R v Bouggas

The accused, Mr Christopher Bouggas, has been charged on indictment with two counts of murder. Count 1 is that on or about 29 January 2022, the accused murdered Steven Glen Finlay at Redfern in New South Wales. Count 2 is that on or about 29 January 2022, the accused murdered Mitchell Watson at Redfern in New South Wales.

In this judgment, the Court is required to deal with a significant human tragedy involving the deaths of two men in heart breaking circumstances. In carrying out the Court’s functions, attention must be focused on aspects of the deceased’s lives which may be distressing and unsettling. The Court intends no disrespect by doing so. Nor does it wish to downplay the significance of Mr Finlay’s and Mr Watson’s lives for their family, loved ones and friends.

Furthermore, however, fairness requires that the Court focus on the circumstances of the accused in this judgment, but by doing so, the Court should not be assumed to have lost sight of the suffering of the two deceased.

After being arrested on 31 January 2022, the accused has been and remains in custody.

On 6 April 2023, after a hearing before N Adams J, the accused was found unfit to be tried, under s 36 of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) (the MHCIFP Act). [1] He was referred to the Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHRT) which determined on 16 January of 2024 that he would not become fit to be tried for 12 months.

The Director of Public Prosecutions did not advise that further proceedings would not be taken in respect of the murder offence. [2] Accordingly, the matter was listed for a special hearing. [3]

The special hearing took place before me commencing on 11 November 2024.

The purpose of a special hearing is to ensure that, despite the unfitness of the person to be tried in accordance with the normal procedures, the person is acquitted, unless it can be proved to the requisite criminal standard of proof that, on the limited evidence available, the person committed the offence charged or any other offence available as an alternative to the offence charged. [4]

A special hearing is to be conducted as nearly as possible as if it were a trial of criminal proceedings, [5] and the accused must generally be legally represented. [6] In this case, the accused was represented by Mr Quilter of counsel.

Although at a special hearing an accused cannot, on his or her own account, enter a plea, the accused is taken to have pleaded not guilty in respect of the offence charged. [7] Consequently, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court on the accused’s behalf in respect of both counts of murder when he was arraigned on 11 November 2024.

The matter proceeded to as a special hearing before a judge sitting alone, as there was no election made to have the special hearing determined by a jury. [8]

The verdicts available at a special hearing include, as set out in s 59(1) of the MHCIFP Act:

A special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible may only be entered under s 59(1) if the judge is satisfied that the requirements of s 28(1) and (2) of the MHCIFP Act are met. [9]

My reasons for determination in this special hearing must include the principles of law I have applied and the findings of fact on which I have relied. [10]

In brief outline, the Crown case was that the accused and the two deceased lived in a boarding house which consisted of adjoining terraced houses, being 259 and 261 Cleveland Street Redfern, which had a shared back courtyard from which access could be gained to both the accused’s room in number 259 and the deceased’s room in number 261. It was alleged that the accused had previously spoken disparagingly of the deceased as “sexual pests” or “paedophiles” and intimated that killing such “pests” was in effect acceptable and, on at least one occasion and possibly two occasions, he had gone to the deceased’s room and threatened them with a knife.

On the Crown case, late on 29 January 2022, the accused went to the deceased’s room, violently stabbed them both and they died in their room immediately before, or within a short time of, Mr Finlay’s making two 000 calls for help and before help could arrive. The Crown relied on the accused’s previous conduct and statements concerning the deceased as establishing his motive for the offending and relied on fingerprint and DNA evidence to support the contention that it was the accused who entered the deceased’s room and wielded the knife or knives with which the deceased were killed.

The Crown also relied on certain tendency and co-incidence evidence in support of its case. In general terms, that evidence concerned:

I shall consider the tendency and co-incidence evidence more fully later.

The defence case was that the Crown had not eliminated the reasonable possibility that the stabbings were carried out by a person or persons unknown and not the accused. In particular, the accused relied on the evidence that other persons could have had ready access to the boarding house and could have left or remained in the building without being apprehended by police and that other persons might have a motive for stabbing the deceased because of their drug use, theft and history of violence. Shortcomings in the evidence of the incident on 6 January 2022 and the earlier incident related by Mrs Finlay were also identified. It was also noted that there was no “dying declaration” by Mr Finlay in his 000 call. In addition, shortcomings in the forensic evidence and absence of evidence more generally were also identified. The accused’s post-offence conduct was said, in effect, to be insignificant or equivocal.

In addition, the defence case included that the Crown had not eliminated the reasonable possibility that the deceased killed each other, having regard to the history of acrimonious relations between them, Mr Watson’s history of domestic violence, the door of their room being barricaded and the wounds inflicted.

In the alternative, if it were found that the accused had caused the death of the two deceased by his deliberate acts, it was the defence case that the accused had established the defence of mental health impairment and there should be a special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible.

In that latter regard, the Crown expressly accepted that, if the acts were proven, the mental health impairment defence was available on the evidence, especially the evidence of the two psychiatrists who were in agreement on that issue from a psychiatric point of view.

There are two principal issues in these proceedings:

The evidence in this matter included oral evidence from:

Other evidence was adduced without objection by way of the tender of statements from:

Video, audio and other evidence included:

In addition, there was a statement of agreed facts in relation to the death of Ryan Dewhurst.

A site inspection of 259 and 261 Cleveland Street and immediately surrounding areas was conducted on 15 November 2024.

As to the accused’s mental health at about 29 January 2022, the expert evidence consisted of the following:

On 21 and 25 November 2024, the Crown sought to tender the statement of Ms Deborah Howlett dated 1 March 2022 under s 65 of the Evidence Act on the basis that she was unavailable to give evidence at that time. Mr Quilter objected to the admission of this statement in respect of the issue of whether the acts alleged in the two counts had been proved. He did not object to its admission in respect of the second issue of whether, if the acts were proven, the accused was criminally responsible because of the defence of mental health impairment. The parties agreed that I should rule on this tender as part of my final judgment.

On this application, evidence was given by audio-visual or audio link by Dr Jones and Dr Goriparti, who were Ms Howlett’s treating psychiatrists at Northern Beaches Hospital where Ms Howlett was an inpatient at the relevant times. They gave evidence, which I accept, that on 21 and 25 November 2024, Ms Howlett was showing signs of psychosis when they each assessed her. Dr Goriparti’s evidence was that, on 25 November 2024, she was exhibiting at that time thought disorder and disorganisation which are symptoms of psychosis. In summary, both doctors were of the view that at the times they each assessed her, she was mentally unable to give evidence.

In addition, I accept Dr Jones’s evidence that Ms Howlett:

The form of Ms Howlett’s statement indicates that it was taken on 1 March 2022 by Plain Clothes Senior Constable Vo, whose BWV recording of the interview with Mr Miles was also in evidence. There was, however, no evidence from Senior Constable Vo as to the circumstances in which the representations in Ms Howlett’s statement were made, including whether she was exhibiting symptoms of psychosis, was wearing her hearing aids and was able to read and understand the statement that she signed.

There was no dispute that notice had been given under s 67 of the Evidence Act and Mr Quilter did not make any substantial submissions in effect challenging that Ms Howlett was “not available to give evidence” or that it was not reasonably practicable to overcome that inability, within s 65(1) of the Evidence Act and cl 4(1)(c) of the Act’s Dictionary. In light of the evidence of Dr Jones and Dr Goriparti, I was satisfied that Ms Howlett was mentally unable to give evidence at the relevant times and there was no reasonably practicable way to overcome that inability.

It was not in dispute that the admissibility of Ms Howlett’s evidence turned on whether the previous representations in Ms Howlett’s statement were made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representations were reliable, within s 65(2)(c) of the Evidence Act.

Hearsay evidence is generally excluded as a means of proving a fact in issue by s 59(1) of the Evidence Act which establishes the “hearsay rule” in the following terms:

Section 65(1) and (2)(c) of the Evidence Act establish an exception to the hearsay rule which may be applicable in a case such as the present. Those provisions relevantly provide as follows:

In Sio v The Queen (2016) 259 CLR 47; [2016] HCA 32 (Sio), the High Court considered the application of s 65(2) of the Evidence Act. While that case focused on s 65(2)(d), the principles are the same for other provisions of s 65(2). The proper approach was set out at [57]-[58] (French CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ)) as follows:

The facts in issue in these proceedings included the accused’s mental state in December 2021 and January 2022, his attitude towards and responses to the deceased, his possession of knives and whether he had a motive for attacking the deceased on 29 January 2022.

The Crown identified two types of representations in Ms Howlett’s evidence relevant to these facts in issue, namely representations as to what she observed concerning the accused and representations as to things said by the accused. In particular, her evidence went to:

Section 65(2)(c) is concerned with whether each of those representations "was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable". Thus, the focus of attention must be upon the circumstances of the making of the representations to determine the likelihood of their reliability, but evidence of events other than those of the making of the previous representation can throw light upon the circumstances of the making of that representation and its reliability: Sio at [69]-[70] citing R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386 at [28]-[29] (Mason P, with Hulme and Simpson JJ agreeing). In assessing the circumstances in which the representation was made, the Court is not to undertake a general assessment of whether the representor is a reliable witness: Sio at [72].

As to the circumstances in which the representations were made, the Crown relied on the fact that the representations were made in an official statement to police containing a statement as to the truth of what was said and that Ms Howlett would be prepared to give this evidence in court as well as her acknowledgement that if the evidence was wilfully false she would be liable to prosecution. This aspect of the circumstances in which the statement was made has been held to favour a finding of reliability: R v Singh (No 4) [2021] NSWSC 75 at [35] and [43(1)] (N Adams J); Harris v R [2005] NSWCCA 432 at [44]-[46] (Studdert J, with Grove and Whealy JJ agreeing).

The Crown also relied on the fact that Ms Howlett made her statement in respect of a very serious matter, namely two murders being investigated by police, the representations were adverse to the interests of someone Ms Howlett thought of as a close friend and were also contrary to her own interests in the sense that she heard the threats and did nothing about them. It may be accepted that to an extent these circumstances also favour a finding of reliability.

Mr Quilter submitted that since Ms Howlett had a history of drug induced psychosis on and off for a number of years it would be relevant to the circumstances in which the representations were made whether or not she was suffering from such psychosis at the time of making the statement and thus the reliability of the representations made. Similarly, it was submitted that the evidence concerning Ms Howlett’s hearing and reading difficulties meant that those matters could have been circumstances when the statement was made and signed by Ms Howlett which adversely affect the reliability of the representations.

While there are circumstances in which the statement was made identified by the Crown which tend towards a finding that the representations in Ms Howlett’s statement are reliable, I am required to be satisfied that it is “highly probable” that the representations are reliable. Apart from the fact that Ms Howlett’s statement included in par 29 that she went to Dee Why Police Station on 1 March 2022 and gave the statement, there was no direct evidence as to the circumstances in which the statement was taken and the representations were made. That evidence could have come from Senior Constable Vo but he was not called to give evidence by the Crown.

The absence of such evidence from Senior Constable Vo is particularly significant in the present case in light of the potential for Ms Howlett to have been suffering some form of psychosis at the time, to have been unable to hear properly if she was not wearing her hearing aids and to have been unable to understand fully what was in her written statement because of her reading difficulty.

It is a finely balanced question but, given the high standard of satisfaction required under s 65(2)(c), namely “highly probable”, the absence of any direct evidence concerning her mental state at the time of making her statement, whether she was wearing her hearing aids and whether the statement was read to her before she signed it, I am not satisfied that the representations referred to above were made in circumstances that made it highly probable that they were reliable.

No other basis for admission of Ms Howlett’s evidence was relied on by the Crown.

Accordingly, I reject the tender of the statement Ms Howlett dated 1 March 2022 in respect of the issue of whether the acts alleged in the two counts of murder were proved. Nonetheless, in light of the limited objection taken by Mr Quilter, I admit the statement in respect of the second issue of whether the applicant has established the defence of mental health impairment.

The Crown also sought to rely on some of the evidence identified above as tendency evidence and coincidence evidence under ss 97 and 98 of the Evidence Act respectively. In that regard, there was no dispute that the notice requirements of both of those sections had been complied with.

Given the fact that the special hearing in this matter was conducted by a judge alone, both parties sought that the evidence relied on as tendency and coincidence evidence should be identified after the close of the evidence and the issue of whether that evidence was admissible as tendency or coincidence evidence should be considered in the final judgment rather than there being an earlier ruling in that regard. In light of the parties’ preference for this approach, I agreed to that course.

