Prakash v Commonwealth Securities Ltd

1. [1]

   Mr Arjun Prakash sues Commonwealth Securities Ltd (trading as CommSec) for damages in the sum of $5,126,850. Mr Prakash has elected to represent himself in these proceedings.

2. [2]

   CommSec provides online brokerage services for shares, derivatives and other products. Mr Prakash opened an exchange-traded options account with CommSec in July 2024. He traded on that account on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) until 15 May 2025, when CommSec closed out Mr Prakash’s positions because he failed to meet a margin call.

3. [3]

   I address below the substance of Mr Prakash’s claim in detail. In summary, however, his complaint is founded on three related propositions. First, he submits that when CommSec calculated its margin requirements for the account, it disregarded or undervalued assets he says he was able to provide as collateral. Secondly, and in consequence, the margin requirements imposed by CommSec were far too high and were fraudulent. Thirdly, when Mr Prakash failed to meet margin calls to satisfy those requirements, CommSec illegitimately closed out his positions, and he suffered loss as a result.

4. [4]

   Mr Prakash seeks compensation for that loss. He has proceeded against CommSec not only in this Court but, as I shall return to below, in the Supreme Courts of Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory as well.

5. [5]

   There are two competing motions before the Court for determination. By Notice of Motion filed on 13 December 2025, Mr Prakash seeks default judgment for $5,126,850 plus costs. By Notice of Motion filed on the same date, CommSec seeks that the Plaintiff’s claim be summarily dismissed or, in the alternative, that his pleading be struck out.

6. [6]

   I propose to deal with the motions in that order. Before doing so, it is helpful to set out the procedural history of this matter.

Procedural background

1. [7]

   On 27 June 2025, Mr Prakash commenced proceedings (Proceedings 2680) in the Supreme Court of Queensland by Originating Application, in which he sought leave to file a Claim and Statement of Claim. He subsequently furnished CommSec with several iterations of a draft Statement of Claim. Following further procedural steps, CommSec applied for those proceedings to be dismissed. That application, and Mr Prakash’s application for leave to file a Statement of Claim, was listed for hearing before Williams J on 21 November 2025.

2. [8]

   Despite his extant application in Proceedings 2680, on 26 September 2025 Mr Prakash commenced a second set of proceedings (Proceedings 4323) in that Court seeking leave to file a claim and statement of claim, substantially on the same basis as the first application. CommSec sought that those proceedings be dismissed. The competing applications were ultimately also listed for hearing on 21 November 2025 before Williams J.

3. [9]

   Her Honour heard all the applications together on 21 November 2025 and delivered ex tempore judgments. In respect of Proceedings 4323, Williams J dismissed those proceedings because they were an abuse of process, given that they raised “the same or substantially the same cause of action as the earlier proceeding”: Tcpt, 21 November 2025, p 18(16–17). In relation to Proceedings 2680, her Honour refused Mr Prakash leave to file a draft statement of claim because it was “clearly deficient” in respect of all pleading rules and “completely incomprehensible”: pp 37(43), 38(1). Her Honour then dismissed Proceedings 2680 for the following reasons:

   1. (1)

      Mr Prakash was “given multiple occasions to put forward a statement of claim which identifies a viable and reasonable cause of action and plead the material facts”: pp 38(28–30). CommSec submitted that “that position is not likely to change, and, in the circumstances, the proceeding as presently constituted is an abuse of process”: p 38(32–34);

   2. (2)

      the Court was “left with a current version of a[n] originating application, which does not identify any relief that could be obtained if [Mr Prakash] was ultimately successful, and is also faced with a proposed statement of claim which simply asserts various civil causes of action and some criminal offences without pleading of material facts to support them”: p 39(1–5); and

   3. (3)

      “there is not a document which meets [the relevant requirements] of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules”: p 39(28–29).

4. [10]

   It is worth recording that Mr Prakash also made an application for a temporary stay of the Queensland proceedings as he had by then commenced proceedings in New South Wales, which he considered was a “better forum”. In refusing that application, Williams J noted that “it appears that the multiplicity of proceedings is reflected in the proposed statement of claim in this court and potentially with what has been filed in the New South Wales court”: p 31(1–3).

5. [11]

   On 14 October 2025, while both of his proceedings were pending in the Supreme Court of Queensland, Mr Prakash filed an Originating Claim and Statement of Claim in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The claim that Mr Prakash sought to prosecute in that Court was the same, or substantially the same, as that brought in the Supreme Court of Queensland and, subsequently, the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

6. [12]

   Mr Prakash apparently applied for a stay of those proceedings while his case in this Court was pending. CommSec applied alternatively to set aside, dismiss or stay the proceedings. Those applications were heard by Muller AJ on 20 February 2026.

7. [13]

   His Honour delivered judgment on 27 March 2026: Prakash v Commonwealth Securities Ltd [2026] ACTSC 77 (Prakash). In summary, Mr Prakash’s claim was set aside because it was an abuse of process. At [21], Muller AJ recorded that:

8. [14]

   Mr Prakash commenced these proceedings by Statement of Claim filed on 5 November 2025. In that pleading, he claimed the sum of $5,110,000, comprising $3.5 million for liquidated damages, $1.5 million for compensation, $100,000 in interest, and $10,000 in costs. The Statement of Claim appears to have been served by 14 November 2025. CommSec filed an Appearance on 21 November 2025.

9. [15]

   As stated above, on 13 December 2025, the parties filed their competing motions. Apparently in light of CommSec’s motion, on 23 December 2025 Mr Prakash filed an Amended Statement of Claim. That pleading seeks damages in the amount of $5,126,850, declaratory relief, interest and costs.

10. [16]

    No Defence to either pleading has been filed.

11. [17]

    On 15 December 2025, the matter came before the Common Law Registrar for directions. The Court made orders setting down the motions for hearing and for the provision of evidence and submissions in that regard. Since that date, the Plaintiff has either filed or attempted to file many affidavits.

12. [18]

    On 30 March 2026, Mr Prakash also attempted to file a further Notice of Motion seeking default judgment. That document was sealed, but on 2 April 2026 the Principal Registrar informed Mr Prakash by letter that the Notice of Motion was being returned to him because the matter had already been listed to be dealt with before me. I should indicate that there is no prejudice to Mr Prakash in this course. His Notice of Motion for default judgment filed on 13 December 2025 is before the Court and I will deal with that motion on its merits.

13. [19]

    On 15 April 2026, Mr Prakash filed a third Notice of Motion. By that motion he sought an array of relief, ranging from a dismissal of CommSec’s motion for want of due despatch, writs of execution, declaratory relief in relation to the substantive claim, and the referral of the matter for investigation by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Strictly speaking, that motion was not listed for hearing before the Court. In any event, no submissions were made in relation to it at the hearing, and the relief sought by it is peripheral to the issues I must decide.

The hearing on 23 April 2026

1. [20]

   The parties’ respective motions were heard by me on 23 April 2026. Mr Prakash appeared in person and was assisted by his wife. Mr Foley of Counsel appeared for CommSec. The Court was in receipt of a court book of 1541 pages, prepared by CommSec, which included all the pleadings, motions and evidence filed in these proceedings, as well as CommSec’s written submissions dated 9 April 2026.

2. [21]

   Mr Prakash made detailed oral submissions. He took the Court to documents he had filed and handed up a document which included short minutes of order he asked the Court to make. His submissions canvassed several aspects of the case, but they fell into three broad categories.

3. [22]

   First, Mr Prakash raised a threshold objection to the Court’s jurisdiction to determine the matter. The basis for this objection was that Mr Prakash had already obtained a default judgment against CommSec in the proceedings, such that the Court was functus officio and there was nothing left to determine. In response I asked Mr Prakash whether, in accordance with his Notice of Motion filed on 13 December 2025, he asked me to enter default judgment against CommSec. Mr Prakash said that he did. However, he then returned to his contention that default judgment had already been entered and that the Court was no longer seized of jurisdiction.

4. [23]

   Secondly, Mr Prakash made submissions on the substance of his case. He addressed the history of the matter and CommSec’s purported unlawful conduct. He explained the loss that CommSec’s conduct had caused and the impact it had on him and his wife. I have considered these submissions in assisting my understanding of the nature of his claim.

5. [24]

   Thirdly, Mr Prakash made allegations of criminal conduct against CommSec and its solicitors. That conduct included fraud, perjury, and attempting to pervert the course of justice. As a result, he said that this was not really a civil matter but a criminal one, and that the Court should either make findings to that effect or refer the matter to the authorities for investigation and prosecution.

