Yu v Perpetual Corporate Trust Limited

Referred to me today as Duty Judge on an urgent basis is a summons filed by Pin Yu seeking relief against Perpetual Corporate Trust Limited The relief sought is:

The summons was supported by an affidavit of Pin Yu which on the front page is dated 20 April 2026, but I was informed by Ms Yu in Court, was prepared today.

That affidavit outlines that Ms Yu was the owner and occupant of the subject property. In August 2025, she was evicted from that property and since that time, the affidavit refers to significant hardship including homelessness.

Ms Yu deposes to being aware that the property has now been listed for sale by auction on 28 April 2026. Evidence of that fact was provided by way of what appears to be an Internet advertisement advertising the property as a two-bedroom, two-bathroom, two-car space apartment with “price on request”.

Ms Yu deposes to the fear that unless the Court grants the injunction she seeks, the sale will proceed and her position will be permanently prejudiced.

The affidavit was accompanied by a series of correspondence commencing in January this year between a firm of solicitors, retained by Ms Yu, Invictus Legal, and the solicitor or paralegal at Dentons Australia who was apparently retained on behalf of Permanent Custodians Limited but I understand is effectively the defendant in these proceedings.

That correspondence appears to betray a lack of understanding on the part of the solicitors retained by Ms Yu as to how default notices work in the context of mortgage default and the rights that accrue to mortgagees for judgment and possession of property.

The emails back and forth between Mr Mandoukos and Invictus Legal centred mainly around that alleged issue. Invictus Legal kept insisting that because the default notice did not “continue”, somehow all the action taken in possession proceedings in this Court was invalid.

In an email of 4 February 2026, the solicitor at Invictus Legal also raised the prospect of urgent injunctive relief being sought together with recovery of all costs “occasioned by the conduct of the defendant” and asserting that there had been payment of arrears and remediation of default in 2022 and 2024 and that there had been a stay of the contemplated eviction in those circumstances.

The correspondence in reply from Dentons was firm but clear that the default point was a misunderstanding and that Mr Mandoukos’ client relied on the validity of its enforcement action which by then was well advanced and past eviction and into progression to mortgagee sale.

The defendant is represented in Court today by Mr Mustafa, solicitor. He has in effect relied upon the contents of the correspondence appended to Ms Yu's affidavit. In addition, he tendered the judgment issued by this Court on 30 May 2023 which gave possession of the subject property to Perpetual Corporate Trust Limited as well as an order for judgment in the sum of $798,329.00.

Also tendered was a letter from Dentons authored by Mr Mandoukos to “The Occupants” at the subject premises dated 21 August 2025, noting that the Sheriff had scheduled an eviction of the property on 29 August 2025 at 9:00am and warning that personal belongings should be removed. The letter also noted if there were any concerns about legal rights in this matter that the occupants should seek independent legal advice.

Ms Yu appears for herself today telling the Court that she does not have sufficient funds to continue instructing a lawyer. She asserted in her affidavit and again orally in Court today that she did not receive any writ of possession prior to the attendance of the Sheriff at the property. Mr Mustafa pointed out, correctly, that service of notice of a writ of possession by the Sheriff’s office is something run by that organisation and not something over which his client or firm has any control. However he relied upon the letter of 21 August 2025 which warned the occupants of the execution of the writ.

Ms Yu outlined in her affidavit that she was living at the property with her elderly father, but is now homeless. She spoke today in Court of the distress and difficulty created by what has occurred. In her affidavit she deposes to attempts to resolve the “dispute”, including raising the matter with the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (“AFCA”) and contacting her local member.

In response to a question from the Court she confirmed that AFCA closed her complaint in January this year. Ms Yu referred to charges and fees that she “doesn't understand” that were applied to the loan account, and that she disputes the accuracy of the amounts claimed. She believes the loan was unfair from the beginning, and that it has caused her significant financial hardship over a number of years. In answer to questions from the Court she confirmed that whilst there had been some payments made after the issuing of the judgment/order in May 2023 and obviously some kind of forbearance arrangement reached at least for some period, she has not made any payments to the loan since April 2025.

Ms Yu also told the Court that in 2023 she did make an attempt to sell the property. She feels that was forced upon her by the defendant, but the property did not sell although she did list it. She referred to the reasons why she thought the property didn't sell at that time

Ms Yu explained that she seeks the orders in the Summons brought before the Court urgently today because she wants “more time”. In answer to questions from the Court she confirmed that she is not in a position to pay the full amount, the subject of the judgment.

She is living in difficult circumstances in rented premises in [REDACTED] which she uses as her dog grooming business. She is living there with her father without adequate accommodation “sleeping on chairs”, which is no doubt extremely difficult for her and her father.

This Court has power to order by interlocutory or other injunction a restraining of any threatened or apprehended breach of contract or other injury. That power is in s 66 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).

We can do this, on terms, at any stage of any proceeding in any case in which it appears to the Court to be just or convenient to do so. Without delving into citations of cases, in short, the principles to be applied when deciding whether it is just and convenient to grant injunctions of the type sought, the Court should look at the nature of the plaintiff's case, the apparent strength of that case and the balance of convenience.

As I see it, the plaintiff's case as revealed in the Summons is an unfortunate state of affairs where she was not able to keep up with payments under a valid mortgage.

A default judgment entered in May 2023 was followed by attempts to negotiate and forbear the inevitable consequences of a failure to make payments as they fell due.

It seems that the plaintiff is not in a position to even catch up on the last 12 months payments, let alone pay the judgment debt which is as I have stated $798,000.00 and more than that now, no doubt, with interest, and costs.

Looking at the legal principles involved to be successful in obtaining an injunction against a mortgagee in possession to stop a sale, it must be noted that apart from exceptional cases, the mortgagor must basically pay into court or pay the full amount owing. I have no reason to doubt that the mortgagee is other than entirely entitled to proceed with the sale.

Nothing, unfortunately, other than compassion for Ms Yu's position would allow or dictate that an injunction should be granted, but there would be no purpose in granting an injunction. There does not appear to be any solution for the situation Ms Yu finds herself in.

The term ‘balance of convenience’ is a kind of shorthand way of referring to the sorts of factors that could be relevant to the Court's consideration of the necessity utility and fairness of granting the interlocutory relief sought.

In this case the defendant appears to have gone through the relevant processes to secure possession of a property, and then to extend some latitude to try and negotiate a situation where it could, in conscience, forebear execution of a writ of possession.

That writ was executed in August last year and we find ourselves in April, days before the mortgagee sale, being asked as a Court to prevent that continuation of those matters in train.

I appreciate that once the property is sold that is a very final position for Ms Yu but frankly the final position was reached well before now, with the execution of the judgment in 2023 and the eviction last year.

I appreciate the fact of refusing the injunction is a difficult result for Ms Yu, but the balance of convenience is against granting the injunction sought in the circumstances outlined in the evidence, and as set out in the reasons I have given. Accordingly, the order I will make is that the Summons is dismissed. The defendant does not seek costs, so there is no order as to costs.