R v Facchi

1. [1]

   On 26 April 2024, the offender Anthony Facchi murdered [the victim] by violently assaulting him in his own home. [The victim] was only 16 years old at the time.

2. [2]

   The offender was arrested on 26 April 2024 and was charged with an offence of murder and offences relating to an assault of Stanley Weatherall.

3. [3]

   He initially pleaded not guilty to all counts and on 5 December 2024, the Dubbo Local Court committed the matter for trial in the Supreme Court. He maintained those pleas when initially arraigned in the Supreme Court. The trial was listed for hearing in Dubbo to commence on 2 March 2026.

4. [4]

   When he was re-arraigned on 28 November 2025, the offender pleaded guilty to the following offences:

5. [5]

   The offender pleaded not guilty to count 2, being a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 59(1) Crimes Act, and count 4, being a charge of using an offensive weapon with intent to commit an indictable offence of intimidation contrary to s 33B(1)(a) Crimes Act. The Crown indicated that it accepted the guilty pleas to counts 1 and 3 in full satisfaction of the indictment.

6. [6]

   The parties agree that as a result of the late guilty pleas to counts 1 and 3, the offender is entitled to a 10% reduction in his sentence pursuant to s 25D(2)(b)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (‘CSPA’), to reflect the utilitarian value of the pleas.

7. [7]

   It is appropriate to commence these remarks on sentence by acknowledging the life lost and the extreme distress and trauma that [the victim’s] death has had on his family.

8. [8]

   Later in my remarks I will have more to say about [the victim] and what his tragic, untimely death has meant to his family. I will also later make reference to the numerous victim impact statements that have been tendered by the Crown which set out the impact that the death has had on the deceased’s family. It is my task to sentence the offender according to law. It is worth noting early in these remarks that in sentencing offenders for murder, judges are asked to perform an impossible equation. No human life, particularly a human life as young as the 16-year-old victim in this case, can ever be equated with a period of imprisonment. No gaol term, of any length, can return a loved one. No life can ever be measured simply by equating it to the punishment imposed.

9. [9]

   The sentence I intend to impose does not, and could not ever, measure the value of [the victim’s] life. Instead, it reflects the sentencing discretion informed by proper legal principle. It must reflect adequate punishment, deterrence and denunciation, in addition to rehabilitation and protection of the community. It must hold the offender to account and reflect the objective seriousness of the offence. It must also reflect the offender’s subjective case, his moral culpability, his prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood of offending again in the future.

10. [10]

    The legal principle involving the purposes of sentencing requires that this sentence punishes the offender and holds him to account for his actions. The offender’s sentence, which unsurprisingly will be to a term of full-time imprisonment, goes some way to fulfilling those purposes. However, punishment is not the only purpose of sentencing. In the circumstances of this case, the offender will have to live the rest of his life with the burden of the consequences of his actions in taking the life of a 16-year-old boy. It can be expected that such a burden, in addition to a significant period of imprisonment, will form part of the offender’s punishment.

The agreed facts on sentence

1. [11]

   [The victim] was 16 years of age at the time of his death. He was killed at night in his own home. The offender was 26 years of age.

2. [12]

   A statement of agreed facts signed by the offender on 18 November 2025 sets out the events and circumstances of 26 April 2024 and the relevant circumstances leading up to that date. I have had regard to the contents of that document. What follows is a summary of the relevant events.

3. [13]

   The offender was released from Goulburn Gaol on parole on 5 March 2024. He was then initially accommodated in a motel in Dubbo and later by his aunt at her home in Narromine. By early April 2024, following the offender moving into his aunt’s house, he commenced doing some concreting work for his uncle. However, that work ceased because the offender became unreliable due to him frequently drinking alcohol to excess.

4. [14]

   At some time between 1:30 pm and 2:00 pm on 26 April 2024 the offender visited his aunt at her work place in Narromine. He told her that he had been drinking, and she observed that he had a 750 millilitre bottle of port. When he left, he took the bottle of port with him.

5. [15]

   From about 2:00 pm that day the offender met with Troy Boyd and Stanley Weatherall. The three men then spent a couple of hours at the river socialising and drinking alcohol.

6. [16]

   At around 4:30 pm the offender arrived at his aunt’s house and she observed that he appeared to be drunk, was emotional and was crying. The offender then told his aunt that he was sick of letting people down, that it was easier to be in gaol, that he had responsibility in gaol and that he was wealthy in gaol. The offender told his aunt that within two or three days he was going to be in gaol.

7. [17]

   His aunt then observed him pull a curved knife out of his pants which he used to open a package that had arrived for her in the mail. He then said that he was going to go and get more alcohol and left.

8. [18]

   At about 6:00 pm the offender met again with Troy Boyd and Stanley Weatherall at another man’s house where they continued drinking alcohol. At some stage during that encounter the offender misheard something that Mr Weatherall had said which resulted in the offender physically confronting Mr Weatherall and hitting him in the head. The two had to be separated by others. During the confrontation the offender was observed to be showing a knife with a curved blade. Following the confrontation the offender left the premises on Mr Boyd’s bicycle.

9. [19]

   A short time later, the offender attended a liquor store in Narromine and purchased three 750 millilitre bottles of port. He then rode to another person’s house and joined a group inside who were socialising. At that premises the offender continued to consume alcohol and became argumentative. Mr Boyd made a number of telephone calls to the offender while he was at the house and eventually attended the house to retrieve his bicycle. The offender then gave Mr Boyd one of the bottles of port and kept one for himself. Mr Boyd then left the house and the offender left a short time later.

10. [20]

    At about 8:10 pm the offender walked onto [redacted] Street, Narromine. The deceased, [redacted], resided with his family at [redacted] Street. Mr Boyd and Mr Weatherall separately told the police that they had previously seen the offender at [redacted] Street. Mr Boyd told the police that when he saw the offender at that address, he observed the offender supplying marijuana to the deceased’s father.

11. [21]

    The offender then walked into [redacted] Street in order to remonstrate over money. At the time the offender entered into the house, [the victim] was inside the house alone. His father, [redacted], was in the backyard of the premises. It is an agreed fact that at the time the offender entered the house he had no intention of assaulting the deceased or anyone else.

12. [22]

    A physical confrontation occurred inside the house during which the offender used a broken glass bottle to strike [the victim] a number of times to his face and neck. It is an agreed fact that at the time he struck the deceased, the offender intended to cause him grievous bodily harm but did not intend to kill him. The glass bottle used by the offender for the attack was one of the glass bottles of port which the offender had purchased earlier that day and from which he had been drinking. A CCTV recording from a neighbouring property records the offender’s voice at 8:42 pm yelling the following words:

13. [23]

    CCTV footage obtained from various properties record the movements of the offender, [the victim] and others in the events following the confrontation.

14. [24]

    At 8:43 pm the offender is recorded leaving through the front gate of [redacted] Street travelling on a bicycle in the direction of his aunt’s place. He is recorded yelling as he cycled away from the property, including yelling the words:

15. [25]

    [The victim] is recorded walking from the front gate of [redacted] Street, walking along the footpath and then collapsing on the ground. At about that time his father came across him and yelled “who done this?” and ran off in a westerly direction along [redacted] Street. [The victim’s father] then ran back towards his son whilst yelling for help. A neighbour then telephoned 000 and reported a stabbing.

16. [26]

    Ambulance officers arrived at the scene at about 9:00 pm and observed [the victim] lying on his back with a large amount of blood around him. He was transported by ambulance to the Dubbo Airport with the intention of flying him to an emergency department in Sydney. When the ambulance arrived at the Dubbo Airport at 10:00 pm [the victim] was pronounced dead.

17. [27]

    CCTV footage from various locations record the offender riding a bicycle through the streets of Narromine and show him holding a cylindrical item in his left hand. He cycled to his aunt’s house where she observed that he was drunk, agitated and stained with blood. The offender told his aunt that he had “got someone with a bottle in the neck”. She then telephoned the Narromine Police Station and kept the phone line open while she spoke with the offender. When she asked him which house he had been to, the offender said “… the dog. They’re the ones that bashed my mate and ripped me off”. When asked about the knife that she had observed him with earlier in the day, the offender said “it could be fucking around there but I didn’t use it”.

18. [28]

    The police attended the offender’s aunt’s house at 9:20 pm and spoke with the offender. At that time the offender said that he was covered in blood because he had fallen over and had hit a glass bottle. He denied stabbing anyone. He was then cautioned and placed under arrest.

19. [29]

    While in custody at the Dubbo Police Station, the offender began biting his own wrists. He was then conveyed to the Dubbo Base Hospital for mental health assessment and medical treatment. Medical records from that hospital note that the offender had a partial thickness tendon laceration to his right thumb.

20. [30]

    The police spoke to [the victim’s father] that evening, who told them that he had been in the backyard of his property and had not heard any argument.

21. [31]

    Subsequent post-mortem examination of [the victim’s] body determined that there were five sharp force injuries to him caused by a broken bottle. Those injuries were:

22. [32]

    The injury to the right upper neck which severed the external jugular vein was determined to be the fatal injury. No other significant injuries were identified and no natural diseases were identified that could have contributed to the death.

23. [33]

    On examining the house at [redacted] Street the police observed blood staining in the hallway and in a bedroom, with a saturation blood stain on the floor of that bedroom. They observed that the furniture appeared to have been knocked over and that there was broken glass from a bottle consistent with the bottle that had been used in the offending. The police also located a knife on the floor of the house which matched the description of the knife the offender had been observed carrying earlier in the day.

24. [34]

    Subsequent examination determined that [the victim’s] DNA was on the handle of the knife. The offender and [the victim] could not be excluded as contributors to mixed DNA profiles recovered from blood stains from several locations inside the house.

25. [35]

    The police later located a bicycle at the offender’s aunt’s house which belonged to the [victim’s family]. That bicycle had blood stains which matched the offender’s and [the victim’s] blood. They also located a curved knife sheath at the offender’s aunt’s house which matched the knife that had been recovered from [redacted] Street.

The Murder of [the victim]

1. [36]

   The killing of another person with a weapon is recognised in the authorities as an extremely objectively serious offence. That is exemplified by the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and the standard non-parole period of 25 years, each of which act as statutory guideposts. Murder is always a most serious offence. However, in determining the objective seriousness of this offending, I am required to take into account that the crime of murder can be committed in a wide range of circumstances with differing gravity. Those circumstances can range from brutal contract killings to merciful euthanasia.

2. [37]

   The maximum penalty of life imprisonment must be imposed if the level of culpability involved was so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence (s 61(1) CSPA). The Crown did not submit that s 61(1) applied. I am satisfied that the level of culpability involved in this case is not at such an extreme level. Accordingly, a life sentence is not appropriate.

3. [38]

   In the present case, the offender attended the [victim’s] family home uninvited, at nighttime and with the intention of remonstrating over money. It can be inferred from the circumstances that the intention to remonstrate was an intention to confront somebody. The facts are silent in relation to who it was that the offender intended to remonstrate with. However, the facts state that the offender and [the victim] were not known to each other. It can be inferred from that fact that whomever it was the offender intended to remonstrate with, it was not [the victim]. Although I accept that the offender did not intend to assault anyone when he first entered the house, I find that the circumstances establish that he placed himself in a position where his uninvited appearance in the house would have come as a surprise to any occupant. I have no doubt that when [the victim] first saw the offender in the house he would have been surprised and by the time of the attack on him with the broken bottle, he would have been terrified. The facts are silent in relation to how the events inside the house escalated into a physical confrontation. What is clear, from the police observations concerning the disturbed furniture, the amount of blood and the nature of the injuries, is that the physical confrontation escalated quickly and involved significant violence.

4. [39]

   Although it is accepted that the offender struck the deceased with the broken bottle a number of times to his face and neck, it is unclear how many strikes were delivered. It does not necessarily follow from the injuries that each injury arose from a separate and distinct blow. However, what is clear from the number and location of injuries is that the offender struck the deceased more than once, including the blows that caused the more significant lacerations to his neck and the wounds to the right cheek.

5. [40]

   It is an agreed fact that at the time the offender struck the deceased, his intention was to cause grievous bodily harm and that he did not intend to kill. That agreed position is accepted and is consistent with the facts, namely that after the stabbing the offender continued to yell to the deceased, including with words indicating the possibility of some future interactions, and that for a period after the stabbing the deceased remained alive and mobile.

6. [41]

   Accordingly, I find that the offender intended to cause the deceased grievous bodily harm, and that he did so following his entry to the house intending to remonstrate with someone else over money, and that a confrontation with the deceased ensued which escalated and went fatally wrong.

7. [42]

   The Crown submitted that the objective seriousness of the murder fell above the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of this type. The offender submitted that the murder offence fell below the mid-range of objective seriousness.

8. [43]

   Taking into account those submissions, I find that this is a serious example of murder with the intention of committing grievous bodily harm and I find that it falls just below the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of this type. The reasons for those findings include that the offender did not plan the attack and did not intend to kill the victim, but he used a weapon in a violent, albeit brief, attack to the neck and face of a vulnerable stranger.

9. [44]

   I take into account that the offending involved the use of a weapon, in this case a broken glass bottle (s 21A(2)(c) CSPA). However, the presence of a weapon for an offence of murder does not have much effect on the objective seriousness of the offending by virtue of that fact alone: R v Chamma; R v Hicks (No 3) [2023] NSWSC 1057 at [85]-[86]; R v Youseff (No 4) [2025] NSWSC 125 at [47].

10. [45]

    In this case, the offender was carrying the glass bottle with him because he had been consuming alcohol from it earlier in the evening. I do not find that he intended to use it as a weapon at the time he carried it into the house. However, I have no doubt that by the time of the altercation, when it was broken and used by the offender as the weapon, the use of the broken bottle would have significantly increased the fear felt by [the victim]. In those circumstances, I consider that the use of the broken bottle as a weapon is an aggravating factor but only to a limited extent.

11. [46]

    I do not take into account the presence of the knife in the [the victim’s family] house that evening as an aggravating factor. That is so because there is no evidence to establish how that knife left the offender’s possession or how it came to be in the position on the floor of the house where it was later found by the police. In addition, the medical evidence does not establish that any of the wounds sustained by the deceased were caused by that knife.

12. [47]

    The offender has a criminal history (s 21A(2)(d) CSPA). The offender has a record of convictions dating back to 2012 which include convictions for drug, firearm, police pursuit, theft, common assault and breach of apprehended violence order offences. He has a criminal record in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and for Commonwealth offences. The various criminal histories indicate that the offender has spent previous periods in custody. His history does not amount to an aggravating factor but is sufficient to disentitle him to any leniency that would otherwise be afforded to an offender with limited or no criminal history. In addition, his criminal history is also relevant to the sentencing purposes of retribution, deterrence and protection of the community.

13. [48]

    The offending was committed in the victim’s home (s 21A(2)(eb) CSPA). As a 16-year-old in his own home at nighttime, [the victim] was entitled to feel safe and protected.

14. [49]

    I take into account that the offending occurred at a time when the offender was on conditional liberty (s 21A(2)(j) CSPA). In July 2023, the offender was sentenced for an offence of destroying or damaging property and for two offences of common assault. That sentence was for an aggregate term of imprisonment of 20 months commencing on 6 May 2023 and concluding on 5 January 2025, with a non-parole period of 10 months commencing on 6 May 2023 and concluding on 5 March 2024. The offender was released on parole on 5 March 2024. Accordingly, on 26 April 2024, when he committed the present offences, he had been on conditional liberty for less than two months. His breach of the conditions of his conditional liberty is a significant aggravating feature.

15. [50]

    The offender has made only limited expressions of remorse and contrition. He told his treating psychologist, Patrick Sheehan, “I feel bad for the mum. It could have been avoided I suppose”. Mr Sheehan also notes in his report that the offender’s insight was poor and that he showed very limited self-appraisal and externalised responsibility for his behaviour and decisions. In an affidavit affirmed on 20 February 2026, the offender’s solicitor, Lisa Munro, records her conversation with the offender in which he said that he did not mean to express himself in that way to the psychologist and that his words “just come out the wrong way”. The offender also told his solicitor that he feels sorry, that he pleaded guilty because [the victim] had lost his life, that he owed it to him and that he felt “bad” for him.

16. [51]

    On the second day of the sentence hearing, a handwritten letter of apology was tendered on the offender’s behalf. In that letter he apologises to [the victim’s] family. He states that he had not written an apology letter earlier because he was too embarrassed and adds that hearing his family members read their victim impact statements made him realise how they felt.

17. [52]

    The offender did not give evidence during the sentence proceedings.

18. [53]

    When the offender left the [victim’s] family house, he must have been aware that he had caused significant injury to [the victim]. Despite that knowledge, he continued to yell abuse as he departed, gave no assistance and failed to call for anyone to come to his aid. His conduct immediately following the murder indicated that he had no concern for the victim or the outcome of his violent attack.

19. [54]

    I accept that there is some evidence of expressions of genuine remorse. It is relevant that the most explicit of those expressions, in the form of the apology letter, was prepared very late and only after he had heard ten of [the victim’s] family members read out their victim impact statements. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the offender has provided evidence that he has accepted responsibility for his actions and acknowledged the extent of the injury, loss or damage caused by his conduct. I accept that, while a plea of guilty is often neutral to the issue of remorse, here the plea to murder (as opposed to manslaughter) adds somewhat to the expressions of remorse. However, I am not satisfied that those expressions of remorse rise to the level required to satisfy s 21A(3)(i) CSPA as a mitigating factor.

20. [55]

    On the topic of the offender’s self-induced intoxication, that matter cannot be taken into account as a statutory mitigating factor (s 21A(5AAA) CSPA). That factor, however, remains relevant and falls for consideration when dealing with other issues relevant to sentence including the issue of moral culpability, prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood of reoffending.

The common assault of Stanley Weatherall

1. [56]

   The assault of Mr Weatherall falls towards the lower end of the range of objective seriousness for offences of that type. That is so because the assault involved a physical confrontation between the two and involved the offender hitting Mr Weatherall in the head. There is no evidence of any injuries sustained as a result of the assault or any ongoing impact on Mr Weatherall’s health. I also take into account that the assault appears to have arisen because of some misunderstanding which occurred as a result of something Mr Weatherall said when the offender, Mr Weatherall and another were consuming alcohol together.

2. [57]

   In relation to the common assault of Mr Weatherall, I take into account that the offending involved the offender showing Mr Weatherall the curved knife which he was carrying (s 21A(3)(c) CSPA). I also take into account that the offender had a previous criminal record which disentitles him to any leniency (s 21A(2)(d) CSPA), that the offence was committed in the home of another person being the home of Daniel Franklin (s 21A(3)(eb) CSPA) and that the offence was committed whilst the offender was on conditional liberty on parole (s 21A(3)(j) CSPA).

3. [58]

   The only mitigating factor which applies to the assault count is that the offender pleaded guilty (s 21A(3)(k) CSPA).

4. [59]

   Mr Patrick Sheehan, psychologist, interviewed the offender by audio visual link on 15 December 2025 and 17 February 2026 for a total period of one and a half hours. In addition to the material received during the consultation, Mr Sheehan took into account the agreed facts, the offender’s criminal history, material relating to the offender’s mother, case notes, Justice Health records, records from the Department of Family and Community Services and a draft affidavit relating to the offender’s subjective circumstances.

5. [60]

   The following background information was obtained from Mr Sheehan’s report, an affidavit affirmed on 17 January 2026 by the offender’s maternal grandmother and from other subjective evidence tendered by the offender.

6. [61]

   In addition to the material contained in the documents, Mr Sheehan was required for cross-examination by the Crown and accordingly gave evidence during the sentence proceedings on 3 March 2026.

7. [62]

   The offender is presently 27 years old. He experienced an early childhood marked by profound disruption, abuse, neglect and parental substance dependence. He was removed from his mother’s care when he was very young due to his mother being sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offence relating to seriously assaulting her own daughter, the offender’s sister, when she was a baby.

8. [63]

   The offender then spent a period in out of home care with his grandparents, which is described as a positive and stable environment.

9. [64]

   Later, the offender and his siblings moved from their grandparents to live with their father, which commenced a period of the offender’s adolescence marked by physical abuse, exposure to drug abuse, lack of food and homelessness. The offender and his sister then moved to live with his mother, who kicked them out of the house at night on occasions, requiring them to sleep in a park.

10. [65]

    Various government department records and legal correspondence indicate that at 14 years of age the offender became homeless because neither of his parents could accommodate him. The documents also record that the offender was introduced to methamphetamine by his mother at about the age of 13 years.

11. [66]

    The offender’s behaviour at school resulted in him being expelled or asked to leave five or six primary schools and two high schools. He ceased full-time school attendance during Year 8.

12. [67]

    [Redacted.]

13. [68]

    The offender reported that he had commenced consuming nicotine from the age of 10 years, cannabis from the age of 11 years, alcohol from the age of 12 years and methamphetamine from the age of 13 years. The records and the offender’s accounts consistently point to the offender’s mother as contributing to his introduction to illicit substance consumption during his formative years.

14. [69]

    Mr Sheehan observed the applicant to be cooperative but taciturn, markedly hyperactive and restless, with poor attention, guardedness, poor insight and a tendency to externalise responsibility. He identified that the offender demonstrated all of the key features of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (‘ADHD’) and offered a diagnosis of ADHD – severe, predominantly hyperactive/impulsive. Mr Sheehan was of the view that the offender’s ADHD was very likely to have played a contributing role to episodes of impulsive aggression including in committing the index offence.

15. [70]

    Mr Sheehan also noted that the offender qualified for diagnosis of Polysubstance Use Disorder – moderate to severe, in early remission in a controlled environment, with opioid agonistic/antagonist treatment.

16. [71]

    He also noted that the offender’s history pointed squarely towards a diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder developing from early Conduct Disorder and following a pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others, impulsivity and failure to adjust his behaviour in response to sanction. Mr Sheehan noted that the offender’s personality development was likely to have been badly undermined by his background of adversity.

17. [72]

    However, Mr Sheehan did not consider that the offender suffered from any primary psychotic disorder and considered, on balance, that there was no schizophrenia or other major mental illness. He formed the opinion that the offender’s psychotic-like phenomena occurred in the context of stimulant and cannabis use during adolescence.

18. [73]

    Mr Sheehan formed the opinion that the offender’s early exposure to abuse and neglect, the early incarceration of a parent, placement in out of home care, neurodevelopmental disorder, interrupted school attendance and suspension, early exposure to alcohol and illicit drugs, homelessness and [redacted] are all likely to have contributed to the interruption of stable personality development, inability to manage emotions, hyperarousal, anger dyscontrol and impulsive aggression. He regarded those factors as the main drivers of the offender’s criminal behaviour including violence. He was of the opinion that there was a nexus between the offender’s troubled background and the present offending conduct. He added that the offender’s ADHD was likely to have played a contributing role in his episodes of impulse aggression including in committing the index offence.

19. [74]

    Mr Sheehan gave evidence and was cross-examined. He stated that the first consultation with the offender lasted only 10 minutes because the offender got up, stated that he was not in the mood and walked out and the second had to be cut short by 30 minutes because the offender was becoming less engaged and less responsive. Mr Sheehan agreed that things the offender had told him needed to be viewed through the lens of his opinion that he showed very little realistic self-appraisal and externalised responsibility for his own behaviour and decisions.

20. [75]

    Mr Sheehan accepted that non-stimulant medication may be available to the offender in custody to treat his ADHD. He accepted that although ADHD medication might reduce the offender’s impulsive behaviour, his impulsivity was not solely attributable to ADHD, and that his personality disorder and complex trauma effects also contributed.

21. [76]

    Because of the offender’s issues, he requires “high intensity” rehabilitative programs which are not offered until towards the end of an inmate’s period of full-time custody.

22. [77]

    Mr Sheehan is of the opinion that because of the offender’s risk factors, which include impulsivity, substance abuse, reckless behaviour and use of weapons, his prospects of rehabilitation are “not good right now”. Although he said that he could not predict what the offender’s risk factors or prospects of rehabilitation would be towards the end of his term in custody, he commented that if the offender settles down, regulates himself and engages in programs as they become available to him, he may present with better prospects in the future.

23. [78]

    He confirmed his written opinion that it was very likely that the offender’s ADHD played a contributing role to the offending, and added that he was also of the opinion that his personality disorder and complex trauma effects had a contributing role.

Moral culpability

1. [79]

   As I have already noted, I cannot take into account self-induced intoxication as a mitigating feature (s 21A(5AA) CSPA). However, there is an important distinction between using such intoxication as a mitigating feature and using it to reduce the offender’s moral culpability as part of a general mix of factors that are intrinsically connected.

2. [80]

   In the present case, there is an abundance of evidence to establish that the offender’s early upbringing involved significant neglect as well as exposure to alcohol and illicit drugs. That, in turn, led to social and learning difficulties and poor educational outcomes. As recognised in Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 (‘Bugmy’) at [43] and as expressed by Simpson J in R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2 at [69]:

3. [81]

   Although an offender’s drug addiction may not be a mitigating factor on its own (R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111 (‘Henry’) at [197]-[201]), an offender’s moral culpability may be reduced if their drug dependency was acquired because of an exposure to drugs at a very young age, leading to the conclusion that their addiction did not arise from a free choice. In Henry, Wood CJ at CL stated at [273] with Newman, Hulme and Simpson JJ agreeing, that a drug addiction may be relevant in assessing moral culpability in circumstances where the addiction arose not as a matter of personal choice but attributable to some event, including exposure to drug consumption at such an early age that they were unable to exercise appropriate judgement or choice.

4. [82]

   The Crown conceded that Bugmy factors should be recognised in this case and that, similar to the situation considered in Henry, the offender’s drug addiction issues appear to have arisen at a very young age in a context where his ability to exercise personal choice or judgement was incomplete. In my view, that concession was correctly made.

5. [83]

   I take into account that, although the murder offence is serious, there was no significant planning involved. In my view, the offender’s early exposure to drugs, his background of developmental disadvantage, his behavioural difficulties, disrupted schooling, and other traumas from which he suffers, affected his capacity to exercise good judgement and to make prosocial choices. Accordingly, I find that the offender’s moral culpability for the offending is reduced.

6. [84]

   In addition, I accept the opinions of Mr Sheehan in relation to the offender’s mental health conditions. I am satisfied on the basis of Mr Sheehan’s report that the offender’s ADHD, personality disorder and complex trauma effects played a contributing role in the commission of the index offences. Accordingly, I am satisfied that his mental health contributed to the commission of the offences in a material way and that, as a result, his moral culpability and the need to denounce the crimes are both reduced in accordance with Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194.

7. [85]

   However, based on Mr Sheehan’s opinions concerning the nature, intensity and pervasiveness of the offender’s mental health conditions, I am also satisfied that the offender presents more of a danger to the community because of those conditions. Consequently, the need for specific deterrence and the need to protect the public are to be given increased significance in the sentencing exercise.

Others matter

1. [86]

   I take into account that the factors which have led me to reduce the offender’s moral culpability are such that general deterrence should be given somewhat less weight in the sentencing exercise. However, notwithstanding the somewhat reduced significance of general deterrence, general and specific deterrence still have a role to play in the sentencing exercise. Without appropriate and effective therapy, including to address his ADHD, personality disorder and substance abuse issues, the offender is likely to have a continuing problem with conducting himself in a lawful manner upon his eventual release from custody. On his release, absent any meaningful intervention, if the offender continues to be unable to effectively control his violent responses to frustration, he will continue to present as a danger to the community. That means that specific deterrence has a more significant role to play in the overall sentencing exercise.

2. [87]

   I also take into account that the offender’s conditions of custody, some of which has been spent in isolation with periods of lockdown, and his future custody, are made somewhat more difficult as a result of his ADHD.

3. [88]

   In considering his prospects of rehabilitation, I note that in his oral evidence Mr Sheehan expressed the opinion that at present his prospects are “not good”. He notes that the offender requires programs of high intensity such as residential treatment programs and states that it was unclear whether the offender would be considered suitable for violent offender treatment programs whilst in custody and that relevant programs may not be offered until towards the end of his sentence.

4. [89]

   In those circumstances, I am unable to find that the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation or that he is unlikely to reoffend in the future. Much will depend on his willingness to engage appropriately with programs offered to him in custody and his ability to remain abstinent and compliant with treatment when he is ultimately released on parole. I note that there is only limited evidence of any remorse and that, where lengthy terms of imprisonment are likely, such as in the present case, the prospects of rehabilitation may well take on less significance in the sentencing process.

5. [90]

   I accept the submission made on the offender’s behalf that he is entitled to a finding of special circumstances under s 44(2) CSPA on the basis that he is at risk of institutionalisation due to his repeated interactions with the criminal justice system, the need for a greater period on parole for the offender to participate in community based rehabilitation, and because his circumstances of custody are likely to be more onerous on him than other prisoners due to his subjective circumstances. Accordingly, I propose to make some, albeit a modest, variation to the statutory ratio to account for the finding of special circumstances.

Victim Impact Statements

1. [91]

   During the course of the sentence proceedings, the Court received victim impact statements from the deceased’s father, his sisters [S1] and [S2], his brother, his aunts [A1] and [A2], his cousins [C1] and [C2], his great aunt and his grandmother.

2. [92]

   Most of the authors of the victim impact statements read their own statements in Court. Others had their statements read for them.

3. [93]

   Pursuant to s 30E(3) CSPA, I consider that it is appropriate to take the victim impact statements into account on the basis that the harmful impact of the offending on [the victim’s] family is an aspect of the harm done to the community. The victim impact statements also allow the Court to obtain a better understanding of [the victim] and how deeply his death impacted on his family and loved ones.

4. [94]

   The deceased’s father, describes his son as gentle and kind. He states that his son helped anyone in need and volunteered at the local library. He describes that when his son was killed, he felt as though a part of him had also died. He struggles to sleep and eat, suffers from depression and feels overwhelming anger. He describes the remaining family relationships as strained, adding that he has observed his other children suffering sadness and a deep sense of loss and that he and the deceased’s mother now have a strained relationship. He states that a quiet, unspoken sadness is now between them. [The victim’s father] says that he has been unable to return to the family home because the memories there haunt him.

5. [95]

   [S1] movingly sets out the impact that her brother’s death has had on her. She describes him in glowing terms as loving the library and computer games. She describes the impact of her brother’s death as a “gut wrenching pain” which has had a continuing impact on her and has caused her to feel hypervigilant, unsafe and wary of strangers.

6. [96]

   [S2], [the victim’s] older sister, describes him as joyful, playful and cheeky. She says that he was the heart and soul of their family. She describes that [the victim] would often help younger children at the library and assist the elderly with their groceries. She says he was compassionate and smart. She describes the impact of his murder as causing her to shut down and feel as though something inside her had been destroyed. She experiences difficulty sleeping and regulating her moods. She says that she no longer feels safe in her own home and has trust issues. She was so impacted by his murder that she has had to relocate from the area and has left her job working at a nursing home because she could no longer be around death. She also describes that the family dynamic has changed and that they are more closed off.

7. [97]

   [The victim’s] youngest brother, describes that the murder has left their family broken and describes suffering from a whirlwind of emotions including shock, sadness and hatred. He describes feeling as though a part of himself was also killed.

8. [98]

   His aunt [A1] describes the deceased as a sweet soul who was generous and kind-hearted.

9. [99]

   His aunt [A2] describes [the victim] as quiet, reserved, observant, caring and inquisitive. She says that he was loving, loyal and sincere. She describes that he provided stability and that his death has caused the family to feel grief, fear, anger, confusion and emotional withdrawal. She describes her observation of the impact of his death on the deceased’s father, as catastrophic, stating that he has since been admitted to hospital a number of times with depression and mental health issues. She also states that her own sense of safety has been impacted and that she has been unable to drive past the family house because of the associated traumatic memories. She says this has resulted in her now being afraid to leave her own house unlocked and she remains vigilant in relation to home security.

10. [100]

    Similar sentiments are eloquently expressed by [C1], [the victim’s] cousin. She states that as a result of his death she no longer feels safe in her own house and feels on constant alert responding to every noise at night. She also recalls that after the murder she and other members of the family became aware of blood that they observed at various places around Narromine and that her uncle collapsed in the street from shock and had to be rushed to hospital. She describes the pain that she and other family members are feeling at the loss of such a young relative and the sadness associated with never being able to see him grow and develop.

11. [101]

    [C2], [the victim’s] cousin, describes him as kind, caring, protective and having a heart of gold. She describes that his murder caused her to feel overwhelming shock and pain and that she now struggles with fear, feels unsafe in her own home and is more protective of her own children. She states that [the victim’s] murder has caused lingering, permanent sadness and has caused the family to become distant.

12. [102]

    [The victim’s] great aunt, describes the impact of his death on his family and friends, describing that they have been left in a state of absolute shock. She adds that he was in his own home, was alone and vulnerable, and was in a place where he should have felt safe at the time.

13. [103]

    [The victim’s] maternal grandmother, expresses her grief at her grandson’s life being cut short so early and her sadness at not being able to see him reach maturity. She also states that [the victim] was happy, contented, enjoyed working in the library, loved helping younger children and was kind and helpful.

14. [104]

    I am acutely aware that no mere words, nor the sentence that I will impose, could ever mitigate the loss to [the victim’s] family or provide them with any comfort. However, I can assure you that your voices have been heard through your victim impact statements and I take those statements into account to the extent permitted by the law. It is important that the impact of the offender’s crime upon the victim’s family and loved ones be recognised and never forgotten. On behalf of the Court, I extend my sincere condolences.

The “comparable cases”

1. [105]

   The parties referred me to a number of cases said to be relevantly comparable, acknowledging of course that each case is unique. I have considered each of them.

Totality, accumulation and appropriate commencement date

1. [106]

   I propose to impose an aggregate sentence as allowed under s 53A CSPA. Because the assault offence occurred on the same day and during the same general period of aggressive and intoxicated conduct as the murder, I propose to allow for a degree of concurrency reflected in the aggregate sentence. However, noting that the common assault offence is relatively minor when compared to the substantially more serious offence of murder because the assault on Mr Weatherall involved separate conduct at an earlier time and a separate victim, some degree of accumulation is required.

2. [107]

   I am required to indicate the sentences that I would have imposed by separate sentences. In reaching the indicative sentences and in determining the appropriate aggregate, I have taken into account the purposes of sentencing set out in s 3A CSPA and I have taken into account that those purposes often overlap and pull in conflicting directions. In relation to the murder offence, denunciation, punishment and the protection of the community are significant considerations as are the age of the victim and the need to hold the offender to account for his violent actions. However, as I have stated, I accept that he is a less suitable vehicle for general deterrence and that his moral culpability is reduced due to his subjective circumstances.

3. [108]

   For the offence of murder, I indicate an indicative sentence of 22 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 years and 4 months before discount, reduced to a sentence of 19 years and 9 months imprisonment (after some minor rounding) with a non-parole period of 12 years and 10 months after allowing a 10% discount for the guilty plea.

4. [109]

   For the assault, I indicate an indicative sentence of 10 months imprisonment before discount, reduced to 9 months after allowing a 10% discount for the guilty plea.

5. [110]

   I propose to set an aggregate non-parole period that will reflect an individual non-parole period that is shorter than the standard non-parole period for the murder offence. That is because of my findings concerning objective seriousness, the offender’s strong subjective case, his reduced moral culpability, his mental health conditions, and the onerous conditions of custody to date which are likely to continue for some time into the future. I have relied on those same considerations and my other findings in this judgment as warranting a departure from the statutory ratio of the non-parole period to the balance of the term.

6. [111]

   In the result, the offender will be sentenced to an aggregate term of 20 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 years.

7. [112]

   In relation to commencement date, the offender was arrested on 26 April 2024 and has remained in custody since that date. However, part of that time in custody relates to the breach of parole matters, which expired on 5 January 2025. The Court has a broad discretion under s 47(2) CSPA in relation to backdating the offender’s sentence to commence between those two dates. Accordingly, I propose to backdate the sentence to commence on 31 August 2024, approximately halfway between his arrest and the expiration of the parole period.

Orders

1. [113]

   Anthony Facchi you are convicted of the murder of [the victim] and the assault of Stanley Weatherall.

2. [114]

   For those offences, I sentence you to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 20 years with a non-parole period of 13 years commencing on 31 August 2024 and expiring on 30 August 2037 and a balance of term of 7 years expiring on 30 August 2044.

3. [115]

   Accordingly, the first date upon which you will become eligible for release on parole is 30 August 2037.

4. [116]

   I am required to advise you that the provisions of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) apply to the offence of murder and that you may be subject to its provisions at the end of the sentence I have imposed. That Act allows for certain orders for the continued detention or extended supervision of violent offenders at the conclusion of their sentence. I invite your lawyers to advise you of the possible application of the provisions of that Act.