6. [25]

   When Mr Prakash concluded his submissions in chief, I indicated that I proposed to hear from Mr Foley on the motions before the Court. Mr Prakash objected to that course. He submitted that because CommSec had not filed a Defence, and because the Court was functus officio, CommSec had no right to be heard and its motion was incompetent. I rejected this submission. I explained to Mr Prakash that the Court had to afford both parties natural justice and that fairness required that CommSec be allowed to address the Court just as he had. I also indicated that it was in Mr Prakash’s interest to allow that to occur, because if he obtained a favourable outcome in these proceedings where CommSec was denied the opportunity to be heard, that outcome would be liable to be set aside by the Court of Appeal because of procedural unfairness.

7. [26]

   Mr Foley moved on CommSec’s motion and read its evidence in support. He relied on CommSec’s written submissions and did not make an oral address.

8. [27]

   Mr Prakash made submissions in reply. Those submissions were in substance the same as those delivered in chief.

9. [28]

   In his oral submissions, Mr Prakash was polite, sincere and firm. The distress that these proceedings, and the events that have given rise to them, have caused him and his wife was evident. He informed the Court that his wife has been diagnosed with cancer. I gathered that a very substantial part of his savings has been lost. He invokes this Court’s jurisdiction to seek redress for the injustice he says has been visited upon him.

10. [29]

    I indicated to the parties at the conclusion of the hearing that I would review all the material carefully, including the pleadings, submissions and evidence that had been filed, as well as the transcript of Mr Prakash’s detailed oral submissions. I have done so in determining the matter and formulating these reasons.

Has Mr Prakash obtained a judgment?

1. [30]

   Mr Prakash believes that he has obtained judgment against CommSec for the amount claimed. He first disclosed this view to the Registrar at the directions hearing on 15 December 2025. The Registrar informed him that no such judgment had yet been entered but that the Court would consider his motion for default judgment and CommSec’s motion for summary dismissal at the same time. Mr Prakash has not accepted this explanation.

2. [31]

   Mr Prakash’s belief that he has obtained judgment precipitated his sending 35 emails in relation to these proceedings in the week prior to the hearing. Those emails were sent to approximately 50 recipients each including my chambers, the registrars of this Court, many employees of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (including its executives), and many employees of CommSec’s solicitors. Those emails assert various acts of fraud, deception, perjury, perverting the course of justice, and other criminality perpetrated by CommSec and its solicitors, including but not limited to their attempts to interfere with his “perfected judgment”. Mr Prakash both threatened and disclosed referral of that conduct to the AFP, the New South Wales Police, ASIC and other entities. The emails are lengthy and canvass such topics as the “deep in the money fraud”, the “cash in the vault fraud”, the “signatory vacuum”, and “the ‘Jenolan Caves’ smokescreen”. In each case Mr Prakash signs off as “Judgment Creditor”.

3. [32]

   I have some difficulty in discerning the relevance of the issues raised in that correspondence to the issues before the Court for determination. Insofar as it asserts improper or criminal conduct on the part of CommSec and its solicitors, there is no foundation for those assertions and I have disregarded them.

4. [33]

   At the hearing before me, Mr Prakash made two contradictory submissions: on the one hand, he asked me to enter judgment against CommSec, but on the other, he contended that the Court’s jurisdiction was spent because he had already obtained judgment.

5. [34]

   Insofar as Mr Prakash remains in the belief that he has obtained a judgment, his belief is mistaken. He applied for default judgment on 13 December 2025. As the Registrar explained to him at the directions hearing two days later, that motion had not been determined. On that date, the question of whether Mr Prakash’s application for default judgment should be granted was listed for hearing on 23 April 2026. By these reasons I determine that application.

6. [35]

   It follows that I reject Mr Prakash’s submission that the Court is functus officio and that it has no jurisdiction to determine the motions before it.

Mr Prakash’s motion for default judgment

1. [36]

   Mr Prakash seeks default judgment against CommSec for the liquidated sum of $5,126,850 plus costs. The Court has the power to enter a default judgment on a debt or liquidated claim under r 16.6 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), which relevantly provides:

2. [37]

   Rule 14.13(2) applies to proceedings in the Local Court and has no relevance here.

3. [38]

   A defendant is in default if it “fails to file a defence within the time limited by rule 14.3(1) or within such further time as the court allows”: UCPR r 16.2(1)(a). The time limited by r 14.3(1) is 28 days after service on the defendant of the Statement of Claim. In the absence of any orders extending the time within which a Defence may be filed, CommSec is in default.

4. [39]

   However, Mr Prakash’s application encounters two difficulties.

5. [40]

   First, it is not apparent to me that Mr Prakash’s claim is for a debt or liquidated amount. In his Amended Statement of Claim, he claims $5,126,850 “for Damages”, at least partly for “breach of contract, misleading and deceptive fraud pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Consumer Law”. There is nothing in his pleading which suggests that CommSec is liable to him in debt or any liquidated sum. I do not know how he has arrived at the figure he claims. If his case is that he has suffered loss due to CommSec’s conduct, then the quantum of those damages is to be assessed on the evidence if liability is established. Mr Prakash is not permitted to claim an amount for unliquidated damages: UCPR r 14.13(1). It is well established that “the specification of a precise amount does not convert what is otherwise a claim for unliquidated damages into a liquidated claim”: Arnold v Forsythe [2012] NSWCA 18 at [48] (Sackville AJA, McColl and Young JJA agreeing). In those circumstances, the Court has no power under r 16.6 to award default judgment for the amount that Mr Prakash claims.

6. [41]

   Secondly, and putting the question of a liquidated claim to one side, r 16.6(1) provides that default judgment “may” be given. The Court’s power is discretionary, and Mr Prakash has no strict entitlement to judgment. The Court will not exercise its discretion to give default judgment if it perceives there is injustice in doing so: Wily v King [2010] NSWSC 352 at [17] (Barrett J); Charles v Shepherd [1892] 2 QB 622 at 624 (Lord Esher MR). I consider that it would be unjust to do so in the face of CommSec’s motion, filed only hours after Mr Prakash’s motion, by which it disputes the entirety of his claim. If CommSec succeeds on its application for summary dismissal, then Mr Prakash is not entitled to judgment; CommSec would be entitled to judgment against him. If it fails on that point but makes good its contention that the Amended Statement of Claim should be struck out, then it should not be required to respond to a defective pleading. And if CommSec’s motion fails altogether, then it should be allowed an opportunity to respond to the pleading which the Court has permitted to stand.

7. [42]

   For those reasons, I dismiss Mr Prakash’s motion for default judgment.

CommSec’s motion for summary dismissal

1. [43]

   CommSec seeks that Mr Prakash’s claim be summarily dismissed pursuant to UCPR r 13.4. That rule provides:

2. [44]

   CommSec contends that the claim against it is liable to be dismissed on the basis that it is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process, and because it discloses no reasonable cause of action. In support of its application, CommSec relies on two affidavits (and the exhibits thereto) of Rhiannon Ellaine Zahra, solicitor, sworn on 12 December 2025 and 27 March 2026 respectively.

3. [45]

   Beyond reiterating the substance of his own claim, Mr Prakash did not make submissions on the merits of CommSec’s motion given his position that it is incompetent.

4. [46]

   The Court’s power to dismiss proceedings summarily must be exercised with great care and caution: Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28 (Spencer) at 131 [24] (French CJ and Gummow J). This is because a party is ordinarily permitted to place their case before the Court in the usual way, such that the power should not be exercised except in the clearest of cases: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41 at 575 [57]. The Court must have a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.

5. [47]

   In considering a summary dismissal application, I must take Mr Prakash’s claim at its highest. That means both CommSec and the Court must accept the truth of the allegations of fact in the Amended Statement of Claim, and the “ranges of meaning” which the assertions in that claim are capable of bearing: Simmons v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian [2014] NSWCA 405; 17 BPR 33,717 at [200] (Gleeson JA, Beazley P and Barrett JA agreeing).

6. [48]

   Proceedings are “frivolous” (or “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty”) where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting them: Spencer at 141 [59]. They are “vexatious” if they are productive of “serious and unjustified trouble and harassment”: Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; [1990] HCA 55 at 555. Whether a case is an abuse of process is unconfined by closed categories, but may be taken to include where “the use of a court’s procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”: Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28 (Tomlinson) at 519 [25].

7. [49]

   As was observed by the High Court in Tomlinson at 518 [25], the doctrine of abuse of process “is inherently broader and more flexible than estoppel”. On this basis, the Court determined at 519 [26] that:

8. [50]

   It must be accepted that the concepts raised by r 13.4(1) overlap with one another: Stimpson v State of New South Wales [2026] NSWSC 126 at [51] (Williams J). CommSec says it is entitled to relief on essentially two bases: first, these proceedings are a continuation of the claims litigated in Queensland and the ACT and, secondly, that in any event the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and is hopeless. I will deal with each in turn.

9. [51]

   CommSec submits that because Mr Prakash raised identical claims in the Supreme Court of Queensland and the Supreme Court of the ACT, and those claims have been dismissed, it is vexatious and an abuse of process for him to seek to relitigate those claims in this Court.

10. [52]

    In the ACT proceedings, Mr Prakash pursued a claim “in almost identical terms” as the claim in this Court: Prakash at [10]. I have set out at [13] above Muller AJ’s dispositive reasons for dismissing that claim. The sole basis on which those proceedings were determined was that Mr Prakash may obtain complete relief in this Court in respect of the claim brought in the ACT. His Honour did not otherwise consider the merits of Mr Prakash’s claim. Accordingly, I would not find that the continuance of these proceedings after the determination of the ACT proceedings is an abuse of process if Mr Prakash’s claim was otherwise meritorious.

11. [53]

    The Queensland proceedings were determined on a different basis. Proceedings 2380 were dismissed because Williams J found that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action and did not comply with the rules, and Mr Prakash had several opportunities to rectify those defects but did not. Her Honour also noted that the claims pending in that Court and in New South Wales represented a “multiplicity of proceedings”. My own review of the various pleadings confirms that Mr Prakash now seeks to relitigate the claim dismissed by the Supreme Court of Queensland. In this regard, I respectfully agree with the observations of Lonergan J in Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] NSWSC 1149 at [77]:

12. [54]

    Mr Prakash’s claim was considered by the Supreme Court of Queensland and dismissed. It is vexatious and oppressive, and an abuse of process, for him to seek to prosecute that claim again in this Court because he is not satisfied with the outcome. On that basis, these proceedings must be dismissed.

13. [55]

    CommSec contends that Mr Prakash’s claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and should therefore be dismissed.

14. [56]

    Mr Prakash is self-represented. Accordingly, I have had regard to the following observations of Kirby P (with whom Hope and Samuels JJA agreed) in Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 at 536–537:

15. [57]

    In seeking to discern the basis of Mr Prakash’s claim, I have considered his Statement of Claim and Amended Statement of Claim, the affidavits he has filed, and his oral submissions. The following represents my understanding of his claim in a light most favourable to him.

16. [58]

    Mr Prakash traded options contracts using an account with CommSec that he opened in July 2024. The “inherent value” of his portfolio was $3.5 million.

17. [59]

    On 11 April 2025, CommSec for the first time imposed a margin requirement on Mr Prakash’s account. He says that margin called for $823,412.50 to cover his positions, comprising an ASX margin of $79,440.50 and a CommSec margin of $743,972. I infer that Mr Prakash did not satisfy some or all of that margin call, because he contends that CommSec forced the closure of a lot of his positions unnecessarily, causing a loss that exceeded $3 million. He describes this as a “hijack attack”.

18. [60]

    On 8 May 2025, CommSec placed an illegitimate restriction on his account preventing him from opening any new positions in Aristocrat Leisure. He was thereby restricted from rolling over his existing positions to the benefit of his account. Mr Prakash says this constituted a breach of contract and market manipulation.

19. [61]

    On 10 May 2025, Mr Prakash’s account was subjected to a margin requirement of $221,048.10, comprising an ASX premium of $1494 and a CommSec margin of $219,554.10. He contends this was a breach of contract and fraudulent.

20. [62]

    On 14 May 2025, CommSec imposed a margin requirement of $227,056, comprising an ASX premium of $33,376 and a CommSec margin of $193,680. Mr Prakash pleads that this was a breach of contract, fraudulent, and a violation of s 12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).

21. [63]

    On 15 May 2025, CommSec ignored Mr Prakash’s instructions to roll his positions when the margin situation had been “handled” by him. This is pleaded as a breach of contract, negligence, contravention of duty, and market manipulation. On the same date, despite Mr Prakash contending he had “duly addressed” the “Margin situation”, he says CommSec “hijacked” his account and closed out all of his positions. This, he says, caused “huge losses”.

22. [64]

    Each of the foregoing is said to constitute “Illegitimate access and damage, Fraud, Intentional Deception, Unconscionable conduct, Negligence”.

23. [65]

    The crux of Mr Prakash’s complaint appears to be that the margin requirements imposed by CommSec were too high which caused loss when he was unable to meet them. This contention is in part informed by Mr Prakash’s claim that he had valuable “deep in the money” positions in his portfolio which CommSec either undervalued or ignored when calculating his risk profile and formulating its margin requirements. Furthermore, Mr Prakash says that the formula CommSec used to calculate its margin requirements was never revealed to him when his account was active and was not permitted by the terms governing the account.

24. [66]

    In discerning Mr Prakash’s claim, I have been assisted by the two affidavits read by CommSec on this motion. In doing so, I am mindful that I must accept the truth of Mr Prakash’s allegations of fact at this stage of the proceedings.

25. [67]

    CommSec draws the Court’s attention to clauses 20 and 21 of the CommSec Exchange-Traded Options Product Disclosure Statement and Terms and Conditions. Those clauses provide as follows:

26. [68]

    CommSec says that the margin requirement imposed in accordance with clause 21 comprises three components, including:

    1. (1)

       the margin required by the ASX, referred to as the “ASX Clear Margin”. This is in turn calculated by reference to the:

    2. (2)

       an additional margin referred to as the “CommSec Margin”; and

    3. (3)

       the outstanding trade balance on the account.

27. [69]

    The CommSec Margin was calculated at 90% of the Initial Margin. This amount is based off the “standard book level” being 70% (which is applied generally across the CommSec book), with an additional 20% applied where there are breaches of internal stress-testing reports.

28. [70]

    CommSec contends that when it closed out Mr Prakash’s positions on 15 May 2025, after he failed to meet a margin call, it suffered a loss of $91,051.25.

29. [71]

    Accepting Mr Prakash’s allegations of fact at their highest, he says that he has suffered a loss of several million dollars because CommSec imposed illegitimate margin requirements and closed out his positions without a proper basis. The difficulty with Mr Prakash’s claim is that it does not disclose the legal basis upon which CommSec is liable to him, or upon which he can recover damages from it for the loss he has incurred. Even granting some latitude to Mr Prakash, in relation to pleading infelicities and exactitude, he must expose a legal basis for his complaints.

30. [72]

    Mr Prakash says that CommSec’s conduct constituted a breach of contract but he does not explain how that is so. Beyond mere assertion of breach, he does not disclose which provisions of a contract CommSec has contravened. By contrast, CommSec draws the Court’s attention to contractual provisions which repose it with a very broad discretion to calculate and impose margin requirements.

31. [73]

    There are many allegations of fraud. This is a serious allegation which requires specific particularisation and a proper basis to be made: Admiral International Pty Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd [2022] NSWCA 277 at [88]ff (Bell CJ, Ward P and Macfarlan JA agreeing). Neither is disclosed in Mr Prakash’s claim.

32. [74]

    In a similar vein, insofar as Mr Prakash alleges misleading or deceptive conduct, unconscionable conduct, or negligence, his claim does not make clear how CommSec’s conduct satisfies those criteria. There must be an articulated legal structure that corrals this array of disparate facts into some, even loosely, coherent legal framework. None exists.

33. [75]

    Mr Prakash cites many rules and regulations from various entities, including ASIC, the ASX, and others. His claim does not make apparent how CommSec has breached those requirements, or how such breaches are actionable at law.

34. [76]

    There are several allegations of criminal conduct by CommSec. Similar charges were levelled at CommSec’s legal representatives prior to and at the hearing. There is no foundation for those allegations. They are scandalous. Had they been made by a legal practitioner that practitioner would be liable to professional sanction. In any event, and contrary to Mr Prakash’s submission, this is a civil case and not a criminal one. The commission of a criminal offence does not, by itself, give rise to an action at law.

35. [77]

    I accept that Mr Prakash is a self-represented litigant. However, even if he had the benefit of legal assistance to refine his position, I have determined that his claim discloses no reasonable cause of action. It must be dismissed.

CommSec’s motion to strike out the Amended Statement of Claim

1. [78]

   In the alternative, CommSec applies to strike out the Amended Statement of Claim pursuant to UCPR r 14.28. Because I have decided to dismiss Mr Prakash’s claim, it is not necessary to decide this question. However, if I was wrong to dismiss Mr Prakash’s claim, I consider below CommSec’s alternative position.

2. [79]

   UCPR r 14.28 provides as follows:

3. [80]

   As considered by Ward J (as her Honour then was) in Szanto v Bainton [2011] NSWSC 985 at [107], a pleading is embarrassing where it fails:

4. [81]

   The UCPR requires a Statement of Claim in this Court to:

   1. (1)

      be divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs: r 14.6;

   2. (2)

      be brief: r 14.8;

   3. (3)

      not claim an amount for unliquidated damages: r 14.13(1);

   4. (4)

      be verified by affidavit subscribed to the pleading: r 14.23;

   5. (5)

      give such particulars of the claim as are necessary to enable the opposite party to identify the case that the pleading requires it to meet: r 15.1(1);

   6. (6)

      give particulars of any fraud or misrepresentation on which the party relies: r 15.3;

   7. (7)

      where alleging negligence, state the facts and circumstances on which the party relies as constituting the negligent act or omission: r 15.5(1)(a).

5. [82]

   The Amended Statement of Claim does not comply with any of these requirements. The pleadings are prolix. The Amended Statement of Claim is 35 pages in length. It does not put CommSec on notice of the specific legal claim or claims it must meet, but is instead an imprecise recitation of Mr Prakash’s complaints about its conduct. The several allegations of fraud, negligence, and misleading or deceptive conduct are mere assertion and are unparticularised.

6. [83]

   To my mind there is no question that the Amended Statement of Claim is embarrassing, fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and must be struck out.

7. [84]

   The question that then arises is whether Mr Prakash ought to be given leave to replead his claim. To deny him that opportunity would have the effect of dismissing his claim. As such, Mr Prakash should only be denied leave to replead in the clearest of cases, where the Court is satisfied that there could be no utility in allowing him a further opportunity to plead his case.

8. [85]

   Mr Prakash should not be given leave to replead his claim for three reasons. First, and fundamentally, the real defect is not in Mr Prakash’s pleadings (although they are defective) but his underlying claim; for the reasons given above, he does not have a reasonable cause(s) of action. Secondly, Mr Prakash has had several opportunities to refine his claim over many months, including after he received reasons for judgment in another court which drew to his attention the deficiencies which attended his claim. His attempt to replead that claim in this Court, by filing an Amended Statement of Claim, proved fruitless. Thirdly, the Court’s discretion to grant such leave must be exercised in accordance with the overriding purpose of civil litigation, being the “just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings”: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(1). To allow Mr Prakash a further opportunity to replead his claim would achieve the opposite effect.

Costs

1. [86]

   There is no question that CommSec should have its costs of these proceedings in accordance with the usual rule that costs follow the event: UCPR r 42.1. CommSec also seeks that its costs be paid on an indemnity basis and in a gross sum.

2. [87]

   I gratefully adopt Peden J’s recent summary of the principles which inform the exercise of the Court’s discretion to order indemnity costs in Council of the City of Broken Hill v Redenbach Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 367 at [32] as follows:

3. [88]

   There is a basis for CommSec’s application. The most concerning features of Mr Prakash’s conduct are that he elected to continue these proceedings after they had been determined in the Supreme Court of Queensland, and the volume of correspondence that he sent to CommSec’s solicitors and associated parties, the terms of which were rude and levelled unfounded accusations of criminal conduct and other impropriety. However, taking into account all the circumstances of this case, I do not think it would be in the interests of justice to order indemnity costs. Mr Prakash is to pay CommSec’s costs on the ordinary basis.

4. [89]

   CommSec indicated that it sought a gross sum costs order. I will determine its application on the papers in accordance with Orders (4) and (5) below.

Orders

1. [90]

   For the above reasons, the Court orders that:

   1. (1)

      The Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be dismissed.

   2. (2)

      The Plaintiff’s claim be dismissed pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).

   3. (3)

      The Plaintiff pay the Defendant’s costs of the proceedings.

   4. (4)

      By 4 May 2026, the Defendant file and serve written submissions of no longer than 3 pages, and any affidavit evidence, in support of its application for a gross sum costs order.

   5. (5)

      By 11 May 2026, the Plaintiff file and serve any submissions in response to the Defendant’s application of no longer than 3 pages, as well as any affidavit evidence in response.