The position of the defence in respect of the evidence relied on by the Crown as tendency and coincidence evidence was as follows:

On 27 August 2024 the Crown served a Tendency Notice on the solicitors for the accused. The accused’s tendency asserted in that notice was “his tendency to act in a particular way, namely to threaten the use of a knife (or bladed weapons), and actually use a knife (or bladed weapons) against the deceased Steven Finlay and Mitchell Watson”. The substance of the tendency evidence set out in the notice was not only the evidence in respect of an incident on 6 January 2022 when the accused is said to have gone to the deceased’s room and threatened Mr Finlay with a knife but also the evidence of what occurred on the night when the deceased were killed.

In the Crown’s eventual submissions in relation to the admissibility of the tendency evidence, the asserted tendency was modified to:

In addition, the Crown’s submissions no longer contended that the tendency evidence included the evidence of what occurred on 29 January 2022, the night the deceased were killed.

The substance of the tendency evidence was eventually identified as being as follows:

The admission of tendency evidence in a criminal matter such as the present is governed principally by ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence Act which relevantly provide:

The Dictionary to the Evidence Act defines "probative value" as meaning:

Finally, it can be noted that s 94(5) of the Evidence Act provides:

As noted above, the fact in issue in relation to which it is sought to adduce the evidence as tendency is whether it was the accused who stabbed the deceased on 29 January 2022.

Since there was no dispute that the requisite notice had been given, the matter to be considered under s 97(1)(b) is whether the tendency evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the Crown, have significant probative value.

For the purpose of making that assessment of probative value, it must be assumed that the evidence is accepted at its highest, but the circumstances surrounding the evidence may indicate that its highest level is not very high: IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 (IMM) at [49], [50] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). In addition, in order for the probative value to be “significant” the capacity of the evidence to contribute to the proof of a fact in issue must be more than simply the capacity to make the existence of that fact more or less probable. To be “significant”, the capacity of the evidence to contribute to the proof of the fact in issue does not need to be “substantial” but does need to be “important” or “of consequence” and the evidence must be influential in the context of fact-finding: IMM at [46] and [103] (Gageler J).

In determining whether the tendency evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have "significant probative value", there are two matters that must be considered. First, the extent to which the evidence establishes the tendency, in conjunction with other evidence: Hughes v The Queen (2017) 263 CLR 338; [2017] HCA 20 (Hughes) at [61], [64] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ); and, secondly, the extent to which the tendency makes more likely the relevant fact or facts in issue: Hughes at [64].

The consideration of these issues in the present case involves a certain degree of artificiality or pointlessness since it is not in issue that the evidence identified as tendency evidence by the Crown was expressly accepted by the defence as being admissible as relevant to establishing the accused’s state of mind, namely his animosity towards the deceased at about the relevant time.

In my view, the evidence identified by the Crown as tendency evidence in its submissions is not evidence which has significant probative value in relation to establishing that the accused had the tendency asserted. Rather, it was evidence of the accused’s particular state of mind. Accepted at its highest, that evidence might establish that the accused had considerable animosity towards the deceased to the extent that he would threaten them with a knife but leave when they said they would call or were calling the police. It does not go further and establish a tendency to threaten the deceased with a knife so as to engage the syllogistic mode of reasoning identified by the Court in Elomar v R [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [360]; 316 ALR 206. In Elomar at [367], it was held:

The situation in the present case is, in my view, similar to that described in Elomar at [369]:

In the circumstances, I do not accept that the evidence identified by the Crown has "significant probative value", in conjunction with other evidence, in relation to establishing the tendency for which the Crown contends.

Accordingly, I reject that evidence as tendency evidence but note that it is admitted for other purposes, in particular in order to establish the accused’s state of mind at about the relevant time and in relation to the defence of mental health impairment.

On 14 October 2024 the Crown served an updated Coincidence Notice on the solicitors for the accused. The Crown identified the two incidents said to attract coincidence reasoning as being:

The Crown also referred to two other events:

The incident on 6 January 2022 was relied on only as being relevant to identifying the accused as the person who killed the two deceased on 29 January 2022.

Despite the terms of the notice, it appears that the Crown relied upon the evidence of the event relating to Mr Smeda as also being coincidence evidence given the asserted similarity of circumstances.

The evidence which was sought to be adduced only as coincidence evidence in relation to the issue of whether the accused committed the relevant acts was the evidence concerning the killing of Mr Dewhurst on 29 September 2013 and the assault of Mr Smeda in September 2012. The relevant portions of this evidence were identified in par 17 of the Revised Crown Submissions dated 29 November 2024.

The accused did not object to this evidence being admitted on the issue of whether he had established the defence of mental health impairment but objected to it being admitted as coincidence evidence in respect of the issue of whether he committed the relevant acts charged.

Section 98 of the Evidence Act relevantly provides:

The additional requirement in relation to coincidence evidence in criminal proceedings set out in s 101 of the Evidence Act and other applicable provisions such as s 94(5) and the definition of “probative value” in the Dictionary to the Evidence Act have been referred to in the context of tendency evidence and are not repeated here, although they remain applicable.

Since there was no dispute that the requisite notice had been given, the matter to be considered under s 98(1)(b) is whether the coincidence evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the Crown, have significant probative value. In this regard, relevant principles set out above in relation to tendency evidence are also applicable to coincidence evidence.

In R v Gale; R v Duckworth [2012] NSWCCA 174; 217 A Crim R 487 Simpson J (with McClennan CJ at CL and Fullerton J agreeing) set out the steps involved in the assessment of admissibility of coincidence evidence. It can be noted that the sixth step requires modification because s 101(2) has been amended so that it now refers to probative value outweighing the danger of unfair prejudice. Her Honour held at [31] (with the sixth step amended to reflect the current wording of s 101(2)):

In the present case, the relevant fact in issue is whether it was the accused who killed the deceased on 29 January 2022. The Crown seeks to prove that the acts involved in the stabbing of the two deceased were the acts of the accused by relying on, inter alia, the coincidence evidence.

The “two or more events” are the stabbing of Mr Finaly and Mr Watson, the killing of Mr Dewhurst and the assaulting of Mr Smeda.

The similarities in the events were identified by the Crown as being as follows:

As noted above, it was accepted that the relevant notice had been given.

In determining whether the evidence has significant probative value, it is to be accepted as credible and reliable, and the issue is in essence whether or not the similarities in events and circumstances can be accounted for by way of coincidence. If not, then the evidence is capable of being regarded as having significant probative value in establishing that it was the accused who stabbed the two deceased on 29 January 2022.

As the accused submitted, one aspect of the present case which raises significant difficulties when addressing the issue of significant probative value is the fact that there is little evidence as to the circumstances of the stabbing of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson on 29 January 2022. In particular, there is no evidence of: the accused’s involvement on that day in what preceded the deceased being stabbed; who instigated the conflict which led to the stabbing; and, whether any allegations of stealing were made by the accused in connection with the stabbing. Accordingly, the third, fourth and fifth asserted similarities are deprived, to a significant extent, of their force as elements which might negative coincidence in the present case.

In addition, the extreme violence apparently involved in the stabbing of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson is in marked contrast to the limited violence involved in the killing of Mr Dewhurst and the assault on Mr Smeda. While dissimilarities do not necessarily undermine a conclusion that the events were not coincidental, the difference in the level of violence between the various events in the present case militates against a finding that the events were not coincidental.

Finally, the circumstances of the events occurring in socially disadvantaged housing, between persons who were known to one another but not personal friends, where the victims were believed to be paedophiles or homosexuals are not, unfortunately, unusually or uncommonly associated with violence of the nature involved in the present case. This consideration tends to support the conclusion that it is not improbable that the occurrence of the events involving the accused and Mr Dewhurst and Mr Smeda and the stabbing of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson were a coincidence.

There are no other considerations which provide substantial support for the conclusion that the events relating to Mr Dewhurst’s death, Mr Smeda’s assault and the killing of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson could not have been or were not coincidental.

Weighing all of these considerations in light of the asserted similarities and the evidence, I am not satisfied that the coincidence evidence sought to be adduced by the Crown, by itself or taken together with other evidence, has significant probative value in the circumstances of the present case in establishing that it was the accused who stabbed the deceased on 29 January 2022.

Consequently, the requirement in s 98(1)(b) has not been met and it is not necessary to consider whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused under s 101.

For these reasons, the evidence relating to the killing of Mr Dewhurst and the assault on Mr Smeda [11] is not admissible as coincidence evidence in relation to the issue of whether the accused did the acts by which Mr Finlay and Mr Watson were killed. As there was no objection to that evidence being adduced in relation to the defence of mental health impairment, it is admitted with its use being restricted to that defence.

In reaching my verdicts in these proceedings, I have applied the following legal principles and have taken into account the following directions.

The accused is not required to prove his innocence. He is presumed to be innocent unless and until the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the offences charged were committed.

The legal consequence of the presumption of innocence is that the prosecution bears the onus of proof. Putting to one side for the moment the defence of mental health impairment, in relation to the offences charged, the onus remains on the Crown from beginning to end and that burden never shifts to the accused and it is not for him to prove his innocence but for the Crown to prove his guilt.

The standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Those words and that phrase have their ordinary English meaning. The Crown is not required to prove the truth and reliability of every disputed fact, or to establish everything that its witnesses said in evidence was true. The matters that the Crown needs to establish beyond reasonable doubt are the essential legal ingredients or elements of each of the offences charged.

When, as in this case, an accused relies on the defence of mental health impairment, [12] there is an onus on the accused to prove that he is not criminally responsible for his acts because of his mental health impairment. To this limited extent, there is an onus on the accused in this matter, but the standard of proof is the lesser civil standard, on the balance of probabilities. [13] I shall discuss the defence of mental health impairment in more detail later.

As to the witnesses who gave evidence, I must determine whether I accept that a witness is being truthful when giving evidence and whether the evidence is reliable. Evidence may be truthful but unreliable. I am entitled to accept part of a witness’ evidence and reject other parts.

That the accused did not give evidence before this Court is a matter of no significance. He was not obliged to do so. No conclusion adverse to him can be drawn from this feature of the matter.

The accused chose not to give an account of what occurred on 6 January 2022 when spoken to by police at about that time. He also chose not to give an account of what he had done on 29 January 2022 at the time of his arrest on 31 January 2022. All people in this country have a right to silence — that is, to choose not to answer questions put to them by the police. Any exceptions to that right did not apply in the present case.

I must not use the fact that the accused exercised his right to silence in these ways adversely to him. I bear in mind that the accused’s silence on those occasions cannot be used against him in any way at all and I have not done so.

Although the accused did not give evidence, he did give an account in which he in effect denied being involved in the stabbing of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson to Andrew Chandler, Dr Martin and Dr Nielssen and during his ERISP. The fact the accused relies on those denials does not alter the burden of proof. The accused does not have to prove that his version is true. The Crown has to satisfy me that the account given by the accused should not be accepted as a version of events that could reasonably be true.

Mr Bouggas effectively denied that he stabbed the deceased. He must be found not guilty if his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt I may have at the end of my deliberations. A number of things follow from this.

First, if I believe the accused’s account and denials, I must acquit.

Secondly, if I find difficulty in accepting that account or denials, but think one or more might be true, then I must acquit.

Thirdly, if I do not believe the accused’s account or denials and do not think they might reasonably be true, then I am to put them to one side. Nevertheless, the question will remain: has the Crown, upon the basis of evidence that I do accept, proved the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

The evidence has included information indicating that the accused has previously been in custody for other offences, has been involved with prohibited drugs and has behaved aggressively or offensively towards police and others. This evidence has been given because it was relevant to the accused’s circumstances, state of mind and actions in the present case.

I have taken into account that, although the evidence shows the accused to be a person of bad character in those regards, I must not reason that since crimes are more often committed by the bad than the good, therefore the accused is likely to be guilty of the crimes with which he has been charged.

I am not permitted to use the evidence of the accused’s bad character for the purpose of concluding that the accused is guilty of the crimes with which he is charged simply because he is the sort of person who would be likely to commit such crimes.

As the tribunal of fact, I may draw inferences from the direct evidence. Inferences are conclusions of fact rationally drawn from a combination of proved facts. If A, B and C are established as facts then I might rationally conclude that D is also a fact, even though there might be no direct evidence that D is indeed a fact. Inferences may be valid or invalid, justified or unjustified, correct or incorrect.

Drawing inferences involves a number of steps. The first step is determining the primary facts upon which any inference is based. Those primary facts do not have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The next step is to consider what inferences are logically and reasonably available based on those primary facts I have found. Drawing an inference from a set of established facts to find that another fact is proved involves a logical and rational process of reasoning. I must not base my conclusion upon mere speculation, conjecture or supposition. It is important not just to consider one obvious inference but also to consider whether alternative inferences may be available.

In a special hearing such as the present, I must relevantly be satisfied of the accused’s guilt or that the accused committed the acts in question beyond reasonable doubt for the Crown to establish its case. Amongst other things, that means that I should be extremely careful about drawing any inference and I should examine any possible inference to ensure that it is a justifiable inference. When I am considering whether to draw the ultimate inference that the accused committed the acts, or an inference that one of the elements of the offence has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, I must be satisfied that the inference I draw is the only reasonable inference available on all the evidence. If there is another inference reasonably available which is inconsistent with the accused’s guilt, I must find him not guilty.

In the present matter, the prosecution case in relation to the murder charges is a circumstantial one. In this situation, I may draw reasonable inferences from the facts established on the evidence. However, in doing so, I must first be satisfied of those primary facts. As I have already noted, I need not be satisfied of the primary facts beyond reasonable doubt. There is no particular standard of proof to be applied to the individual items of evidence. Rather, it is the combination of facts or evidence that may lead me to infer the existence of facts that are not, or cannot, be proved by direct evidence.

A case based on circumstantial evidence may be just as convincing and reliable as a case based upon direct evidence. This will depend upon the number and nature of the basic facts relied upon by the Crown when considered as a whole rather than individually or in isolation. It also depends on whether all of the evidence leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the Crown has established the guilt of the accused or that he committed the relevant acts.

I am to approach the circumstantial case in the present matter by considering as a whole, and weighing, all the facts I have found established by the evidence. Considering all the facts I have found together as a whole, I am to determine whether I can conclude from those facts that the accused committed the acts in question beyond reasonable doubt, by a logical and rational process of reasoning and not mere speculation, conjecture or supposition.

When it comes to drawing the ultimate inference of guilt or that the accused committed the relevant acts, I must be satisfied that this inference is a reasonable one to draw from the facts found and that it is the only reasonable inference or conclusion that can be drawn from a consideration of all the established facts on the evidence viewed as a whole. If there is any other reasonable conclusion that is open and is inconsistent with the accused’s having committed the acts in question, then the Crown’s circumstantial case will have failed and the accused must be found not guilty.

The Crown relies on evidence of things said by the accused after the stabbing of the two deceased as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Although the Crown drew attention to what were said to be unusual aspects of the accused’s conduct in the days after the stabbing of the two deceased, it was not submitted that this conduct demonstrated a consciousness of guilt on the accused’s part. Rather, it was said that the conduct was consistent with the accused experiencing an unusual event around the time of the death of the deceased. In addition, the Crown referred to the accused’s highly aggressive behaviour during one of the forensic procedures and submitted that this was indicative of his mental state at about the time of the killings.

As to lies as consciousness of guilt, the Crown relies on the evidence that the accused:

The Crown contends that these were lies because there was evidence that the accused was aware of who the deceased were, had spoken to them before in the shared back courtyard and during the incident on 6 January 2022 and had seen them in the preceding two weeks when he had been at the boarding house with various friends, who gave evidence.

Before I can accept that the accused told lies and that they demonstrate a consciousness of guilt, I must be clear about what a lie is. A lie is to say something untrue, knowing at the time of making the statement that it is untrue. If a person says something which is untrue, but does not realise at the time that it is untrue, then that is not a lie. The person is simply mistaken or perhaps confused. Even if the person later comes to realise that what they said was incorrect, that does not transform the statement into a lie. To be a lie, the person must say something that the person knows, at the time of making the statement, is untrue.

If I find that the accused made any of the three statements I have identified, and I find it was a lie, then I must exercise care in deciding what significance, if any, it has. I may take this lie into account as evidence of the accused’s guilt in the sense that it can be considered along with all of the other facts that the Crown relies upon and which I find established on the evidence in considering whether the Crown has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Crown does not suggest that if I found the accused told a lie that this finding can prove, by itself, the guilt of the accused or that he committed the acts in question. I can take any such lie into account in the way I have explained, however, only if I find two further things.

First, I must find that what the accused said that amounts to a lie relates to an issue that is relevant to the offences the Crown alleges that the accused committed. It must relate to some significant circumstance or event connected with that alleged offence. In this case, the Crown says the lies it relies on are relevant because they relate to the accused’s knowledge of, and attitude towards, the deceased.

Secondly, I must find that the reason the accused told the lie is because he feared that telling the truth might reveal his guilt in respect of the charges he now faces. In other words, he feared that telling the truth would implicate him in the commission of the offences in question.

I must remember, however, that people do not always act rationally, and that conduct of this sort, that is, telling a lie, may sometimes be explained in other ways. A person may have a reason for lying quite apart from trying to conceal their guilt. For example, a lie may be told out of panic; to escape an unjust accusation; to protect some other person; or to avoid a consequence unrelated to the offence.

If I think that the lie may have been told for some reason other than to avoid being implicated in the commission of the offences with which the accused is now charged, then it cannot be used as evidence of the accused’s guilt. If that is the case, I should put it to one side and focus my deliberations upon the other evidence in the case.

In summary, before I can use what the accused said as something which points towards his guilt, I must be satisfied that he lied deliberately. I must find that the lie related to some significant circumstance or event connected with the alleged offence. I must find that the reason the accused told this lie was because he feared that the truth would implicate him in relation to the commission of the offences with which he is charged.

The defence case in relation to this issue is in effect that the things said by the accused were either not untrue, for example because he did not know the deceased in the sense of knowing them by name, were not deliberate lies or were said out of panic or to avoid an unjust accusation. As a result, it was said that I would not put any weight on this aspect of the Crown case.

The evidence included hearsay evidence from various witnesses about what Mr Finlay or Mr Watson had told them concerning the events of 6 January 2022 and other events and matters relating to the accused and the boarding house in Cleveland Street or Mr Finlay and Mr Watson’s relationship and activities. I take into account that hearsay evidence of this nature may be unreliable, even though it is not necessarily so, and care must be taken when assessing that evidence for a number of reasons. These include that the information given to the witness was not given on oath, publicly and for the purposes of a formal court hearing. In addition, there may have been weaknesses, or inconsistencies, or problems in the information provided to the witness that could have been revealed in cross-examination, or even perhaps in evidence in chief, which were not able to be revealed because of the way in which the information was given as hearsay evidence. I also note that because the Crown bears the onus of proof, it is not up to the accused to prove that the information given by way of such hearsay evidence was unreliable or false.

The hearsay evidence in the present case included, in particular, evidence from Mr Finlay and Mr Watson which identified or tended to identify the accused as the person who went to the door of the deceased’s room on 6 January 2022 and threatened them with a knife. I take into account that, in addition to the care which must be taken in relation to hearsay evidence, special caution must be exercised before I accept the identification evidence as reliable. This relates only to the reliability of the identification evidence given, not to the honesty of the witness or the honesty of the persons who provided the information to the witness. A person who gives evidence or information of identification may honestly and sincerely believe that their identification is correct, and that evidence or information may be quite impressive, even persuasive. So here, even if I thought Mr Finlay and Mr Watson and the witnesses who gave evidence as to what they said were entirely honest in that evidence and information, I must still approach the task of assessing the reliability of the identification with special caution.

This is because experience of the criminal courts demonstrates that it is possible that a person may be mistaken in their identification of a person accused of a crime. I must carefully consider the circumstances in which Mr Finlay or Mr Watson made their observation of the person. The circumstances in which the witness made their observation of the person can affect the reliability of identification evidence. Those circumstances include how well the witnesses knew the person, what opportunity they had to observe the person, was their attention focused on the person, in what light was the observation made, was there any reason to remember the person, were they under stress or pressure at the time, and was the identification given at a time when the incident was fresh in their memory. Even if a witness knows a person the possibility of mistake remains and even if more than one person identifies a person, they can be mistaken.

In the present case, there is additional need for caution since on Mr Finlay’s account he identified that the person involved in the incident on 6 January 2022 was named “Drew” and he lived upstairs with his girlfriend when this was not the accused’s name and there was no evidence that the accused lived with his girlfriend in the boarding house at about this time. On the BWV of Senior Constable Cregan, Mr Finlay and Mr Watson appeared to be unable to give a detailed description of the person or his clothing. In addition, Mr Finlay said to Senor Constable Cregan, “It was dark, maybe it was somebody else … It might have been somebody else”.

As to other evidence that may be unreliable including that of Witness X, I have taken into account that he gained a benefit by undertaking to give and giving evidence in these proceedings. The benefit was that his assistance to authorities in this matter was taken into account in his favour when Witness X was sentenced for unrelated offending concerning stealing from a dwelling house.

Witness X’s evidence was that he requested police to provide evidence concerning his assistance in this matter to a court in the unrelated proceedings, to help him avoid going to gaol and he did avoid going to goal for the offence of stealing from a dwelling house. I have taken into account that a witness seeking to obtain such a benefit in this way may be motivated to provide evidence which the witness perceives may assist police to obtain a conviction rather than the truth and that the experience of the courts has shown that once such a witness has given a version to the police which incriminates an accused, the witness may feel locked into that version, even if it contained inaccuracies or even if it were substantially untrue.

I note that there may be other reasons or motives why false evidence has been given by such a witness. It is not for the accused to establish what they might be. I have proceeded on the basis that the Crown has to prove the essential elements of its case beyond reasonable doubt and the accused does not have to prove anything.

The law provides that evidence may be given by audio-visual link (AVL), as occurred with a number of witnesses in the present case. I am to assess this evidence in the same way as I would evidence given in court and I should not give it more or less weight because of the way in which the evidence was given. Where, however, the credit of a witness who gave evidence by AVL is a crucial issue in the resolution of any charge against the accused, any difficulty I might encounter in assessing the credibility of the witness by reason of the evidence being given by AVL should be resolved in favour of the accused.

In the present case, a number of expert witnesses have given evidence. This expert evidence most relevantly included:

In addition, a number of Crime Scene Officers with expert qualifications gave evidence which included opinions within their areas of expertise concerning what was observed and done by them at the scene and as part of their investigations.

In relation to all of the expert evidence, if it is not inherently unbelievable, I would need to have a good reason to reject it. I would do so, for example, if it were based on facts that did not accord with what I have found to have been proved on the evidence, if the experts were not briefed with all relevant material, if their conclusions were not adequately explained in the reasoning in their reports or if there were some reason to doubt that a witness had relevant expertise.

In the present case, however, the experts’ opinions were based on material which was supported by the evidence. There was no suggestion that any expert did not have access to the necessary information when forming their opinions. The reasoning of the experts by which they reached their conclusions was adequately exposed in their evidence and there was no issue that they possessed the relevant expertise. I also take into account that the defence did not take issue with the evidence of the state of the crime scene or the results of the forensic testing.

More specifically in relation to the psychiatric evidence in the reports of Dr Martin and Dr Nielssen, it is well established that if medical evidence relating to the issue of mental health impairment is unanimous, it cannot be rejected by a tribunal of fact in the absence of other material which casts some doubt on it. [14] In the present case, the opinions of Dr Martin and Dr Nielssen were in substance unanimous and there was no material which cast doubt on any aspect of their opinions.

The essential elements of the murder charges, each of which the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt, are as set out below.

In this context, “caused” means “substantially contributed to”. Deliberate acts are one which result from a willed movement of the muscles. They can be thought of as conscious or voluntary acts. Examples of actions that are not voluntary include those which occur because of an epileptic fit, sneezing and sleepwalking.

“Intention” has its ordinary English meaning. “Grievous bodily harm” is really serious bodily injury and thus is not like a cut, a bruise or a broken finger where, although it may be an injury, it is not really serious. In order to be really serious bodily injury, however, it does not have to be permanent injury and it does not have to be life-threatening.

If the Crown has not proved each of the elements of each relevant charge beyond reasonable doubt, the verdict is to be that the accused is not guilty of that charge.

However, before it can be found on the limited evidence available that the accused in this case committed the offences charged, it is necessary to consider whether the defence of mental health impairment has been established.

Where the defence of mental health impairment is raised, as in the present case, it is necessary first to consider whether the Crown has proved to the requisite standard that the deceased died as a result of the accused’s deliberate, or voluntary acts as charged. If it is concluded that he did, it is next necessary to examine the evidence to determine whether the accused can be held criminally responsible for those act or acts. In the case of these murder charges, it is only when those basic questions are answered adversely to an accused that the issue of the necessary intent for murder can be addressed. [15]

The accused is to be found not criminally responsible by reason of a mental health impairment if:

If the Crown proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused the death of the deceased by his deliberate act or acts, but each of the elements of the defence of mental health impairment is made out, then the verdict should be a special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible in each case. In such a case, it is not necessary to consider whether the intention element of murder has been established.

As already noted, the Crown did not submit that, if the accused is found to have committed the relevant acts, the defence of mental health impairment has not been made out.

In order to make my factual findings, I have assessed the various witnesses and their evidence.

Dealing first with the civilian witnesses, I formed the view that Mrs Finlay, Steven Finlay’s mother, was an honest witness trying conscientiously to give truthful evidence and I generally accept her evidence except her account of being told about an earlier incident in December 2021 involving the accused coming to her son’s room with a knife. Mrs Finlay said that this was not referred to in her statement made on 9 March 2022. In addition, such an incident was not supported by any text or other written messages, 000 calls or similar material. No other person gave evidence of such an incident occurring at that time and Mr Finlay in his 000 call early on 7 January 2022 (after the 6 January 2022 incident) in effect denied that he had had any problems before 6 January 2022 with the person who came to his room on that later occasion.

The other member of the deceased’s family from whom evidence was obtained was Ms de Varge, Mr Finlay’s sister. Her evidence was contained in a statement admitted without objection and I accept it.

Apart from Mr Finlay’s family members, the civilian witnesses included friends and acquaintances of the two deceased, Mr Highland who gave oral evidence, and Mr Moosman, Mr Happ and Mr Kerslake whose statements were admitted without objection. There was no substantial challenge to their evidence and I accept their evidence generally. More specifically, Mr Highland’s evidence included that an acquaintance of his, Mr Gebbe, who went to the police station with him as a support person, had alleged to police that Mr Highland “orchestrated the deaths of Steven and Mitchell”. Mr Highland said that this was completely false and in cross examination denied being involved in the murder of the deceased. There was no evidence indicating that there was any truth in Mr Gebbe’s allegation and it was unclear what might have been Mr Gebbe’s motive for making such an allegation. Mr Highland’s evidence was not inherently incredible and was consistent with the evidence of other witnesses. Nothing in his evidence or in the way that he gave evidence caused me to consider that his evidence was likely to be untruthful or unreliable. I accept his evidence that he was not involved in the deaths of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson.

The witnesses who were other residents in the boarding house or friends or acquaintances of the accused who visited the boarding house included Mr Thompson, Mr Chandler, Mr Kaadi, Mr Murphy and Ms Higley, who all gave oral evidence. The evidence from Mr Hannan who also lived in the boarding house, Mr Cook, a resident of the building next to the boarding house, and Mr Gallego, who was the owner of the boarding house was contained in statements admitted without objection. Once again, none of this evidence was in effect challenged and I generally accept it.

Witness X [REDACTED] gave oral evidence. For reasons which I have already referred to in relation to this witness’s evidence, I have approached it with particular caution. In addition to the fact that this witness received a benefit in unrelated proceedings because of his assistance to police by giving a statement and oral evidence in these proceedings, there were aspects of Witness X’s evidence which were inherently incredible. One such aspect was his evidence that at about the time of the stabbing of the two deceased in order to go to [REDACTED] 259 Cleveland Street Witness X took a route which went past the deceased’s room in 261 Cleveland Street then out of that building and into 259 Cleveland Street when it was quite unnecessary for him to enter number 261 at all or to go past the deceased’s room. I found the explanation given by the witness that he took this circuitous route because of his paranoia and that his “procedure [REDACTED], [was to] go around the whole perimeter of the building” was unconvincing, not least because his route did not go around the perimeter of the building in any usual sense. Another aspect which caused me concern was his evidence that, although he heard noises from the deceased’s room as if someone was vomiting and choking which “stopped [him] dead in [his] tracks” and caused him to wonder what it was “because [he] never heard anything like that before” and to pause for maybe 10 seconds trying to figure out what that noise was, he took no steps to investigate, to assist or to call 000. Finally, I found the evidence concerning the blue “Jetty lighter” that the witness said he gave to the accused quite unconvincing. The witness said that he did not know when he gave the accused the lighter but, after the police had examined the deceased’s room, the witness found the lighter in that room and grabbed it but when police asked him for it he was unable to find it and produce it.

In addition, my observation of his demeanour included that he appeared uncomfortable giving evidence and his language was somewhat unusual. For example, in the context of explaining what he did when he heard the noise from the deceased’s room, he said “I paused for maybe 10 seconds, trying to figure out what that noise was and I proceeded to the front door” of 261 Cleveland Street. The verb “proceeded” seemed out of place and was more reminiscent of how police officers might express themselves rather than what might usually be expected from a civilian witness. Further, when trying to explain why he had not initially provided information to police when they first spoke to him in the mid-morning of 30 January 2022, the witness denied not being honest and said he was “purposely blunt as possible”, which was an unusual expression to use in that context.

In all the circumstances, I am not prepared to accept Witness X’s evidence except if it was supported by evidence of another witness or documentary evidence.

There was also evidence given by way of statements admitted without objection from residents of the streets near the boarding house, Mr Stewart and Ms Ellison, whose statements concerned seeing two men who might have been the deceased walking in the street and having arguments in the afternoon and evening of 29 January 2022. While I accept their evidence, it did not appear to me that it included sufficient information for me to be able to infer that the persons observed were the two deceased.

Mr Dixon, who let the second bedroom of his unit in Chippendale on Airbnb to the accused in July 2021, gave unchallenged oral evidence, as to being threatened by the accused and calling the police which led to the accused being involuntarily admitted for mental health treatment. He appeared to me to be a straightforward and honest witness. His evidence was credible and reliable and I accept it.

There was also oral evidence from persons involved in the treatment or supervision of the accused: Ms Clarke, a social worker; and the case manager of the accused’s CTO in late 2021 and early 2022; and, Mr Eyles, the Community Corrections Officer, who took over supervision of the accused on parole for manslaughter after about September 2021. Their evidence was not challenged, it was credible and I accept it.

The evidence also included, in accordance with my earlier rulings in this judgment:

I generally accept all of the evidence I have just referred to but I limit the use to be made of it in accordance with the rulings which I have made.

I have already listed the police officers, crime scene officers and paramedics who gave oral evidence or whose evidence was given by way of statements admitted without objection. Their evidence included photographs, video recordings of the ERISP, forensic procedures and BWV. None of this evidence was effectively challenged, it was credible and I generally accept it all.

As to the expert witnesses, whom I have identified in this judgment, I am satisfied that their opinions were based on material which was supported by the evidence which I accept. All the experts had access to the necessary information when forming their opinions. Their reasoning was adequately exposed in their evidence and it was not suggested that any of the experts lacked the necessary expertise to provide a proper foundation for their opinions. In addition, I found their evidence inherently credible. No challenge to the evidence as to the state of the crime scene or the results of the forensic testing was made by the defence.

In the present case, the opinions of Dr Martin and Dr Nielssen concerning the defence of mental health impairment were properly based on material established on the evidence accepted by me and the opinions were in substance unanimous. Since there was no material which cast doubt on any aspect of their opinions, I accepted Dr Martin’s and Dr Nielssen’s opinions without reservation.

All of the other evidence and my observations made during the inspection of the site conducted on 15 November 2024 were relevantly consistent with the other evidence and I accept it.

On the basis of all of the evidence considered as a whole bearing in mind the principles, directions and warnings to which I have referred, my relevant findings include most pertinently those set out in what follows.

Sometime prior to Mr Finlay and Mr Watson being in a relationship together, Mr Watson was in a relationship with Mr Kerslake and this relationship was marked by significant physical violence on Mr Watson’s part. The relationship with Mr Kerslake ended, however, in December 2013.

Since 2019, Steven Finlay rented a room in the boarding house comprising two terraced houses at 259 and 261 Cleveland Street, Redfern, NSW. In 2021 and 2022, Mitchell Watson lived with Mr Finlay in that room which was on the ground floor towards the rear of number 261.

Each of numbers 259 and 261 have their own front and rear entrances but they share a common back courtyard, access to which can be gained through a gate in the rear fence on James Street, which is a lane which runs parallel to Cleveland Street behind the two terraced houses.

As at July 2021, the accused was on parole in relation to his sentence for the manslaughter of Ryan Dewhurst in September 2013.

On 9 July 2021, the accused moved into the second bedroom of an apartment in Chippendale occupied by Andrew Dixon who had advertised the room on Airbnb. The accused told Mr Dixon that he had been in gaol as a result of being charged with manslaughter for killing someone whom he said was like a demon and a paedophile.

On 22 July 2021, as a result of moving to Chippendale, the accused came under parole supervision by Daniel Eyles, a Community Corrections Officer at the Leichhardt office. By this time, he had been identified as having issues relating to drug and alcohol misuse, as well as anger, aggression and mental health issues.

On 27 July 2021, Mr Dixon came home from work in the early hours of the morning and found that the accused had been going through his possessions and they were in a mess, some on the counter and some on the floor. The accused asked Mr Dixon for his mobile phone because he said he thought Mr Dixon would call the police. The accused was ranting and appeared paranoid. At one point, the accused obtained a knife and started waving it at Mr Dixon saying he needed a knife because he thought Mr Dixon would have one. This went on for about five or ten minutes after which he returned Mr Dixon’s telephone and went to the bathroom where he stayed for about half an hour. While the accused was in the bathroom, Mr Dixon heard him screaming as if talking on the telephone to someone. When the accused came out of the bathroom, he went to the kitchen and took another knife and went back into his room. Mr Dixon could hear a noise like knives being clanged together and the accused laughing. One of the knives was a 30 cm kitchen knife and the other was a meat cleaver. Because he was worried about being stabbed, Mr Dixon called the police. After the police arrived, an ambulance also arrived and the accused was taken away in the ambulance. At Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, the accused was scheduled for a mental health assessment and then transferred to Concord Hospital.

On 22 September 2021, the accused was discharged from Concord Hospital subject to a CTO to be administered by Inner City Mental Health Services Caritas Centre (ICMHS) at St Vincent’s Hospital. At about this time, the accused expressed the view that he did not want to comply with the CTO and he told Mr Eyles that he would comply with it until his parole expired, which was due to occur on 14 October 2021, and thereafter his plan was not to comply with the CTO. The CTO required him to take specified medication including a monthly depot injection administered and supervised by ICMHS for his mental health conditions, which had been diagnosed in September 2021 as being schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder.

After being discharged from Concord Hospital on 22 September 2021, the accused moved into a room on the first floor of 259 Cleveland Street, Redfern. Access to that room could be gained from an internal door in the terraced house and from a back door which led to a small landing and an external stair down to the common courtyard at the rear of the boarding house. Mr Finlay and Mr Watson, who occupied a room in 261 Cleveland Street, often passed through the common rear courtyard on their way to their room.

On 7 October 2021, a telephone conversation between the accused and Mr Eyles had to be terminated because the accused was talking loudly and angrily over Mr Eyles and his mood became too elevated.

On 12 October 2021, there was a further conversation between Mr Eyles and the accused in which he was willing to engage with his supervising officer, was not angry and was apologetic about his behaviour. On this occasion, the accused said that he had had his depot injection on that day. This was Mr Eyles’s last interaction with the accused. During his conversations with Mr Eyles, the accused had said that the victim of the manslaughter deserved what happened to him because he was a paedophile and the accused referred to multiple people as paedophiles.

Ms Clarke was the social worker at ICMHS at St Vincent’s responsible for managing the accused on the CTO, including ensuring that he received his monthly depot injection by following up if he did not attend on the specified day. Ms Clarke first met the accused in about September or October 2021 and he made it clear to her that he felt he did not need a CTO or depot injections.

The last time Ms Clarke saw the accused was in November 2021 and he was teary and distressed about having to have the injection.

