O’Brien v Australian Broadcasting Corporation

1. [1]

   McCOLL JA: The appellant, Ms Natalie O’Brien, an investigative journalist, appeals from a judgment of McCallum J who found in favour of the respondent, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), in defamation proceedings the appellant commenced in respect of allegedly defamatory comments made in a segment of the Media Watch programme presented by Mr Paul Barry. Her Honour held that the matter complained of was defensible as fair comment on a matter of public interest and honest opinion under s 31 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) (Defamation Act), entered judgment in favour of the ABC and ordered the appellant to pay its costs. [1]

Statement of the case

1. [2]

   As the primary judge said:

2. [3]

   The segment of Media Watch on which the appellant sued was broadcast twice on ABC television (on 29 and 31 July 2013) to estimated audiences of 1.142 million and 69,000 respectively. A video and a transcript of the broadcast were also placed on the ABC’s website and remained on that site at the time of trial. [3] The appellant’s legal representatives downloaded the transcript from the ABC’s website, annotated it with paragraph numbers and annexed it as a schedule to the statement of claim. The transcript included a heading “Scary toxic beat-up” which did not appear in the audio-visual form of the matter complained of. The primary judge held that that difference did not affect the question of the meanings conveyed by the matter complained of. [4] It is annexed as Schedule 1 to these reasons. [5]

3. [4]

   The matter complained of criticised two articles written by the appellant and published in The Sun Herald, one on 7 July 2013 entitled “Toxic substances found in reserve” (first article), the other on 14 July 2013 entitled “Cancer chemicals detected, yet park gets all clear” (second article). The articles reported the alleged discovery by testing conducted by the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) of toxic substances on land near the Orica industrial site in Hillsdale (Orica site) in New South Wales. The primary judge described the area as follows:

4. [5]

   Each article was illustrated by a photograph of children playing on play equipment in an area clearly demarcated from its surrounds as a children’s playground area by the presence of a slippery dip, climbing apparatus and monkey bars. No tests for toxic substances had been conducted in that area. In the first article, the photograph of the children was approximately as large as the text of the article itself.

5. [6]

   Media Watch made two broad criticisms: one directed to the appellant’s articles and the other to two television stations, which, essentially, uncritically repeated the first article in news broadcasts on the evening of its publication.

6. [7]

   Insofar as the articles were concerned, Media Watch asserted that the suggestion in the first article that the EPA tests had been conducted where the children were playing was a “little sleight of hand” as the tests had been conducted “some distance away.” Secondly, Media Watch asserted that the central claims of the story were “just wrong” or “false” as could have been discovered by “rely[ing] on the experts”, and that the stories were “alarmist” and a shocking beat-up. The two television stations were accused of copycat journalism.

7. [8]

   The appellant contended that the Media Watch programme conveyed the following imputations of and concerning her, each of which was defamatory of her:

8. [9]

   In her statement of claim, the appellant particularised the trickery imputation as arising from lines 9 – 14 and 36 – 52 of the matter complained of. She particularised the irresponsible journalist imputation as arising from lines 63 – 67 and 110 – 114 of the matter complained of. Finally, she particularised the toxic substances imputation as arising from lines 51 – 92 of the matter complained of.

9. [10]

   The ABC pleaded five defences: truth (s 25, Defamation Act); fair comment at common law; honest opinion (s 31, Defamation Act); contextual truth (s 26, Defamation Act); and qualified privilege at common law.

10. [11]

    As I have said, the primary judge upheld the defence of fair comment at common law and honest opinion. Her Honour also indicated her conclusions regarding the remaining defences in the event that her conclusions on the comment defences were found to be incorrect.

11. [12]

    As to truth, her Honour found that the ABC had established the substantial truth of the irresponsible journalist imputation, but not the trickery imputation. [6]

12. [13]

    As to contextual truth, the ABC pleaded four contextual imputations (A – D), two of which, A and B, her Honour found to be substantially true and, by reason of them being of “greater seriousness” than the trickery imputation, concluded the appellant’s reputation was not further harmed by the trickery imputation. [7] Finally, her Honour would have rejected the defence of qualified privilege. [8] Her Honour did not address the question of damages.

13. [14]

    The appellant challenges the primary judge’s upholding of the defences of fair comment and honest opinion as well as her Honour’s findings in support of her conclusions that the ABC had established its defence of truth in respect of the irresponsible journalist imputation and of contextual truth in respect of the trickery imputation. The finding that the contextual imputations were substantially true is not challenged. Rather, the appellant’s challenge to the contextual truth finding is confined to the question whether the trickery imputation did not further harm the appellant’s reputation because of the substantial truth of the ABC’s contextual imputations.

14. [15]

    By amended notice of contention, the ABC contends the primary judge’s decision should also be affirmed on the basis of her reasons for upholding the defence of contextual truth by reference to contextual imputations A and B. The ABC also contends that her Honour ought to have found that the trickery imputation was substantially true and her decision should be affirmed on that basis as well.

15. [16]

    For the reasons that follow, I am of the view that the primary judge did not err in upholding the comment defences and, alternatively, that her Honour’s verdict could also be affirmed on the basis of the ABC’s defences of substantial truth and contextual truth. I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

Factual background

1. [17]

   The appellant mainly writes investigative pieces about the environment, immigration and refugees.

2. [18]

   In about January 2013 her attention was drawn to the prospect of a story concerning the Orica site by a member of the Greens party, who told her of a “pollution issue” in the Botany area around the Orica site. The appellant then wrote a number of articles concerning the issue. She continued to research the matter further apparently in response to learning of local residents’ frustration with Orica’s response to the issue. The residents were “pushing for off-site testing to be done by someone they perceived to be independent.” [9]

3. [19]

   In the course of conducting her research, the appellant learnt that a Mr Andrew Helps of Hg Recoveries Pty Ltd, had been asked by the residents to “put together a proposal”. He had provided a “commercial proposal for testing” the area around the Orica site “for any mercury that had travelled offsite from the Orica plant”. She contacted Mr Helps who said he had many years’ experience working in Australia and overseas and that his partner in the business, Mr Ian Brown, was an industrial chemist. She knew that Mr Helps himself was not a chemist. [10] Mr Helps played a pivotal role in informing the appellant about the matters the subject of her two articles. He was not called as witness. Nor were other “experts” the appellant consulted such as Professor Paul Brown or Dr Lloyd-Smith to whom I refer below.

4. [20]

   The appellant spoke to Professor Brown in January 2013. She said in her evidence in chief that he had been involved “in the community work and with Orica and that site”. She also said Professor Brown told her he did not want to be quoted, but “felt that he could understand why the residents wanted this testing done and he didn’t think it was unreasonable.” In cross-examination on this issue, she agreed that when she contacted Professor Brown, he advised her, after looking at a proposal she sent him which Mr Helps had prepared about testing the area around the Orica site “for any mercury that had travelled offsite from the Orica plant”, [11] that he was not qualified to comment on the issue.

5. [21]

   Later in the year, the appellant obtained a quote she included in the first article from Dr Lloyd-Smith who was the “Senior Advisor, National Toxics Network Inc” and a lawyer, not a chemist. The appellant knew Dr Lloyd-Smith had no academic qualification in science and was not a toxicologist. [12]

6. [22]

   In early 2013, the appellant obtained a copy of a draft scope of work proposal Mr Helps had provided to Hillsdale residents for a preliminary survey of the extent of mercury pollution in the area. In that proposal, Mr Helps suggested a budget of $400,000 for the work (with a $70,000 “mobilisation fee” to be paid prior to the commencement of any work). The primary judge was of the view that, from the preliminary information Mr Helps provided to the appellant, it must have been clear to her that Mr Helps had a commercial interest in securing a retainer to undertake the testing he was proposing for Hillsdale. [13]

7. [23]

   In about April 2013, Mr Helps and Mr Brown took some soil samples from the nature strip outside the Orica site on behalf of the Hillsdale residents and sent them for testing at a Sydney laboratory. After receiving the results, on 11 April 2013 Mr Helps emailed Mr Gifford, the Chief Environmental Regulator of the EPA, asserting that he had strong evidence to suggest that hexachlorobenzine (HCB), an organic compound, was leaking from the Orica site. [14]

8. [24]

   According to EPA documents tendered at the trial, the information provided to the EPA by Mr Helps did not include sample locations or other “contextual information”, which made it difficult for the EPA to assess the concerns he raised. Accordingly, the EPA felt compelled to take its own samples in the same area. [15]

9. [25]

   Mr Helps also informed the appellant of the results of his tests and spoke to her about writing a story. She said they should wait until the EPA did its testing. [16]

10. [26]

    On 15 April 2013 the EPA undertook its own tests, taking 15 soil samples to test not only for HCB, but also for other organic substances and metals (including chromium, lead and mercury). The results of these tests were reported by the EPA in a document referred to by the primary judge as the EPA report, presented in list format. [17] An aerial photograph of the area onto which the location of the 15 EPA test sites was superimposed in red formed part of the EPA report (EPA map). It showed all the tests were conducted in the Sydney Water easement land. The EPA map was exhibit K at trial and is Schedule 2 to these reasons. The EPA map was shown during the Media Watch programme (see line 50 of Schedule 1).

11. [27]

    In May 2013, the EPA issued a press release informing the public of Mr Helps’ concerns that HCB was present “on the nature strip outside the boundary of Botany Industrial Park, Matraville” (in Denison Street) and the results of its tests in response to those concerns. The press release indicated that the 15 samples it had taken were “well below the national health inspection levels” and that no further investigation was required, but noted that the samples were analysed for “a range of other contaminants” that were detected and referred to Sydney Water for further investigation. [18]

12. [28]

    The appellant obtained a copy of the EPA map. It showed that the testing was mainly concentrated in the area of Denison Street and on the Orica site on the west side of the street. Six of the EPA samples were taken from the Sydney Water easement land close to Denison Street and some distance away from Grace Campbell Reserve. The primary judge inferred that the reason the EPA tests focussed on that area was that it was the area from which Mr Helps said he had taken his samples on behalf of the residents. [19]

13. [29]

    Mr Helps and the appellant also obtained a copy of the EPA test results through the freedom of information process. Mr Helps provided the appellant with his analysis of the results, which she believed was prepared with Mr Brown’s help. The appellant discussed this material with Mr Helps and Mr Brown, then attempted to obtain an opinion about the EPA analysis. No one wanted to be quoted, except Dr Lloyd-Smith. [20]

14. [30]

    The appellant then wrote the two articles to which I have referred. The primary judge described them in the following terms:

15. [31]

    The appellant had not seen any children playing on any parts of the Orica site other than in the playground equipment area, prior to the publication of her articles. As I shall explain, it was she who arranged for the children whose photograph was included in her articles to go to the park for that purpose. [21]

Primary judgment

1. [32]

   At the trial, the appellant was the only witness on liability. She also called two reputation witnesses.

2. [33]

   The ABC did not call any witnesses. It tendered an export report prepared by Professor Brian Priestly, a research scientist who held a Bachelor of Pharmacology obtained from Sydney University in 1963, a Masters of Pharmacology obtained from Sydney University in 1965 and a PhD obtained from Sydney University in 1968. He had substantial expertise in the area the subject of the proceedings. [22] His report explained the genesis and operation of Australia’s national system for assessing site contamination as set out in a statutory instrument, the National Environment Protection (Assessment of Site Contamination) Measure 1999 (NEPM). The appellant did not object to any aspect of Professor Priestly’s report. Professor Priestly was not required for cross-examination.

3. [34]

   The primary judge described the Media Watch programme in the following terms:

4. [35]

   The ABC denied that the appellant’s imputations were carried by the programme and pleaded that, in any event, they were not defamatory. Her Honour noted that “no submissions were put to support that optimistic contention.” [24]

5. [36]

   The primary judge found that the matter complained of conveyed the trickery and irresponsible journalist imputations and that both were defamatory of the appellant. [25] Her Honour held that there was no need for the appellant to rely on the toxic substances imputation which was pleaded in the alternative. However, for the purposes of the defence of contextual truth, her Honour was of the view that that imputation was also clearly conveyed. [26]

6. [37]

   The primary judge identified the following elements of the ABC’s defence of fair comment:

7. [38]

   As to (a), in relation to the trickery imputation, the primary judge concluded that the Media Watch programme “conveyed, as fact, that the photograph [in the first article] contributed to the misrepresentation as to the true location of the tests”, [28] and was intended by Mr Barry to be the basis for the remark in which he described that misrepresentation as a “little sleight of hand”. Her Honour continued:

8. [39]

   The primary judge found the defamatory meanings captured in both the trickery and the irresponsible journalist imputations to amount to comment based on facts truly stated. [29] Her Honour considered the attribution of trickery in imputation (a) to be based on the following facts stated in the matter complained of (which the appellant accepts were a fuller articulation of what her Honour had set out at [59]):

9. [40]

   Critical to this summary of the facts, were her Honour’s findings that the appellant had arranged for children to attend the area where she understood the testing had been carried out, at a time when a newspaper photographer was to attend, that she wanted a photograph of children playing in the park area, that she appreciated it was likely the article would probably be illustrated by a photograph of children playing in the play equipment area, and that she was intimately involved in the process of obtaining the photographs that illustrated the article, and was responsible for the combination of materials as they appeared in the articles in the sense attributed to her by Media Watch. Her Honour observed, “[p]erhaps most significantly, the caption is entirely consistent with the content of the article written by Ms O’Brien.” [30]

10. [41]

    As to the irresponsible journalist imputation, the primary judge was of the view that the matter complained of would have been understood to state as a fact:

11. [42]

    In addition, the content of what “the experts” said concerning the assertions made in the story was set out, as fact, in the Media Watch programme. Accordingly, her Honour concluded that “the ordinary reasonable viewer or reader would understand the presenter to be making the comment, on the basis of those stated facts, that the failure to consult experts was irresponsible and caused unnecessary concern in the community.” [32]

12. [43]

    The primary judge concluded that each of the facts on which the two imputations were based was true for the reasons her Honour addressed more fully in considering the truth defence and, as I have said, accordingly concluded that the trickery and irresponsible journalist imputations amounted to comment based on facts truly stated. [33] Finally, her Honour found that the comments were objectively fair and related to a matter of public interest. [34] Accordingly, the defence of fair comment at common law was made out in respect of both defamatory meanings. [35]

13. [44]

    The ABC relied on all three grounds for the defence of honest opinion under s 31 of the Defamation Act, namely that the comment was that of the ABC (s 31(1)), of Mr Barry, being its servant or agent (s 31(2)) and of the experts named in the programme being persons other than the ABC or Mr Barry (s 31(3)).

14. [45]

    Counsel for the appellant at trial did not submit that, if the defence of fair comment was made out, there was any separate reason as to why the statutory defence of honest opinion should not succeed. Accordingly, for the reasons set out in respect of the common law defence, the primary judge was satisfied that the statutory defence was also made out. [36]

15. [46]

    The appellant complains that the primary judge erred in finding that the comment/honest opinion defences were made out. She contends neither the trickery nor the irresponsible journalist imputation was based on facts truly stated within the matter complained of, or else sufficiently identified. In essence, in this respect, the appellant submits that paragraphs [72](d) and [74](a) of the primary judgment are erroneous.

16. [47]

    The primary judge held that the trickery imputation was not true, but that the irresponsible journalist imputation was substantially true.

17. [48]

    The primary judge considered that the trickery imputation raised three elements for proof:

18. [49]

    Her Honour had no doubt that elements (a) and (b) were satisfied, [38] but could not be persuaded that the appellant had engaged in trickery. [39] As to (a) and (b), her Honour held:

19. [50]

    The harder question for determination on the trickery issue was identified by her Honour as being whether the ABC had established as a matter of substantial truth that the appellant engaged in trickery as a journalist. In this context, her Honour “understood the term ‘trickery’ to mean that, in order to establish that she did, the ABC would have to establish some element of dishonesty or an intention on [her] part to mislead her readers.” [40]

20. [51]

    The primary judge was of the view that resolution of this issue turned not merely on the information in the appellant’s possession, but on an assessment as to what she made of that information at the relevant time. [41] In this respect, her Honour said:

21. [52]

    The respondent challenges this finding by its amended notice of contention.

22. [53]

    The primary judge held that the elements of the irresponsible journalist imputation were:

23. [54]

    The primary judge considered that before considering those elements, it was necessary to explain what was required to be understood in order to analyse the significance of the EPA report. This entailed an appreciation of the NEPM. [43] Her Honour described the NEPM as a lengthy document contained in 22 volumes, whose stated purpose was to establish “a nationally consistent approach to the assessment of site contamination to ensure sound environmental management practices by the community which include regulators, site assessors, environment auditors, land owners, developers and industry.” [44] Volume 1 contained an overarching explanation. Schedule B contains general guidelines, and also 9 further schedules which occupy volumes 2 to 21. Schedule B1 provides general guidelines in relation to investigation levels for soil, soil vapour and groundwater in the assessment of site contamination. [45]

24. [55]

    The issue at trial concerned the proper interpretation of the EPA results by reference to health investigation levels (HILs). The NEPM established HILs for four different “soil exposure scenarios”: HILA for residential dwellings with gardens or accessible soil, HILB for residential dwellings with minimal access to soil (high rise flats etc), HILC for public open spaces and HILD for commercial/industrial buildings. [46]

25. [56]

    The appellant said that she had looked at the NEPM before her first article was published and thought she had downloaded “the whole thing”. The primary judge thought it unlikely that she would have downloaded all 22 volumes, and inferred she may have been referring to schedule B1. Her Honour observed that it would have been difficult to understand the application of the guidelines set out in schedule B1 without also considering at least the overarching explanation contained in volume 1. [47]

26. [57]

    The primary judge formed the view that the appellant’s answers in cross-examination in respect of the four HILs set out in schedule B1 suggested she did not have a close understanding of their application. Her Honour observed that “[s]he seemed reluctant even to accept their application, even though the position had been clearly explained to her in at least two documents from the EPA.” [48] Each of those explanations pre-dated publication of the first article.

27. [58]

    In her Honour’s view, the NEPM reflected “highly specialised and complex principles”. Her consideration of it persuaded her “that one would not lightly venture an opinion as to the significance of a report in the form of the EPA report without consulting an independent expert in that field.” [49]

28. [59]

    In determining whether the appellant failed to consult experts, the primary judge held that the meaning of the irresponsible journalist imputation was informed by the context that the substance of Mr Barry’s accusation on Media Watch was of a failure to consult appropriately qualified, independent experts. [50] Her Honour considered “that those words would have been understood by the ordinary reasonable viewer to mean the kind of well-educated, independent brainiacs who can provide reliable opinions as to the kinds of complex questions addressed in the articles.” [51]

29. [60]

    Accordingly, “[u]nderstood in context, the sting of the imputation … [was] not that Ms O’Brien failed to consult any person with any knowledge of that field at all, but that she failed to consult an appropriately qualified, independent expert who would prevent her from misunderstanding the issues upon which she was reporting.” [52]

30. [61]

    The appellant’s articles quoted Mr Helps and Dr Lloyd-Smith, neither of whom, the primary judge concluded, was “even a scientist, let alone one with appropriate academic qualifications and experience in the specialised field of assessment of site contamination.” The appellant gave evidence that she also spoke to Mr Brown, the industrial chemist who worked with Mr Helps. [53]

31. [62]

    The primary judge held that the appellant knew that “Mr Helps had been extremely critical of the EPA”, while her Honour’s “own assessment of his correspondence … is that he is very clearly not someone who could conceivably be regarded as having the independence required of a true expert”. [54] Her Honour also held that Mr Brown’s qualifications as an industrial chemist “were simply not at the level required for this task”. Her Honour also held that “that neither Mr Helps nor Mr Brown was an appropriately qualified expert for Ms O’Brien to rely upon for the purpose of her preparation of her articles, particularly the article dated 7 July 2013. Nor was the lawyer, Dr Lloyd-Smith.” [55]

32. [63]

    In her Honour’s view, informed by Professor Priestly’s report, the information Mr Helps was providing to the appellant prior to the publication of the first article persuaded her that Mr Helps “may have had an inadequate understanding of the chemistry or the regulatory regime (or both).” [56]

33. [64]

    In her Honour’s view:

34. [65]

    Accordingly, the primary judge held that “in a relevant sense, Ms O’Brien failed to consult experts in the preparation of her articles.” [57]

35. [66]

    In considering whether the appellant’s failure to consult experts was irresponsible in the circumstances, the primary judge regarded as a significant consideration, that the appellant’s first article was factually wrong in important respects. [58]

36. [67]

    Her Honour observed that:

37. [68]

    Her Honour also took into account the fact that the first article was illustrated with “a prominent graphic which included an image of a warning sign with a skull and cross bones”. She rejected the appellant’s evidence that the graphic was not prepared by reference to information conveyed to the relevant sub-editors by the appellant, which she in turn had obtained from Mr Helps. [59]

38. [69]

    The graphic asserted:

39. [70]

    The appellant accepted that it was wrong to identify the EPA as the source of the information in the graphic. Professor Priestly also explained that each of the individual propositions was wrong. [60]

40. [71]

    The appellant refused to accept that, in order to express the views in her article, one would need to know the applicable HIL according to the NEPM. She said:

41. [72]

    The primary judge accepted “that the reference in the [EPA] press release to the ‘health-based investigation levels for residential use’ may have created a measure of confusion.” In her Honour’s opinion “[t]hat is precisely the kind of issue as to which it was important and necessary to consult an expert.” [62] She observed:

42. [73]

    The uncontested evidence of Prof Priestly was that the first article, so far as it concerned toxic pollution, was factually wrong. His opinion was:

43. [74]

    The primary judge accepted, as the ABC submitted:

44. [75]

    The primary judge found it difficult to understand why the appellant did not make certain to obtain an independent expert’s comments on Mr Helps’ analysis of the EPA results having regard to the animus he bore towards Mr Gifford, as amply revealed in Mr Helps’ correspondence. While the appellant conceded that his correspondence expressed a negative view of the EPA, Orica and Mr Gifford, she would not accept that Mr Helps was “anti-Gifford”. [64]

45. [76]

    The primary judge held that the appellant also had information from which she ought to have appreciated that Mr Helps’ expertise had been doubted by others:

46. [77]

    In addition, her Honour held that “a close analysis of Mr Helps’ written communications sent to Ms O’Brien ought to have brought home to her the need to check his contentions with an independent expert. Apart from the partisan, at times offensive tone of the correspondence, there were glaring inconsistencies in, for example, his treatment of the HILA level for “mercury” which called for explanation.” [66]

47. [78]

    The primary judge found:

48. [79]

    The primary judge concluded “with some regret” that the appellant’s failure to consult an appropriately qualified and independent expert was irresponsible in the circumstances. Her Honour had little doubt that the appellant believed she was being given reliable information by a person experienced in this field. She accepted that, although Mr Helps did not give evidence, there was “every indication in the written material … that he would have presented as a passionate and well-meaning advocate for the residents of Hillsdale.” [67]

49. [80]

    However, her Honour’s assessment of the appellant’s evidence persuaded her that:

50. [81]

    The primary judge was also satisfied that “by her failure to consult experts (whose assistance would undoubtedly have modified the message of the article), Ms O’Brien created unnecessary concern in the community. Whilst there is no direct evidence from any particular concerned member of the community, that is the overwhelming likelihood, having regard to the content of the article.” [68]

51. [82]

    Accordingly, her Honour was satisfied that the irresponsible journalist imputation was substantially true.

52. [83]

    In light of her conclusion that the irresponsible journalist imputation was substantially true, but the trickery imputation was not, and in case she was wrong in any of the conclusions she had otherwise reached, the primary judge considered the ABC’s contextual truth defence under s 26 of the Defamation Act which provides:

53. [84]

    The ABC pleaded the following contextual imputations:

54. [85]

    The ABC asserted that, in addition to the four contextual imputations, it could rely on the toxic substances imputation as a contextual imputation as the appellant no longer relied upon it. The primary judge rejected this submission on the basis that the toxic substances imputation was wholly subsumed in the irresponsible journalist imputation and was therefore not capable of being an “other” imputation arising “in addition to” to the appellant’s imputations, as s 26 requires. [70] The ABC does not challenge this conclusion.

55. [86]

    The primary judge held that contextual imputations A and B were “plainly conveyed”, but were “in substance the same”. [71] For the reasons explained above in her Honour’s consideration of the truth defence to the irresponsible journalist imputation, she was satisfied that the attribution captured in those imputations was substantially true. [72]

56. [87]

    As to contextual imputation C, as her Honour had found “the higher meaning (trickery) conveyed”, she was of the view that the attribution of unethical failure to disclose could not be conveyed “at the same time”, as required by s 26. [73]

57. [88]

    As to contextual imputation D, her Honour held that its defamatory sting was wholly subsumed within contextual imputation B and, accordingly, it could also be put aside. [74]

58. [89]

    Thus, in summary, her Honour held:

59. [90]

    The primary judge considered what she regarded as inconsistent authority regarding the application of s 26 and, in particular, whether, in considering, because of the substantial truth of the contextual imputations, “the defamatory imputations” do not further harm the appellant’s reputation, “the defamatory imputations” included the irresponsible journalist imputation which the ABC had proved to be substantially true. [76]

60. [91]

    The primary judge’s view was that it was illogical to allow a plaintiff to meet the contextual truth defence by relying on a plaintiff’s imputation which had been proved substantially true. [77] However, her Honour acknowledged that other courts had reached the opposite conclusion. [78] In the light of the fact that she was only considering the defence of contextual truth against the risk that the conclusion on the defences of comment and honest opinion were incorrect, her Honour did not consider it necessary to resolve that issue and adopted the former approach. Therefore the task became one to consider whether the trickery imputation did not further harm the appellant’s reputation because of the substantial truth of contextual imputations A and B. On this point, her Honour concluded:

61. [92]

    The appellant challenges this conclusion.

Other defences

1. [93]

   The primary judge also rejected the ABC’s defence of common law qualified privilege and reply to an attack. [80] It is unnecessary to consider her Honour’s reasons for doing so as the ABC does not seek to revive either defence.

Issues on appeal

1. [94]

   By the notice of appeal, the appellant raised 9 grounds of appeal, four of which were abandoned.

2. [95]

   Grounds 1 and 3 relate to the defence of fair comment at common law. The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in holding and/or finding that this defence was established and that any opinion was based on proper material for comment.

3. [96]

   Ground 4 concerns the statutory defence of honest opinion. The appellant submits that the primary judge erred in holding and/or finding that any or all of the defences pursuant to s 31 of the Defamation Act were made out.

4. [97]

   Ground 8 concerns the defence of contextual truth. The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in holding that, because of the substantial truth of contextual imputations A and/or B, the defamatory imputations of which she complained did not further harm her reputation. At the outset of the appeal, the appellant abandoned ground 7 of the notice of appeal which had complained that the primary judge in finding that contextual imputations A and/or B were substantially true. In her written submissions she had not pressed ground 6 of the notice of appeal complaining that the primary judge erred in finding contextual imputations A and/or B were carried by the matter complained of.

5. [98]

   By ground 9, the appellant submits that the primary judge erred in finding that the irresponsible journalist imputation was substantially true.

6. [99]

   The appellant accepted that, if she was successful on her appeal, the question of damages would have to be remitted to the primary judge.

7. [100]

   The respondent submits by its amended notice of contention that the trickery imputation was substantially true and her Honour should have so found so that its defence of justification should succeed. In addition, the respondent submits that her Honour’s reasons for upholding the defence of contextual truth by reference to contextual imputations A and/or B were correct, and the decision should also be affirmed on that basis.

Appellant’s submissions

1. [101]

   The appellant challenged the primary judge’s findings in respect of the second element of the defence of fair comment, namely that the comment in each imputation was based on facts truly stated within the matter complained of or else sufficiently identified.

2. [102]

   The fair comment aspect of the appeal, insofar as the trickery imputation was concerned, turned on two relatively simple issues by which the appellant sought to challenge the substantial truth of the fact the primary judge found in paragraph [72](d), that the first article represented that the playground equipment area that had been tested included the area depicted in the photograph published with the article.

3. [103]

   First, whether the first article represented that the testing for toxic substances (as referred to in the headline, or in one of the synonymous expressions in the first article) had taken place in the play equipment area depicted in the photograph illustrating the article, as opposed to in the wider park area. Secondly, the appellant’s responsibility, for the photograph and, to a lesser extent, the caption used in the first article.

4. [104]

   The appellant accepted that no such testing was conducted in the play equipment area. She contended that, read as a whole, the first article, including the photograph and its caption, did not represent that testing had taken place in the exact area where the play equipment was, as opposed to in the park in which the play equipment area was located.

5. [105]

   The appellant submitted that in order to understand the primary judge’s findings as to the facts upon which the trickery imputation was based, it was necessary to understand the area in question and where the EPA tests were conducted.

6. [106]

   I have set out earlier the primary judge’s description of the area. [81] The appellant emphasised that her understanding was that the whole of the area to which the primary judge referred as the Sydney Water easement land and the Grace Campbell Reserve was the grassed area depicted in the photograph, including the play equipment area. She identified that as the Grace Campbell Reserve, and said she believed that within that area, there was play equipment erected over a surface such as bark and mulch which was not separated from any other part of the reserve by fences or other means. Although she accepted that she had not seen children playing in the grassed area prior to the publication of the articles, she did see them playing in areas where two of the samples were taken after their publication. She contended that, applying common sense and a presumption of continuity, it was highly probable they had done so prior to the articles’ publication.

7. [107]

   As I have said the appellant at all material times had a copy of the EPA map (see Schedule 2) which showed the areas the primary judge described and, too, where the EPA took the samples the subject of her articles. By reference to that exhibit, the appellant pointed out that there was a cluster of EPA sampling points on either side of Denison Road (see above (at [4])), but that some samples were also taken about halfway into the grassed park area, towards, although not as far as, the play equipment. She accepted that it was probable that none of the test sites appear in the photographs in either of her articles.

8. [108]

   The appellant emphasised that the first article did not refer to the playground equipment area per se. She submitted that when regard was had to the first article, the reference in the first paragraph to the “discovery of some of the most poisonous substances on earth…alarming residents whose children use the tested area as a playground”, could refer to the area beyond the playground depicted in the photograph where the appellant had seen children playing. In other words that “playground” was used generically, rather than by reference to the area depicted in the photograph. She emphasised that other geographical references in the first article were to the “discovery at the Grace Campbell Reserve” (para 4), and to “children … playing at the park” (para 6).

9. [109]

   In the appellant’s submission, a sufficient basis for paragraph [72](d) arose only when one looked at the photograph and its caption. She submitted that they could not trick readers and, in any event, that she was not responsible for them.

10. [110]

    Insofar as the caption was concerned, the appellant submitted that one plain reading of it was that children played in the park in question, and that toxic materials were found in the park. She argued that once one appreciated that the play equipment was within the park in question, the caption was substantially correct. This was notwithstanding that she accepted that the words “at risk” at the commencement of the caption did not apply to the particular children depicted because they were not, at the time of the photograph, in the part of the park where the test had occurred. She submitted that that scarcely established a basis for contending that the caption was substantially false or misleading. That consequence would flow only if one assumed that the ordinary reader would read “park” as meaning “the area with the play equipment” or “the area owned by the Council”, rather than the park as a whole, parts of which she observed were visible in the background of the photograph.

11. [111]

    The appellant also submitted that the photograph in the first article did not establish the necessary connection. She submitted that, again, it was only by assuming that the ordinary reader would ignore the words “park” and “reserve” (the latter appearing in both the headline and the fourth paragraph) and treat the phrase “as a playground” in paragraph 1 as meaning the play equipment, that such a basis could be established.

12. [112]

    The appellant next submitted that, even if the photograph and caption did have the effect stated by the primary judge, her Honour erred in attributing “responsibility” for that material to her. She argued that the primary judge erred in rejecting her unchallenged evidence that she did not choose, and was not involved in choosing, the photograph.

13. [113]

    The appellant submitted that the evidence the primary judge set out in paragraph [68] of her reasons did not go as far to establish that she took it upon herself to explain to the photographer what the caption to her article should say. [82] Rather, the evidence showed only that she raised one aspect with the photographer which was that if he took photographs in areas of the park other than that she believed to be contaminated (being the area with red dots on the EPA map), he should note that in the caption.

14. [114]

    As to the irresponsible journalist imputation, the appellant submitted that a defence of fair comment had to meet the whole of the charge against the plaintiff. Thus, she argued, if no proper basis was established for the defamatory meaning which corresponded with the imputation complained of, the defence of fair comment failed.

15. [115]

    The appellant submitted that the primary judge proceeded on the basis that the comment was based on the asserted fact that the appellant “failed to consult experts” in preparing the articles. Relying on the submissions set out below in respect of ground 9 dealing with the substantial truth of the irresponsible journalist imputation, [83] the appellant submitted that her Honour erred in so finding.

16. [116]

    The appellant accepted that, as the primary judgment proceeded on the basis that the requirements of the s 31 defence corresponded to those of the defence of fair comment at common law, ground 4 stood or fell with the success of the appeal grounds in relation to the common law defence.

17. [117]

    The appellant submitted that the primary judge erred in concluding that by reason of the substantial truth of contextual imputation A, the trickery imputation did not cause her further harm. For the purposes of this submission, the appellant treated contextual imputations A and B as effectively one contextual imputation having regard to the primary judge’s conclusion that they did not differ in substance.

18. [118]

    The appellant contended that the trickery imputation was effectively an allegation that she had acted dishonestly, whereas contextual imputation A amounted to an allegation that she published an alarmist article containing objectively false statements.

19. [119]

    The appellant argued that an allegation of dishonesty was substantially more serious than an allegation of incompetence. She contended that the community would distinguish quite sharply between allegations of dishonesty and allegations of want of care made about her in her capacity as a journalist. While she accepted that the truth of contextual imputation A would have damaged her reputation as a careful journalist, she submitted that it would not have damaged her reputation as an honest journalist, such that it could be said that the trickery imputation did not further harm her reputation.

20. [120]

    The appellant also relied upon evidence of her two reputation witnesses, Mr Rifi and Mr Feneley. Mr Rifi gave evidence that the appellant had a reputation for being non-biased, a thorough journalist who took her work as such very seriously and ethically. Mr Feneley was the appellant’s former editor. He gave evidence that reputation was critical for somebody like the appellant because “what you write needs to be trusted by readers”.

21. [121]

    The appellant submitted that this was evidence of the sort referred to in Reader’s Digest Services Pty Limited v Lamb, [84] which proved the impact of the defamatory imputation upon her reputation and could be taken into account in determining whether, by reason of the ABC’s contextual imputation A, the trickery imputation did not further harm her reputation.

22. [122]

    The appellant submitted that the primary judge ought to have found that the ABC had not established the substantial truth of the irresponsible journalist imputation. In particular, she argued that by approaching the question whether a person was an “expert” in the relevant sense only if he or she was independent and had a certain level of qualification, similar to that applicable to court proceedings, the primary judge added further elements to the irresponsible journalist imputation. [85]

23. [123]

    The appellant also criticised the primary judge’s conclusion that Mr Helps did not have the degree of independence “required of an expert” because of his commercial interest in establishing contamination had taken place. She submitted that so far as qualifications were concerned, an “expert” in this context had to be a person with adequate knowledge in the relevant field.

24. [124]

    The appellant also criticised the matter complained of insofar as it alleged not that she failed to consult the best available experts, or failed to consult those with any particular level of expertise, but, rather, that she failed to consult those who could be regarded as experts in the relevant area at all. This was, in effect, an assertion that she could be criticised for “going off ‘on her own’”. The appellant submitted that the fact that she consulted in some detail with Mr Helps, Mr Brown and Dr Lloyd-Smith made such an assertion unjustified.

25. [125]

    Next, the appellant submitted that there was sufficient evidence before the primary judge to mean that the ABC had not discharged its onus of proof that Mr Helps was not relevantly an expert. She contended that it was irrelevant that Professor Priestly was more expert and/or more knowledgeable than Mr Helps. She also observed that the primary judge did not find that Mr Helps’ knowledge was inadequate, but only that it “may” have been, [86] which was not a proper basis to conclude that he was not “an expert” in the relevant sense.

26. [126]

    The appellant submitted that in terms of expertise, and onus of proof, the position in relation to Mr Brown was the same, given his qualifications as an industrial chemist. She also argued that while Dr Lloyd-Smith’s expertise was in law, it was in connection with environmental disputes and while consulting her may not have been sufficient by itself, that consultation was not irrelevant because the process of consulting experts was a cumulative one.

27. [127]

    Finally, the appellant relied on her communication with Mr Brown, and the fact that he had some familiarity with Mr Helps’ testing and did not say anything negative about it.

ABC’s submissions

1. [128]

   The ABC submitted that the appellant’s submissions on the fair comment grounds of appeal conflated the issue of the substantial truth of the particular facts found to constitute “facts truly stated”, with a separate and different issue of the substantial truth of the imputations in relation to the defence of truth. Insofar as the latter defence was concerned, the ABC accepted that the appellant’s understanding might, on her approach, be relevant. However, in relation to comment, as to the truth of the identified “facts truly stated”, especially those the appellant challenged in the primary judgment at [72](d), the ABC submitted the appellant’s understanding was not relevant, yet, it pointed out, it was her evidence on those matters which was relied upon in several of the appellant’s submissions.

2. [129]

   Specifically, in respect of the trickery imputation and in response to the appellant’s suggested construction of the first article as a whole, the ABC made two submissions. First, that the relevant question on the defence of fair comment was whether the facts identified by the primary judge were “truly stated” and, if so, whether an opinion of trickery was able to be based on those facts, not “the extent to which this material was liable to trick readers” as the appellant submitted. Secondly, that the appellant’s suggested construction of the first article was too “strained and forced” to survive scrutiny and failed to address the primary judge’s straightforward and realistic reasoning on this point (at [85] – [86]), which the ABC adopted.

3. [130]

   The ABC submitted that the biggest feature of the first article was the photograph of children playing on play equipment over a caption “At risk: Children play in a park adjacent to Grace Campbell Circuit at Hillsdale, where toxic metals and chemicals were discovered”. The ABC contended that the caption made it clear that the children depicted in the photograph were at risk, presumably because they were playing in a park where toxic metals and chemicals had been discovered. The ABC argued that the caption was consistent with the thrust of the text of the first article as the words “used the tested area as a playground” in its first paragraph were reflected in the caption.

4. [131]

   The ABC contended that an ordinary reasonable reader of the first article would not adopt the appellant’s approach and wonder whether the word “playground” in paragraph 1 was being used to describe the area depicted in the photograph or, rather, the larger grassed area, parts of which could be observed in the background to the playground where people, including children, might occasionally kick a ball. Rather, the ABC submitted, the ordinary reasonable reader would understand the first article to be conveying that toxic metals had been discovered in an area used as a playground, illustrated by a photograph of children in a playground as meaning the toxic metals were discovered in that playground at least, and possibly elsewhere as well.

5. [132]

   As to the appellant’s responsibility for the use of the photograph and the caption in the first article, the ABC submitted that she knew that the system at Fairfax was that a photograph would be chosen, and the caption would be written, by others and acquiesced and participated in that process.

6. [133]

   The ABC also argued that the appellant’s involvement went beyond acquiescence. It was she who arranged for the children to be present to be photographed. She saw the photographer taking photographs of them in the play equipment area. She knew that it was highly likely that the photograph which would illustrate her article would be one showing children in the play equipment area. She demonstrated her approval of the article as a whole after its publication, by tweeting it to her followers and later citing the whole article, in support of an application for the Kennedy Award for journalism.

7. [134]

   The ABC submitted that the appellant was incorrect in her submission in relation to the irresponsible journalist imputation that a defence of fair comment had to meet the whole of the charge against the plaintiff, such that if no proper basis was established for the defamatory meaning which corresponded with the imputation in question, then the defence of fair comment failed. The ABC submitted that that submission would involve the proposition that a defence of comment as to the matter complained of, could not succeed unless a defence of truth as to the plaintiff’s imputation had also been established. The ABC argued that if that was correct, it would follow that in any case in which a defence of substantial truth was not to succeed in respect of a particular imputation, a defence of comment would also be bound to fail. Such an approach would rob the defences of comment and honest opinion of any utility.

8. [135]

   Next, the ABC submitted that the only basis for the appellant’s challenge was that one of the three persons she consulted was an “expert” in the relevant sense and, for the reasons set out below in respect of ground 9, [87] that criteria was not met.

9. [136]

   It is unnecessary to set out the ABC’s detailed submissions on this ground of appeal, as the appellant accepts that its success rises or falls with the defence of fair comment.

10. [137]

    The ABC disagreed with the appellant’s characterisation of imputation (a) as an imputation of “dishonesty” and of contextual imputations A and B as imputations of “incompetence” or “want of care”. It submitted that it was clear that the “trickery” in imputation (a) was in the context of Mr Barry’s comment concerning the “little sleight of hand” as to the precise location of the EPA tests, something which Mr Barry himself stressed was of much lesser seriousness than the falsity of the “central claims” of the appellant’s story. Therefore the primary judge’s assessment that the trickery imputation, while serious, did not further harm the appellant’s reputation because of the greater seriousness of the criticisms of the incorrect “central claims” of the article was justified.

11. [138]

    The ABC submitted that its contextual imputation that the appellant had written an alarmist article making false statements about the EPA test results and thereby causing grave concern in the community was very serious, especially in a context where, in addition to the alarmist nature of the article, the falsity of the statements in it and the causing of grave concern, there was an accusation of cover up by the EPA about risks to public health.

12. [139]

    The ABC first submitted that the primary judge’s treatment of the issue whether the appellant consulted an “expert” having regard to the context of the Media Watch programme was both appropriate and necessary. That context was “that the substance of [Mr Barry’s] accusation was the allegation of a failure to consult appropriately qualified, independent experts.” [88] The ABC submitted that the primary judge’s distillation of the context in which the trickery imputation was published did not import any additional or impermissible elements into it. So contextualised, the ABC submitted that it was appropriate for her Honour to consider the question of who the appellant ought to have consulted in the context of those the matter complained of was saying ought to have been consulted, such as Professor Jack Ng of the National Research Centre for Environmental Toxicology in Queensland and Professor Wayne Smith, director of Environmental Health in New South Wales.

13. [140]

    The ABC also argued that the Media Watch programme made clear that the need to consult experts was to consult such persons on particular issues as to the accuracy or inaccuracy of the “central claims” of the appellant’s story. These were:

    1. (1)

       the claim that the EPA tests had found each of mercury, lead and chromium at levels well above “health limits”;

    2. (2)

       the claim that the New South Wales “limit” for mercury was zero and that “significant levels” of mercury had been found;

    3. (3)

       the claim that lead had been found at “up to three times the New South Wales limit”; and

    4. (4)

       the claim that chromium had been found at “twice the New South Wales limit.”

14. [141]

    The ABC submitted that what Media Watch was saying, as the primary judge appreciated, was that:

    1. (1)

       such (alarmist) claims depended for their validity on the correct interpretation of the EPA test results;

    2. (2)

       that was a complex exercise, requiring the expertise of genuine “experts” – i.e. people with not only the necessary high-level scientific credentials, but also a specialist understanding and experience of the applicable standards or requirements against which the EPA results had to be assessed; and

    3. (3)

       the alarmist and sensationalist nature of the appellant’s “central claims” was such that such specialists needed not only to be authoritative, to be leaders in their field, but to be objective and independent – so as to be able to be “relied upon”, as stated in the matter complained of at line 66.

15. [142]

    Secondly, the ABC submitted that the findings that the primary judge made as to the expertise of each person the appellant consulted were correct. As to Mr Helps, the ABC submitted that he had no scientific qualifications (as the appellant knew), presented incorrect and inconsistent assertions about the EPA results, was wrong as to the “central claims” of the appellant’s first article which emanated from him, and lacked any independence or objectivity. The ABC pointed out that the appellant herself had sought to identify an expert other than Mr Helps to interpret the EPA results.

16. [143]

    As to Mr Brown, the ABC submitted that as a chemist his qualifications were not at the level required to be an “expert” in this context as the primary judge found, [89] and, being a business partner of Mr Helps and a shareholder in his company, he shared the same commercial interest as Mr Helps. In addition, the evidence about the appellant consulting Mr Brown was “scanty”.

17. [144]

    Finally, as to Dr Lloyd-Smith, as a lawyer she had no scientific qualifications, let alone qualifications in toxicology. In addition, she was not “consulted” by the appellant about the “central claims” of her article, but, rather, was asked to provide comments for quotation in the article.

18. [145]

    The ABC submitted that the primary judge should have found the trickery imputation to be substantially true. The essence of its submission is that the primary judge took into account irrelevant matters in her assessment of the third element of the trickery imputation, namely whether the appellant engaged in trickery.

19. [146]

    Instead of focussing on the disparity between what her Honour found the appellant responsible for having published (that is, an article which represented that the tests had been performed in the playground area), and the true state of affairs (that is, the tests had not in fact been performed in that area), the primary judge considered what the ABC contended were the following irrelevant matters: the appellant not having understood the EPA report or the regulatory regime, having accepted uncritically the alarmist interpretation put on the EPA results by Mr Helps, and having understood (rightly or wrongly) that the whole area (including the playground area) was considered by local residents to be Grace Campbell Reserve.

20. [147]

    The ABC submitted first that, regardless of the appellant’s comprehension of these matters, she nonetheless deliberately participated in the publication of an article which, including the photograph and the caption, knowingly misrepresented the nature of the tests undertaken. It argued that the appellant allowed her article to be accompanied by a photograph that was likely to depict children using play equipment. This, the ABC contended, was knowingly untrue and misleading, as the appellant had previously conceded that any article that conveyed, or left open the impression, that the EPA had found harmful chemicals in the play equipment area would have been misleading by virtue of the fact it was untrue.

21. [148]

    Secondly, the ABC submitted that the primary judge’s conclusion that the ABC had not established the substantial truth of the trickery imputation could not stand with her Honour’s findings in dealing with the comment defence that the appellant was responsible for the combination of material in the first article and the facts in the matter complained of on which her Honour found the attribution of trickery to be based, [90] in two respects.

22. [149]

    These were first, that in dealing with the substantial truth of the trickery imputation, her Honour was not persuaded that the misrepresentation made by the first article concerning the site of the tests was deliberate or mischievous on the appellant’s part but, rather, appeared to have been due to a combination of inattention to important detail and exuberance for a good story. [91] Secondly, her Honour’s finding that the appellant’s understanding that the whole area was considered by local residents to be Grace Campbell Reserve combined with her lack of understanding of the proper application of the NEPM conduced her to believe that the presentation of the article with a photograph of children playing in “the park” would be fair. [92]

23. [150]

    Thirdly, the ABC submitted that the primary judge’s conclusion was inconsistent with the evidence that the appellant was writing an article about high levels of dangerous substances on land, the danger to children being of particular concern, and, with that in mind, she arranged to have children present for the photo shoot. When she arrived at the site on 4 July 2013, the appellant saw the photographer taking photographs of children in the play equipment area. The ABC pointed out that of the 26 photographs the photographer took on that day, 24 showed children in that area while the other two showed neither that area nor children. Accordingly, the ABC submitted, it was inevitable that the photograph chosen to accompany the first article about danger to children in a playground would be one of those showing children in the play equipment area. As the primary judge found, [93] the appellant must have appreciated the likelihood that the first article would probably be illustrated by such a photograph.

24. [151]

    Fourthly, the ABC submitted that there were three significant features of the evidence to which the primary judge seemed not to have given sufficient attention on the issue of the truth of the trickery imputation.

25. [152]

    The first was an email from the appellant to the EPA on 9 July 2013, two days after the first article was published. In that email, the appellant referred to the EPA’s media release issued on the day the first article was published and, apparently, statements made by the EPA in television interviews the same evening saying there were no chemicals found at the Sydney Water easement above the health investigation levels. In her email, the appellant observed from the media release that the EPA was “also saying that [it] is not the same Sydney Water easement” but commented that “the aerial map attached to the original EPA results … shows that it is … [and] unless that photo [sic, as in original] is wrong. It shows six or seven test sites on the easement stopping just short of the playground.” The ABC submitted that it was difficult to read that email in any other way than that the appellant realised in July 2013 that the playground was in Botany Council land where the play equipment was.

26. [153]

    Secondly, the ABC drew attention to another email the appellant sent, on this occasion to Mr Helps, on 10 July 2013 setting out her proposed response to the EPA’s media release. In that draft response the appellant suggested that she say:

27. [154]

    Thirdly, the ABC drew attention to the two matters in respect of which the primary judge disbelieved the appellant on central matters. The first was the appellant’s contention that she did not know that the photograph which would accompany her article was likely to be one of children in the play equipment area. [94] The second was her rejection of the appellant’s evidence that the graphic was not prepared by reference to information the appellant conveyed to the relevant sub-editors which she in turn had obtained from Mr Helps. [95] Once those two matters were taken into account, the ABC submitted that the last sentence of paragraph [92] of the primary judgment in which her Honour concluded that the appellant believed “that the presentation of the article with a photograph of children playing in ‘the park’ would be fair”, was insupportable or, a generous surmise on the primary judge’s behalf.

28. [155]

    The ABC submitted orally that the evidence properly supported the proposition that the appellant’s enthusiastic adoption of Mr Helps’ antagonism towards, and contempt for, the EPA led her to be indifferent to the likelihood which she knew to exist that the photograph would show the play equipment area where she knew tests had not been conducted.

29. [156]

    Finally, the ABC noted that the appellant conceded that any article which conveyed, or left open the impression, that the EPA had found lead, mercury or chromium in the play equipment area would have been misleading because it would have been untrue – and, all the more so, if the article conveyed that those substances had been found in that play equipment area at levels above health limits. Nevertheless, the appellant allowed her text about test results in “a playground” to be accompanied by a photograph she appreciated was likely to be that of children in the play equipment area. By doing so, the ABC contended, on her own admission she published an article which she knew would be misleading because untrue in that critical respect. That, the ABC submitted, was precisely the fact that the primary judge considered it would need to establish to prove the truth of the trickery imputation. [96] The ABC submitted that this admission amounted to incontrovertible evidence inconsistent with the primary judge’s findings which, notwithstanding that those findings contained elements of credit, were thus overcome. [97]

Appellant: notice of contention submissions

1. [157]

   Insofar as the ABC seeks to establish by its amended notice of contention that the trickery imputation was substantially true, the appellant submitted that the primary judge was correct to find that the vital and particularly damaging element of trickery was not established, and, in any event, that it was true that tests for toxic substances had been conducted in a children’s playground that included the area shown in the photograph.

2. [158]

   The appellant also submitted that the primary judge’s conclusion that the appellant believed “that the presentation of the article with a photograph of children playing in ‘the park’ would be fair”, [98] was based in part on her observations of her giving her evidence, thus attracting Fox v Percy [99] principles concerning the relevance of demeanour.

3. [159]

   The appellant argued that the ABC was incorrect to assert that her understanding of the EPA report/NEPM and her state of mind concerning whether the whole Orica site was the Grace Campbell Reserve, were irrelevant to the substantial truth of the trickery imputation. She argued that an allegation of trickery necessarily imported an intention to deceive.

4. [160]

   The appellant contended that the respondent had failed to establish the existence of deceit on her part. In her submission, the article was written distinctly from, and without knowledge of, the specific photograph and accompanying caption, which was in any event, “perfectly accurate”.

Consideration: fair comment at common law

1. [161]

   For the defence of fair comment at common law to succeed, it is necessary, among other matters, that the matter complained of constitutes “opinions stated by the writer or speaker about facts, which are at the same time presented to, or are in fact present to, the minds of the readers or listeners, as things distinct from the opinions, so that it can be seen whether the opinions are such that they can fairly be formed upon the facts.” [100] I shall refer to such facts as “facts sufficiently stated”. The essence of the appellant’s complaint about the primary judge’s finding that the fair comment defence was made out lies in her contention that the fact critical to found that defence in respect of each imputation, was not stated in her articles.

2. [162]

   The appellant accepts that the headline of the first article is false. The outer limit of the area where EPA testing had been undertaken was well to the west of the playground equipment area depicted in the photograph which accompanied the articles. Her lengthy submissions on why the primary judge’s finding at paragraph [72](d) should not be accepted ultimately turn on the bald proposition that the first article did not refer to the playground equipment area per se.

3. [163]

   That submission should be rejected. The photograph which accompanies the first article is as large as the text and is captioned “At risk: Children play in a park adjacent to Grace Campbell Reserve at Hillsdale, where toxic metals and chemicals were discovered.” The headline of the first article is “Toxic substances found in reserve”. The first paragraph stated “children use the tested area as a playground”. In my view, the ordinary reasonable reader of the first article would have understood it to be clearly conveying that the children depicted in the photograph were playing in the area where tests had identified toxic substances. Why else would they be at risk? Why else would the photograph have been used?

4. [164]

   There was a clear link between the statement in the first paragraph and the photograph, but even had that statement not been there, the ordinary reasonable reader, in my view, would have reasonably drawn the inference that the photograph depicted the area where “Toxic substance [had been] found in reserve”. Inclusion of such photographs bears out the aphorism that “a picture is worth a thousand words.”

5. [165]

   In addition, as the primary judge, in my view, correctly concluded, “[t]he caption is unambiguous. It asserts that toxic substances were discovered in a park and that the photograph shows children playing in that park.” [101]

6. [166]

   In my view, the primary judge’s finding that the appellant was relevantly responsible for the photograph and caption which accompanied the first article was unexceptional. The primary judge determined that the appellant’s conduct demonstrated that she conduced in its publication as a whole. The degree of her participation may have been somewhat less in relation to the final choice of photograph, but was sufficient to render her liable for its publication. [102] It is sufficient to repeat that she arranged for the children to attend, saw them being photographed in the play equipment area and must have appreciated having regard to the content of her article that one of such photographs would be used. Both such a photograph and the caption reflected the article.

7. [167]

   The primary judge found that the irresponsible journalist imputation was based on the facts her Honour identified in paragraphs [72] and [74]. [103]

8. [168]

   I have concluded the primary judge did not err in finding the fact in paragraph [72](d), nor in finding that the appellant was relevantly responsible for the inclusion of the photograph and the caption in the first article. As did her Honour, I have considered the question whether the stated facts were true when considering the truth defence. [104] For the reasons there set out I reject the appellant’s submission that the primary judge erred in finding the facts stated in paragraph [74] were true.

9. [169]

   The appellant’s challenge to her Honour’s finding that this defence was established also fails for the reasons set out in relation to fair comment.

10. [170]

    Accordingly, the appellant’s challenge to the primary judge’s conclusion that the ABC established the fair comment/honest opinion defences should be rejected.

Consideration: truth

1. [171]

   The defence of substantial truth proceeded on the premise that the matter complained of was a statement of fact, rather than an expression of comment or opinion. Accordingly, as did the primary judge, this aspect of my reasons proceeds on the premise that, despite the appellant not challenging her Honour’s conclusion that the words in question were an expression of comment or opinion, the defence of comment was not established.

2. [172]

   In order to establish the trickery and irresponsible journalist imputations were substantially true, the ABC had to establish that every material part of each was true, that is to say, that it was true in substance and in fact. This did not mean it had to prove the truth of every detail of the words established as defamatory, rather the defence of substantial truth is concerned with meeting the sting or stings of the defamation. [105] Accordingly, to establish its defence of justification, the ABC had to prove that both the appellant’s imputations were true. [106]

3. [173]

   In my view, the primary judge erred in finding the ABC had not established the substantial truth of the trickery imputation. In so concluding, I have taken into account both s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and Briginshaw v Briginshaw. [107] In my view, there was “clear and cogent proof” that the appellant had conducted herself in the manner the ABC contended. The primary judge’s finding to the contrary was made in the face of incontrovertible facts establishing that proposition, or, at least, was “contrary to compelling inferences”. [108]

4. [174]

   The primary judge concluded that in order to establish the substantial truth of the trickery imputation, the ABC would have to establish some element of dishonesty or an intention on the appellant’s part to mislead her readers. By analogy with the tort of deceit, such conduct could be established by establishing that she made the representation referred to in the trickery imputation “recklessly, careless whether it be true or false”. [109]

5. [175]

   It is sufficient to find that, in my view, the ABC established an intention on the appellant’s part to mislead, in the sense of trick, the readers of the first article into believing that tests had found toxic substances in the area containing playground equipment on which the children depicted in the photograph were playing, whereas the appellant knew the tests had been conducted elsewhere.

6. [176]

   In my view, the ABC is correct in its submission that the primary judge took into account irrelevant matters in determining the substantial truth of the trickery imputation and, further, failed to take into account relevant matters. Those relevant matters were her Honour’s findings concerning the appellant’s responsibility for the publication of the matter complained of, including the photograph and caption. I would emphasise, in this respect that the caption and the photograph merely reflected the content of the first article. That is precisely why the photograph was used to illustrate the first article’s content and the caption reflected the content of the articles. It is irrelevant, in my view, that the EPA had conducted tests elsewhere in the Sydney Water easement land, albeit as counsel for the appellant conceded, not within the grassed area beyond the playground depicted in the photograph.

7. [177]

   The angle of the first article was all about highlighting the risk posed by the toxic substances the first article was asserting the EPA had discovered in the “playground”, and emphasising that risk, as is often the wont of journalists, by reference to vulnerable children.

8. [178]

   The appellant knew that no tests had been conducted in the playground equipment area, or, for what it is worth, in the area beyond it. Indeed, she gave evidence that she thought it irresponsible to have the children depicted playing in the area where tests actually had been undertaken. The facts the primary judge found the comment was based on, [110] amply bore out that the first article represented the toxic substances had been discovered in the area in which the children were depicted in the photograph. That was false, and known to the appellant to be false.

9. [179]

   In my view, the primary judge’s conclusion that the misrepresentation made by the first article was due to a combination of inattention to important detail and exuberance for a good story, cannot, with respect, withstand scrutiny. It is clear that the appellant deliberately arranged for children to attend at the scene to be photographed with a view to maximising the impact of her article on the reader. She deliberately positioned them away from the area where tests had been undertaken. Her Honour’s finding, with respect, of inattention in this context, is, as the ABC submitted, inconsistent with her finding in the context of her consideration of whether the comments were based on facts fully stated, that the appellant must have appreciated the likelihood that the first article would probably be illustrated by such a photograph as, in fact, it was. The latter finding involved disbelieving the appellant on the opposite proposition.

10. [180]

    Finally, as the ABC submitted, on the appellant’s own admission, the article was misleading because it conveyed the impression that the EPA had found lead, mercury and chromium in the play equipment area at levels above health limits. All of the above, should, with respect, have satisfied the primary judge that by writing the first article and arranging for it to be published with a photograph of children in the play equipment area, and a caption which reflected the article, the appellant engaged in trickery as a journalist.

11. [181]

    Such a representation was clearly intended to trick the reader into believing the children depicted in the photograph, and those generally referred to in the article were being permitted to play in an area where toxic substances dangerous to human health had been discovered and whose presence the government was concealing.

12. [182]

    The appellant’s only challenge to the primary judge’s conclusion that the irresponsible journalist imputation was true was to contest the primary judge’s conclusions that she had to consult independent experts, rather than people such as Mr Helps, who she knew did not have scientific qualifications, and also had a commercial interest in the investigation of chemicals contaminating the ground near the Orica site and had displayed animus towards the EPA, his partner, Mr Brown, who had the same commercial interest as Mr Helps, and Dr Lloyd-Smith, a lawyer with no scientific expertise.

13. [183]

    I do not accept the appellant’s submission that by determining that she ought to have consulted independent expert(s), the primary judge impermissibly added elements to the imputation. The defence had to be understood in the context of the matter complained of from which, as the ABC submitted, it was apparent that the criticism being mounted was of a failure to consult appropriately qualified, independent experts.

14. [184]

    The starting point of considering this aspect of the appeal could well be the appellant’s admission that:

15. [185]

    The appellant does not challenge the primary judge’s detailed analysis of Professor Priestly’s report, nor her analysis of the deficiencies and “glaring inconsistencies which called for explanation” demonstrated in the communications Mr Helps was forwarding to her when seeking to deal with information the appellant was receiving from the EPA.

16. [186]

    It is apparent that the appellant appreciated, early in the piece, that Mr Helps’ and Mr Brown’s inputs may not be sufficient. She sought to get assistance from both Professor Brown and, ironically, from Professor Priestly. The former said he was not qualified to comment on the matters about which she sought to consult him. While she approached Professor Priestly in January 2013, she did not attempt to contact him for the July articles. [112]

17. [187]

    By the time the appellant came to write the articles, accordingly, she knew she was writing about an area in which she had no expertise. The primary judge’s unchallenged finding is that she “did not herself analyse or have any real understanding of the EPA report or the regulatory regime; she was content to rely on Mr Helps and Mr Brown for that purpose.” [113] Nor did she have “any appreciation of the limited significance of the EPA’s findings.” [114] In addition, the appellant looked at the NEPM, but did not understand its application, [115] nor, at least at trial, would she readily accept its application, even though, as the primary judge found, “the position had been clearly explained to her in at least two documents from the EPA.” [116]

18. [188]

    The question whether in the circumstances the appellant engaged in irresponsible journalism has to be understood also in the context of the information the articles conveyed to the community. As the primary judge described it, the “main punch of the [first] article was the contention that the EPA had been ‘accused of covering up the discovery of some of the most poisonous substances on earth at levels well above health limits’.” [117]

19. [189]

    In the first article, the appellant reported interviews with local residents to whom she had communicated, according to Media Watch, the “misleading”, “ridiculous and alarming” and fabricated information concerning the Grace Campbell Reserve and, in addition, the assertion that the EPA had not released the results but, rather, stated the “contaminants found did not pose a health risk”. Not surprisingly this elicited an outraged response from members of the community quoted in the first article. No doubt those who read the first article had a similar response.

20. [190]

    If the main punch of the first article was true, as one local resident was quoted, that was “disgraceful”. The importance of ensuring such alarming information was true should have been self-evident to the appellant.

21. [191]

    Instead, she uncritically accepted “the alarmist interpretation put on [the EPA’s findings] by Mr Helps and Mr Brown, who she knew were actively pursuing a lucrative contract to undertake further testing.” [118] In addition, there were “glaring inconsistencies” in Mr Helps’ written communications to her about the EPA report. Mr Helps’ advice was also at odds with what the EPA was contending. All these matters, as the primary judge held, ought to have made her appreciate “the need to check his contentions with an independent expert”. [119]

22. [192]

    Professor Priestly’s evidence demonstrated that the “main punch” of the first article “was factually wrong in that it misstated the proper application of the NEPM to the results obtained; furthermore, it misconceived the purpose of HILs, which are not ‘health limits’ at all but, rather, conservatively-set criteria used to assess the need for further investigation.” [120] In fact, “[t]he concentrations found by the EPA [did] not indicate a health risk to the community or to children.” [121]

23. [193]

    Had the appellant consulted such experts, it is apparent both from the experts Media Watch quoted, and from Professor Priestly’s evidence, that the articles would probably not have been written, nor the local residents advised of the “cocktail of hideous chemicals in [the] soil” which “the government … [was] hiding”.

24. [194]

    It is difficult to understand the appellant’s submission that the ABC failed to establish that Mr Helps was not an expert. The analysis of the EPA report required the input of persons with, at the very least, expertise in the area of toxicology, risk assessment and environmental health. Mr Helps was not a chemist. It may be that he had “significant experience in the field of contamination”. [122] However, the deficiencies in his analysis of the EPA report apparent prior to the first article’s publication to which I have referred demonstrated that he lacked the expert qualifications to provide a reliable opinion on it. The appellant, as I have said, ought to have appreciated that prior to writing the articles.

25. [195]

    In my view, the primary judge did not err in finding the ABC established the defences of comment and substantial truth as to the irresponsible journalist imputation.

26. [196]

    Accordingly, in my view, the ABC established its defence of substantial truth of the matter complained of.

Consideration: contextual truth

1. [197]

   The conclusion that the defamatory matter is defensible either as comment or as being substantially true obviates consideration of the defence of contextual truth. [123] However, once again, I shall consider this defence against the possibility that those conclusions are incorrect. In other words I shall consider whether, by reason of the substantial truth of the ABC’s contextual imputation A and B, recalling the primary judge treated them as one imputation, the trickery and irresponsible journalist imputations did not further harm the appellant’s reputation.

2. [198]

   As the primary judge observed, [124] in Mizikovsky, the Queensland Court of Appeal, in considering a defence of contextual truth under s 26 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) – which is on all fours with s 26 of the Defamation Act, held that the tribunal of fact should take into account all of the defamatory imputations complained of by the plaintiff, including those that have been found to be substantially true. This conclusion is contrary to Born Brands. Neither party submitted Mizikovsky should be followed in preference to this Court’s decisions. It is unnecessary, in such circumstances, to consider this issue further.

3. [199]

   The purpose of the s 26 contextual truth defence is that a plaintiff should “not be able to avoid serious stings in defamatory matter by selective pleading.” [125] A contextual imputation must be carried by the matter complained of in addition to the defamatory imputations of which the plaintiff complains (s 26(a)) and differ in substance from the plaintiff’s defamatory imputations. [126]

4. [200]

   The defence is established if the contextual imputations are substantially true (s 26(a)), and if the plaintiff’s defamatory imputations “do not further harm the reputation of the plaintiff because of the substantial truth of the contextual imputations”: (s 26(b)). The requirement to prove no further harm to the plaintiff’s reputation focuses on the facts, matters and circumstances which establish the substantial truth of the contextual imputations. [127]

5. [201]

   This requires the tribunal of fact to weigh or measure the relative worth or value of the several imputations contended for by both parties. The defence will fail if the plaintiff’s imputations would still have some effect on his or her reputation notwithstanding the effect of the substantial truth of the defendant’s contextual imputations. [128] This Court has also approved an approach pursuant to which “the tribunal of fact must consider holistically the effect of the defamatory matter on the reputation of the plaintiff, deciding at the end of the day whether, by reference to the imputations pleaded by both plaintiff and defendant, any imputations which have not been shown to be substantially true cause any further harm to the reputation of the plaintiff once the effect of the substantially accurate imputations has been assessed.” [129]

6. [202]

   The matters which establish the truth of the contextual imputations must have a powerful effect on the plaintiff’s reputation compared to the effect of the imputations upon which the plaintiff succeeds. In practice this requires the defendant to plead and prove the substantial truth of contextual imputations which are clearly more serious than the plaintiff’s imputations. [130]

7. [203]

   Thus, under this heading, the ABC had to establish that by reason of the substantial truth of its contextual imputation that:

8. [204]

   I appreciate that the primary judge found that in order to establish the truth of the trickery imputation, the ABC would have to establish some element of dishonesty or an intention on Ms O’Brien’s part to mislead her readers. [132] However, that does not mean that in dealing with the issue of contextual truth, the appellant can characterise the trickery imputation as importing dishonesty per se. Such an allegation is fundamentally different from one of trickery. Had the appellant wished to rely upon an imputation of dishonesty, she should have pleaded it. Rather, as I have earlier explained, the appellant particularised the trickery imputation as arising from the first part of the matter complained of, and ending with the reference to “this little sleight of hand”. It had to be understood in that context of the matter complained of.

9. [205]

   The contextual imputations, on the other hand, as the ABC submitted, are conveyed by the graver allegations in the latter part of the matter complained of, which explains why the “central claims” concerning “toxic metals” set out under the skull and crossbones image on the first article were wrong. While the appellant’s imputations merely refer to “trickery”, “irresponsible journalism” and “toxic substances”, the contextual imputation referred to the appellant as having published an “alarmist” article containing “false” and “incorrect” statements that “some of the most poisonous substances on earth at levels well above health limits” had been discovered by the EPA “in an area used as a children’s playground”.

10. [206]

    Referencing that discovery to the EPA would clearly have been understood by readers of the first article to lend verisimilitude to its assertions. It was a grave allegation which could only have struck great fear into the minds of readers, both generally and in relation to the health of some of the most vulnerable members of the community: small children seeking fun in a playground where they should find joy, but, by reference to the article, in particular the skull and crossbones, were at risk of death.

11. [207]

    One can test the impact of the contextual imputation just as much by assessing the impact of the appellant’s imputations by reference to the Reader’s Digest evidence. On that basis too, I would conclude that the appellant’s reputation as a journalist would be more gravely affected by the contextual imputation, than by her imputations. It was clearly more serious than the appellant’s imputations.

12. [208]

    In my view, for these, as well as the reasons the primary judge gave in upholding this defence, the ABC established that the appellant’s imputations did not further harm her reputation.

Orders

1. [209]

   I propose that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

2. [210]

   MACFARLAN JA: I agree with McColl JA that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I also agree with her Honour’s reasoning, other than in relation to the substantial truth of the “trickery imputation” (plaintiff’s imputation (a)) and the defence of contextual truth.

Substantial truth of the trickery imputation

1. [211]

   The primary judge concluded that for the ABC to establish that the appellant had engaged in “trickery” it “would have [had] to establish some element of dishonesty or an intention on Ms O’Brien’s part to mislead her readers” (Judgment [88]). Neither in its Notice of Contention nor in its written submissions did the ABC challenge this approach. Nor in its oral submissions did it explicitly do so. Whilst, in the course of the hearing, the bench raised with senior counsel for the ABC the possibility that reckless indifference might suffice, he did not embrace that proposition, at least not in a sufficiently explicit fashion for the Court to regard him as having adopted the point as part of his argument (transcript p 54).

2. [212]

   In any event, my view is that the imputation of “trickery”, which the parties accept was conveyed by the matter complained of, involved, as the primary judge held, “some element of dishonesty or an intention on Ms O’Brien’s part to mislead her readers”. Consideration of the substantial truth of the trickery imputation should accordingly be approached on that basis.

3. [213]

   The primary judge observed the appellant giving evidence over the equivalent of about three full hearing days, during which the appellant was subjected to searching cross-examination. Based on that evidence, her Honour concluded that the appellant “had been persuaded by Mr Helps that the results of the EPA testing revealed real cause for alarm among residents” and that the appellant did not “deliberately set out to misrepresent the true location of the tested areas” (Judgment [89] and [90]). Her Honour referred to the appellant’s evidence that she thought “it would be ‘irresponsible’ to ask the children to pose for photographs at the precise point where the tests were taken because those areas were ‘contaminated’” and that the appellant “considered the whole of the grassed area made up of the Sydney Water easement land and Grace Campbell Reserve to be an area where children played” (Judgment [91] and [92]). Her Honour concluded:

4. [214]

   These findings as to the appellant’s state of mind were credit-based findings. In making them, the primary judge enjoyed a considerable advantage over this Court because her Honour saw and heard the appellant give evidence over a lengthy period. As a result, the ABC has a high hurdle to surmount to successfully challenge the findings. The ABC would need to demonstrate that the findings were contrary to “incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony”, “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” (Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 at [28]-[29]). Moreover, in considering whether the ABC has established a basis for setting aside her Honour’s findings, this Court must have regard to the gravity of the contrary finding that her Honour was asked by the ABC to make, namely that the appellant had acted dishonestly or with an intention to mislead (see s 140 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-2).

5. [215]

   The first basis of the ABC’s challenge to her Honour’s findings was that she took into account irrelevant matters, first that the appellant accepted uncritically Mr Helps’ interpretation of the EPA results and secondly that the appellant understood that local residents considered the whole area (including the playground area) to be the Grace Campbell Reserve (written submissions [77]). Whilst the former matter did not focus directly on the critical consideration of whether the appellant intended to misrepresent that tests had been carried out in the play equipment area, it was in my view of some relevance in determining whether the appellant was dishonest or had an intention to mislead. If she did not intend to mislead readers about what the tests showed, a conclusion that she did not intend to mislead them about the related matter of where the tests were conducted could more easily be reached.

6. [216]

   The latter matter was also relevant, and in fact more directly so. It bore directly on the question of whether, as the primary judge found in Judgment [92], the appellant “considered the whole of the grassed area … to be an area where children played”, rendering an intent on her part to mislead significantly less likely.

7. [217]

   Secondly, the ABC submitted that the findings are inconsistent with earlier findings of her Honour (which it said were soundly based on the evidence) that the appellant was at least in part responsible for the published photograph and caption. It relied in this context on the appellant’s concession in cross-examination that the published article of 7 July 2013 would have been misleading if it gave the impression that the EPA tests found contamination in the play equipment area (transcript p 263; written submissions [79]-[88]).

8. [218]

   However, the ABC did not suggest that the appellant conceded that inclusion of the photograph and the caption would have indicated to readers that contamination had been found in the play equipment area, as distinct from in other parts of the large grassed area. Indeed, in cross-examination the appellant expressly rejected the proposition that the article, with its photo, would have conveyed “to readers, or some at least, that the area depicted in the photograph, namely [where] children … [were] on play equipment, was the area where the metals had been found” (transcript p 264). The appellant may have been careless when concerned in the preparation of the article in not appreciating that this is what the article would convey, but without evidence or a finding that she knew that to be the case, the primary judge’s lack of satisfaction that the appellant acted dishonestly or had an intent to deceive was justifiable.

9. [219]

   In oral argument, the ABC relied on emails that the appellant sent on 9 and 10 July 2013 seemingly acknowledging that the playground area did not form part of the Reserve. However, these emails were written three and four days respectively after the article which was the principal subject of complaint was published in the Sun Herald and after the EPA issued a press statement refuting the contamination claims made in the article. What the appellant said in the emails was therefore no sure guide to her state of mind at the time she wrote the article. It was well open to the primary judge to base her findings on the appellant’s oral evidence.

10. [220]

    For these reasons, I do not consider that the ABC established on appeal that the primary judge’s finding that the ABC had not proved that the appellant acted dishonestly or with an intent to mislead in respect of the trickery imputation was “glaringly improbable” or satisfied either of the other tests stated in Fox v Percy (see [214] above). I consider that it was open to the primary judge to find that the misrepresentation made by the appellant’s article of 7 July resulted from her “inattention to important detail and exuberance for a good story”, rather than dishonesty or an intent to mislead (Judgment [93]).

Contextual truth

1. [221]

   The ABC relied upon an alternative defence of contextual truth under s 26 of the Defamation Act. As the primary judge indicated, the issue that arose for determination in relation to this defence was whether the appellant’s imputation (a) (the trickery imputation) did not further harm the appellant’s reputation because of the substantial truth of contextual imputations A and B (Judgment [163]). As her Honour found contextual imputations A and B were in substance the same (Judgment [153]), it is sufficient to set out contextual imputation A, which was as follows:

2. [222]

   The primary judge expressed the following views in relation to the s 26 defence:

3. [223]

   It is clear that contextual imputation A was very serious indeed, that it would have harmed the appellant’s reputation substantially and that it arose out of the central claims in the appellant’s article. However the imputation did not include that the appellant had acted dishonestly or with an intent to mislead, whereas the plaintiff’s imputation (a) (the trickery imputation) did.

4. [224]

   In my view this distinction between the imputations is significant. It leads me to differ from the primary judge’s conclusion concerning the s 26 defence. Whilst the appellant’s reputation would have been substantially damaged by contextual imputation A, her honesty would not have been impugned by it. As the plaintiff’s imputation (a) did impugn her honesty, I consider that that imputation further harmed her reputation beyond that caused by the substantially true contextual imputation.

5. [225]

   The distinction to which I have referred is one between different “sectors” of the appellant’s reputation, a distinction well-recognised in other aspects of defamation law (see Australian Broadcasting Corporation v McBride (2001) 53 NSWLR 43; [2001] NSWCA 322 at [16]-[23]; Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Mahommed [2010] NSWCA 335; (2010) 278 ALR 232 at [162]-[186]; Holt v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 90 at [29]). Whilst the level of generality at which sectors of reputation should be identified will in some cases be in doubt (see Mahommed at [182]), it is sufficient to say in the present case that the appellant’s honesty and competence constitute different sectors of her reputation. Even a severe blow to the latter will not necessarily, and in my view in this case did not, affect the former. The trickery imputation did however affect the former.

6. [226]

   For these reasons, if the defence of fair comment had failed, unlike the primary judge, I would not have upheld the defence of contextual truth based on s 26 of the Act.

7. [227]

   LEEMING JA: I agree with Macfarlan JA.