Collins v Stowers

Samantha Stowers and Mr Ferreira (a pseudonym), the respondents to the appeal (together, the respondents), apply, by notice of motion filed on 28 August 2025, for an order for security for costs against Sabrina Collins, the appellant, who is bankrupt.

Ms Collins resists such an order. She argues that she is vulnerable (including by reason of various mental illnesses), poor and that the making of such an order would stultify the proceedings which she maintains have been brought in the public interest.

The evidence before me on the notice of motion comprises, in support of the application:

Ms Collins’ evidence in opposition to the notice of motion comprises:

There is a lengthy history of litigation between Ms Collins and Ms Stowers. For present purposes, it can be summarised briefly.

In 2022 and 2023, Ms Collins applied for a Domestic Violence Order and a Peace and Good Behaviour Order (PGBO) against Ms Stowers in Queensland. Her applications were refused. On the basis of the same facts, Ms Collins, on 17 October 2023, also sought an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) in the Local Court of New South Wales at Lismore under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). Before her application was determined, Ms Collins filed a further application for a PGBO in the Queensland Magistrates Court in Southport, which was dismissed on 7 March 2024.

On 29 February 2024, Dunlevy LCM dismissed Ms Collins’ application for an ADVO on the basis that it was frivolous and vexatious and because there was no link to New South Wales as both of the parties lived in Queensland.

Mr Boss, who appeared for Ms Stowers on that date, sought an order for costs pursuant to s 99 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act (which relevantly provides that a court may make an order as to professional costs at the end of the apprehended violence order proceedings: s 99(5)). Section 99(8) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act provides:

Section 99A(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act provides:

Dunlevy LCM found that Ms Collins’ application was frivolous or vexatious and ordered Ms Collins to pay Ms Stowers’ costs of the application. His Honour ordered, pursuant to s 98(4) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), that the costs be paid in the gross sum of $15,050 (which was calculated at the rate of $350 for a total of 43 hours).

In March 2024, Ms Collins appealed to the District Court against the dismissal of her application by Dunlevy LCM (the District Court appeal).

An appeal lies to the District Court against the dismissal of an application for an apprehended violence order (AVO): s 84(2)(a1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act. Under s 84(3), such appeal is to be made under Pt 3 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) (CAR Act) in the same way as an application against a conviction arising from a court attendance notice dealt with under Pt 2 of Ch 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). The appeal is by way of rehearing on the basis of evidence given in the Local Court: CAR Act, s 18(1): see the discussion of the relevant procedure and applicable law in Smith v Blanch [2025] NSWCA 188 (Kirk, Stern and McHugh JJA) at [35].

In the same proceedings, Ms Stowers applied for a non-publication order pursuant to the Courts Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) (the NPO Act), on the basis of publications which Ms Collins made on social media concerning her. The order was made, on an interim basis, on 11 June 2024 and expressed to expire on 13 September 2024. As no further order was made on that date, it expired.

Ms Collins made several unsuccessful interlocutory applications in the District Court appeal which led to the matter being listed twice in July 2024 and once in November 2024. The District Court appeal was listed for hearing on 13 September 2024 but was not reached.

On 20 November 2024, Ms Collins’ District Court appeal was listed with priority. Ms Collins applied for an adjournment of the hearing which was refused. The matter proceeded before Priestley SC DCJ (the primary judge). In the course of the hearing of the appeal, the primary judge indicated that a report had been received that Ms Collins was “livestreaming from within the courtroom”. His Honour adjourned the Court. Later that day, the hearing of the District Court appeal resumed and concluded. The primary judge dismissed Ms Collins’ appeal.

Following the dismissal of the substantive appeal on 20 November 2024, the primary judge proceeded to hear Ms Collins’ appeal against Dunlevy LCM’s costs order. His Honour dismissed the appeal against the costs order and gave ex tempore reasons.

The respondents filed a notice of motion seeking a non-publication order against Ms Collins. Ms Collins was required to attend the District Court at Lismore on 19 December 2024 but failed to do so, stating that she would remain in Queensland and would not voluntarily return to New South Wales.

On 16 January 2025, Ms Collins was served with a bankruptcy notice for the costs ordered in the Local Court at Tweed Heads, together with interest and costs in a total amount of $16,743.56. The notice required her to pay the amount in full within 21 days.

On 19 February 2025, Ms Collins again failed to appear at the District Court at Lismore. The respondents’ application for a non-publication order was stood over to 28 February 2025.

Ms Collins failed to appear on 28 February 2025, although she was on notice of the proceedings and the application which would be made. The respondents’ application was heard on that day.

On 28 February 2025, the primary judge heard and determined the respondents’ application. His Honour:

On 13 March 2025, Ms Collins commenced proceedings in this Court by filing a summons dated 19 February 2025 in this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, to which was attached a notice of appeal. Under the heading, “Details of appeal”, she said:

Ms Collins also filed a document entitled “Summons seeking leave to appeal” dated 20 February 2025 in which she sought leave to appeal against the whole of the decision of the Court below, being the decision of the primary judge made on 20 November 2024.

While the filed originating processes referred to above would appear to confine Ms Collins’ challenge to orders made by the primary judge, her affidavit evidence also refers to challenges to the magistrate’s orders.

Ms Collins submitted that she was vulnerable and impecunious and ought not be ordered to provide security for costs. She argued that her appeal had considerable merit and submitted that no costs order ought to have been made against her as her litigation was public interest litigation and she had no means to pay any costs order.

Further, she submitted, relying on Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738; [2002] NSWCA 213, that no costs order ought to have been made as there has been no assessment of her costs. Ms Collins also submitted that the jurisdiction under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act was not intended to be “weaponised” against a person in need of protection into a financial instrument which would result in the bankruptcy of that person. She alleged that the respondents were “biased”, “conflicted” and had made false statements and that she had been the victim of denial of natural justice.

Mr Liedermann, who appeared for the respondents, submitted, in part, that the only avenue open to Ms Collins to challenge the decision of the primary judge was on the basis of jurisdictional error and that no such challenge had been made: s 176 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) and Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1 (Kirk) at [100]. He submitted on this basis that the appeal had no proper foundation, was an abuse of process and that his clients ought not be exposed to a liability for further unrecoverable costs.

Special circumstances are required before security for costs may be ordered for the costs of an appeal: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 51.50.

In Tyneside Property Management Pty Ltd v Hammersmith Management Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 417 (Tyneside), Basten JA (Meagher and Emmett JJA agreeing) addressed the differences between ordering security for costs at first instance and ordering it on appeal. His Honour said:

I am satisfied that the following circumstances, taken in combination, warrant the making of an order for security for costs against Ms Collins:

Unlike in Tyneside, there is no concession by the respondents that the appeal is arguable. Indeed, Mr Liedermann submitted to the contrary (as referred to above). In Mr D v Ms P [2020] NSWCA 174, Bell P said at [45], that it is usually neither possible nor desirable, for the purposes of an application for security for costs, to undertake a detailed analysis of the prospects of success of the appeal.

However, in the present case, it is well established that the primary judge’s orders can only be challenged on the basis of jurisdictional error (by reason of s 176 of the District Court Act and Kirk). There has been no attempt to formulate an allegation of jurisdictional error. Accordingly, it cannot, on the basis of the material before me, be inferred that there are any arguable grounds of appeal. In these circumstances, the prospect of the primary judge’s orders being overturned is, to borrow Basten JA’s words from Tyneside at [52], “too remote to justify the risk of further financial expense to [the respondents].”

The further question arises as to the amount of security which ought be required. Mr Ferreira annexed the estimate provided by the respondents’ solicitor of $35,200 plus GST. There was no challenge to the amount of this estimate. Indeed, Ms Collins submitted that such were her circumstances, she would be unable to meet any order for security, with the result that any such order would stultify the proceedings. It is not uncommon for a solicitor’s estimate of the amount of security required to be discounted when an order is made. However, in the present case, having regard to Ms Collins’ conduct to date in the proceedings in the Local Court and the Court below (including non-appearances and speculative interlocutory applications), only a minor discount is warranted. I propose to make an order in the sum of $33,000 including GST.

In the course of the hearing of the notice of motion, Ms Collins sought to read her affidavit of 23 September 2025. Mr Liedermann objected to paragraphs 3-6 of that affidavit on the grounds of relevance. I indicated that I would review all the material before ruling on the evidence to which objection was taken. In paragraphs 3-6, Ms Collins makes various allegations against Ms Stowers, including that she has acted vexatiously and maliciously towards her. I do not regard these allegations as relevant to the questions before me. Accordingly, paragraphs 3-6 of Ms Collins’ affidavit of 23 September 2025 are rejected.

For the reasons given above, I make the following orders: