an affidavit sworn by him on 2 June 2025; an affidavit sworn by him on 26 January 2026; and a document dated 26 January 2026 and entitled, "Written Submissions in Support of the Plaintiff's Motion dated 2 June 2025". Mr Dimitrovski has confirmed to me today that is the total universe of the written material upon which he relies. He also took advantage of a further opportunity to address the Court this morning in which he reiterated his overarching submission that the Bolands had engaged in a fraud and a deception of which he, his late sister and Life Order Pty Ltd had been the victims.

Before turning to the specific orders sought in the motion, I set out the three matters that have arisen in recent times which Mr Dimitrovski contends are relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion in relation to the motion.

The first relates to a criminal complaint which Mr Dimitrovski originally made to the police in 2010 concerning the conduct of the Bolands. That complaint has been reactivated recently with what Mr Dimitrovski considers to be the benefit of further information that has come to light during the course of the hearings before me.

The evidence is that the complaint Mr Dimitrovski has made to the police has an active complaint number. The evidence does not disclose to what extent the complaint is actively being investigated by the police, but I will assume for the purposes of this judgment in Mr Dimitrovski's favour that those investigations are continuing. What is important for present purposes is that there is no evidence that any prosecution has been commenced of anybody in relation to the matters which Mr Dimitrovski has drawn to the attention of the police.

The second matter is that Mr Dimitrovski has made a complaint to the Legal Services Commissioner concerning the conduct of the Bolands' solicitor in these proceedings, Mr Phillip Tull. In the course of his submissions to me at the hearing which led to No 3, Mr Dimitrovski made a number of serious allegations about the propriety of Mr Tull's conduct. In No 3 (at [94]) I expressed this conclusion about the allegations against Mr Tull:

The evidence in relation to Mr Dimitrovski’s complaint is that it was received by the office of the New South Wales Legal Services Commissioner on 14 January 2026. By a response from that office on 15 January 2026, Mr Dimitrovski was informed that his complaint had been received and that it had been allocated a file number. The letter asked Mr Dimitrovski to be patient while the office undertook its usual processes to investigate the complaint, which could include writing to Mr Tull.

The third matter of present relevance is that Mr Dimitrovski has informed me that he has filed a notice of intention to appeal from what I will assume for the moment to be all of my previous decisions in this case. Pausing there, I have informed Mr Dimitrovski that, in my respectful view, it is the appellate course which he must now pursue, and it will be a matter for him whether he now does so.

Having carefully read all of Mr Dimitrovski's materials and heard him this morning, I have concluded that it is not necessary for the Court as a matter of procedural fairness to call upon the Bolands and to require the further expenditure of both time and money. That is because on its face I am more than satisfied that the Court would not, and in some respects could not, make the orders sought in the motion (set out in [2] above). Given this conclusion, I have proceeded to deliver these reasons notwithstanding that there was no appearance for the Bolands today.

I will briefly consider each of the substantive orders sought in the motion.

Order 1 seeks a stay of the present proceedings to allow criminal proceedings to commence as against all the defendants (including Mr Reid, who Mr Dimitrovski sought to bring back into the proceedings by his further amended statement of claim considered in No 3). There is no basis to stay these proceedings in circumstances where there are no criminal proceedings on foot and the Court has no evidence that would even enable it to conclude that there is a prospect that criminal proceedings will ever be brought.

As I have explained to Mr Dimitrovski, it is sometimes the case that when criminal proceedings are commenced that overlap with civil proceedings it is more often than not the defendants to the criminal proceedings who seek to have related civil proceedings stayed.

However, in the present circumstances where there is no indication as to whether any criminal proceedings are even likely, it would not be appropriate for the Court to make any kind of order staying the orders that I made on 16 December 2025 which brought these proceedings to an end. That is all that the Court could stay, because the proceedings are otherwise concluded.

Order 2 falls into the same category, being an order that my judgment be embargoed until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The reasons set out in [19] to [21] above also apply to explain why Order 2 will not be made.

As I indicated earlier, I refrained from publishing No 3 on NSW Caselaw against the possibility that Mr Dimitrovski would be able to demonstrate a proper basis on which publication of those reasons should be restricted. He has failed to do so and my Associate will arrange for the immediate electronic publication of that judgment.

Mr Dimitrovski’s submissions included expressions of concern about the influence my judgment in No 3 may have on some future jury. It is a matter for the future, and if criminal proceedings are commenced, for someone to make an application to the Court for the temporary restriction of my reasons if it were thought necessary for the fair and proper conduct of any criminal proceedings. However, again in the absence of any evidence that such proceedings are even likely, let alone as to what conduct may be the subject of any charges, it is not appropriate having regard to the principles of open justice that my judgment be restricted from publication.

Orders 3 and 4 relate to the costs of the proceedings by reference to the allegations concerning Mr Tull's conduct pending a tribunal investigation, or disciplinary proceedings, or as the Court may determine. In my respectful opinion, there is no basis to set aside the costs orders that I have made. Again, there is no evidence of what if any action may be taken against Mr Tull by reason of the complaint that Mr Dimitrovski has made to the Legal Services Commissioner.

The Court's conclusions concerning Mr Tull are reproduced in [14] above. They do not bind the Legal Services Commissioner. Nevertheless, it would be an extraordinary thing – and I can see no present basis (assuming the power) - to make either of the orders sought by Mr Dimitrovski as to costs dependent upon what he has submitted was the improper conduct of Mr Tull.

Order 5 seeks to restrain Mr Tull from continuing to act. Mr Dimitrovski has not demonstrated any basis on which at this stage the Court would make such an order. As a practical matter, the Court has no evidence that Mr Tull is continuing to act for the Bolands. It will be a matter for them whether they choose to retain him in any appeal which Mr Dimitrovski may wish to bring. While the Court undoubtedly has a supervisory jurisdiction that enables it to restrain solicitors from acting in particular circumstances, nothing in Mr Dimitrovski's material at the moment gives any reason for the Court to restrain Mr Tull from continuing to act for the Bolands if in fact it is the case that he will continue to do so.

Order 6 is an order that asks the Court to compel presumably a representative of the Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of Australia to appear in court to undergo some kind of examination. There are no proceedings on foot in which the Court could make such an order and, even if there were, the Court would not do so, even assuming relevance. That relevance remains completely obscure.

As part of Mr Dimitrovski's complaints against the Bolands I apprehend from the material that he has provided that he feels that there was misleading and deceptive conduct on the part of the Bolands by them apparently representing that they were Jehovah's Witnesses, as the Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of Australia is more commonly known. There is, in short, simply no basis for the Court either jurisdictionally (in the sense of power) or on the merits (assuming power), for the Court to make an order of the kind which Mr Dimitrovski seeks.

Finally, I do not propose to make an order vacating or varying any of the previous orders I have made. Mr Dimitrovski has made submissions that the orders that I have made should be set aside under UCPR 36.15 or based upon a general allegation of fraud. That rule provides:

It is sufficient to make two observations.

First, insofar as fraud is alleged, it is neither adequately nor properly particularised. More importantly, as I understand it, Mr Dimitrovski seeks to reprise allegations about the conduct of the Bolands which have, as to their essentials, been determined by me as a matter of findings of credit and otherwise in No 2. As I have indicated to Mr Dimitrovski, those are matters which he is entitled to take up in any appeal, however they do not constitute a basis to set aside the orders I have made.

In relation to the specific application of UCPR 36.15, its focus is upon the setting aside of the giving or entry of a judgment or order of the Court. In Tutoveanu v Velez (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 594, I said:

Applying those principles, the orders that I made on 16 December 2025 (and in my earlier judgments) have been made and there is nothing – and certainly not sufficient cause - in Mr Dimitrovski's material that would provide any basis for the Court to conclude that the giving or the entry of the Court's judgments or orders was irregular, illegal, or against good faith.

The Court understands that Mr Dimitrovski strongly believes that he and his late sister were wronged by conduct of the Bolands. The Court has considered the issues within the framework of the proceedings that Mr Dimitrovski has sought to bring and has reached the conclusions expressed in No 2 and No 3. I simply and respectfully reiterate that irrespective of what other course of action Mr Dimitrovski may wish to take in relation to the police or the Legal Services Commissioner, the matter upon which he should now focus in this Court, if he wishes to do so, is the prosecution of any appeal from my decisions.

I assume from their absence today that the Bolands have acted in accordance with the indication given in paragraph 8 of the orders made on 16 December 2025 (see [7] above). Therefore, the Court will make no order as to the costs of the motion.

The orders of the Court are: