State of NSW v Mathers

Mr John Mathers (a pseudonym for the defendant) was born in October 1972, and accordingly is 46 years of age. He has spent most but not all of his life living in the Newcastle area. As a teenager, his unfulfilled ambition was to join the RAAF. Instead, he studied jewellery-making at TAFE, and until recently rented premises in the Newcastle suburb of Charlestown in which he conducted a small business in that regard, and also resided.

In the early part of 2017, he commenced a dispute with the real estate agent for the lessor of those premises. In a nutshell, his complaint was that mould was growing inside the rented premises, and it was affecting his health. He put forward an odd explanation as to how the mould may have got there. He hung plastic sheets around the property, in an effort to protect himself from possible infection. His emails and texts to the real estate became more and more vitriolic.

Eventually, in May 2017 police were asked to check on the welfare of the defendant. They entered the premises and spoke to him. The living quarters of the defendant have been described by police as more like those of a teenager, rather than a middle-aged man. In the premises they found quite a few prohibited weapons, including two torch batons, a number of knives (some of them ceremonial in appearance, but no less sharp for that), and a Chinese made air gun that could readily be mistaken for a handgun capable of firing a deadly projectile.

They also found that the defendant had downloaded from the internet a very large volume of written material, and printed off some of it. Much of it was to do with the so-called Sovereign Citizen Movement (the Movement).

To interpolate a concise description of the Movement based upon the expert and other evidence placed before me, it originated in the United States of America, and is based on a conception of law that rejects the current United States polity as an imposed fraud that has unlawfully and immorally superseded the original ideas underpinning the American Revolution of 1776 and the US Constitution of 1787.

Its practical thesis is that individuals are entitled to resist the enforcement of laws made pursuant to that alleged fraud. For example, the Movement began as a rejection of the proposition that a citizen of that country is required to pay federal income tax.

The Movement has its idiosyncratic features quite apart from its fundamental thesis, an example of which is the adoption of a particular form of punctuation, which is preferred by adherents of the Movement to standard English usage.

In accordance with its underlying thesis, there has been on occasion violent resistance in the United States by its members to the enforcement of federal and state law, including by way of the murder of police officers and the attempted murder of judges.

The Movement has been connected to other aspects of political thought within that country, including survivalism (which involves preparedness for a post-apocalyptic world in which organised society has been destroyed), and armed militias (whereby US citizens take it upon themselves to form armed groups, often with an eye to defending not only the constitutional right to bear arms, but also a libertarian conception of the way in which the founding events and documents of that nation are said to mandate the current organisation of its society).

Some of the ideas of the Movement have been transposed to other countries, including Australia, despite its focus on particular aspects of the history of the United States.

Returning now to the search conducted by the police, other downloaded items discovered in the premises of the defendant at that stage included a lengthy article about how to make booby traps. It was placed in evidence before me, and appears to be very out of date; in my opinion, it could date from the Korean War or even earlier.

There was also located a lengthy document about how to manufacture plastic explosives.

In similar vein was a document entitled the “Guerilla’s Arsenal”.

Another document, seemingly prepared by an Australian, and to do with Australian politics, described itself as a “brief of evidence” accusing a former Australian Prime Minister of being “attainted with treason”, and is redolent of the thinking of the Movement.

So is another document authored by a person who describes himself as “Johnny Liberty”.

Other, even more radical, documents were also located. Some of them speak of Queen Elizabeth II as having been convicted by a European court of child abuse. Others speak of satanic conspiracies, and refer to the demon “Moloch”. Yet another shows a distressing image of what appeared to be mutilated human bodies being fed to children at a formal dinner (I presume that it had been “photo shopped”).

The police also located scribbled documents in the handwriting of the defendant. Some of them are illegible, some unintelligible. But some of them appear to constitute efforts to understand the statutory and common law of this country. It is possible that some of the writings relate to the dispute about the mould, because they seem to make reference to offence-creating provisions to do with the infliction of a grievous bodily disease.

After the search of May 2017, police made enquiries about the online and other activity of the defendant. They discovered that, in November 2016, the defendant had purchased a commercial pressure cooker on a website that facilitates private buying and selling (the asserted relevance of that will become apparent shortly).

In January 2017, the defendant had downloaded from the internet blueprints whereby a private individual is said to be able to manufacture plastic firearms by use of a 3-D printer. One of them was for an airgun that, according to the blueprints, looked very much like a real weapon. But others were plans for weapons that are indeed real: a plastic sub-machine gun, a carbine rifle well-known to be used by the United States Army, and a plastic semi-automatic pistol (I interpolate again that it is well known that the highly regarded Glock semi-automatic pistol is largely made of plastic).

On 6 February 2017, the computer of the defendant was used to access a YouTube video entitled “See the Difference Between Pipe Bombs and Pressure Cooker Bombs”.

Separately, on 3 March 2017 two letters were discovered at the parliamentary office of an opposition member of the New South Wales Parliament (the MP). On the outside of each envelope, the following typewritten words appear verbatim:

Inside were located typewritten documents that provide a purported analysis of the Australian Constitution. That analysis is consistent with the approach of the Movement to such matters.

The MP was understandably very distressed by the discovery, and the police were of course contacted. In due course, they located a DNA profile on adhesive tape attached to one of the envelopes that was consistent with the profile of the defendant.

As a result, he was charged with the following offences: sending a document threatening death or grievous bodily harm; two counts of possessing or using a prohibited weapon without a permit; and possessing an unregistered firearm, in the form of a pistol.

The defendant was granted bail. However, in August 2017, he failed to appear in answer to that bail, and was subsequently arrested and bail refused.

In due course, the defendant pleaded guilty to all offences. On 21 February 2018, he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the Local Court. The aggregate sentence imposed comprised a head sentence of 1 year 4 months, with a non-parole period of 12 months, each to date from 19 September 2017, the former to expire on 18 January 2019, and the latter to expire on 18 September 2018.

Meanwhile, in October 2017, the digital material containing the blueprints for the firearms had been seized by police. It took quite some time for that material to be analysed, but after it was, the defendant was charged in November 2018 with offences arising from those downloads. He has always been bail refused on those charges.

In the meantime, it had been proposed that he be released at the end of his non-parole period on 18 September 2018. Once the nature of those downloads came to light, however, the State Parole Authority intervened and took steps to ensure that the defendant would not be released to parole.

His custodial position as at the date of the hearing before me, 11 December 2018, was therefore that his current sentence will expire in its entirety on 18 January 2019. He is also bail refused on the most recent charges, but of course could lodge a bail application (either to the court of charge, or to this Court) at any time.

It is in that context that the State of New South Wales (the plaintiff) has sought preliminary orders against the defendant pursuant to the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) (the Act).

The primary position of the plaintiff is that I would impose an interim detention order (IDO) of 28 days from the date of its making, along with an ancillary order mandating the preparation of psychiatric and psychological reports about the defendant. The secondary position of the plaintiff is that I would impose an interim supervision order (ISO), of the same length, along with the same ancillary order.

The position of the defendant is as follows. He resists the proposition that the statutory preconditions for the making of an order pursuant to the Act have been established. If I reject that primary proposition, his secondary position is that the evaluative tests for the making of an ISO have been established. His position however is that an IDO should not be made, on the basis that, on all of the evidence placed before me, an ISO would be sufficient.

Above and beyond the matters of background that I have summarised above, the plaintiff relied upon a risk assessment report prepared by a specialist psychologist employed by a section of the New South Wales Department of Corrective Services directed towards countering extremism. In a nutshell, the report assessed the risk of the defendant reoffending generally as low, but the risk of him reoffending by way of an act of political violence as high. It spoke of the need for treatment of the “identified mental health concerns” pertaining to the defendant. And it also spoke of the defendant having attempted dishonestly to manipulate the psychometric testing that the psychologist had administered.

The defendant placed before me an affidavit of his solicitor and of his father. In a nutshell, the former suggests alternative interpretations of items obtained or downloaded by the defendant. The latter explains that the defendant enjoys the love and support of his parents, who would offer him accommodation if he were released from custody. It also speaks of the defendant having been quite open with his father about the purchase of the pressure cooker.

I turn first to analyse the threshold question of whether the statutory preconditions for the making of any order pursuant to the Act have been established.

Because the primary position of the plaintiff is that I should make an IDO, and its ultimate position is that this Court would impose a Continuing Detention Order (CDO), I shall consider the applicable preconditions in that regard. The first of them are to be found in s 34 of the Act. It is relevantly as follows:

There was no dispute between the parties that the defendant is a detained offender, as defined in s 33 of the Act, for the purposes of s 34(1)(a) because, as at the date of the filing of the summons and indeed the hearing, he continued to serve the sentence of imprisonment, by way of its parole period, to which I have referred above.

Nor was it disputed that the application had been made pursuant to Part 3 of the Act, in accordance with s 34(1)(b) thereof.

Senior counsel for the plaintiff also relied upon s 34(1)(c)(iii), and submitted that the defendant is a “convicted NSW terrorism activity offender”. That leads one to the definition of that concept to be found in s 10 of the Act, which is relevantly as follows:

Again, there was no dispute before me that the defendant, at the time of the hearing, was serving a sentence of imprisonment for an indictable offence against the laws of New South Wales, for the purposes of s 10(1) of the Act.

Senior counsel for the plaintiff explained that he did not rely upon s 10(1)(a), because the defendant has never been subject to a control order. Nor did he submit that the defendant has at any time been a member of a terrorist organisation, and accordingly he did not rely on s 10(1)(b). Finally, nor did he rely upon any of the matters to be found in s 10(1)(c)(ii) of the Act.

Senior counsel submitted that the defendant had previously made a statement advocating support for any terrorist act or violent extremism, in accordance with s 10(1)(c)(i) of the Act. He relied for that proposition upon the sending of the envelopes with their contents to the MP that I have described above.

He explained that, in the circumstances of this case, he further relied upon s 10(1A)(a)(iii) of the Act. He submitted that the particular variant within that sub-paragraph upon which he relied was the proposition that the defendant, by way of sending those letters, had made a threat of violence of a kind that is promoted by an ideology (that is, the Movement) that supports violent extremism.

Delving more deeply into s 10(1)(c)(i) in order to analyse whether the proposition of the plaintiff can be sustained, the phrase “terrorist act” is defined in s 4 of the Act to have the same meaning as it does in Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code (the Code). The definition in s 100.1 of the Code in its entirety is as follows:

Turning to the first part of the statutory structure upon which senior counsel for the plaintiff relies – that is, the proposition that the defendant had previously made a statement advocating support for a terrorist act – I do not accept that submission, for the following reasons.

I do accept that, by sending the two letters to the MP, the defendant was advocating support for an act that causes serious physical harm to a person, in the form of a person being hanged (s 100.1(2)(a) of the Code).

And I also accept that the words written on the exterior of the envelopes advocated support for the infliction of such harm to be accompanied by an intention to advance an ideological cause; namely, that of the Movement (s 100.1(1)(b) of the Code). I say that because the phraseology adopted by the defendant is redolent of the themes and terminology of the Movement.

But I do not accept that any of the preconditions to be found in s 100.1(1)(c) of the Code have been established. That is because I am not satisfied on the evidence that that the sending of the threatening and frightening letters to a member of the opposition party in the New South Wales Parliament was of itself a statement advocating support for an action (that is, death by hanging) accompanied by an intention to coerce or influenced by intimidation any government, whether state, federal, or foreign.

To expand on that analysis a little, although the victim of that matter was a MP, I do not believe it can be said that a person who intends to frighten or disturb or distress an opposition member of Parliament is intentionally coercing or influencing by intimidation a government. Although that concept is not defined in the definitions section of “Part 5.3 – Terrorism” of the Code, and although I accept that “government” is a protean concept, I do not accept that sending such a letter to an opposition member of the New South Wales Parliament is ipso facto within the sub-paragraph.

In other words, I do not accept the oral submission of senior counsel for the plaintiff that the Parliament of a polity is to be equated with the government of the same polity. In referring to the latter, the legislation in question is surely referring generally to the Executive branch, not to the legislature or its members.

Separately, there is no other convincing evidence of the necessary intention on the part of the defendant, apart from the envelopes and their contents. And whilst I have not overlooked the fact that the documents were addressed to “The Minister”, nor the fact that a Minister is a member of the executive government, I do not believe that one can infer that the defendant appreciated that reasonably subtle difference, and thereby evinced an intention to coerce or influence a government in mistakenly addressing the opposition MP as a Minister.

Nor do I believe that the preconditions contained in s 100.1(1)(c)(ii) of the Code, which speak of an intention to intimidate the public or a section of the public, have been established. That is because I believe that that sub-paragraph is directed towards intimidation either of the Australian public as a whole, or a segment thereof that is made up by a number of people who share a characteristic (by way of completely hypothetical examples, such as persons who attend football games, or persons who work in factories, each of whom could be intimidated by a threat to detonate IEDs at a number of such locations). But I do not believe that the concept of “a section of the public” can be stretched so far as to apply to a single individual, even when that person is a member of Parliament.

In short, I do not believe that the plaintiff has established for the purposes of s 10(1)(c)(i) of the Act that the defendant has previously made a statement advocating support for any terrorist act.

I turn now to consider whether there is evidence that he has done so with regard to any violent extremism.

As I have said, the other basis upon which senior counsel for the plaintiff submitted that a necessary precondition for the making of an order had been established was as follows. In accordance with s 10(1)(c)(i), he submitted that the defendant, by sending the envelopes, had previously made a statement advocating support for violent extremism. And he relied upon s 10(1A)(a)(iii) for the proposition that the defendant had made a threat of violence of a kind that is promoted by the Movement, and the Movement supports violent extremism.

It is noteworthy that the phrase “violent extremism” is not defined in the Act.

Turning to my determination of the initial aspect of this question, on the evidence placed before me, I think that there is a real question as to whether or not the threat of violence made by the defendant by way of what was typed on the exterior of the envelopes is promoted by the Movement. I also think that, on the evidence, there is a real question whether it has been established that the Movement supports violent extremism. I think that both of those propositions are questionable because, although there have undoubtedly been violent interactions between adherents of the Movement in the United States, and, elsewhere and government functionaries (such as police officers) seeking to enforce the laws of those governments, the legitimacy of which is not accepted by the adherents of the Movement, it is not clear to me that the Movement actively promotes violence, or explicitly supports violent extremism. And although one of the documents downloaded by the defendant was authored by a person who is to be understood as part of the Movement, and that document speaks of (at the least) threats of violence against police officers, I am not satisfied that that approach can be ascribed to the Movement as a whole, or as a general proposition.

In short, I am not satisfied that the sending of the envelopes falls within s 10(1A)(a)(iii) of the Act.

That is not the end of the matter, however, because the contents of that sub-paragraph are merely included within the concept of advocating support for violent extremism; they are not definitive or exclusive of it.

Returning now to s 10(1)(c)(i) of the Act more generally, can it be said that by sending the envelopes with their contents, including what was typewritten on their exterior, the defendant made a statement advocating support for violent extremism? I consider that that more general question must be answered in the affirmative, for the following reasons.

In summary, they were sent to a serving MP; they spoke of that person in derogatory terms; they spoke of her having committed or committing treason; they spoke of her being hanged seemingly as a form of capital punishment for that offence; and they spoke of her being denied mercy or a sentence of imprisonment.

In my opinion, the proposition that an MP has been somehow judged to be guilty of treason in her absence must be assessed as an extremist one; the “sentence” purportedly passed of death by hanging is unquestionably violent; and by baldly and insultingly conveying the “facts” of the conviction and sentence to the MP, I consider that the defendant has made a statement advocating support for those communicated propositions.

In short, having had a chance to reflect on the statutory structure, I believe that the plaintiff has established at least one of the prerequisites for making an order to be found in s 10 of the Act. It follows that I do not accept the primary proposition of senior counsel for the defendant in resistance to the making of any order.

That means that the application turns on the central evaluative fulcrum to be found in s 34(1)(d), s 38(5), (6), and (7), and s 41 of the Act. The former is extracted above, and the latter two are as follows:

As has been said many times about the (similar but not identical) Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the HRO Act), that test is founded on the potentiality of the evidence as it may appear subsequently to another judge of this Court, and is not inherently overly rigorous.

Before discussing my evaluation of that test, however, I record that the definition of the phrase “serious terrorism offence” (which, as has been seen, is a central part of s 34(1)(d) of the Act) is to be found in s 4 of the Act as follows:

It would not be practical for me to extract in this judgement all of the offences in that Part of the Code that fall within that definition. Suffice to say I understood the submission of the plaintiff to be that the asserted unacceptable risk is that the defendant could commit a serious terrorism offence to do with a “terrorist act” as defined, and to be found in Division 101 of that Part of the Code, as opposed to an offence to do with “terrorist organisations” to be found in Division 102 of the Part, or an offence of “financing terrorism” to be found in Division 103 of the Part. That focus leads one back to the definition of a “terrorist act”, including a threat thereof, to be found in s 100.1 of the Code, and which I have already discussed in some detail.

The following concise analysis is undertaken in the context of senior counsel for the defendant, as I have said, having advisedly conceded that, if I were satisfied of the statutory preconditions that I have discussed at some length above, it would not be inappropriate for me to make an order (though, as I have also said, his position was that it should be an ISO, not an IDO).

A number of aspects of the evidence placed before me, bearing in mind the contingent nature of the test that I am being asked to apply, satisfy me that it has been established.

First, there is ample evidence that the defendant is at the least influenced by the ideas underpinning the Movement. Those ideas are unusual, idiosyncratic and inherently antisocial, in the sense of rejecting the fundamental propositions underpinning the current organisation of Australian society.

Secondly, quite apart from his plea of guilty and subsequent conviction and sentencing, there is ample evidence that the defendant sent a frightening and bizarre threat of violent death to a member of Parliament.

Thirdly, there is strong evidence that he is not merely interested in alternative conceptions of society as a theoretical or philosophical exercise. To the contrary, he has also accessed and downloaded material about inflicting death or serious injury in a military or quasi-military setting.

Fourthly, it is true that a possible alternative rational hypothesis for the downloading of the blueprints for making plastic firearms is the creation of metal jewellery that features miniature models or casts of such items. But the downloads cannot be seen in isolation: they were undertaken by a man who is influenced by very unorthodox ideas, who has downloaded other material about fatal violence in military settings, and who has been sufficiently motivated to make a bizarre threat of death to a person in Australian public life. And it is not to be forgotten that the downloads for blueprints for manufacturing firearms by way of a 3-D printer were undertaken by a man who had access to precisely that device.

Fifthly, it is also true that a pressure cooker has many innocent domestic or business applications. And I accept that it is possible that such an item has an entirely legitimate use within a jewellery-making business. But seen in the context of all the other evidence – most importantly, the access to the Youtube video, the title itself of which speaks of IEDs able to be manufactured from such items – the possession of the pressure cooker is surely significantly probative, and of serious concern.

Sixthly, I respectfully believe that the defendant may be suffering from some impaired psychiatric or psychological state. I say that because of (amongst other things) his reaction to the alleged “mould problem” in the premises that he was renting, the scribbled notes that were located, and the reference to the psychologist of the need for psychological intervention. Of course, the mere fact that a person may be, or may have been, suffering from a mental illness or psychological condition by no means establishes that he or she presents an unacceptable risk of an act of political violence. Nevertheless, in the context of all of the various acts and activities of the defendant, it plays its part in my satisfaction of the establishment of the contingent test.

Seventhly and finally, it is true that, as my analysis above indicates, I am not satisfied that, by sending the letters to the opposition MP, the defendant actually committed a terrorist act in the past as defined in the Code. But here I am considering whether a subsequent judge of this Court could determine that, if not the subject of an order pursuant to the Act, there would be an unacceptable risk of the defendant possibly committing a terrorist act in the future, or threatening to do so. In my opinion, such a judge might well infer from all that the defendant has done so far that there is an unacceptable risk that he could very well proceed to do such a thing in the future.

In short, I am satisfied that an order of some kind pursuant to the Act should be made.

Having come to the view that the contingent fulcrum test has been established, I turn now to the question of whether such an order should deprive the defendant of his liberty entirely for a time (pursuant to an IDO) or merely temporarily restrict it (pursuant to an ISO).

Senior counsel for the plaintiff submitted that an IDO should be imposed until this litigation is determined. Underpinning that was the simple proposition that an ISO would be insufficient to protect the community, if the defendant were released on bail, or if the pending criminal proceedings were resolved in his favour, either by way of an acquittal or a non-custodial sentence.

He emphasised that deadly weapons, at least in the form of knives, were located in the premises of the defendant; that the defendant saw fit to fail to answer his bail; that he was untruthful and manipulative when assessed by the psychologist; that his risk of committing an act of political violence has been assessed as being in the high range; and that, despite their good intentions, his parents are elderly and can hardly guarantee the safety of the community. And of course he relied upon the combined force of the all of the other acts of the defendant that I have outlined above.

As a general proposition, however, senior counsel for the plaintiff accepted in his oral submissions that, whatever may be the complexities of the Act, I would not impose an IDO if I were satisfied that an ISO would be sufficient.

I am so satisfied, for the following reasons.

First, the defendant has never been convicted of an offence of physical violence in his life. That does not guarantee an absence of political violence or the threat thereof in the future, but it surely argues against it.

Secondly, it would be remarkable if the pending criminal proceedings were resolved in the next 28 days. I believe that I can proceed on the inference that, were any order of mine of that duration to take effect, it would only be in the context of the defendant having been granted bail with regard to those pending proceedings.

Thirdly, I proceed on the confident assumption that, if the defendant were to be granted bail on the pending changes, it would only be on the strictest terms. That would itself have a protective effect.

Fourthly, the evidence placed before me establishes that his parents have come to appreciate the position their son is in, and have undertaken not only to have him live with them, but also to monitor him carefully.

Fifthly, I think there is force in the submission of senior counsel for the defendant that, even assuming (for the sake of argument only) that the downloads and the obtaining of the pressure cooker were because of an interest in political violence, there is no evidence that the defendant actually commenced to try to manufacture a firearm or an IED or other item capable of killing or maiming in the many months when he was “off the radar” of the authorities.

Sixthly, the overarching impression I have of this matter, based upon all of the evidence placed before me, is of an isolated and mentally unwell man who has been adversely influenced, and inflamed, by an unorthodox theory of society to which he has been exposed on the Internet. The picture revealed is not one of an organised, determined, well-resourced individual who is part of a much larger team or organisation, and who is well on the way to inflicting harm on Australian society for political reasons.

It is true that his actions have seemingly gone beyond mere reading and reflecting. But I believe that the combination of inevitably extremely strict bail conditions, an extremely strict ISO, and undoubted police interest in the defendant generally, would sufficiently protect the community during the proposed interim period.

Seventhly, and finally, it was noteworthy during the hearing before me that the defendant did not espouse the ideas of the Movement by way of, for example, shouting over the audio visual link that I had no jurisdiction whatsoever to make any orders affecting his liberty, or that the Supreme Court of New South Wales is an unlawful, tyrannical institution. To the contrary, his behaviour at all times was respectful and courteous. More generally, I think it quite possible that the experiences of being charged, refused bail after not being before court, sentenced to imprisonment, bail refused on further charges, and now being the subject of these civil proceedings, has led the defendant to appreciate the seriousness of the consequences of his actions, and to reflect upon the response of the legal system to those who might disobey it, or reject its authority.

In short, in all the circumstances of this case, although I am satisfied that an order should be made pursuant to the Act as against the possibility that the defendant is granted bail on his pending charges, I am not satisfied that an IDO is required. On the evidence placed before me, I believe that an ISO would be sufficient.

At the conclusion of the hearing, junior counsel for the defendant invited my attention to a number of the conditions of any ISO proposed by the plaintiff, and submitted that some of them should not be made. I shall discuss each of them briefly in turn, but in my opinion all of them are useful, and all should be made, not least because an important part of my rejection of the necessity for an IDO is my acceptance of the proposition that nothing less than an extremely rigorous ISO should be imposed.

Proposed condition 10, which would impose a flexible curfew between 9 PM and 6 AM, was said to be nothing to do with any risk that the defendant may present. I respectfully disagree: in my opinion it is important that, unless permitted otherwise by the authorities, the defendant be leading a very quiet and curtailed life at home with his parents during the evening. I say that not only because I think there should be reasonable restrictions on the socialising undertaken by the defendant, bearing in mind that there are undoubtedly members of the Movement in Australia, and they might well be tempted to try to make contact with this man, and to influence him in person more than he has been influenced already by the Internet. I also say that because, as I have said, I suspect that this man may be mentally unwell, and I believe that (for example) late night imbibing in a hotel or a nightclub could exacerbate his condition.

Proposed condition 12 was also disputed, whereby visitors to his home can be limited by the authorities. But for the reasons that I have given above, I believe that it is important that the authorities be in a position to limit the social contacts of the defendant, if necessary very strictly.

Proposed condition 15, which restricts the places to which the defendant may go, was also said to be of no utility and therefore inappropriate. But in my respectful opinion it is an important part of restricting the access to the Internet of this man that he not be permitted to be out and about at unapproved locations away from home where such access may be available.

The same may be said about proposed condition 18, which limits paid work, volunteer work, and education: many places at which such activities take place will be connected to the Internet, and in my opinion it is imperative that such access is not just limited but rigorously so.

Finally, proposed conditions 25 to 29 were also disputed, on the basis that abuse of alcohol, prohibited drugs or unprescribed medication is nothing to do with the concerns in this case. As I have said more than once, however, I think that there is a real possibility that the defendant is psychiatrically or psychologically unwell, and it is well known that abuse of such substances can exacerbate such a condition; at the least, they can be disinhibiting, even of a person who is perfectly well.

As I have said, an important part of my rejection of the need for an IDO is the proposition that the defendant will be subject to a very rigorous ISO (as well as strict bail). And quite apart from that general proposition, I am satisfied that each of the disputed proposed conditions is appropriate, and useful.

Finally, I record that, near the commencement of the hearing before me on 11 December 2018, I prohibited the promulgation of the real name of the defendant, pursuant to ss 7 and 8 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW). That was because I accepted the submission of his counsel that, due to the unusual nature of the application of the plaintiff; of the facts underpinning it; and of the latest charges, a potential trial by jury on those charges could be prejudiced by members of the jury panel being aware of all of the matters canvassed at the hearing before me. For the same reason, I have adopted a pseudonym in this judgment, and taken care not to refer to the real names of the parents of the defendant.

On the other hand, I rejected a submission that I should similarly suppress the nature of the latest allegations; that seemed to me to be an unnecessary further step, and not to sit comfortably with the primary objective of open justice of which Parliament has spoken in s 6 of the same Act.

Separately, at the same hearing, I also made orders restricting the promulgation of some of the evidence of the plaintiff by the defence team and indeed the defendant, with which they had been supplied in preparation for the hearing. I also restricted more broadly access to third parties to the exhibits that had been placed before me. In each case, the basis of the order was to prevent the details of instruction manuals about how to destroy and maim and kill being disseminated into the community by way of these proceedings, with the intention of stopping malign people having access to such information.

Finally the parties were agreed that I should make order 7 in the summons of the plaintiff. Whilst not prohibiting access by third parties to the court file, it provides for an extra forensic step that needs to be fulfilled before that can occur. I understood the point to be that that will assist with the rehabilitation of the defendant, and that it is an order commonly made in applications such as these. I am content to adopt the joint position of the parties in that regard.

I make the following orders: