Spencer v The Trustee for CCG Projects Trust

1. [1]

   By amended summons filed on 9 December 2025, Robin John Spencer (“the plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the decisions of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“NCAT”), NSW Fair Trading, and the NSW Sheriff’s Office relating to the termination of a residential tenancy agreement and his consequent eviction on 10 October 2024 (“the Summons proceedings”). The first defendant is the Trustee for CCG Projects Trust (ABN 99 267 782 452), the second defendant is CCG Pty Ltd (ACN 057 597 912), the third defendant is the Trustee for the RCS Unit Trust (ABN 95 406 425 484), the fourth defendant is Fairwether Holdings Pty Ltd (ACN 118 893 182), and the fifth defendant is the State of New South Wales.

2. [2]

   By amended statement of claim filed on 6 November 2025, the plaintiff seeks damages against the same five defendants for, inter alia, breach of statutory duties, tort of deceit, tort of misfeasance and “abuse of process” (“the Statement of Claim proceedings”).

3. [3]

   Both proceedings pertain to the same factual dispute. In short, the plaintiff, who is self-represented, challenges the decision of NCAT to make an order of termination of lease under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) (“RTA”) and grant possession to his then landlord on 18 September 2024, the decision of NSW Fair Trading on 23 July 2024 not to investigate his landlord while the NCAT proceedings were pending and the decision of the NSW Sheriff’s Office to execute the order for possession on 10 October 2024.

4. [4]

   Before the Court today are four notices of motion pertaining to both proceedings.

5. [5]

   The first notice of motion was filed by the plaintiff on 19 September 2025 in the Summons proceedings. He seeks orders that the time to file and serve the summons be extended to the date of filing, and that the Summons and Statement of Claim proceedings be heard together and case managed by a single judge.

6. [6]

   The second notice of motion was filed by the second defendant, who I propose to refer to for convenience as “CCG”, on 31 October 2025 in the Statement of Claim proceedings. CCG seeks orders that it be removed as a party to the proceedings. In the alternative, it seeks an order that the proceedings be dismissed in relation to all claims against it or that the statement of claim be struck out as against it.

7. [7]

   Similarly, the third notice of motion filed by CCG on 7 November 2025 in the Summons proceedings also seeks orders that it be removed as a party or that the summons be dismissed in relation to all claims against it. This motion also seeks an order that certain paragraphs of some of the plaintiff’s affidavits be struck out.

8. [8]

   The fourth notice of motion was filed by the plaintiff on 18 November 2025 in the Statement of Claim proceedings. He seeks the following orders:

   1. (1)

      That the second defendant’s notice of motion filed 31 October 2025 be dismissed;

   2. (2)

      That the affidavit of Jacob Inatey sworn 31 October 2025 be struck out as false, misleading and an abuse of the process of the Court;

   3. (3)

      In the alternative to order 2, that Jacob Inatey attend the hearing of this motion to be cross-examined on his affidavit; and

   4. (4)

      That the plaintiff have leave to file a second amended statement of claim joining Roky Gorgees and CCG Projects Pty Ltd as the sixth and seventh defendants.

9. [9]

   I should note at the outset that the affidavit of Jacob Inatey was not ultimately read in these proceedings and thus it was not necessary for the Court to consider either orders two or three in that fourth notice of motion.

Evidence on the motions

1. [10]

   The parties filed a joint court book that comprised four volumes of material, two volumes in each proceedings.

2. [11]

   In the Summons proceedings, Mr Spencer relied on three affidavits: two affirmed on 13 August 2025, including one in support of his extension of time application, and a further affidavit affirmed on 9 March 2026.

3. [12]

   In the Statement of Claim proceedings, Mr Spencer relies on an affidavit affirmed on 18 November 2025 in support of his motion and two affidavits affirmed on 9 March 2026.

4. [13]

   Some of the allegations made in these affidavits are the subject of orders sought by CCG that they be struck out. For reasons to which I will return, I do propose to strike out the relevant paragraphs of those affidavits.

5. [14]

   CCG relied on two affidavits sworn by George Inatey sworn on 25 February 2026, one in each proceedings.

6. [15]

   Further, the third and fourth defendants filed an affidavit of Sharon Begovich affirmed on 20 April 2026. Ms Begovich is the director and principal of the fourth defendant, Fairwether Holdings Pty Ltd, which is the corporate trustee of the third defendant, the RCS Unit Trust. For ease of reference, I propose to refer to those defendants collectively as “LJ Hooker Fairfield”.

7. [16]

   One of the orders sought by the plaintiff in the fourth notice of motion was that Roky Gorgees and CCG Projects Pty Ltd be added as the sixth and seventh defendants. Mr Vuu appeared on behalf of those parties and consented to CCG Projects Pty Ltd being joined as the sixth defendant but opposed the joining of the director of that company, Mr Gorgees. I will return to that issue later in these reasons. I do propose to join the sixth defendant. The sixth defendant relied upon an affidavit of Pasquale Maltese affirmed on 23 April 2026. Only paragraphs 1 to 8 of that affidavit were read in relation to the motions before the Court today.

Background

1. [17]

   On 10 November 2022, Mr Spencer entered into a residential tenancy agreement to rent premises located at Unit 3, 64 Hamilton Road, Fairfield NSW 2165 (“the premises”). This agreement named the landlord as “Kingdom Developments”.

2. [18]

   On 14 June 2023, the residential block of units in which the premises was located was the subject of a mortgagee sale to CGG Projects Pty Ltd (ACN 667 282 144) ATF CCG Projects Trust (ABN 99 267 782 452) (emphasis added).

3. [19]

   All of the tenants of the block of units were issued with a Notice of Attornment confirming the sale and informing them that all rent, outgoings, fees and other monies payable under the lease were now payable to the purchaser. Annexed to the affidavit of Ms Begovich is a copy of the letter sent by HWL Ebsworth Lawyers addressed to Mr Spencer at the premises and signed by both a partner and special counsel at that firm. Mr Spencer denies receiving that letter.

4. [20]

   The fourth defendant, LJ Hooker Fairfield, was subsequently appointed as managing agent of the unit. On or about 9 August 2023, Ms Begovich lodged a “Change of Managing Agent/Owner” form with Fair Trading NSW confirming the details of the new owner as CCG Projects Pty Ltd with the same ACN and ABN as trustee for CCG Projects Trust. A copy of that document was before the Court as was the ASIC company search and ABN “lookup” search of that company. Ms Diana Franso of LJ Hooker Fairfield became Mr Spencer’s new agent and numerous emails between them were annexed to some of Mr Spencer’s affidavits.

5. [21]

   On 20 February 2024, Mr Spencer filed an application in NCAT against his landlord, CCG Projects, seeking orders for repairs, namely the installation of a rangehood above the oven and modifications to the front door to ensure fire safety compliance. On 9 May 2024, General Member George ordered a rent reduction for the repairs to the oven and the door but rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the Fire Safety Compliance Certificate relied upon by the landlord’s agents in relation to the front door was fraudulent or false and misleading.

6. [22]

   Following this partially unfavourable finding by the Member, Mr Spencer did not appeal any part of this decision. He had a right of appeal on any question of law under s 80(2)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (“NCAT Act”) and with the leave of the Panel on any other ground. He could have appealed, if leave was granted, on a question of fact under cl 12 of Sch 4 of the NCAT Act which provides as follows:

7. [23]

   Instead of exercising his appeal rights, Mr Spencer sought to relitigate the parts of the NCAT decision in relation to which he was unsuccessful with the landlord. On 17 May 2024, he wrote to LJ Hooker Fairfield raising “critical compliance issues” with the premises, including the non-compliance of doors with fire safety standards and failure to keep an asbestos register.

8. [24]

   On 21 May 2024, Ms Franso issued a “no grounds” termination notice requiring Mr Spencer to vacate the premises by 20 August 2024. Regrettably, that notice erroneously identified the landlord as “CCG Pty Ltd” instead of CCG Projects Pty Ltd. Not only that, but it did not include the relevant ACN or ABN. That oversight has caused significant concern to Mr Spencer and is the cause of him having believed for some time that a fraud was committed upon him, NCAT and the Court.

9. [25]

   On 22 May 2024, Mr Spencer wrote to Ms Franso and demanded to know why he was being evicted. In response on 23 May 2024, Ms Franso advised him that the owner wanted the property back, that some repairs would be undertaken and that a relative would be moving in.

10. [26]

    On 31 May 2024, Mr Spencer filed an application with NCAT making a number of complaints as follows:

    1. (1)

       That the termination notice was retaliatory under s 115 of the RTA;

    2. (2)

       That he had suffered a loss of quiet enjoyment due to the notice which is a breach of his agreement and the RTA;

    3. (3)

       That the landlord was in breach of his agreement due to the fire door and the lack of an asbestos register; and

    4. (4)

       That due to these breaches, he was entitled to $100,000 compensation.

11. [27]

    In relation to the first of these complaints, Mr Spencer relied on s 115 of the RTA which is headed “Retaliatory evictions” and relevantly provides that NCAT may, on application by a tenant, declare that a termination notice has no effect if it is satisfied that the notice was a “retaliatory notice”. Such an order can only be made if NCAT is satisfied that the landlord was “wholly or partly motivated” to give the notice for any of three specified reasons set out in s 115(2), namely:

12. [28]

    After commencing these proceedings in NCAT, Mr Spencer also lodged complaints with NSW Fair Trading between 31 May and 5 June 2024 concerning the allegedly fraudulent compliance certificate and the retaliatory eviction of the plaintiff. He requested a formal investigation, alleging that the second defendant was using its corporate structure to conceal illicit activities.

13. [29]

    On 23 July 2024, NSW Fair Trading declined to intervene on the basis that the matter was before NCAT which was the appropriate body to resolve that issue.

14. [30]

    On 20 August 2024, NCAT dismissed Mr Spencer’s application. In relation to the claim of retaliatory action, it was noted that none of the three grounds in s 115(2) arose. The parties to this decision were described as “Robin Spencer v CCG Pty Ltd ATF CCG Projects Trust”. A supplementary order was made to insert the missing ABN. Annexure 1 to Ms Begovich’s affidavit shows her handwritten notations to the Termination Notice adding the ABN “99 267 782 452”, which is the ABN of CCG Projects Trust. The obvious difficulty with this is that the landlord was CCG Projects not CCG.

15. [31]

    On 30 August 2024, an application for termination and vacant possession was filed by LJ Hooker Fairfield with NCAT. In this application, the applicant was identified as “Roky Gorgees” of “CCG Pty Ltd” using the ABN of CCG Projects Pty Ltd.

16. [32]

    On 18 September 2024, an order granting vacant possession and issuing a warrant for possession was granted.

17. [33]

    Following that, the plaintiff reported “fraudulent conduct” to the NSW Police by filling out a Fraud Report Form. He named Sharon Begovich as the person of interest and George Inatey as another involved party. The form detailed the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the discrepancy of Roky Gorgees being named as the applicant for CCG Pty Ltd, the use of outdated company information, the use of forged documents to obtain the NCAT order and a “suspicious asset sale” by the major shareholder of CCG Pty Ltd. The police declined to receive the report.

18. [34]

    On 10 October 2024, the warrant for possession was enforced by officers from the NSW Sheriff’s Office.

19. [35]

    On that day, the plaintiff called the police. He claims that the police operator was dismissive and told him to, “[s]top wasting our time”. He also claims that his call was internally rerouted.

20. [36]

    On 11 October 2024, the plaintiff emailed the Sheriff’s Enforcement Operations Centre claiming that the warrant was unenforceable. The plaintiff then called the Sheriff’s Department on that same day. He states:

21. [37]

    On the same day, the Department replied by email and stated that since possession of the premises was signed over to LJ Hooker Fairfield on behalf of the landlord, the NSW Sheriff’s Office ceased to have any further involvement in the matter. As I have indicated, the warrant for possession was enforced on 10 October 2024.

The second and third notices of motion

1. [38]

   While various orders are sought by the second defendant and the plaintiff, the essential issue between the parties is the identity of the true landlord of the premises.

2. [39]

   In the written material before the Court, CCG submits that it is not and never has been the owner or landlord of the premises. Instead, at all relevant times the premises were owned by CCG Projects Pty Ltd.

3. [40]

   In his pleadings and affidavits, Mr Spencer has stated repeatedly that CCG and not CCG Projects is the landlord and had insisted that CCG was involved in the NCAT proceedings despite its denials. In doing so, he has made serious allegations against CCG including of fraud, money laundering, asset dissipation and maintaining a deceased person as a company officer. It is those serious allegations that CCG seeks to have struck out.

4. [41]

   Although ultimately in this Court the plaintiff accepted that the second defendant was not his landlord at the relevant time, it is necessary to set out the evidence which leads me to be satisfied that that is the case

5. [42]

   It is common ground that in Mr Spencer’s residential tenancy agreement dated 10 November 2022, the landlord is identified as “Kingdom Developments”. This is not a registered business or trading name, nor a corporation appearing on the Australian Business Register. As noted in the NCAT order on 20 August 2024, “[i]t does not exist”.

6. [43]

   The fact that Kingdom Developments no longer exists does not take the question of who the landlord was at the dates of the relevant decisions that Mr Spencer now seeks to impugn any further. The fact remains that by then the premises had been sold and Kingdom Developments was no longer the landlord.

7. [44]

   The question that Mr Spencer raised was whether his landlord was CCG Projects or CCG. The evidence before me is as follows.

8. [45]

   First, in his affidavits Mr George Inatey deposes that he is the sole director and secretary of CCG Pty Ltd. He states that CCG has never owned the premises nor had any dealings or associations with CCG Projects or Roky Gorgees.

9. [46]

   Secondly, Ms Begovich from LJ Hooker Fairfield, who Mr Spencer agrees was his managing agent at the relevant time, deposes that the landlord who appointed her as managing agent was CCG Projects Pty Ltd and not CCG Pty Ltd.

10. [47]

    Thirdly, the applicant for termination and vacant possession was named as “Roky Gorgees” of “CCG Pty Ltd” but using the ABN of CCG Projects Pty Ltd.

11. [48]

    Fourthly, in the affidavit of Pasquale Maltese, who is the solicitor of what is now the sixth defendant, he has annexed searches showing that CCG Projects is the owner of the premises.

12. [49]

    In his written material, the documents that Mr Spencer relied on to dispute that CCG Projects was his landlord was that, first, when he received trust account receipts from LJ Hooker Fairfield the landlord was described as CCG Pty Ltd with the ABN of 99267782452 and, secondly, he noted that the NCAT orders include CCG Pty Ltd as being the landlord.

13. [50]

    In fact, the NCAT proceedings name the landlord variously as follows:

    1. (1)

       In the NCAT order of 9 May 2024, the landlord is identified as “CCG Pty Ltd”;

    2. (2)

       In the NCAT order of 20 August 2024, the landlord is identified as “CCG PTY LTD ATF CCG PROJECTS TRUST”; and

    3. (3)

       In the NCAT order of 18 September 2024, the landlord is identified as “CCG Pty Ltd”.

14. [51]

    The orders sought by the second defendant are that it be removed as a party to both proceedings.

15. [52]

    Rule 6.29 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) provides that the Court may order that a person who has been improperly or unnecessarily joined be removed as a party. I would accede to that order if I was satisfied that the second defendant has been improperly joined. I would be so satisfied if the evidence established that the second defendant was not Mr Spencer’s landlord at the relevant time.

16. [53]

    Ultimately, when the hearing commenced before me today, the plaintiff accepted that to be the case. Even if he had not, I am easily satisfied that that is the case having regard to the contents of the affidavits and other documentation before me, which I have already described.

17. [54]

    It is most unfortunate that more care was not taken by LJ Hooker Fairfield who misdescribed the landlord in the trust receipts and the termination letter and did not remedy that when the orders were made. But the question raised in the motion is not whether that clerical error has any relevance to the decisions under review but whether the second defendant should be removed as a party and it has established that it should be.

18. [55]

    For completeness, I notice that Mr Spencer's motions filed on 18 November 2025 also sought other orders in relation to those motions but given the ultimate resolution of the removal of the second defendant I do not propose to make any of those orders.

19. [56]

    As for the second defendant’s application that portions of the plaintiff's affidavit be excluded, I propose to grant those orders and specifically strike out the following paragraphs from the three affidavits of the plaintiff:

    1. (1)

       As for the plaintiff’s affidavit affirmed on 13 August 2025, paragraphs 25 to 28, paragraphs 30 to 31 and pages 155 to 186 of the court book, being annexures to that affidavit, are struck out.

    2. (2)

       Secondly, the plaintiff's affidavit affirmed on 9 March 2026, filed in the Statement of Claim proceedings, I strike out paragraphs 25 to 28, paragraphs 30 to 31 and pages 236 to 267 of the court book, being annexures to that affidavit.

    3. (3)

       Thirdly, in relation to the plaintiff’s affidavit affirmed on 18 November 2025, I strike out paragraphs 16 to 20 and paragraphs 22 to 23.

20. [57]

    The remaining outstanding issue in relation to the second defendant was the appropriate costs order. Section 98(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) provides that the Court has “full power to determine by whom, to whom and to what extent costs are to be paid”. The discretion is subject to the qualification that it “must be exercised judicially in accordance with established principle and factors directly connected with the litigation”: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; [1998] HCA 11 at [65] (McHugh J). One of the fetters on that discretion is the rules of the Court contained in Pt 42 of the UCPR. The usual rule is that costs follow the event unless it appears to the Court that some other order should be made: UCPR, r 42.1.

21. [58]

    The second defendant has been successful and I am satisfied that it should have its costs paid. During the hearing today, Mr Robertson of counsel, who appeared for the second defendant, sought that I would make a Bullock order requiring the third, fourth and sixth defendants to also contribute to the costs. Submissions were made in relation to that issue, but I propose to reserve my reasons as to the costs order. I have heard submissions on it. I will provide my judgment in relation to that to the parties at a later date.

The first and fourth motions

1. [59]

   The remaining order of Mr Spencer’s second motion was for leave to file a second amended statement of claim joining Roky Gorgees and CCG Projects Pty Ltd as the sixth and seventh defendants.

2. [60]

   As for whether Mr Gorgees should be joined to the Statement of Claim proceedings, Mr Vuu, on behalf of both he and the sixth defendant, opposed that order being granted. He took the Court to the proposed second amended statement of claim, which the applicant sought leave to file, joining those two defendants.

3. [61]

   He noted the plaintiff’s allegations in that proposed second amended statement of claim as follows:

   1. (1)

      At proposed paragraph 6C, that Mr Gorgees, as the sole director of the sixth defendant, instituted a “fraudulent” application for termination and vacant possession;

   2. (2)

      At proposed paragraph 21A, that Mr Gorgees “deliberately and falsely” represented that he was acting on behalf of the second defendant; and

   3. (3)

      At proposed paragraph 30V, that Mr Gorgees “on behalf of the Sixth Defendant is alleged to have made a false representation”.

4. [62]

   Mr Vuu’s submission was that any relief that the plaintiff sought in relation to those allegations could still be granted in circumstances where the sixth defendant is a party to those proceedings. It was submitted that under UCPR r 6.24 it was not necessary for the resolution of the issues before the Court that the seventh defendant be joined. Mr Vuu also took the Court to the principles set out at [17] of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tarmoor Coal Pty Ltd v Visser [2022] NSWCA 35. After Mr Spencer heard those submissions and understood the effect of them, he did not press the application for the seventh defendant to be joined to the Statement of Claim proceedings.

5. [63]

   That leaves the remaining orders as being the filing of the statement of claim, whether both matters should be case managed by a single judge and, thirdly, whether the plaintiff, Mr Spencer, should be granted leave to bring these proceedings out of time. UCPR r 59.10(3) is in these terms:

6. [64]

   In Dyason v Butterworth [2015] NSWCA 52, McColl JA (with whom Barrett and Gleeson JJA agreed) identified (at [65]) two additional factors to which it is necessary to have regard when determining whether to extend time to bring proceedings for judicial review. Those two factors are the length of the delay and whether or not the plaintiff has “a fairly arguable case”.

7. [65]

   The plaintiff identified three key factors for the delay in commencing these proceedings.

8. [66]

   First, he pointed to the personal instability and displacement caused by this eviction. He deposes that he was homeless and was forced to seek emergency accommodation assistance. This also interfered with his ability to seek employment.

9. [67]

   Secondly, the plaintiff submitted that he exhausted every available avenue of support. This included seeking assistance from NSW Fair Trading, Legal Aid NSW, the Law Society of New South Wales Pro Bono Scheme, the Macarthur Legal Centre, the NSW Ombudsman and ICAC. The plaintiff states that these entities have all either declined to advise him or discouraged him from pursuing the matter. The plaintiff specifically points to the advice of NSW Fair Trading that NCAT had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter which he says he relied upon to his detriment.

10. [68]

    Thirdly, Mr Spencer attributed further delay to his attempts to engage private representation. He approached Jason Li Laywers who briefed counsel Mr Jayden Krieg for the purposes of a merits advice. Mr Krieg advised that the case had no reasonable prospects of success. Thus, he submitted, the delay is explained by the significant time required for him, as a self-represented litigant, to research and compile the extensive evidence necessary to bring this complex matter before the Court.

11. [69]

    These will ultimately all be relevant matters for the Court to determine but given that the question of the merits of the application is relevant to the question of leave it seems to me that both questions should be dealt with together at the final hearing. In other words, the question of whether an extension of time should be granted should be heard concurrently with the finalisation of the judicial review proceedings.

12. [70]

    I do not propose to make the orders sought by Mr Spencer that the Summons and Statement of Claim proceedings be heard together. Rather it seems to me that the Summons proceedings, which are confined and on a narrow legal issue, should be determined first and pending the ultimate resolution of those proceedings the question of the resolution of the Statement of Claim proceedings can then be considered.

Orders

1. [71]

   Accordingly, I propose to make the following orders in relation to the notices of motion:

   1. (1)

      The second defendant is removed from both judicial review proceedings 2025/00361491 and the common law proceedings 2025/00361558.

   2. (2)

      The question of the appropriate costs order in relation to the second defendant is reserved.

   3. (3)

      Court grants leave for the CCG Projects Pty Ltd to be added as the sixth defendant in the common law proceedings 2025/00361558.

   4. (4)

      Court grants leave for CCG Projects Pty Ltd to be added as the seventh defendant in the judicial review proceedings 2025/00361491.

2. [72]

   I make the following further orders in relation to the judicial review proceedings 2025/00361491:

   1. (1)

      The plaintiff is to file and serve his written submissions no later than 5pm on Thursday, 21 May 2026.

   2. (2)

      The third and fourth defendants are to file and serve their written submissions no later than 5pm on Thursday, 4 June 2026.

   3. (3)

      The State of NSW is to file and serve its written submissions by 5pm on Thursday, 21 June 2026.

   4. (4)

      The seventh defendant is to file and serve its written submissions by 5pm on Thursday, 2 July 2026.

   5. (5)

      The plaintiff is to file and serve any written submissions in reply and 5pm on 9 July 2026.

   6. (6)

      The judicial review proceedings is listed for hearing on 6 August 2026 with the estimate 1 day.

   7. (7)

      Usual order as to the provision of the joint court book no later than 3 days prior to the hearing.