Re Adam (Adoption)

1. [1]

   This is an application for the adoption of a twelve year old boy, to whom I will refer as “Adam” (not his real name). The application is made under the Adoption Act 2000 (“the Act”).

2. [2]

   As I will describe in more detail below, an order has been made under the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (the “Care Act” or “CA”) giving the Minister for Communities and Justice parental responsibility for Adam. This responsibility is discharged on the Minister’s behalf by officers of the Department of Communities and Justice in conjunction (since June 2019) with the child welfare charity Barnardos.

3. [3]

   Six years ago, in the exercise of the Minister’s parental responsibility for Adam, he was placed with a foster couple. They now wish to adopt him. I will refer to the proposed adoptive father and mother as “PF” and “PM” respectively. The adoption is supported by Barnardos and by the Department. The Secretary of the Department is the plaintiff.

4. [4]

   Adam’s birth mother (“BM”) is the first defendant. She opposes the application. Adam’s birth father (“BF”) was the second defendant, but he took no part in the proceedings and died before final submissions were made. Adam is not formally a party to the proceedings, but an independent solicitor, Mr Levy, has been appointed to represent his interests.

Procedural history

1. [5]

   The proceedings were commenced in May 2024. At the time, Adam was ten years old. Because he was less than twelve years old, consent to the adoption needed to be obtained from BM and BF, or dispensed with. BM refused to consent, and opposed the application. BF also declined to consent, but, as already noted, he did not actively oppose the application.

2. [6]

   In June last year the hearing date was fixed for 27 October. At the hearing both the Secretary and BM were represented by counsel. Mr Levy also appeared to represent Adam’s interests. The evidence of the parties was presented to the Court, followed by submissions. But belatedly, in the course of final submissions, counsel for BM sought an adjournment.

3. [7]

   The purpose of the adjournment was to allow BM to pursue an application under the Care Act to have the order conferring parental responsibility on the Minister revoked. The adjournment application was opposed by counsel for the Secretary and by Mr Levy, but I granted it.

4. [8]

   When the application returned to Court on 7 November, a further affidavit had been filed from BM deposing that she was making a legal aid application to fund the foreshadowed application under the Care Act for restored parental responsibility for Adam. But the application had not, at the time of the affidavit, been determined. I was informed that advice was to be provided at a meeting to take place in a few days’ time which would determine whether the application for legal aid would go forward. Over the opposition of counsel for the Secretary, I adjourned the proceedings for a further four weeks to allow that to happen.

5. [9]

   When the application returned to Court on 5 December, there was nothing further from BM about the foreshadowed Care Act application. Presumably, legal aid had been refused and BM was either unable, or unwilling, to conduct or fund the application herself. Nevertheless, counsel for BM made an application for a further adjournment.

6. [10]

   This application involved a change of tack on the part of BM. By this point, Adam was only a week or so away from turning twelve. Once that happened, he could consent to his own adoption and the consent of BM (and BF) would no longer be necessary. Counsel for BM submitted that it would be invidious for Adam to be treated differently from other twelve-year-olds. The hearing should be adjourned to allow Adam to turn twelve and then to go through the procedure required for him to give consent to the application.

7. [11]

   I asked counsel what BM’s position would be if, after turning twelve and going through the consent procedure, Adam, wished to proceed with the adoption and gave his consent for that purpose. Counsel replied:

8. [12]

   Counsel for the Secretary opposed the application for a further adjournment, but again I decided to grant it. In doing so, I was influenced by two main factors. One was that I thought that in the scheme of things, there was no disadvantage, and indeed a positive advantage, in Adam going through the formal consent process, which would provide him with further information about what the adoption would mean for him and an opportunity to make the decision for himself whether or not to consent. Secondly, the adjournment offered the possibility that, if consent was given, BM’s opposition would be withdrawn, thus streamlining the process.

9. [13]

   The application returned to Court on 13 February this year. I was informed that BF had died in January. There was also supplementary evidence from the Secretary which established that Adam had been through the consent process and, had given his consent to adoption, and had made further expressions of his desire for the adoption to go ahead.

10. [14]

    Faced with this, BM did not fall into line with Adam’s wishes as she had foreshadowed in December. As I will describe in more detail below, there had been a sharp deterioration in the relationship between BM on the one hand and PF and PM on the other. BM continued to oppose the application.

11. [15]

    Counsel for the Secretary and BM presented their clients’ submissions. Submissions were also provided by Adam’s independent solicitor, Mr Levy, in support of the application.

12. [16]

    But it was not possible to determine the application on the day. Section 89(b) prevented the Court from making an order until a period of 30 days had expired after Adam’s execution of the instrument of consent. This was to give Adam a “cooling off” period during which he could revoke his consent. That period would not run out until 27 February.

13. [17]

    In these circumstances, the parties agreed that I should defer dealing with the application until after 27 February. That date has now passed without Adam revoking his consent. I therefore proceed to give my decision.

Application for adoption

1. [18]

   Adam has three siblings who are also the children of BM and BF. The four children are close in age. The oldest sibling, a boy to whom I will refer to as “S1”, was born in March 2010. A sister (“S2”) followed in January 2011. There followed another brother (“S3”) in January 2013. Adam himself was born in December 2013.

2. [19]

   The family first attracted the attention of the Department in 2012. In September 2013, three months before Adam was born, an application was made by the Department under the Care Act concerning S1, S2 and S3. The proceedings were brought in the Children’s Court. They involved allegations of domestic violence against BF and harm, or potential harm, to the children.

3. [20]

   As already mentioned, Adam was born in December 2013. At the time BM was living in a women’s refuge. In January 2014 further proceedings were brought by the Department under the Care Act concerning Adam, on grounds similar to those in the pre-existing proceedings concerning S1, S2 and S3.

4. [21]

   In March 2014, interim orders were made in the Care Act application which allocated parental responsibility for Adam to the Minister temporarily. Final orders were made in October of that year. Pursuant to those orders parental responsibility was conferred on the Minister for a period of 12 months, following which it would revert to BM.

5. [22]

   In accordance with the orders, parental responsibility for the children returned to BM in October 2015. By this time, pursuant to arrangements which had been sanctioned by the Department, Adam, BM, and the siblings were living with BM’s parents (Adam’s grandparents). I will refer to them as GF and GM.

6. [23]

   The Department became dissatisfied with these arrangements and in November 2015 an application was made by it for further care orders conferring parental responsibility for Adam and his siblings on the Minister. Pending determination of the application, an order for interim parental responsibility for each of Adam and his siblings was made in the Minister’s favour until further order.

7. [24]

   Pursuant to these orders, Adam and his siblings were each placed in out-of-home foster care placements. Adam was placed, on his own, with a foster couple (not the proposed adoptive parents in the present case). In February 2016, S3 joined him. At the end of May, they were both placed with the carers who were looking after S1 and S2. But after a further three weeks Adam and S3 were returned by the Department to the care of GM and GF.

8. [25]

   Three months later, in September 2016, final orders were made in the Department’s application. The orders gave the Minister parental responsibility over all four of the siblings until they turned 18.

9. [26]

   The making of these orders did not disturb Adam’s living arrangements with GM and GP. But in April 2019 GF and GM intimated to the Department that they were experiencing difficulties caring for Adam because of his behaviour. In June 2019 the Department placed Adam with another foster couple. This arrangement lasted for seven months. Adam was then, in late January 2020, placed with PF and PM. He has lived with them ever since.

10. [27]

    In December 2021 an application was made by BM under the Care Act to vary the parental responsibility arrangements for all four of the children. This application, however, does not appear to have been pursued. But a year later, in December 2022, BM made an application under the Care Act, for parental responsibility for S1, S2 and S3 to be returned to her. That application was ultimately successful.

11. [28]

    BM did not, however, seek the restoration of her parental responsibility for Adam. In his case, she limited her application to one for regular contact (which was not controversial). Orders giving effect to this were made in January 2023.

12. [29]

    It is not clear exactly when PF and PM indicated to Barnardos that they wished to adopt Adam. The evidence, however, shows that the possibility of adoption was being canvassed with Adam by his Barnardos caseworker as early as 2021.

13. [30]

    A number of affidavits and reports were prepared for the purposes of these proceedings. Some of the evidence which was before the Children’s Court was also admitted. There was no cross-examination by any party.

14. [31]

    In support of the application there were: (1) affidavits from the officer of Barnardos responsible for the application, and from Adam’s case worker (other file notes by officers involved in the case were admitted as business records); (2) affidavits from PM and PF, dealing in particular with their family life and experiences with looking after Adam; (3) affidavits in the nature of references from three friends of PM and PF, attesting to their qualities as parents; and (4) reports from an expert psychologist, Dr Dee Neveling.

15. [32]

    In opposition to the application there was affidavit evidence from BM. No other evidence, lay or expert, was relied upon.

16. [33]

    PF and PM are 51 and 56 years of age respectively. They have been married since 2001 and do not have any children of their own. They live in a suburb in the southern outskirts of Sydney.

17. [34]

    Since Adam was placed in their care he has lived continuously with PF and PM. He began his primary school education at a local public school in year one shortly after he was placed with PF and PM in 2020. He is currently in year seven, having begun secondary schooling well at the suburban high school earlier this year.

18. [35]

    The relevant evidence, which is not in dispute, leaves no reason for doubt that PF and PM have established a mutually close and loving relationship with Adam. Adam refers to them as “dad” and “mum”. His emotional and material needs are being met.

19. [36]

    Adam has not completely overcome the behavioural problems which led to his placement with PF and PM. He has been diagnosed with ADHD (for which he takes medication) and “Oppositional Defiance Disorder”. But the symptoms are much reduced and Adam lives a happy and healthy life with his foster parents. According to his school reports, he is thriving at school, both socially and academically.

20. [37]

    As already noted, the evidence before me indicates that Barnardos raised with Adam the possibility of his being adopted by PF and PM as early as 2021. Over the years Adam was provided with reading material about adoption by his case-worker, who discussed it with him. From the outset he was enthusiastic.

21. [38]

    A report from Dr Neveling prepared for the purpose of this application and based on conversations with him in April and May last year records her conversations with Adam on this subject. She wrote:

22. [39]

    During the formal consent process, Adam confirmed that he had received the mandatory information and counselling, demonstrated his understanding of adoption and its consequences, and expressed that he wished to be adopted and would be “kind of sad” if it did not occur. He agreed to provide his consent, and the counsellor assessed him as “competent … thoughtful and clear” in his answers, and satisfied that his decision was informed, voluntary and genuinely his own.

23. [40]

    Adam’s three siblings were restored to BM’s care and have lived with her since January 2023. According to her affidavit made in October last year she has made positive progress to achieve stability in her life: she now refrains from illicit substances, has a three-bedroom home and has consistent employment since January 2025.

24. [41]

    Since June 2019, Adam has been having regular contact with BM and his siblings, supervised by his Barnardos caseworker. The contact is supposed to take the form of a monthly visit to BM at her home for at least 90 minutes but on some occasions has taken the form of a video call.

25. [42]

    The last organised contact (a ten-minute video call) took place in October last year. Adam had a scheduled visit in early November but did not attend because of “not feeling up to it” after recent court proceedings, which PF communicated to BM. BM responded negatively, suggesting that Adam had been “brainwashed” to think negatively about her and his siblings. A subsequent visit scheduled for mid-December was cancelled by BM due to Adam’s siblings having influenza.

26. [43]

    On 30 December, PF contacted BM proposing of dates for contact visits over the next six months. BM responded with multiple messages sent over several days criticising and blaming PM and PF for keeping Adam away from his family. The language of these texts was hostile and accusatory. After discussion with Barnardos, PF and PM blocked BM’s number on 2 January. Barnardos wrote on 2 and 5 January to BM to address BM’s concerns, and BM responded on 12 January with frustration at Barnardos’ involvement.

27. [44]

    On 19 January, Barnardos asked BM, on PM and PF’s behalf, to clarify whether the scheduled visit for 25 January was still happening. BM did not confirm this. Five days later, BM texted PF directly to say, among other things, that there would be no more visits anymore and the next time they meet “won’t be nice”. The following day, PF obtained from the Local Court a provisional apprehended domestic violence order against BM, which on 4 February was extended until further order. The order prevents BM from approaching PF, at his home or elsewhere, or from contacting him, but does not prevent BM from contacting PM or Adam. She has not however done so.

28. [45]

    It is common ground that the requirements of the Adoption Act concerning the ages and residency of the parties are satisfied (s 27(2), s 28(1) and s 28(4) of the Act). Adam, PM, and PF were all present and domiciled in NSW (at the time of the filing of the summons). PM and PF are both over the age of 21, are more than 18 years older than Adam, and have been cohabiting for 25 years.

29. [46]

    The report to the Court required by s 91 has been provided. The report supported the making of an adoption order.

30. [47]

    Further requirements before the Court could make any adoption order are set out in s 90, which relevantly provides:

31. [48]

    It is common ground that the requirements in s 91(c) and (d) have been satisfied. PF and PM were selected as proposed adoptive parents in accordance with the Act. The consent given by Adam complies with the relevant statutory requirements.

32. [49]

    Nor is there any dispute that PF and PM are taking appropriate steps to raise Adam in a way which is appropriate having regard to the ethnicity and religious background of his birth family. The proposed adoption plan provides for this to continue. The requirement in s 90(1)(h) is therefore satisfied.

33. [50]

    The evidence makes it clear that Adam is eager to be adopted by PF and PM. It also establishes that Adam has been assessed as being intelligent and mature beyond his years. There was no suggestion from counsel for BM that the views he has expressed about adoption by PF and PM were other than genuine and considered ones. In accordance with s 91(b), therefore, Adam’s wishes have been obtained and due consideration given to them in pursuing this application.

34. [51]

    Accordingly, the Court’s power to make an order depends on whether I am satisfied that Adam’s best interests would be promoted by his adoption by PF and PM (s 90(1)(a)).

35. [52]

    In deciding whether to make an adoption order I must also take into account the principles stated in s 8. In the course of argument, I was referred in particular to the following.10/03/2026

36. [53]

    Counsel for the Secretary acknowledged that, as a result of s 90(3), the Court was required to consider what alternatives there might be to making the adoption order sought. Counsel submitted that for practical purposes the only alternative would be a continuation of the status quo, with Adam remaining in the care of PF and PM under the auspices of the 2016 order of the Children’s Court conferring parental responsibility on the Minister.

37. [54]

    In particular, counsel submitted that making a guardianship order in favour of PF and PM was not a practical possibility. The power to make such an order had been conferred on the Children’s Court, but that Court could not make such an order except on the application of, or with the consent of, the Minister. Counsel made it clear that the Minister considers that a guardianship order is not in the best interests of Adam because adoption is preferable. Even if the Court would have power, upon refusing this application, to make a guardianship order under its general consequential powers under s 92 (see Adoption of IEK [2019] NSWSC 171 at [113] to [145]) no such order had been sought in this case.

38. [55]

    Counsel had previously provided me with detailed written submissions in support of the application. In his final submissions, counsel argued that the adoption order should be made for three main reasons, which I summarise as follows.

    1. (1)

       Adoption would provide emotional stability for Adam. It would give continuity to his relationship with PF and PM both up to and after he turns 18. Counsel observed, in particular, that PF and PM have been looking after Adam as his parents for more than half his life.

    2. (2)

       Adoption would also provide legal recognition for that ongoing relationship. Adam would have the security of knowing that, legally, as well as emotionally, he, PF and PM are a family.

    3. (3)

       Adoption would be in accordance with Adam’s clearly expressed wishes. Those wishes go back to the beginning of the adoption process and have recently been confirmed, in the clearest and most formal possible way, by Adam consenting to his adoption by PF and PM.

39. [56]

    In his capacity as Adam’s independent legal representative, Mr Levy supported the submissions from counsel for the Secretary. Consistently with his role as Adam’s own independent representative, Mr Levy laid particular emphasis on Adam’s own expressed wishes. He also submitted (and this was a point made by Dr Neveling in her evidence) that once an adoption order is made the personal relationships between BM on the one hand, and PF, PM and Adam on the other, might be repaired.

40. [57]

    In response, counsel for BM did not dispute the existence, or the significance, of the factors upon which counsel for the Secretary relied. But he emphasised the requirement in s 90(3) that the Court must be “clearly satisfied” that adoption is preferable to any other alternative. Counsel submitted that, owing to the significant and far-reaching impact of an adoption order, the requirement that it be “clearly preferable” to any other alternative was particularly stringent. The Court should not make such an order unless it was “obviously, plainly and manifestly” preferable to any other available action (see Re IEK at [111]; Re Kevin [2025] NSWSC 259 at [60]).

41. [58]

    Counsel submitted that, judged according to this stringent standard, the Secretary had failed to demonstrate that adoption was “clearly preferable” to maintaining the status quo (which counsel agreed was the only practicable alternative). The premise for this submission was that it would always be better, if possible, for Adam to be brought up by BM. Particularly was this so because she was looking after his three birth siblings. In principle, the best outcome would be for the family to be reunited.

42. [59]

    Counsel acknowledged that this could not occur unless BM could first persuade the Children’s Court to revoke the parental responsibility order in favour of the Minister. That had not happened. But, according to counsel, this was only because of a lack of funds and a failure to obtain legal aid. BM remained “committed to working towards” doing so. Counsel urged to me refuse the adoption application and maintain the status quo to allow an opportunity for it to happen in future.

43. [60]

    It had previously been argued on behalf of BM, in support of the initial application for an adjournment, that it was particularly important for BM to be given an opportunity to apply to have parental responsibility restored because that would preserve Adam’s relationship with his siblings. I asked counsel for BM about whether that submission still had any force in circumstances where BM had ceased contact with Adam and BM as well as BF. This led to a debate about how the recent communications between the parties which accompanied the rupture in their relationship should be characterised.

44. [61]

    In his submissions, counsel for the Secretary had described the communications as “offensive and threatening” conduct on the part of BM. Counsel had not however argued that that conduct was a specific additional factor supporting the case for adoption, and had submitted that I did not need to go into the content of the communications any further.

45. [62]

    When I asked counsel for BM about this, he was reluctant to address directly the objective effect of his client’s conduct. He preferred to deal with it in terms of her emotions, describing what she had said as “raw”, “indicative of great deal of pain” and “very clearly articulated in a very direct manner”. When pressed about whether BM had been “offensive and threatening”, he ultimately was not prepared to accept that characterisation.

46. [63]

    In reply, counsel for the Secretary pointed out that even if, as had been claimed on her behalf, BM lacked the funding required to pursue a revocation application without recourse to legal aid, she could have pursued the application in person. Instead what she was effectively asking was to maintain the status quo indefinitely. Even if there was still a possibility of her making an application in future, there was no current plan to do so and there was no guarantee it would ever happen. Counsel submitted that it would clearly be wrong to dismiss the application on such a basis.

47. [64]

    The submission by counsel about BM’s recent conduct caused counsel for the Secretary to change his position on whether I should have regard to the terms of the correspondence between BM and PF and PM. Counsel now submitted that I should do so. He argued that BM’s correspondence demonstrated that it was she who had caused the rupture in the relationship. And in doing so she had acted in furtherance of her own personal frustrations and resentments rather than trying to do what was best for Adam. Counsel described her conduct as “adult-focused” rather than “child-focused”.

48. [65]

    Counsel observed that it was clearly not in Adam’s best interests for him to be made the focus of an ongoing conflict between BM and PF and PM on the other. Indeed the desirability of bringing the application to an end was something I was expressly directed to take into account under s 8(1)(e1) of the Act. The falling-out between BM and PF and PM only made it more important to give Adam security and certainty by making the adoption order sought. Picking up on the point made by Mr Levy, the sooner the order was made, the more hope there was that BM might eventually come to accept the situation and re-establish contact between Adam and his birth family.

49. [66]

    As already noted, at the hearing on 5 December, BM, through her counsel, expressly stated that she would withdraw her opposition to the adoption application if Adam consented to it. Although Adam did consent, she still maintains her objection. BM has resiled from what she previously told the Court, and has offered no explanation for doing so.

50. [67]

    Nonetheless the Court will not hold BM to what she said through her counsel in December. The predominant consideration is what is in Adam’s best interests. The Court is obliged to consider any submissions put forward by BM, or any other party, bearing on that question.

51. [68]

    Nevertheless the point made by counsel for BM in December that it is in Adam’s interests that he be treated in the same way as other twelve year-olds retains the force which it had then. As already noted, the evidence establishes that Adam possesses a maturity beyond his years and has made his decision to consent enthusiastically and with full appreciation of the consequences. This naturally must have great weight for the Court in deciding whether to make the order sought. BM is not bound by her previous contention, but the fact that she put it forward and has not tried to justify going back on it gives further weight to it.

52. [69]

    Given the competing submissions from counsel for BM and counsel for the Secretary, I should say something about the correspondence which accompanied the rupture between BM and PF and PM. I have reviewed that correspondence. Regrettably, it was indeed both offensive and threatening. The emotional strain on BM may go some way to explaining her conduct, but in no way justifies it.

53. [70]

    A particular concern is that BM alleges that Adam has been brainwashed into consenting into his adoption. As already noted, the evidence is quite to the contrary. Counsel for BM, quite properly, made no attempt to support this allegation in his final submissions.

54. [71]

    Again, with regret, I must accept the submissions from counsel for the Secretary about the consequences of BM’s behaviour. At present she is not thinking and acting in terms of Adam’s best interests as she should be. Indeed, as counsel submitted, BM’s present refusal to engage with PF and PM, and with the adoption process more generally, only reinforces the desirability of proceeding to determine the application.

55. [72]

    As already noted, the advantages of adoption, in terms of Adam’s stability and security, were not contested. Nor was the evidence attesting to PF and PM’s suitability to take on the formal role of being his parent. The grounds for opposing the application come down to a single proposition: because of the possibility of Adam’s birth family being reunited if BM can overturn the parental responsibility order made in favour of the Minister, adoption cannot be said to be the clearly preferable option.

56. [73]

    Issues along these lines have arisen in this Division in the past. In RCC at [69]-[71], Brereton J said:

57. [74]

    In IEK, Robb J said at [233]:

58. [75]

    In my opinion, the facts of the present case are sufficiently similar to those in IEK to make his Honour’s comments applicable. Adam is older than IEK was. The decision about permanent placement has already been made. But in the present case Adam is just as much in need of ongoing stability and security.

59. [76]

    Most importantly, in the present case, as in IEK, the prospect of restoration is no more than a possibility which might occur at some indefinite point in the future. Even if an application were made, much would depend on the circumstances at the time. By that time Adam will have been living with PF and PM for a further period of months, or, more likely, years. The Children’s Court would need to consider very carefully the housing and other resources then available to BM and the competing pressures from Adam’s birth siblings in evaluating whether the possible benefit of returning him to BM would be worth the disruption which would be entailed. In this application, the Court could not even begin to make some sort of assessment of what those circumstances would be and how likely they would be to result in the application succeeding.

60. [77]

    In my opinion, the assessment which s 90(3) requires as to whether adoption is “clearly preferable” must be undertaken by reference to the circumstances as they exist at the time the application falls to be determined. If the Court is to have regard to future events, they must be events which are established by the evidence as possessing at least as being likely, as opposed to being possible or even more probable than not. A mere contingent possibility, or even an event which is “on the cards” but not necessarily likely, would not suffice. Otherwise, the statutory requirement would become self-defeating. I take this to be what Robb J meant when he said that the question had to be determined “having regard to the real likelihood of the alternative outcomes”.

61. [78]

    The same point can be made in another way. I agree with counsel for the Secretary that it would be an abuse of the Court’s discretion to dismiss an application which comprehensively addressed the circumstances of the relevant child as they stood at the time, merely because of a theoretical possibility that those circumstances might change in future.

62. [79]

    In truth, what counsel for BM is really asking for the Court is to defer its decision until an application for restoration is made and determined, or it becomes clear that BM does not want to pursue one before Adam turns eighteen. But the Court has already gone as far as it can in adjourning the proceedings to allow BM to institute such an application. She has not done so and has clearly no intention of doing so. In these circumstances, the Court cannot simply wait forever and must determine the application on its merits as they now appear.

63. [80]

    On the evidence which has been presented, I am clearly satisfied that adoption by PF and PM is in Adam’s best interests. In particular it is clearly preferable to any other action which could be taken so far as his care is concerned.

Orders

1. [81]

   The Court makes the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Order for the adoption of the child [Adam] in favour of the adopting parents [PM] and [PF] and approve the name [PM and PF’s surname] as the surname and [Adam’s proposed given names] as the given names of the child

   2. (2)

      Order that pursuant to the Adoption Act 2000, ss 50(1) and (3), the Maternal Adoption Plan signed by the proposed adoptive parents [PM] and [PF] and the Principal Officer, Adoptions, Barnardos Australia, Olivia Rennie, on 23 and 24 October 2025, be registered.

   3. (3)

      Order that pursuant to the Adoption Act 2000, ss 50(1) and (3), the Paternal Adoption Plan signed by the proposed adoptive parents, [PM] and [PF] and the Principal Officer, Adoptions, Barnardos Australia, Olivia Rennie, on 13 February 2026, be registered.