In November and December 2021, the accused received his monthly depot injections at ICMHS.

Mr Murphy had known the accused since 2002 and in about 2021 kept in touch with him on a regular basis. When Mr Murphy visited the accused at 259 Cleveland Street, he recalled the accused referring to another resident of the boarding house as a “sexual pest”. On another occasion when Mr Murphy and Ms Higley visited the accused and Ms Howlett was present, the accused started talking to people who were not there and getting very agitated. He took a knife and stabbed a table and slapped his hand down and screamed "No" and grabbed his head. Mr Murphy eventually calmed him down.

From around mid-December 2021 to January 2022, Ms Higley visited the accused with Mr Murphy on a number of occasions. On some of these occasions, the accused told her that there were bad vibrations in the boarding house and that people were projecting their thoughts to him through the walls. He also told her that those people included a gay couple whom he claimed were “sex pests and paedophiles” and part of an evil collective trying to take over the world. On one evening, Ms Higley saw the accused go downstairs to try to attack some of his neighbours but there were motorcycles in the way in the common back courtyard and Mr Murphy convinced the accused to go back upstairs and the accused calmed down.

On 24 December 2021, Mr Thomson moved into 261 Cleveland Street in a room a short way down the corridor from the deceased’s room. From the window in Mr Thomson’s room, he could see the door of the deceased’s room. From time to time, he heard the two deceased fighting, having a “blue”, but in his view this did not involve their hitting one another. Mr Thompson knew the accused as “Bougie”. On occasions most likely in January 2022, Mr Thompson heard the accused say from his room or the back stairs loudly enough for the deceased to hear as they walked in through the common back courtyard of 259 and 261 Cleveland Street words such as “poofters, cunts, filthy cunt” and “someone should run a blade through ‘em”.

In late 2021 or early 2022, Mr Finlay told Mr Moosman that there was another tenant in the boarding house called “Booga” who would brush against him and Mitchell Watson as they walked past and snarl at them. Mr Finlay’s impression was that this was done to intimidate Mr Finlay and Mr Watson.

By January 2022, Mr Highland had been a friend of Mr Watson for approximately eight years and somewhat less in the case of Mr Finlay. During late 2021 and early 2022, Mr Highland visited the two deceased in the boarding house more than a dozen times and they would socialise and take drugs together.

In January 2022, the door to Mr Finlay and Mr Watson’s room did not lock properly and they kept a sheet up in front of the door to give them some privacy.

On 6 January 2022, there was an incident in which a person came to the door of the deceased’s room late at night, accused them of stealing his telephone and threatened to kill Mr Finlay with a large kitchen knife. Mr Finlay called 000. By the time police attended, the person had left. What then occurred was recorded on the BWV and in Senior Constable Cregan’s statement. Mr Watson indicated to police that the person lived in the room at the top of the outdoor stairs which led to the accused’s room. When questioned by police, the accused denied that he had left his room that night.

I have already referred to the difficulties with the evidence concerning Mr Finlay’s and Mr Watson’s identification of the person involved in the 6 January 2022 incident. Nonetheless, Mr Finlay and Mr Watson were clear that it was the person who lived at the top of the stairs leading to the accused’s room. Mr Finlay’s somewhat tentative statement that he thought the person’s name was “Drew” and the statement that he had a girlfriend living with him are explicable given that the accused was generally known not by his first name, Chris, but by a nickname, Bougie or Bouga, and he did have a number of female visitors while he lived at 259 Cleveland Street. Although Mr Finlay said to Senior Constable Cregan, “It was dark, maybe it was somebody else … It might have been somebody else”, this was, in my view, probably because Mr Finlay had achieved his purpose of having the person go away and did not want to cause further problems for himself and Mr Watson by clearly identifying to the police the accused as the person involved, given that the accused lived in the same boarding house and it was evident that his mental health was volatile and they probably feared he could be violent.

Although I would not be satisfied of the identification beyond reasonable doubt, what occurred on 6 January 2022 is not an element of any of the charges and is not an essential fact in establishing whether the accused committed the acts charged. I have approached the identification evidence with considerable caution but having regard to the evidence as a whole, I find that it was the accused who went to the deceased’s room on 6 January 2022 and threatened them with a knife. What occurred is adequately summarised by what Mr Finaly said in his 000 call:

On 9 January 2022, Mr Finlay messaged his mother that he had become aware that Mr Watson had another boyfriend and Mr Finlay was thinking of leaving him and moving into a friend’s spare room in the following week.

On 10 January 2022, Mr Finlay went to stay with his family near Blacktown for about three or four days.

On 14 January 2022, the accused was due to have his depot injection but he did not attend at ICMHS on that day. Ms Clarke, the social worker from ICMHS, was on COVID leave at that time and there was no immediate follow-up on his failure to attend. On the first morning that Ms Clarke returned to work, she telephoned to remind the accused that his depot injection was due but by this time the accused was in police custody having been arrested on 31 January 2022.

By about 17 January 2022, Mr Finlay had returned to 261 Cleveland Street and was with Mr Watson. Nonetheless, at about this time Mrs Finlay hoped, in light of comments Mr Finlay had made to her, that Mr Finlay would leave Mr Watson and come and live at the family home. Mrs Finlay helped by paying the rent on a number of occasions and, during January 2022, ordered Pizza Hut deliveries for Mr Finlay and Mr Watson.

Sometime in January 2022 prior to the 29th, Mr Kaadi visited the accused with Ms Howlett. After Mr Khaadi went into the accused’s room, the accused got up and rushed past him and stood on the landing where the stairway ends at the accused’s back door yelling "I'm going to fucking kill you” and "faggots". Then he ran down, and eventually came back up, the stairs. Mr Kaadi did not see the persons at whom the accused was yelling, who were downstairs in the common rear courtyard and yelled back at him. Mr Kaadi left soon after that incident.

On 28 January 2022, Mr Highland contacted Mr Finlay and they caught up for a couple of hours at 261 Cleveland Street. Mr Finlay advised Mr Highland to enter through the front door rather than the rear courtyard because of an incident in which one of their neighbours who lived “out the back” had come to their door in the middle of the night with a knife and threatened them. Drugs were acquired and all three of them took drugs. Later, Mr Finlay walked with Mr Highland around the corner so that Mr Highland could buy a laptop computer and they then walked together to Redfern station where they parted company.

For a few months prior to 29 January 2022, Mr Cook who lived in 263 Cleveland Street, had heard “a lot more arguments” coming from Mr Finlay and Mr Watson’s room in number 261.

On 29 January 2022, Mr Finlay borrowed money from Mr Highland and bought drugs which he consumed with Mr Highland over about a two hour period in the mid-morning at Mr Highland’s place in Newtown. Mr Finlay left while Mr Highland was in the bathroom and took a hard drive with him. Mr Highland messaged Mr Finlay about the hard drive later that day but did not see Mr Finlay again. After visiting a friend in Newtown, Mr Highland spent the night of 29 January 2022 at home. Subsequently, Mr Highland provided a sample of his DNA to police.

At about 9:00 pm on 29 January 2022, Mr Happ was on a website for “dating and hookups” and started talking to Mr Finlay, who sent a photograph of himself and asked if Mr Happ was into “party and play” (or “pnp”) which is an expression referring to using hard drugs and engaging in sexual activity. At 9:49 pm, Mr Happ sent a message to Mr Finlay saying that he did not “do pnp”. Mr Happ did not hear back from Mr Finlay and had no further contact with him.

At about 11:30 pm on 29 January 2022, Mr Cook returned home to 263 Cleveland Street after going to the cinema. He went to bed and a short time later he heard a sound coming from 261 Cleveland Street like a door being kicked in, one or two loud thuds, then heard screaming “like someone’s getting killed” and two voices yelling “stop” and “help”, which went on for about five or ten minutes. At 11:44 pm, Mr Cook called 000 and reported the disturbance at 261 Cleveland Street but unfortunately gave the incorrect address for the location of the disturbance saying it was at 265 Cleveland Street. The screaming stopped and he did not hear anything else. At about 11:54 pm, police who had attended 265 Cleveland Street called Mr Cook to clarify the address.

On the same evening, having had some beers, Mr Thomson was in bed in his room and the Australian Open men’s doubles final on television had just finished when he heard noises, which he thought were the two deceased arguing, then Mr Finlay saying “Get the fuck out. Get out.” Mr Thomson also heard what he thought was someone being “backslammed” into the door from the inside of the deceased’s room. Then it all settled down and stopped.

At about 11:48 pm, Mr Finlay made his first, short call to 000 and said “I’ve been stabbed. I’m dying” and gasping can be heard on the recording of the call. About a minute later, Mr Finlay made a second call to 000 in which he said “He’s dead. I’m dying.” When asked if he had anyone with him, Mr Finlay said “No just me. He’s dead. I can’t breathe” and, while gasping for air, asked for an ambulance and said that he needed help. After that, there was no audible reply to the operator’s questions. During those calls there was no sound of any commotion at the location.

The paramedics received a call at about 11:50 pm on 29 January 2022 to attend 3/261 Cleveland Street. They arrived at 11:57 pm, and there was difficulty gaining access to the deceased’s room because the door was blocked. When the door was taken off its hinges by police, the paramedics heard the 000 operator’s voice on the telephone still in Mr Finlay’s hand and paramedic Mitchell Burke confirmed to the 000 operator that they had arrived. The 000 call was terminated. The paramedics confirmed that both Mr Finlay and Mr Watson were dead.

Autopsies on the bodies of the two deceased were carried out on 1 and 2 February 2022 by the forensic pathologist, Dr Szentmariay, whose evidence was not challenged. As already explained, I accept his expert opinions.

Mr Watson suffered numerous sharp force injuries, 10 of them around the head and neck area as well as defensive injuries to palms of each hand. There were no injuries to Mr Watson’s back. Those wounds included:

Mr Watson’s cause of death was “multiple stab wounds”, noting the substantial blood loss caused by the numerous sharp force injuries. There were no injuries caused by screwdrivers or scissors. The small amount of methylamphetamine and related chemicals in Mr Watson’s blood was not related to the cause of death.

Similarly, Mr Finlay suffered numerous sharp force injuries which were described by Dr Szentmariay as stab wounds and incised wounds. He further explained:

The approximately 20 wounds which Mr Finlay suffered included:

Mr Finlay’s cause of death was multiple stab wounds noting the severe blood loss due to the sharp force injuries. It was not suggested that the small amount of methylamphetamine and related chemicals in his system was relevant to the cause of death.

A crime scene cordon was established by about 12:15 am on 30 January 2022. Crime scene officers first attended 259 and 261 Cleveland Street at 6:55 am on 30 January 2022 and investigations continued for a considerable period including at night when Luminol testing for blood was conducted.

The deceased’s room was furnished with a bed and included a small kitchenette and bathroom at the end farthest from the door. The room was extremely cluttered not only with household items and items for eating and drinking but also with goods that the deceased had collected from the streets. This was consistent with Mr Thompson’s description of them as hoarders.

The deceased’s bodies were lying next to one another blocking the door consistent with their having barricaded themselves in so as to prevent the door being opened. Around the deceased’s bodies and between their bodies and the door were a large round dog bed, a large cinder brick and a small unbroken window as well as pieces of timber and other items. There was a large amount of blood on the bodies and on items near the door but little if any blood further away from the bodies to the rear of the room towards the kitchenette and bathroom.

On examination of the door to the deceased’s room, it was found that there was no latch and cylinder, which was consistent with witnesses’ observations that the door could not be locked properly.

Apart from blood deposited outside the deceased’s room when their bodies were moved and blood on items moved from the deceased’s room in the process of gaining access or subsequently, there was little blood detected outside their room. The bloodstained items found outside the deceased’s room included the external doorknob on the door to the room and a bloodstained timber board which was outside the room when police and paramedics attended. Based on the forensic testing of these items and the opinions of the relevant experts, all of whose evidence I accept, my findings are:

On the internal doorknob of the deceased’s door, a bloodied palm print was detected. The forensic testing established that:

Various knives, screwdrivers and pairs of scissors were located in the deceased’s room.

Two knives were located near the television at the end of the bed farthest from the door and the bodies. The knives did not appear to have been disturbed when photographed and were not visibly bloodstained. There was nothing to suggest that they were involved in inflicting the wounds on the deceased.

Two screwdrivers were also found in the room. The one located underneath Mr Watson’s ankle near the cinder block had no obvious blood staining but testing established that Mr Finlay’s blood was on it and as well as the DNA of Mr Watson and Mr Finlay. The other screwdriver was found underneath the bodies with blood adjacent to it. Testing established that it had Mr Finlay’s blood and DNA on it. It is likely that the blood on the screwdrivers was the result of their being in the same location as the bodies of the deceased which were covered in blood. The non-blood DNA was most likely the result of being previously handled by the deceased. Furthermore, the forensic pathologist’s report established that the wounds suffered by the deceased were of shapes and dimensions that were inconsistent with their having been inflicted by a screwdriver. In light of those considerations and the evidence as a whole, I find that the two screwdrivers were not used in the stabbing of the deceased.

Five pairs of scissors were found in the room. Four pairs were not near the bodies and were not bloodstained and there was nothing to suggest they had been used to inflict any wounds. One pair of scissors was found on top of the bodies of the deceased when police managed to gain entry to the room. This pair was removed and placed on a suitcase located just outside the deceased’s room. These scissors were blood stained with the blood of both deceased and also had their non-blood DNA on them. These scissors were blunt-nosed and, once again, the shapes and dimensions of the wounds suffered by the deceased were not consistent with their having been inflicted using those scissors. Since it is likely that the blood on the scissors was the result of being near the bodies of the deceased and the presence of their DNA was the result of previous handling of the scissors, and having regard to the evidence as a whole, I find that these scissors were not the weapon by which either of the deceased was stabbed.

On 30 January 2022, Detective Senior Constable Pantos and Plain Clothes Constable Drake conducted a canvas of the residents in 259 and 261 Cleveland Street. The accused appeared to them to be in his room but, when they knocked on the accused’s door, he did not open the door. After they knocked, they noticed that the volume of the music which was playing was turned down for about 30 seconds but when they announced their presence the music was turned up again and there was no answer.

On that same day, the accused went to visit Mr Chandler in 257 Cleveland Street for about 20 minutes but was not very communicative. When asked about what had happened the previous night, the accused gave a sort of non-committal answer. In text messages exchanged with Mr Chandler, the accused indicated he was asleep at the time of the killings.

During the day on 30 January 2022, investigation of the crime scene and examination and photographing of the deceased’s bodies and items taken from the crime scene continued.

At some point, forensic samples were taken from the bodies of the deceased. Based on DNA testing of these samples, I find that the accused’s DNA, together with that of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson, was recovered from a fingernail clipping from Mr Watson’s left hand.

Luminol testing for blood was carried out on the night of 30/31 January and the next night. No blood was detected around the accused’s room, on or near the stairs leading up to the back door of his room or in the common bathroom and kitchen areas in the boarding house that were tested. No other material results were obtained from such areas. Items in James Street, which provided rear lane access to the boarding house, were not seized because there was no apparent blood staining on them.

As a result of the accused’s left palm print being identified on the internal doorknob of the deceased’s room, it was decided to arrest the accused.

At about 3:30 pm on 31 January 2022, the accused was arrested and this was recorded on BWV. When he was told that he was under arrest for the murder of Steven Finlay and Mitchell Watson, he said “I don’t even know who they are”.

When the accused was arrested, personal items including his watch, a ring and a neckless were seized and later forensically tested. Based on the results of the DNA testing, I find that on the strap of the watch there was, in addition to the DNA of the accused, at two locations the DNA of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson and at another location there was the DNA of Mr Watson.

On the same day, the accused’s room was searched and this was also recorded on BWV and photographs were taken.

The furniture in the accused’s room included a bed, chest of drawers, bar fridge, microwave, a chair and a small table. It appeared that the accused prepared meals in the room. In addition, in the accused’s room, police found a bottle of Vanish stain remover partially under the accused’s bed and at the foot of the bed a wet and dry vacuum cleaner was located.

Near the internal entrance to the room was a small ensuite shower room with a basin and toilet. The shower hose was connected to the tap in the basin. In the basin were a metal scourer, a scourer with a sponge on one side and plastic scourer on the other, soap, a body wash pump pack and a washcloth. No blood was found around the sink or the tap.

There were two knives found in the accused’s room. On a chair next to the accused’s bed, there was a black handled knife approximately 30 cm long with the word “mint” on the blade which was about 16 cm long. The blade had marks on it consistent with it having been cleaned with abrasive material. There was no blood detected on this “mint” knife.

Another black handled 30 cm knife with a 15.5 cm blade with the word “inspire” on it was found on the accused’s bed. The blade of this knife also had marks on it consistent with it having been cleaned with abrasive material. There was blood detected on this “inspire” knife along where the blade joined the handle. DNA testing found that the blood on both sides of the knife was that of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson.

Apart from the blood on the “inspire” knife, no blood linked to the deceased was found in the accused’s room, including on the thongs and shoes seized from the room.

At the police station on 31 January 2022, the accused participated for a time in an ERISP. The accused was verbally aggressive and eventually terminated the interview. The interview included:

On 1 February 2022, the accused was subject to certain forensic procedures, recorded on BWV. On this occasion, the accused was also frequently verbally aggressive.

The procedures included taking a swab from under the nail of the accused left little finger. Based on DNA testing of that swab, I find that Mr Finlay’s DNA was found under the accused’s left little fingernail.

During those procedures, the accused’s upper body and limbs were photographed. Various scratch type injuries could be seen on the accused including on his upper back and front and on his left hand.

Further investigations and forensic procedures were undertaken in the days following.

On 17 February 2022, police interviewed Mr Milton Miles and the interview outside his unit was recorded on BWV. Mr Miles said that he had known Mr Finlay for more than 25 or 30 years and they would steal items such as mobile phones, laptops and electronic devices and use the proceeds in acquiring illicit drugs. I have approached Mr Miles’s hearsay evidence with caution, in accordance with the warning referred to above in relation to hearsay evidence. His evidence in relation to the allegations of stealing lacked any specificity. There was no indication whether it was based on direct observations made by Mr Miles or rumour, speculation or what he was reliably told by others. I have given his evidence little, if any, weight.

I now turn to consider whether the elements of murder and of the defence of mental health impairment have been made out.

For each count, the first element which the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt is that the relevant deceased died on or about 29 January 2022 at Redfern in New South Wales. Based on my findings and the evidence as a whole and given that there was, in effect, no dispute concerning this element, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Steven Finlay and Mitchell Watson both died on or about 29 January 2022 in the boarding house at Cleveland Street in Redfern.

The second element which the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt is that the death of the relevant deceased was caused by a deliberate act or acts of the accused.

Given the nature and extent of the wounds suffered by each deceased, I am satisfied to the requisite standard that they were inflicted by deliberate acts in the sense that the acts involved in stabbing the deceased resulted from a willed movement of the muscles and were conscious or voluntary acts. In addition, on the basis of Dr Szentmariay’s uncontested evidence, which I accept, the deaths of the deceased were caused by those acts.

The remaining issue to be determined in respect of this element is, therefore, whether the Crown has proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the accused who did those acts to each deceased. In the absence of direct evidence of what occurred during the stabbings, the Crown’s case that it was the accused who carried out the acts is circumstantial. The Crown submitted that in concluding that the accused killed the deceased, I would find that:

These conclusions were submitted to be based on the following categories of evidence:

In substance, the defence contended that the Crown had not excluded the reasonable possibility that it was another, unknown person who killed the deceased or that the deceased killed one another. In support of this submission, the defence drew attention inter alia to the shortcomings in the evidence of the 6 January incident, shortcomings in the forensic evidence and the general absence of evidence in various regards.

In considering these submissions, I have based my inferences and conclusions on the findings referred to above and the evidence as a whole, taking into account the directions and warnings to which I have already referred. My most pertinent inferences and conclusions are set out in the paragraphs which follow.

The relationship between Mr Finlay and Mr Watson in January 2022 was marked by domestic arguments which were on occasion so loud that they came to the attention of other residents of the boarding house, including the accused and Mr Thompson. Despite Mr Watson’s previous history of domestic violence in his relationship with Mr Kerslake, in my opinion the evidence viewed as a whole did not support an inference that Mr Watson’s relationship with Mr Finlay involved any significant physical violence. Rather the types of conflict between Mr Finlay and Mr Watson were effectively limited to verbal arguments and one leaving the other for a period of time.

By 29 January 2022, Mr Finlay and Mr Watson’s relationship was strained as a result of Mr Finlay discovering some weeks earlier that Mr Watson had a new boyfriend and Mr Finlay was considering leaving him and moving out. On the evening of 29 January 2022, the relationship was also strained to the extent that Mr Finlay unsuccessfully sought to meet up with Mr Happ for “party and play”. In addition, earlier that day, Mr Finlay spent time with Mr Highland when they had socialised and consumed the drug ice together. The evidence as a whole did not, however, provide any significant support for a finding that there was a reasonable possibility that either Mr Happ or Mr Highland was in any way involved in the deaths of Mr Finlay or Mr Watson. Mr Happ declined to meet Mr Finlay for reasons he explained in his message. Mr Highland was at his home that night. In addition, Mr Highland provided a DNA sample and his DNA was not detected in relation to any of the items or swabs taken during the investigation.

The accused lived in the boarding house at 259 Cleveland Street, from September 2021 after his discharge from Concord Hospital. He was aware of the two deceased living in 261 Cleveland Street, referred to them as sexual pests and paedophiles and had an extremely negative attitude towards them and aggressive interactions with them in January 2022, even though he did not know them by name.

The accused’s mental state at the end of January 2022 can be inferred from his conduct and state of mind in the preceding months and immediately after 29 January 2022.

Based on the accused’s conduct towards Mr Dixon at the Chippendale unit, his admission to Concord Hospital during the second half of 2021 and his interactions with his parole officer, I infer that the accused’s mental state included a degree of paranoia and irrationality. It extended to a willingness to take and potentially use knives when he was affected by paranoia.

In late 2021 and early January 2022 after he had moved into the boarding house at 259 and 261 Cleveland Street, the accused reacted aggressively to noisy arguments between Mr Finlay and Mr Watson including, on occasion, going down the stairs from his room towards the deceased’s room.

His conduct on 6 January 2022 (which I find was established for the reasons already explained) demonstrated that when he was annoyed with the deceased, for whatever reason, his mental state could be such that he displayed signs of paranoia and was prepared to go to the deceased’s room with a knife and threaten them. Given that the accused did not receive his depot injection to manage his mental health conditions in mid-January 2022, I infer that his mental state continued to be unstable and liable to similar episodes of paranoia and may even have deteriorated further, by the end of January 2022.

Furthermore, during December 2021 and January 2022, the accused generally expressed a violently negative attitude towards the deceased, extending so far as describing them as “poofters, cunts, filthy cunts”, “faggotts” and “sex pests and paedophiles” and on one occasion saying “someone should run a blade through ‘em”.

During his ERISP on 31 January 2022 and the forensic procedure, which was video recorded, the accused’s conduct was consistent with elements of paranoia and included verbal aggression and movements which could be perceived as being physically aggressive.

Thus, based on the evidence as a whole, I infer that the accused’s mental state on the evening of 29 January 2022 potentially included episodes of paranoia and significant animosity towards the deceased. I also infer his thought processes would have been unlikely to operate to inhibit him from attacking the deceased, and he may well have motivated him to do so, if he became annoyed by their noisiness or conduct.

The defence submitted that other persons may have had a motive to kill or attack the deceased. These were said to include the persons involved in the supply and use of the drug ice, which the deceased acquired and used. It was contended that use of the drug ice is often associated with violent behaviour. In this regard, it was said that Mr Miles’s evidence that the deceased engaged in theft to support their drug use should be accepted.

It was then in effect submitted that these circumstances, together with the lack of focus in the evidence on the motives of persons other than the accused, indicated that other persons, for example those who supplied the deceased with drugs or those from whom they stole, may have had a motive to attack or harm the deceased on 29 January 2022.

I accept that use of the drug ice can be associated with violence and the deceased were drug users. I also accept that the evidence at trial focused on the accused and there was limited evidence led to rebut the possibility of an alternative offender committing the offence and leaving the scene without being detected. Nonetheless, for the reasons already given, Mr Miles’s evidence concerning the deceased stealing to support their drug use, in my view, should be given little if any weight. It was hearsay and was not able to be challenged or clarified in cross-examination. There was no identification of any person from whom the deceased were said to have stolen anything or when this may have occurred. Mr Miles did not mention any specific incident with some temporal proximity to the stabbing of the deceased. In these circumstances, I was not prepared to infer from his evidence that there was another person or other persons who had a motive to attack or kill the deceased arising out of their drug acquisition or use.

I have already explained that I do not infer that Mr Happ or Mr Highland was involved in the stabbing of the deceased. In addition, I would not infer that either of those persons had a motive to do so. Mr Happ decided not to meet up with Mr Finlay on 29 January 2022 because he did not want to engage in “party and play”. Mr Highland’s evidence did not establish a basis for inferring that he had a motive for attacking the deceased. The evidence that Mr Gebbe had said that Mr Highland orchestrated the killing was hearsay, unable to be challenged and unsupported by any other evidence as to why Mr Highland might have had any motive to do so. I do not accept that the evidence of what Mr Gebbe may have said provided a basis for inferring that Mr Highland had, or might reasonably be thought to have had, any motive to harm or attack the deceased or to orchestrate such an occurrence.

The evidence did not indicate that there was any other person who might have any motive to harm or attack the deceased.

Consequently, when the evidence is viewed as a whole, there was, in my view, insufficient material to justify a finding that would rise above being mere speculation or conjecture that it was a reasonable possibility that a person other than the accused, whether Mr Happ, Mr Highland or another unknown person, had a motive to kill or harm the two deceased on 29 January 2022.

Shortly after about 11:30 on 29 January 2022, Mr Cook and Mr Thompson heard noises of a fight or disturbance coming from the deceased’s room. Mr Thompson thought that, at least at some point, it was the two deceased arguing. The evidence of the noises from the deceased’s room heard by Mr Cook and Mr Thompson did not establish one way or the other whether there was a third person present at any time. If Mr Cook and Mr Thompson heard those noises, I infer that the accused would also have been able to hear them.

From my findings based on the evidence of Mr Cook and Mr Thompson and the timings of the various calls to 000 and their contents, I infer that the two deceased were stabbed between about 11:35 pm and 11:45 pm on 29 January 2022.

Between about 11:35 pm and 11:45 pm and before police arrived at 265 Cleveland Street at about 11:50 pm, given the location of the accused’s room and the deceased’s room, the accused would have had the opportunity to go from his room to the deceased’s room, attack and stab them and return to his room without being seen by anyone other than the deceased, including police who attended the scene.

I also accept, as the defence submitted, that since the front and rear doors of the boarding house and the door onto James Street were not generally locked and were not locked when police investigated, a person other than the accused could have entered the boarding house, gone to the deceased room, stabbed them and left via the rear courtyard and James Street without being apprehended by police or seen by any of the witnesses.

On the day following the stabbing of the deceased, Mr Chandler observed in effect that the accused was somewhat subdued in his interactions with him. In addition, the accused refused to answer the door when police knocked during their canvas of residents and turned his music up and down. The Crown submitted that these matters indicated that the accused had recently experienced something unusual and submitted I should infer that this supported a finding that it was the accused who killed the deceased.

In my view, there may be many reasons why the accused may have been subdued in his interactions with Mr Chandler, even though they were friends. Similarly, there may be many reasons why a person in the accused’s position might not wish to speak to police or allow them into his room. I am not prepared to infer, based on my relevant findings in those regards and all the evidence as a whole, that the accused had experienced something unusual on 29 January 2022 so as to provide support for an inference that the accused killed the deceased.

In addition, as noted already, the Crown contended that the accused lied to police when he was arrested and during his ERISP and that I should find that he did so out of consciousness of guilt. This, it was submitted, supported a finding that it was the accused who killed the deceased on 29 January 2022. In particular, it was contended that he lied by:

Applying the directions in relation to lies as consciousness of guilt set out above, I have considered whether I am satisfied that accused lied deliberately as the Crown contended. As to the statement that he did not even know who the deceased were, I do not accept that the Crown established that it was untrue or that the accused believed it was untrue when he said it. I accept, as the accused effectively explained, that he had never been formally introduced to them by name and did not know them by name and, in that sense, did not know who the deceased were.

Similarly, the Crown did not establish that the accused’s denial that he had ever spoken to the two deceased was untrue, or that he did not believe it to be true. It is not unreasonable to think that offensive comments about the deceased made when brushing past them or such comments yelled in their direction do not amount to speaking to them in the sense of having a conversation with them. Similarly, the incident on 6 January 2022 might reasonably have been perceived by the accused as not involving speaking to them in that sense.

In relation to the accused’s statement that he had not seen the two deceased for two weeks although he had seen them walking in and out of the building, the evidence of the accused seeing the deceased was not so specific as to allow me to find that he did in fact see them between 16 January 2022, two weeks before the ERISP, and the date of the ERISP. Furthermore, I do not accept that I should find that this statement was a deliberate lie because the accused saw the deceased while stabbing them, as that would involve circular reasoning in that the finding as to the accused lying was to be relied on in support of the inference that it was the accused who stabbed the deceased. Furthermore, I do not accept that the Crown proved that the accused believed the statement was untrue when he made the statement, even if that belief were misguided.

Moreover, even if I were satisfied that one or more of those statements was a deliberate lie and related to some significant circumstance or event connected with the alleged offence, I am not satisfied that the accused said what he did because he feared that the truth would implicate him in relation to the commission of the offences with which he is charged. It is likely, in my view, given the accused’s irrationality and apparent panic during his ERISP, that the accused’s heightened mental state caused him to be unable to think sufficiently clearly as to be able give deliberately false answers with the intention of avoiding being implicated. His responses were more likely the result of irrationality or panic.

Accordingly, I have not relied on any relevant aspect of the accused’s conduct after 29 January 2022 in support of an inference that it was the accused who stabbed the deceased and, except where it is otherwise relevant, I have put that material to one side.

The Crown emphasised the forensic evidence said to support the conclusion that it was the accused who killed the deceased. In particular, the following matters, among others, were relied on:

I shall consider each of these matters in turn.

In relation to the deceased’s blood said to have been found on the inspire knife, the defence submitted that caution should be exercised in concluding that the this blood was the blood of the deceased, since the process of swabbing can lead to the presence of other biological material forming part of what is tested. While I accept that it is a possibility that the DNA was from biological material other than blood, in the present case the swab was taken from the area where there was bloodstaining on the knife and there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the DNA might actually have been from biological material other than blood. In these circumstances and in light of the evidence as a whole, in my view, the possibility propounded by the defence does not rise above a theoretical possibility. Further and in any event, the DNA of both deceased was found on the accused’s knife and this is a matter that I can take into account in considering whether there is an inference that the inspire knife was used in stabbing the deceased because of the presence of either the blood, or the non-blood DNA, of both the deceased on the knife.

The defence also submitted that the presence of the deceased’s blood or non-blood DNA on the inspire knife had to be considered in the light of the fact that there were communal kitchens in both 259 and 261 Cleveland Street and these may have been used by both the accused and the deceased. Thus, it was said that there was a reasonable possibility that the DNA, whether from blood or other material, found its way onto the inspire knife by a process of secondary or more remote transfer.

In relation to this submission, the deceased had a kitchenette and a small ensuite bathroom in their room and the evidence which I accept did not include any significant indication that instead of using their kitchenette the deceased engaged in meal preparation in the communal kitchen in 261 Cleveland Street or that they prepared meals in the communal kitchen in the other building at 259 Cleveland Street. Indeed, there was no significant evidence about meal preparation by the deceased and, at about the time of the killing, Mrs Finlay was organising pizza deliveries for Mr Finlay and Mr Watson.

The accused had a small ensuite bathroom in his room and appeared to use it for cleaning food utensils given the scourers in the sink. In addition, the photographs of his room indicated that he prepared meals in his room using the microwave oven, the electric kettle and the refrigerator. The evidence did not include any significant indication that the accused used the communal kitchen in 259 Cleveland Street or the communal kitchen in number 261.

Furthermore, no blood was detected in any of the communal kitchens, bathrooms or other areas that were tested and the blood or DNA on the inspire knife was not located in an area where transference of DNA was likely to have occurred in ordinary use of the knife in food preparation.

In those circumstances and having regard to the evidence as a whole, I do not accept that there is an inference available that it is a reasonable possibility that the deceased’s DNA on the inspire knife was deposited as a result of secondary or more remote transfer occurring in a communal kitchen used by both deceased and the accused or as a result of both deceased cutting themselves in one of the communal kitchens and both their blood finding its way onto the accused’s knife as a result of being in the same communal kitchen.

As to the DNA of both deceased being found on the accused’s watch band, the defence submitted that the presence of the deceased’s DNA on the band could be explained by transference in a context in which the three relevant persons co-resided in a boarding house with common areas. I do not accept that that is a reasonably available inference in the circumstances. The evidence did not establish or even suggest that the deceased used the communal rooms in their respective buildings let alone that the deceased used the communal facilities in 259 Cleveland Street or that the accused used the communal rooms in number 261. Even though both the deceased and the accused used the entry from James Street and the shared rear courtyard and the accused may have brushed past them on occasion, that does not in my view establish a realistic possibility for transference to occur of both deceased’s DNA onto the accused’s watch band as a result of such use or interaction, having regard to the evidence as a whole and my findings.

As to the DNA of the accused on Mr Watson’s fingernail clipping and the DNA of Mr Watson and Mr Finlay under the accused’s left little fingernail, there was no evidence that the accused had physical contact with the deceased on any occasion other than the night of 29 January 2022, apart perhaps from brushing past them on occasion which would not have involved contact with fingernails. The incident on 6 January 2022 was not said by Mr Finlay, Mr Watson or any witness to involve anything more than the accused threatening the deceased and there was no suggestion of physical contact on that occasion. In addition, the scratches to the accused shown in the forensic photographs and the injuries to the deceased were such as to provide substantial support for an inference that DNA could have been deposited under the fingernails of those involved in inflicting those scratches and injuries.

The defence contention was once again that this DNA could have been deposited by transference among these co-residents of the boarding house. For essentially the same reasons as those in relation to the DNA on the watch band and given that the DNA was under the fingernails and not on parts of the body which might be likely to come into contact with surfaces which had other persons’ DNA on them, I do not accept the submission that transference in the way suggested was a reasonably possible explanation for the DNA under the fingernails.

The final key piece of forensic evidence relied on by the Crown was the accused’s left palm print in the blood of both deceased on the internal doorknob of the door to their room.

The defence submitted that there was no evidence as to the state of the doorknob immediately prior to the killings or how long a blood print may remain on a surface. In addition, it was said that it could be inferred that the deceased were not diligent in cleaning up stains and, in substance, the accused could have been in their room earlier for other reasons, in light of the evidence of Witness X.

For the reasons already given, I do not accept or give any weight to the evidence of Witness X where it was not supported by other evidence. There was no evidence that any person had been told by Mr Finlay or Mr Watson that the accused went into the deceased’s room on any occasion other than the 6 January incident, in which no blood was shed. Nor was there evidence from any [REDACTED] resident of the boarding house, or from visitors to the boarding house, that the accused went into the deceased’s room in January 2022 other than on 6 January 2022. There was no evidence as to the blue Jetty lighter being found in the deceased’s room other than from Witness X and he conceded that he could not produce the lighter when requested to do so by police. As I explained above, I did not accept Witness X’s evidence. I found the evidence concerning the lighter unconvincing and it was not supported in any way, even by production of the lighter.

Furthermore, in light of the evidence of the fingerprint expert, Mr Leechburch-Auwers, which I accept, I find that the palm print was deposited on the internal doorknob when a significant amount of wet blood of both deceased was on the accused’s hand when he touched the knob. Since there was no suggestion in the evidence that there was any occasion, other than on 29 January 2022, when the accused might have been present in the deceased’s room when a significant amount of both deceased’s wet blood was available to be touched by the accused shortly before he touched the internal doorknob of the door to their room, I reject the defence submissions in this regard.

Accordingly, in all the circumstances, I do not accept, based on the evidence as a whole and my findings, that there was any reasonably possibility that the accused’s left palm print was deposited on the internal doorknob of the deceased’s room other than at about the time when the deceased had been stabbed and their blood was on the accused’s left hand as he used it to open the door.

In addition to the submission, which I accept, that there was the opportunity for another person to enter 261 Cleveland Street, stab the deceased and depart via the gate from the shared rear courtyard on to James Street without being detected, the defence submitted in effect that:

The absence of a dying declaration by Mr Finlay as to the identity of the killer during his 000 calls is deprived of some of its force by the fact that it was apparent that Mr Finlay was gasping, struggling to answer the 000 operator’s questions and was most concerned to obtain medical assistance rather than to describe what occurred, before he died prior to help arriving. Nonetheless, the absence of such a dying declaration is something that I take into account along with all of my other findings and inferences, in light of the evidence as a whole.

What was said to be the telling absence of various types of evidence is also a matter I take into account. Nonetheless, I have been cautious not to commit the fallacy of inferring from an absence of evidence of that X occurred, that X did not occur. Furthermore, the absence of evidence to which the defence drew attention must be assessed in light of the presence of the deceased’s blood (or other DNA) on the inspire knife, the accused’s bloodied left palm print on the internal doorknob, the DNA under the fingernails of both Mr Watson and the accused, and both deceased’s DNA on the accused’s watch band, in circumstances where the evidence established no other relevant physical contact between the accused and the deceased and no other realistic opportunity for transfer of the relevant DNA.

As to whether the Crown had eliminated the reasonable possibility that the deceased killed one another, my findings as to the state of the relationship between Mr Finlay and Mr Watson as at late January 2022 have been set out above. I accept, however, that even though I am not satisfied that there was any physical altercation between Mr Watson and Mr Finlay on the night of 29 January 2022, in light of Mr Watson’s previous history of domestic violence and the strains in the relationship at the time, there is a reasonable possibility that there was some physical altercation between Mr Watson and Mr Finlay on that night. Nonetheless, it does not follow from that reasonable possibility, alone or in combination with other factors identified by the defence, that there must be a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused killed the deceased. The reasonable possibility of a physical altercation must be considered in light of the evidence as a whole and the findings based on the evidence accepted. In that regard, the defence submitted that the Crown had failed to explain satisfactorily “how an external killer exited the deceased’s unit and barricaded the door closed in the way it was found by police” and noted the different depths of the injuries to each deceased which were said to indicate the use of two different weapons.

The deceased together with a number of large items were barricaded against the door of their room which prevented police from entering until the door was removed from its hinges. Understandably, there was no direct evidence of when or why the deceased apparently barricaded themselves in in this way. Nonetheless, two observations may be made. First, if the deceased did deliberately barricade themselves in, it indicates that they were concerned that there was a threat from a person outside trying to enter or re-enter the room, which is consistent with there being an “external killer” (to use the defence’s expression) rather than the deceased having killed each other.

Secondly, the inference is reasonably available that after the deceased were attacked and stabbed, the killer left the room and one or both deceased, while still alive, then barricaded themselves in in an attempt to prevent the killer re-entering. In other words, the defence submission proceeds on the false basis that the deceased must have barricaded themselves in before any third person left the room.

For these reasons, I do not accept that the fact that the deceased appeared to have barricaded themselves in supports the possibility that they killed each other and not the possibility of there being an “external killer”.

The differences in the depth of the wounds is also equivocal. While it might be consistent with the use of blades of different lengths, it is also consistent with less force being used against the victim with the shallower wounds and more force being applied when the other victim was stabbed. This might well occur If one victim succumbed easily to being stabbed but the other struggled and it took more force to subdue him.

Furthermore, Mr Finlay’s blood was detected on a piece of board found outside the deceased’s room when police arrived and before they had gained access to the room. Mr Watson’s blood was found on the external doorknob of the deceased door. This was significant evidence indicating that someone must have left that room after the Mr Finlay and Mr Watson had been stabbed with their blood on or about their person.

The Crown also submitted that the defensive wounds suffered by both deceased and the extreme level of violence involved in their stabbing indicated that they were killed by a third person such as the accused. It was said that the previous nature of any violence between the two deceased was of a relatively low level, and the extraordinary level of violence involved in their stabbing was commensurate with the specific threats made by the accused. In my opinion, the defensive wounds present on both deceased and the level of violence are equivocal. Those matters do not establish one way or the other whether the deceased killed one another or were killed by a third person.

Bearing in mind that it is important when drawing inferences for the purposes of considering a circumstantial case not to consider the evidence piecemeal, I find the absence of two blood stained weapons with which the deceased might have stabbed one another in the deceased’s room, as well as the blood, DNA and fingerprint evidence consistent with the involvement of the accused in the killing, and the presence of each deceased’s blood outside their room before police arrived are powerful considerations which, together with all my other findings and inferences viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, lead me to the conclusion that there was no reasonable possibility that the deceased killed one another or that no third party was involved.

In accordance with the direction set out above concerning the accused’s denials of having stabbed and killed the deceased, I have considered the accused’s statements which I understand the defence relied upon as denials of any involvement in the killings, namely:

I consider first whether I believe the accused’s account of being asleep and his denials. Given my findings and inferences assessed in light of the evidence as a whole including observing the accused during his ERISP and forensic procedure which were video recorded I do not accept the statements by the accused to Mr Chandler, Dr Nielssen and Dr Martin and do not believe them to be true. Accordingly, I am not required to find the accused not guilty on the basis of his statements and denials.

Secondly, although I find difficulty in accepting the accused’s statements and denials, I next consider whether they might be true. Once again, my findings and inferences, taking into account the evidence as a whole, lead me to the conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility that his statements and denials are true.

In those circumstances, I put the accused’s statements and denials to one side. Nevertheless, the question remains: has the Crown, upon the basis of evidence that I do accept, proved that the accused attacked and stabbed the deceased on 29 January 2022 beyond reasonable doubt?

To the extent that the evidence has shown that the accused is a person of bad character because of his previous offences and time in custody and involvement with prohibited drugs or similar matters, I have not relied on that evidence to reason that the accused stabbed each deceased because he is the sort of person who would be likely to commit such crimes.

The Crown’s case is circumstantial depending on the various circumstances referred to above which I have considered in light of the evidence, my findings and the inferences available from my findings. There was no one circumstance which was essential to a finding that the accused carried out the relevant acts.

I have exercised care in drawing inferences in this case based on my findings having regard to the evidence, as a whole and not considered piecemeal. After considering the possible inference that may be justified, I am satisfied that I can conclude from the relevant factual findings by a logical and rational process of reasoning and not mere speculation, conjecture or supposition that it is a reasonable inference that the accused committed the acts by which the deceased were killed on 29 January 2022.

I then have considered whether this inference is the only reasonable inference or conclusion that can be drawn from a consideration of all the established facts on the evidence viewed as a whole. Based on my reasons set out above, neither the matters raised by the defence nor the evidence or my findings satisfy me that there is any other reasonable conclusion open that is inconsistent with the accused’s having committed the acts in question. In particular, having regard to the evidence as a whole and to my findings, especially those based on the forensic evidence, I do not accept that there was a reasonable possibility that some unknown person entered 261 Cleveland Street, stabbed the deceased and left the building without being detected or that there was a reasonable possibility that the deceased killed themselves without the involvement of any third person.

In these circumstances, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the deliberate acts which caused the death of the two deceased. Therefore, the second element of murder has been made out in respect of each count.

Thus, the Crown has discharged its onus of proof in respect of the physical elements, elements (1) and (2), of the offence of murder.

It is necessary now to consider the question of whether the accused was criminally responsible for doing the acts which I have found occurred in relation to each of the offences charged, before dealing with the question of any specific intention required for those offences, should that be necessary. [16]

The defence of mental health impairment relied on by the accused raises the question whether the accused can be held criminally responsible for his acts in stabbing the deceased, having regard to the evidence before the Court of the accused’s mental condition at the time of those acts on 29 January 2022.

In this regard, the relevant evidence was from the psychiatrists, Dr Martin, who was called by the Crown, and Dr Nielssen, who gave evidence on behalf of the accused. Their evidence is in substance unanimous. Their opinions were well supported by the evidence relating the accused’s conduct and mental state including the evidence of Ms Howlett and of Mr Smeda and the evidence concerning the death of Mr Dewhurst, admitted in relation to this issue. The Crown did not contend that the psychiatrists’ evidence should not be accepted and there is no material which casts doubt on any aspect of their opinions. Accordingly, I accept their expert opinions.

Dr Andrew Martin, forensic psychiatrist, provided a report dated 27 September 2024. Dr Martin interviewed the accused by audiovisual link on 19 September 2024 when he was accommodated in the Long Bay Hospital Mental Health Unit, an area of the correctional system reserved for involuntary treatment of inmates while mentally ill. Dr Martin reported on the accused’s then current presentation, progress and treatment as well as his psychiatric history, drug and alcohol history and medical and personal history.

The account which the accused gave to Dr Martin of the offending is set out in par 22, which has been quoted in full above. Dr Martin also carried out a mental state examination and reviewed information in other material which had been provided to him, which largely corresponded with my findings.

Dr Martin’s opinions included the following:

In relation to the specific issue of mental health impairment defence, on the assumption that the accused stabbed the two deceased, Dr Martin was of the view that:

Notwithstanding that view, Dr Martin’s opinion was, on balance, that:

As to the availability of the defence of mental health impairment, from a psychiatric perspective, Dr Martin continued in par 50 of his report:

Dr Nielssen provided a report dated October 2024 noting that he had interviewed the accused by telephone from Parklea Correctional Centre on 15 June 2022 and again by audiovisual link on 10 August 2022 and again by audiovisual link to Long Bay Correctional Centre on 3 October 2024. The doctor also spoke to the accused’s father and had read the various documents referred to in his report and viewed relevant video recordings of the ERISP and the forensic procedure, which was in substance the evidence which I have accepted.

After summarising his interviews with the accused and his medical and other histories, as well as information provided by the accused’s father, the document review and mental state examinations, Dr Nielssen gave his opinion as to the accused’s psychiatric diagnoses as:

After setting out the bases for his diagnoses, Dr Nielssen expressed the following views:

Dr Nielssen then expressly stated that he agreed with the opinion of Dr Martin regarding the availability of the defence of mental health impairment from a psychiatric point of view. Dr Nielssen continued:

Dr Nielssen also agreed that the accused was “probably aware of the nature and quality of his actions, although he denies committing the offences.” The doctor went on:

The expert psychiatrists’ opinions were based on their observations and other factual material consistent with my findings. Their unanimous and unchallenged opinions should therefore be accepted. Accordingly, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that, at the time of the acts causing the death of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson, the accused had a mental health impairment that arose from schizoaffective disorder and as a result of that disorder:

The evidence as a whole did not establish that the accused’s impairment was caused solely by the temporary effect of ingesting a substance, or a substance use disorder. Indeed, the evidence established the contrary. As Dr Martin said (in a passage from his report quoted above):

Finally, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the accused’s mental health impairment had the effect that, at the time he stabbed the two deceased, the accused did not know that his acts were wrong, in the sense that he could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether the acts, as perceived by reasonable people, were wrong.

For these reasons, having regard to the evidence as a whole and, in particular, the unchallenged, well founded and consistent opinions of the psychiatrists, I am satisfied to the requisite standard that each of the elements of the defence of mental health impairment in respect of each of the counts of murder has been made out and also that the requirements of s 28(1) and (2) of the MHCIFP Act have been met.

In circumstances where the defence of mental health impairment has been made out in respect of each offence, it is not necessary to consider further whether the requisite intent has been established for any of the offences charged.

The appropriate verdict is, therefore, in respect of each of counts 1 and 2, a special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible.

Accordingly, the Court orders:

These verdicts having been entered, the Court has received victim impact statements under s 30L of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). The Court acknowledges that victim impacts statements were received from:

The victim impact statements speak eloquently of the great loss to the families and loved ones of Steven Finlay and Mitchell Watson.

Before announcing the further orders of the Court, it is appropriate to acknowledge that the deaths of Steven Finlay and Mitchell Watson are a human tragedy, rather than allowing what tragically occurred to be treated only as the subject of a criminal proceeding by way of a special hearing. The deaths of these two men in such horrifying circumstances has been devastating for those who loved or knew each of Mr Finlay and Mr Watson.

To Mr Finlay’s and Mr Watson’s families, loved ones and friends, the Court extends its condolences and sympathy for this great loss.

Furthermore, under s 30N(4) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, the Court is required to give a copy of the victim impact statement to the MHRT so that what has been said today will not be lost.

Accordingly, in addition to the entry of the verdicts of act proven but not criminally responsible, Court orders:

The Court directs that: