Application by Yu Hai Li pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW)

1. [1]

   By application filed on 1 May 2020, Ms Yu Hai Li (“the applicant”) makes an application for an inquiry into her conviction pursuant to s 78(1) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) (“CAR Act”).

2. [2]

   On 6 July 2020, the Attorney General filed submissions in response. Although these are not judicial proceedings, s 79(4) of the CAR Act provides that the Supreme Court may consider any written submissions made by the Crown with respect to an application.

3. [3]

   On 8 September 2020, the applicant filed submissions in reply accompanied by the applicant’s affidavit of 12 August 2020 and an affidavit of Mr Peter Ghibely dated 15 July 2020. The authenticity of this affidavit is a matter I will return to. Further written submissions of the Attorney General were filed on 20 October 2020.

4. [4]

   On 6 November 2020, this application was allocated to me by the Chief Judge at Common Law for determination.

5. [5]

   On 26 November 2020, additional submissions (“urgent pleading”) and a further affidavit were filed by the applicant. The intended effect of these documents appears to be, inter alia, to withdraw the affidavit of Mr Ghibely. An amended version of this “urgent pleading” was later filed in a “final pleading”.

6. [6]

   By email dated 5 May 2021, the applicant sought to provide even more material. On 5 May 2021, my associate notified the parties that I did not propose to consider the material filed on 5 May 2021 or any material filed after that time.

7. [7]

   The applicant has prepared her application herself from custody. English is not her first language and her application is handwritten. It was difficult to read her handwriting and even more difficult to follow her arguments. She makes very serious allegations about the conduct of the trial judge, the Crown, the witnesses, and in some respects, her counsel at trial.

8. [8]

   The applicant relies on three grounds which are, verbatim, as follows:

9. [9]

   The Attorney General does not support the application and contends that it would be open to this Court to decline to consider it, especially as it was so comprehensively dealt with by the Court of Criminal Appeal (“CCA”): ss 79(3)(a)(i) and 79(3)(b) of the CAR Act.

10. [10]

    I have had regard to the material filed and am satisfied that there is no basis to refer this matter to the CCA. The very serious allegations made about the trial judge are completely untenable as are the other issues raised by the applicant.

11. [11]

    Despite the fact that it would be open to me to decline to consider the matter without providing any further reasons, I propose to set out the applicant’s arguments and my findings in relation to each of her grounds of review in the interests of open justice. I do not propose to consider every allegation made by the applicant. There is no requirement for me to do so. As McCallum JA noted in Clark v Attorney General of New South Wales [2020] NSWCA 70 at [47] in relation to the duty of this Court to consider an application under Part 7 of the CAR Act:

12. [12]

    The applicant was convicted on 22 September 2016 of three offences, following a 32-day trial before Herbert DCJ and a jury of twelve. The applicant was convicted on the following counts:

13. [13]

    On 19 May 2017, Ms Li was sentenced to an aggregate term of 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years, commencing on 3 July 2014. She will be eligible for parole on 2 July 2024. The indicative sentences were as follows:

14. [14]

    The trial judge also sentenced the applicant, following a guilty plea, for an offence of ongoing supply of methylamphetamine, contrary to s 25A of the DMT Act. After a discount of 25 per cent for the applicant’s plea of guilty to that offence, the applicant was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years and 1 month to date from 3 July 2014.

15. [15]

    The applicant sought leave to appeal against conviction based on alleged errors in the trial judge’s directions to the jury. She was represented by Mr Tim Game SC and Ms April Francis of counsel; very experienced senior and senior junior counsel respectively. There can be no doubt that the applicant received excellent legal representation in her appeal to the CCA. Leave to appeal was refused: Li v R [2019] NSWCCA 228.

16. [16]

    The evidence upon which Ms Li was convicted is set out in some detail in the judgment of Gleeson JA at [9]-[25] as follows:

17. [17]

    Two grounds of appeal were relied upon. Both contended that a miscarriage of justice had resulted from the directions given by the trial judge in respect of the element of the offences involving “possession” of the drugs and the tasers. The applicant required leave to appeal on those two grounds as they raised questions of mixed law and fact and involved challenges to directions or omissions to direct on the part of the trial judge in circumstances where no objection was taken at trial: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5(1)(b); Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW), r 4.

18. [18]

    Leave to appeal was refused. I do not consider it necessary to set out the Court’s reasons for refusing leave. Suffice to say that the Court was not satisfied that any error was disclosed in the summing up when viewed as a whole.

19. [19]

    On 5 February 2020, special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused: Li v The Queen [2020] HCASL 6.

20. [20]

    On 16 March 2020, the applicant filed a notice of intention to appeal against sentence, but it was in the terms of a complaint about conviction relying upon the same grounds as are relied upon in this application. When on 26 March 2020 the applicant appeared in relation to that notice of intention to appeal, the appeal was marked as being incompetent and the applicant was directed to file an application under s 78 of the CAR Act, which she subsequently did.

21. [21]

    Section 78(1) of the CAR Act provides:

22. [22]

    Section 79 of the CAR Act provides:

23. [23]

    This Court may refuse to deal with an application if the matters raised have already been fully dealt with, including in an application to the CCA, provided that the Court is not satisfied that there are “special facts or special circumstances that justify the taking of further action.”

24. [24]

    In determining an application under Part 7 of the CAR Act, the Court is making an administrative decision: Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) (2003) 214 CLR 318; [2003] HCA 28 at [124].

25. [25]

    The relevant principles to be applied in determining an application pursuant to s 78 were considered by Johnson J in Application of Peter James Holland under s.78 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 [2008] NSWSC 251 (“Peter Holland”). His Honour stated the following at [6]-[9]:

26. [26]

    In Sinkovich v Attorney General of New South Wales (2013) 85 NSWLR 783; [2013] NSWCA 383 (“Sinkovich v Attorney General”), Basten JA referred at [64] to the test stated in Varley v Attorney General (NSW) (1987) 8 NSWLR 30 at 48 of whether there is a feeling of “unease” or “disquiet” (referred to by Johnson J above at [6] in Peter Holland). His Honour went on to observe at [65] that “[t]his language does not assist. There is no purpose served by adopting other words than the statutory language of ‘doubt or question’.”

The application

1. [27]

   The applicant relies on the following material:

   1. (1)

      The applicant’s written submissions filed on 1 May 2020, comprising 3 typed pages of grounds and authorities and 37 pages of handwritten submissions.

   2. (2)

      A folder of transcript from the applicant’s trial, accompanying the written submissions filed on 1 May 2020. The pages of the transcript that were included were selective and non-chronological.

   3. (3)

      Written submissions in reply filed on 8 September 2020, comprising 82 pages of handwritten submissions. The applicant further filed three handwritten pages of an “application for the use of eyewitness affidavits”. The two “eyewitness affidavits” were an affidavit of Mr Peter Ghibely dated 15 July 2020 and an affidavit of the applicant dated 12 August 2020. By way of example of the allegations made in the submissions, one page of the written submissions alleged that: the trial judge’s comment that the charges carried a life sentence was a “RAPE” (as written) on the applicant; the applicant’s trial counsel “RAPED” her case; her counsel’s closing address was “nothing but a RAPE”; and her case “truely was a RAPED Case [sic]”.

   4. (4)

      Following the Attorney General’s further written submissions filed on 20 October 2020, on 26 November 2020 the applicant filed an “urgent pleading” dated 24 October 2020 (five pages typed), a “final pleading” dated 31 October 2020 (two handwritten pages, and another version of the “urgent pleading” containing handwritten amendments), and an affidavit of the applicant dated 11 November 2020. The applicant sought in her urgent and final pleadings to “withdraw” the two “eyewitness affidavits” filed on 8 September 2020.

   5. (5)

      On 5 May 2021, the applicant sought to file further material but was informed that this material would not be taken into account on this application.

2. [28]

   The Attorney General, on behalf of the Crown, filed written submissions on 6 July 2020 and further written submissions on 20 October 2020. On 22 October 2020, the Crown Solicitors Office further filed four pages of a transcript of the proceedings on 19 May 2017.

3. [29]

   This is the material upon which I have considered this application.

Ground 1

1. [30]

   There are two complaints made under the first ground: first, that there was “fake” evidence and secondly that there was a “fake” definition by the trial judge.

2. [31]

   These complaints were not made in the CCA.

3. [32]

   The complaint concerning the “fake” evidence pertains to [16]-[17] of the summary of evidence in the CCA judgment I have extracted above at [16].

4. [33]

   The applicant contends that there was an unlawful entry by police officers into her apartment prior to obtaining the search warrant thus the evidence was illegally obtained. Five police officers gave evidence on this issue at trial. Their evidence can be summarised as follows.

5. [34]

   Detective O’Sullivan gave the following evidence:

6. [35]

   Detective Stevenson gave the following evidence:

7. [36]

   Detective Senior Constable Chivers gave the following evidence:

8. [37]

   Detective Sergeant Mackay gave the following evidence in cross-examination:

9. [38]

   On the other hand, Detective Hakin gave the following evidence:

10. [39]

    In summing up, the trial judge referred to the above evidence in the following way:

11. [40]

    The applicant submitted that the items seized from her apartment (following the execution of the search warrant) should have been excluded on the basis that they were all illegally obtained. The applicant submitted that the police committed an offence under s 112 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) by opening the front door and entering the premises without a search warrant. The applicant relied upon the decision of Barr AJ in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Trudgett [2013] NSWSC 1607 at [15], in which his Honour stated, in obiter, that opening a closed but unlocked door could constitute “breaking” into premises. The applicant also relied upon ss 9, 10 and 47A of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), which set out the circumstances in which police may enter premises. These authorities were the basis of the applicant’s complaint regarding the trial judge’s “fake definition upon the original law”.

12. [41]

    The second complaint is that the trial judge “created fake evidence to replace [the] police officer’s original words.” This is a reference to that portion of the summing up where her Honour referred to the police officers “operat[ing] the lock” of the apartment. I understand this to be a reference to that portion of the summing up I have extracted above at [39].

13. [42]

    This point was not taken at trial, nor in the CCA.

14. [43]

    The Attorney General submitted that the high point of the applicant’s complaint is that a police officer may have briefly stepped across the threshold before closing the door and waiting to obtain a search warrant. That could never be an offence under s 112 of the Crimes Act as no serious indictable offence was committed after entering the premises. The police had a lawful excuse to do what they did and even if they did not it would be a trespass at the most: Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 435; [1994] HCA 15.

15. [44]

    The respondent submitted that there was no basis for the exclusion of evidence under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).

Consideration: Ground 1

1. [45]

   I am satisfied that there is no evidence that police acted either illegaly or improperly as alleged by the applicant. Even if, contrary to the weight of the evidence, a police officer briefly stepped over the threshold, there is no nexus between that act and the obtaining of the relevant evidence, which occurred several hours later after a search warrant was issued: Director of Public Prosecutions v AM [2006] NSWSC 348 at [75]-[84]; R v Xie (No 4) [2014] NSWSC 500 at [169]-[170]; Bandao v R; Bruce v R [2018] NSWCCA 181.

2. [46]

   It is only if such a nexus can be established that the question of whether the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting it would fall to be considered under s 138.

3. [47]

   No doubt or question as to the applicant’s guilt is raised on this evidence.

4. [48]

   Nor am I satisfied that the trial judge erred in her summing up in the way alleged.

Ground 2

1. [49]

   Ground 2 comprises five separate complaints. I have already dealt with the first of these under ground 1. The remaining four areas in which the applicant submitted that the trial judge created “fake evidence” in her Honour’s address to the jury were as follows:

   1. (1)

      Exhibit BB, a photograph of a taser to which a “sticky note” was allegedly attached;

   2. (2)

      Evidence about whether an electronic fob was required to access the applicant’s apartment;

   3. (3)

      Evidence about a “duty free bag” that the applicant said had been left at her apartment;

   4. (4)

      Evidence about the motive and involvement of Mr Peter Ghibely (a friend and business associate of the applicant who became a Crown witness).

2. [50]

   I shall deal with these four complaints in turn.

Exhibit BB: “sticky note”

1. [51]

   The applicant alleges that, in cross-examination, her counsel showed Mr Ghibely a photo of a mobile phone taser (Exhibit BB) with a sticky note attached. The applicant alleges that the sticky note contained a note directing Mr Ghibely to blame the applicant for the taser found by police in her unit.

2. [52]

   The applicant’s folder of transcript included the following exchange in cross-examination of Mr Ghibely:

3. [53]

   The next day, the following exchange occurred between the trial judge and counsel for the applicant:

4. [54]

   I have not been provided with the transcript exchange in which Mr Ghibely is said to have blamed the applicant for giving him the taser, but it appears to be common ground that that occurred.

5. [55]

   In support of her application, the applicant sought to rely on an affidavit of Mr Ghibely dated 15 July 2020 in which Mr Ghibely said:

6. [56]

   In this affidavit Mr Ghibely also referred to “[his] own lawyer”:

7. [57]

   There are a number of characteristics of this affidavit which cause me grave concern as to its authenticity. The transcript reflects that Mr Ghibely spoke fluent English. The applicant does not. The language of the affidavit is consistent with the applicant’s style of writing in broken English.

8. [58]

   Secondly, the reference to “my own lawyer” is a telling slip on the applicant’s behalf. It was the applicant’s lawyer to whom the reference was applicable.

9. [59]

   Thirdly, the contents of the affidavit are inconsistent with the transcript and, quite frankly, could not have occurred. The transcript provided by the applicant (T 1031-1032) shows that the witness was shown a drawing and not Exhibit BB. Further, the warning by the judge was that notes from the applicant should not be attached to documents shown to witnesses as the italicised portion above at [53] makes clear.

10. [60]

    The Attorney General raised these concerns about the affidavit of Mr Ghibely in its further written submissions filed on 20 October 2020.

11. [61]

    On 26 November 2020, the applicant filed a further affidavit sworn by her and typed submissions (her “urgent pleading”) dated 24 October 2020 which stated, inter alia, the following (struck out text was amended by the applicant’s “final pleading”):

Consideration: Exhibit BB

1. [62]

   It is clear that Exhibit BB was shown to Mr Ghibely in examination-in-chief [11] and not shown by the applicant’s trial counsel, as alleged by the applicant. There is nothing in the transcript to indicate that Exhibit BB was shown to Mr Ghibely by the applicant’s trial counsel, or that there was a sticky note attached to Exhibit BB. Further, the exchange extracted above at [53]) clearly indicates that any notes attached to documents were from the applicant.

2. [63]

   At one stage during the cross-examination, the applicant’s counsel showed a drawing to Mr Ghibely (not exhibit BB) and told him to ignore some notes on it. Nothing turns on this.

3. [64]

   No doubt or question as to the applicant’s guilt arises under this ground.

4. [65]

   What is of concern, however, is the filing of an affidavit to this Court which was then withdrawn once the obvious indicators pointing towards its inauthenticity were pointed out by counsel for the Attorney General. The withdrawal of reliance upon the Ghibely affidavit by the applicant is just as troubling as filing it in the first place.

Access to the applicant’s unit: electronic fob

1. [66]

   The applicant submitted that the trial judge “created fake evidence” on the issue of whether an electronic fob was required to access the level of the apartment building on which the applicant lived.

2. [67]

   The applicant’s case at trial was that someone had accessed her apartment on the day of her arrest and planted the drugs that were later found by police. It was in this context that the electronic fob issue was relevant.

3. [68]

   It was the applicant’s case at trial that Mr Ghibely had been given access to the apartment in late 2013 to install furniture, and that he had returned the electronic fob but had kept or copied the key to the front door. The applicant thus sought to prove that someone, through Mr Ghibely, had access to a front door key and could have entered the building and operated the lift without using an electronic fob. Mr Ghibely’s evidence at trial was that he did not keep any keys and did not make any copies of any keys. [12]

4. [69]

   The applicant relied upon the evidence of a police officer, Mr Hinds, who said the following in cross-examination:

5. [70]

   This evidence was relied upon by the applicant to contend that no fob was required to operate the lift (and thus anyone could have gone up to plant the drugs).

6. [71]

   The difficulty for the applicant at trial was that this evidence was contradicted by evidence from other witnesses. Significantly, the applicant’s son said the following:

7. [72]

   The applicant’s son maintained in cross-examination that he was given the second electronic fob once Mr Ghibely returned it. [15]

8. [73]

   Mr Ghibely’s evidence was that the apartment was not accessible from the front door at street level without an electronic fob. [16]

9. [74]

   Detective Hakin gave the following evidence:

10. [75]

    Detective Senior Constable Chivers said that the electronic fob was used to access the building and was also used to operate the lift and access level 26. [18] Detective Stevenson also said that the electronic fob was required to operate the lift to access level 26. [19]

11. [76]

    Prior to closing addresses, the applicant sought to dismiss her counsel and make her own submissions to the jury.

12. [77]

    A discussion occurred between the applicant and the trial judge regarding the submissions the applicant sought to make to the jury:

13. [78]

    The applicant submitted that the trial judge prevented her from telling the “true fact” that anybody who held a key to the front door of the apartment could access the unit without needing a fob to operate the elevator.

Consideration: Electronic fob

1. [79]

   The applicant’s trial counsel agreed that the weight of evidence was that a fob was required to operate the lift and access level 26. It is difficult to see how any other conclusion could be drawn from the evidence. Despite this, the trial judge gave the applicant the opportunity to discuss her concerns with her counsel.

2. [80]

   This issue could not raise a doubt or question as to the applicant’s guilt.

Duty free bag

1. [81]

   The applicant submits that the trial judge misrepresented her evidence about a duty free bag in the summing up.

2. [82]

   The relevance of the duty free bag was that the applicant contended that Mr Ghibely left a duty free bag at her apartment, did not allow her to dispose of it, and that she did not know the contents of the duty free bag. No duty free bag was present when police searched the applicant’s apartment. The defence case was that the items found in the apartment could have been brought in by Mr Ghibely in the duty free bag. The duty free bag was also said to explain the applicant’s admissions in her ERISP.

3. [83]

   The evidence about the duty free bag was as follows.

4. [84]

   The relevant answers given by the applicant in her ERISP of 3 July 2014 are summarised as [27]-[28] of the CCA decision in Li v R:

5. [85]

   The applicant gave a handwritten statement to police on 27 April 2015, after receiving the brief of evidence. That statement is relevantly summarised by the CCA in Li v R at [30]-[31] as follows:

6. [86]

   The applicant gave the following evidence at trial:

7. [87]

   Counsel for the applicant, in his closing address, said the following:

8. [88]

   In summing up, the trial judge referred to the applicant’s evidence about the duty free bag in this way:

9. [89]

   The nub of the applicant’s complaint is that her evidence was misrepresented by the trial judge, to the detriment of her case. The applicant submits that it is clear that her evidence at trial was that she knew her apartment had been altered because the duty free bag was not in the search warrant video, and she was sure that she had left it there. This is said to be demonstrated by her evidence to police about the “plastic bag”. The applicant submitted that the trial judge’s summary of her evidence suggested that the applicant said she saw the duty free bag in the search warrant video, but not in the way she had left it. The applicant submitted that this did serious damage to her case and caused a miscarriage of justice.

10. [90]

    In the applicant’s reply submissions, the applicant alleged that the issue of the duty free bag was misrepresented by counsel. Counsel for the applicant, in his closing address, put two alternative submissions: either that someone accessed the apartment with the key allegedly held by Mr Ghibely, or that the drugs were in the duty free bag which the applicant was forced to keep and the contents of which she was not aware of:

11. [91]

    The applicant said that the issue at trial became whether she knew the contents of the duty free bag, on the assumption that the contents of the bag were the items found in the search. The applicant submitted that, on her case, the duty free bag had been removed from her apartment, presumably at the time when the illegal items were allegedly planted by Mr Ghibely or another person who had access to Mr Ghibely’s key.

12. [92]

    The applicant submitted that the wrong question was posed to the jury when counsel asked the jury to assess whether the applicant knew what she had in her possession, through the duty free bag. The applicant submitted that this is the wrong question because the duty free bag was not found in the search.

Consideration: Duty free bag

1. [93]

   The substance of the trial judge’s comment was that the items seen in the search video were not, to the applicant’s knowledge, the items that were in the duty free bag. There was no confusion at trial about whether there was a duty free bag in the video, nor was there any confusion in the CCA: see Li v R at [24]. All the issues in ground 2 were dealt with at trial without further directions being sought.

2. [94]

   I am satisfied that the applicant’s trial counsel made it clear in his closing address that the applicant was at cross purposes with the police in her ERISP about the presence of the duty free bag. The trial judge’s comment, in relation to which complaint is now made, should not be viewed in isolation. The defence submissions were re-stated in detail in her Honour’s summing up.

3. [95]

   No redirection was sought on this issue at trial and no issue was raised on appeal.

4. [96]

   No doubt or question as to the applicant’s guilt arises under this complaint.

Evidence about Mr Ghibely’s motive and involvement

1. [97]

   The applicant makes complaint as to the manner in which the evidence of Mr Ghibely was presented and the direction given by the trial judge about his evidence.

2. [98]

   Mr Ghibely gave evidence at committal proceedings in 2015. At the applicant’s trial in 2016 the following exchange occurred:

3. [99]

   In cross-examination, the committal evidence was put to Mr Ghibely:

4. [100]

   The applicant now submits that the trial judge concealed the transcript of a 2015 committal hearing, which allegedly revealed Mr Ghibely’s motive for giving evidence against the applicant, and prevented the jury from knowing that Mr Ghibely changed his evidence between the 2015 committal hearing and the 2016 trial.

5. [101]

   The applicant further submitted that the trial judge misrepresented her evidence in the summing up by asserting that the applicant attributed actual possession of the methamphetamine to Mr Ghibely. The applicant submitted that she only attributed the duty free bag to Mr Ghibely, not the drugs that were actually found in her apartment.

6. [102]

   Counsel for the accused, in his closing address, said the following about possession of the items:

7. [103]

   In summing up, the trial judge summarised that submission in this way:

8. [104]

   At the conclusion of the first day of summing up, the following comment was made in the absence of the jury:

9. [105]

   The applicant has not provided the transcript pages that would reveal whether this was later corrected in the presence of the jury.

10. [106]

    The applicant also makes complaint that the trial judge mentioned in her summing up the 15 per cent discount Mr Ghibely received for his assistance to police. The applicant submitted that this created a “fake motive” and that the trial judge should not have mentioned the discount because it was not put in issue by any lawyers.

11. [107]

    The applicant also submitted that the trial judge erred in referring to “multiple reasons” for Mr Ghibely to lie because he only had one motived to lie: to avoid blame for the items found in the applicant’s apartment.

12. [108]

    The trial judge gave the following directions about Mr Ghibely and his possible motives to lie:

Consideration: Mr Ghibely

1. [109]

   Again, this complaint is without substance.

2. [110]

   There was no need for the contents of the committal transcript to be shown to Mr Ghibely. Presumably, it was simply marked for identification for the purposes of cross-examination. The substance of any inconsistency was explored in cross-examination.

3. [111]

   The trial judge accurately summarised the defence submissions in the closing address about the possibility that Peter Ghibely or UCO Sonny had actual possession of the drugs.

4. [112]

   The trial judge gave the mandatory direction in a criminal trial where a witness is criminally concerned in the events. It is for the benefit of an accused person, such as the applicant, that such a direction is given.

Ground 3

1. [113]

   The applicant alleges that an “abuse of power” or “abuse of human rights” occurred when the trial judge “threatened” the applicant with “life time imprisonment” and “no chance to appeal”. This allegation arises from an exchange between her Honour and the applicant after the applicant tried to dismiss her counsel immediately before his closing address. This was because he refused to address on matters which were not in evidence.

2. [114]

   The exchange relied upon by the applicant under this ground is as follows:

3. [115]

   As the transcript makes clear, contrary to the applicant’s contention, the trial judge was understandably concerned that the applicant should not be unrepresented in a trial for an offence which carries a life sentence and was trying to help the applicant understand the risk she was taking.

4. [116]

   The issues raised by the applicant in the above exchange were ultimately addressed by her trial counsel in his closing address.

5. [117]

   The matters raised under ground 3 could not and do not raise a doubt or question as to the applicant’s guilt.

Conclusion

1. [118]

   Although there were various other discrete complaints made in the applicant’s submissions, it was unclear which ground they related to. As stated above at [11], I am not required to refer to every submission made in these reasons. I am satisfied that the reasons I have provided adequately explain why I am satisfied that there is nothing in any of this material which gives rise to a doubt or question as to Ms Li’s guilt.