R v Geeves; R v Geeves (No. 4)

1. [1]

   Objections have been taken by the defence to the admission into evidence of identified parts of statements of witnesses taken by police and to parts of the evidence given at the Inquest into the death of Amber Haigh held in 2011 (“the Inquest”).

2. [2]

   Robert and Anne Geeves are being tried before me for the murder of Amber Haigh. It is the Crown case that there was a joint criminal enterprise between the two accused to murder Amber, and that they murdered her between 1 and 6 June 2002. Amber had a baby to Robert Geeves on [REDACTED]. It is the Crown case that Amber was used as a surrogate mother as Anne could no longer have children, and that once Amber had provided that child, she was disposed of by the Geeves.

3. [3]

   This judgment addresses objections taken to the parts of those statements and that Inquest evidence that contain representations made by Amber to various relatives and people she met about Robert and Anne Geeves, particularly in the months before she disappeared.

4. [4]

   Rulings in respect of some of the objections have been made progressively as witnesses were called. Those rulings are recorded in the transcript, on the basis that a judgment with detailed reasons would be provided later once counsel had fully articulated their positions, particularly regarding the status of evidence given by certain persons at the Inquest and the operation of s 65(3) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (“the Act”) in that context. The evidence relied upon in respect of the s 65(3) positions of the parties and their submissions about that were finalised on 12 July 2024.

5. [5]

   Some of the witnesses to whom Amber made the subject representations were available to be called to give evidence at the trial. Stella Nealon is Amber’s great aunt, with whom Amber lived for some of the years prior to her disappearance. Angelina Goode and Lisa Parker were young women also expecting babies at the same time as Amber, living near her and with whom she struck up an acquaintance if not friendship. Ray Harding, the partner of Stella Nealon made some observations. Petrina Ingram, a young woman Amber met while waiting with her baby for a train for some hours in March 2002 in Cootamundra, recollected aspects of her conversation with Amber. Keli Wood, a mum Amber got to know at the QEII mothercraft centre provided a statement about her recollection of conversations with Amber. Jacqueline Cash (now Winn), Amber’s older cousin, was a regular visitor at Stella Nealon’s house. Angela Fitzpatrick, a young woman who had a baby the same time as Amber at the Young District Hospital had given an account of her recollection of conversations with Amber. Paul Harding, Amber’s cousin to whom she became pregnant in late 1997, leading to a termination of pregnancy and with whom she maintained a relationship of sorts (including sexual activity in late 2001 and phone calls to him whilst he lived interstate) also provided a statement in 2002 and is to be called.

6. [6]

   Angela Fitzpatrick’s situation has been dealt with in a separate judgment, as it included a very particular unfair prejudice to the defence that needed to be addressed in separate reasons: R v Geeves; R v Geeves (No. 3) [2024] NSWSC 862.

7. [7]

   Before the trial commenced, the Crown had notified the legal representatives for Mr and Mrs Geeves that statements and Inquest evidence would be tendered from the following now deceased persons: Geoffrey Haigh (Amber’s father), Stephen Cash (husband of Jacqueline Cash), Patricia Haigh (Amber’s aunt), Daphne Henry (a neighbour in Clarke Street) and Judith Khan (Amber’s grandmother). Objection was taken by the defence only to parts of Judith Khan and Patricia Haigh’s statements and Inquest evidence.

Relevant legislation

1. [8]

   Section 59 of the Act provides as follows:

2. [9]

   The effect of s 59 is that hearsay evidence is inadmissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation.

3. [10]

   Section 62 restricts the exceptions provided in this division of the Act to first hand hearsay:

4. [11]

   Section 66A provides:

5. [12]

   The statutory exception to the hearsay rule in criminal proceedings where the maker is unavailable is s 65(2) of the Act, which is in these terms:

6. [13]

   The Crown relied almost exclusively on s 65(2)(c) in relation to the hearsay representations contained in police statements and the evidence given at the Inquest that it seeks to tender. The Crown must therefore show, in relation to each representation, that the representation was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable.

7. [14]

   The Crown also relied on s 65(3), (4) and (5) of the Act in respect of evidence given at the Inquest, on the basis that it is evidence of a person’s representation in the course of giving evidence in an Australian proceeding:

8. [15]

   It was conceded by the Crown Prosecutor on 12 July 2024 that s 65(3) has no application to Amber’s previous representations because none of those representations were “made by her in the course of giving evidence in an Australian or overseas proceedings”.

9. [16]

   The role of s 65(3) is limited to representations made in evidence at the Inquest by persons other than Amber, and has no application to circumstances where the evidence in issue is limited to a recount of Amber’s representation.

10. [17]

    Also relevant to the consideration as to whether the evidence in question should be admitted are ss 135 and 137 of the Act, providing a discretion to exclude evidence in some circumstances and a mandate to exclude it if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant(s).

11. [18]

    Section 135 provides:

12. [19]

    Section 137 provides:

13. [20]

    In some instances s 136 limitation were sought:

14. [21]

    The Court and the parties have been unable to find any decisions containing discussion of the operation of s 65(3), (4) and (5) in the context of evidence given at an inquest or cases that discuss circumstances where the objecting parties were not legally represented, or not present at an inquest, which were the respective positions of Mr and Mrs Geeves at the Inquest.

15. [22]

    In the context of evidence given to ICAC, Fullerton J said the following in R v Macdonald; R v Edward Obeid; R v Moses Obeid (No 4) [2019] NSWSC 1286 at [7] to [10]:

16. [23]

    As explained by Davies J in R v Omar [2022] NSWSC 371, in circumstances where s 65(3) is not engaged because there was no reasonable opportunity to cross-examine, s 65(2) must then be addressed:

17. [24]

    The High Court (French CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ) considered the application of s 65(2) in Sio v The Queen (2016) 259 CLR 47; [2016] HCA 32 (“Sio”). That case concerned s 65(2)(d) of the Act but the principles are the same. The Court held that proper approach to application of s 65(2) is as follows:

18. [25]

    The High Court went on in Sio to observe at [63] and [69]-[70]:

19. [26]

    As stated by N Adams J in R v Singh (No 4) [2021] NSWSC 75 (“Singh”) at [28]:

20. [27]

    The Court must not take a “compendious” approach, but must consider each particular representation separately: Sio at [58].

21. [28]

    Button J in R v Ryan [2020] NSWSC 1394 (“Ryan”) at [6]-[7] made some remarks about the policy considerations behind the rule against hearsay in the context of the examination made in Sio:

22. [29]

    In respect of the application of ss 135 and 137, the remarks of Wood CJ at CL in R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182; [2002] NSWCCA 509 are to be borne in mind:

23. [30]

    The Crown Prosecutor placed emphasis on the observations by Harrison J (as the CJ at CL then was) in R v Dawson [2022] NSWSC 814, in support of a submission that this particular Court, a judge sitting alone, will not misuse evidence, and so s 137 has a limited role:

24. [31]

    The Crown Prosecutor submitted that in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; [1999] HCA 37 per McHugh J at [91], focus was clearly on the potential for misuse of evidence by the jury in some unfair way:

Evidence given at the Inquest in 2011 and the operation of s 65(3) of the Act

1. [32]

   Initially, the Crown Prosecutor argued that s 65(3) provided a route by which evidence given at the Inquest repeating representations that Amber made to witnesses did not have to fit within any exceptions to the rule against hearsay. This was ultimately acknowledged by the Crown Prosecutor on 12 July 2024 to be incorrect. Obviously Amber did not give evidence at the Inquest and so there was never any opportunity, reasonable or otherwise, to cross-examine her about those representations.

2. [33]

   On the wider question of whether both accused had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine any witness called at the Inquest as to that witness’ own representations, the following analysis is relevant.

3. [34]

   Both accused were served with a letter from the Crown Solicitor’s Office in March 2011 informing them that they were “persons with sufficient interest to be granted leave to appear”.

4. [35]

   After noting the Inquest hearing date of 20 to 24 June 2011, the Crown Solicitor’s letter stated:

5. [36]

   The Crown Prosecutor argued that by virtue of this letter, each accused was provided with a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the maker of any representation at the Inquest, and if they chose not to do so, they could not now complain that s 65(3) did not operate. He argued that given the contents of the letter, both Mr and Mrs Geeves should have sought (and, presumably successfully obtained) legal representation for the Inquest. Their choice not to appear, and not to seek an “accommodation” from the Coroner was a decision each of them made, and they could not now complain about that missed opportunity.

6. [37]

   The Crown Prosecutor noted that Mr Geeves appeared for himself. He was invited to question each witness by Deputy State Coroner Mitchell and/or counsel assisting the Coroner, Mr Hamill SC (as his Honour then was). This provided an actual opportunity to cross-examine of the kind referred to in s 65(3)(b) and as defined in subs (5).

7. [38]

   The position of Mrs Geeves was different. Medical evidence was tendered in this trial, (and at the Inquest), to the effect that at the time the Inquest proceeded in June 2011, Mrs Geeves was undergoing kidney dialysis in Canberra three days a week. This fact was referred to in the transcript of the Inquest. Mrs Geeves was effectively excused by the Coroner from attending in June 2011. She did appear briefly at the end of the Inquest on 11 July 2011 and answered some questions, but in effect, and apparently on advice, declined to give evidence of any substantive kind. Mr Geeves also declined to give evidence.

8. [39]

   The following was included in the Preface to the Coroner’s findings:

9. [40]

   On the question of legal representation for Mrs Geeves, in a transcript of a directions hearing in April 2011, there is mention by the solicitor assisting the Coroner, Ms Murty, of the name of a solicitor who at that stage was said to be retained by Mrs Geeves, and likely to seek leave to appear on behalf of Mrs Geeves at the Inquest.

10. [41]

    An affidavit of Clive Hill, solicitor for Mrs Geeves in this trial, tendered on the voir dire outlined Mrs Geeves’ circumstances around that time. That affidavit demonstrates to my satisfaction that Mrs Geeves was in ill health with serious kidney disease, that she was on Centrelink Disability Support and that she made a timely application for Legal Aid as an “interested party” to the Inquest. The application stated that in addition to her ill health, she had “little legal knowledge in relation to the procedures of the Court and the law”, but had been notified by the Crown Solicitor’s Office that there may be adverse findings made against her or adverse comments about her.

11. [42]

    On 18 April 2011, Legal Aid requested further information to determine whether the matter met the public interest test. A further detailed letter was sent to the Legal Aid Coronial Investigation Unit by Garden and Montgomerie Solicitors, providing cogent reasons why a grant of Legal Aid ought to be provided. On 6 June 2011 Legal Aid notified Mrs Geeves and her solicitor that her application had been refused.

12. [43]

    Mr King submitted on behalf of Mrs Geeves that she could not reasonably have been present at the Inquest when the other witnesses gave evidence, and that she was effectively excused from attending by the Coroner based on the medical certificates she provided.

13. [44]

    Mr King also made the point that most, if not all, of the identified passages of Inquest evidence to which objection was taken, related soley to Robert Geeves, and/or could not be said to be in furtherance of the alleged joint criminal enterprise and so was not admissible against Anne Geeves.

14. [45]

    Mr Coady submitted on behalf of Robert Geeves that “reasonable opportunity” in the context of s 65(3) must at the minimum mean that someone is legally represented. He was not able to identify an authority that stated that proposition in those terms, but relied, appropriately, on the recognised reluctance of this Court, (and other courts), to admit hearsay evidence because of the consequences of admitting it: see Singh at [42] per N Adams J, citing Button J in Ryan at [6] and [7].

15. [46]

    Mr Coady drew distinctions with the situation dealt with in Puchalski v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 220, where a witness was in fact cross-examined at the committal by a solicitor, and R v Ronald Edward Medich (No. 17) [2017] NSWSC 170, where a witness unavailable at trial had in fact been cross-examined at the committal by experienced senior counsel, although on pre-arranged topics only.

16. [47]

    Mr Coady submitted that in the context of a murder trial, where witnesses gave evidence at an inquest where the rules of evidence did not apply, and at which neither Mr Geeves (nor Mrs Geeves) were legally represented, there was no reasonable opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses, and, of course, those proceedings provided no opportunity to cross-examine Amber.

Conclusion as to the role of s 65(3) in this case

1. [48]

   I am unpersuaded by the Crown Prosecutor’s submissions. They ignore the reality that was presented to the accused persons at the time of the Inquest and the context and function of this part of the Evidence Act. The letter from the Crown Solicitor’s Office is not one that makes any formal acusation. To a member of the public unfamiliar with the Coroners Act 2009 (NSW) and its multifaceted operation, this letter would provide no alert to or concern about the very serious potential repercussions for a “person of interest”.

2. [49]

   The Inquest was held nine years after Amber’s disappearance. Although Mr and Mrs Geeves were questioned in ERISPs in 2002, no charges were laid. This is a very different circumstance to a committal proceeding, or even an ICAC or Crime Commission hearing, where certain allegations or complaints have been made and are explored at that hearing. An inquest is, by necessity, a much more inchoate process, unless and until s 78 of the Coroners Act comes into play to suspend or confine or terminate the inquest.

3. [50]

   The rules of evidence do not apply to evidence led at inquests. The examination of witnesses by counsel assisting is done with ample reference to statements previously prepared. Leading questions are often used. The focus of an inquest is to lead evidence in an inquisitorial fashion that assists the Coroner to arrive at a conclusion as to the manner and cause of death. There are no “parties” opposing each other. Persons or organisations seek leave to appear. Leave is not a fait accompli. The focus is for the Coroner to work out what happened, and, in some circumstances, make recommendations to improve risks and systems relevant to the manner and cause of a death.

4. [51]

   Legal representation is not provided through some kind of free scheme such as is the case for ICAC hearings. There is no “accusation” or “allegation” made against anyone in a formal sense. If there is, or the Coroner forms a view that there should be and there is evidence capable of satisfying a jury beyond reasonable doubt that a known person has committed an indictable offence, the Coroners Act requires suspension or limitation of the inquest: see s 78.

5. [52]

   Cross-examination at an inquest is a complex and tactical task. In the absence of an allegation, forensic judgment needs to be deployed as to whether to ask a question and what to ask. Despite the polite and appropriate encouragement of the Coroner and counsel assisting, it is unreasonable to expect a lay person (Mr Geeves) in that complex forum, to “cross-examine”. Even if a lay person is brave enough to do so, I would not class such an attempt as “a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine” within the meaning of s 65(3).

6. [53]

   Mrs Geeves was not able to be present due to ill health. Even if she had a lawyer present, (and I am satisfied she made reasonable steps to pursue Legal Aid help, which failed), she would need to be physically at Court to instruct on a daily basis as to what evidence needed challenging or exploration. Her ill health provided a further difficulty impeding any “reasonable opportunity” to cross-examine.

7. [54]

   I accept Mr Coady and Mr King’s submissions. There was not, in the context of these people at this Inquest, any reasonable opportunity to cross-examine. Section 65(3) of the Act has no role to play in rendering admissible any of the evidence given at the Inquest.

Stella Nealon

1. [55]

   Stella Nealon is Amber’s great aunt, with whom Amber lived for a while at Carinya Downs, a property not far from the Geeves house. She provided a statement to police dated 25 June 2002. Objection is taken by the defence to this part of her statement referring to a conversation with a nurse at the hospital just after Amber had her baby in January 2002:

2. [56]

   Given the lack of detail about “the nurse”, the circumstances relevant to a s 65(2)(c) analysis have not been sufficiently identified and so I cannot be satisfied that the circumstances in which the representation was made by “the nurse” are such as to make that nurse’s representation highly likely to be reliable.

3. [57]

   In any event I excluded this evidence on the basis of s 137 of the Act as “the nurse” was not identified and so the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused, as the maker of the representation and her/his basis for the assertion could not be examined in this trial.

4. [58]

   Objection was taken to the following assertion in that same statement:

5. [59]

   I ruled that s 66A of the Act permitted admission into evidence of “they are standing over me” because it is a contemporaneous statement made by Amber to her great aunt about her feelings or state of mind.

6. [60]

   The assertion by Ms Nealon in paragraph 20 of her statement:

7. [61]

   The following is an example of the evidence given by Ms Nealon at the Inquest sought to be led by the Crown to which objection has rightly been taken:

8. [62]

   This evidence is confusing and potentially misleading and I excluded it under s 135 of the Act. The recount does not fall within one of the s 65(2) exceptions because the circumstances being referenced in the evidence are so vague. It would be unfairly prejudicial to the accused to admit that exchange into evidence in that form. Its probative value is very low as its reference points are so unclear.

9. [63]

   The following questions at the Inquest led to this evidence to which objection has been taken:

10. [64]

    This evidence was excluded under s 135 of the Act as the evidence is confusing, potentially misleading and unfairly prejudicial. The “circumstances” of the representation by Amber - if that is what this extract is referring to - are unclear and so an assessment under s 65(2)(c) cannot adequately be performed.

11. [65]

    Objection was also taken to this evidence:

12. [66]

    The prevailing circumstances in which those representations were made by Amber were inadequately identified such as to allow an adequate s 65(2) assessment to be made. It may be a reference to a number of conversations, and so the evidence cannot be admitted under this provision of the Act. The assertion includes second-hand hearsay. “She said she wants the baby” is a reference to what Amber said Anne Geeves had said. In any event, I excluded the evidence under s 137 of the Act as it is of low probative value in that form, and there is a significant danger of unfair prejudice to the defence.

Ray Harding

1. [67]

   In his statement to police dated 11 July 2002, Mr Harding said this:

2. [68]

   I excluded this evidence as the language used suggests Mr Harding is possibly recounting someone else’s recount of what Amber said and so would be second-hand hearsay, and no exception to the rule against hearsay applies: s 62.

Petrina Ingram

1. [69]

   Petrina Ingram is a young woman whom Amber met at Cootamundra train station in March 2002 while they were both waiting for delayed train connections. They started up a conversation and spent some time together during which Amber told Ms Ingram things about her baby, (who was with her), and her circumstances. Ms Ingram was shocked about a number of things Amber said and contacted Crime Stoppers on at least three occasions after Amber was referred to in television reports as missing. Ms Ingram was not approached by police for a statement until 2024.

2. [70]

   In her statement to police dated 3 April 2024, Ms Ingram stated that:

3. [71]

   Objection was taken to this evidence being led however it was accepted by counsel for the accused that this was a representation made by Amber to which s 66A of the Act applied as a contemporaneous statement of Amber’s feelings, knowledge or state of mind.

Keli Wood

1. [72]

   Keli Wood was a mother Amber met at QEII (the mothercraft residential course Amber attended with her baby between 4 and 8 March 2002) and whom Amber told certain things about her living arrangements with the accused.

2. [73]

   Objection was taken to the following part of her statement to police dated 31 October 2022:

3. [74]

   I ruled that this evidence could be given as the circumstances in which the representation was made were such that made it highly likely the representation was reliable: s 65(2)(c). Amber had a habit of telling other women in shared circumstance what was happening in her life. It seemed to be done to seek a response, or, potentially, maybe some advice. Amber had little exposure to positive role models for healthy, loving relationships and it seems was struggling to find people she could trust and in whom she could safely confide.

4. [75]

   There was no reason to exclude this evidence under ss 135 or 137. It was not unfairly prejudicial to the defence. The probative value was high on the question of whether there was in fact coercion and control by Mr and Mrs Geeves. It raises the possibility on this issue that Amber chose to remain with the Geeves to prevent the risk that she would have her baby taken from her by DoCS as a single mother with little income and inadequate support.

5. [76]

   Ms Wood also recounted that:

6. [77]

   I ruled that this representation fitted within the s 66A exception to the rule against hearsay as contemporaneous state of mind evidence and there was no basis for exclusion under ss 135 or 137, as it was not unfairly prejudicial to the defence.

Jacqueline Cash (now Winn)

1. [78]

   Jacqueline Cash is Amber’s older cousin. She made a statement to police dated 9 July 2002, which included this extract to which objection was taken:

2. [79]

   I excluded this evidence as it is of low probative value and is potentially unfairly prejudicial given the vagueness of the assertion.

3. [80]

   Ms Cash also asserted:

4. [81]

   I ruled that this evidence could not be given in this form as it was too vague as to time, basis and circumstances and so unfairly prejudicial: ss 135 and 137. I granted leave to the Crown Prosecutor to ask Ms Cash questions about this topic.

5. [82]

   The evidence given by Ms Cash at the Inquest on 21 June 2011 was not ultimately pressed by the Crown Prosecutor.

Paul Harding

1. [83]

   Paul Harding is Amber’s third cousin. Amber had a romantic and sexual relationship with Paul and became pregnant to him in late 1997. (She was discovered to be about 10 weeks pregnant in February 1998).

2. [84]

   He made a statement to police dated 4 July 2002, in which he said the following, to which objection was taken:

3. [85]

   This falls within the s 66A exception as a contemporaneous statement of Amber’s feelings or state of mind and can be led.

4. [86]

   Paul Harding also said the following, which also fits within s 66A:

5. [87]

   Paul Harding gave evidence at the Inquest on 21 June 2011 to similar effect:

6. [88]

   I concluded that this evidence cannot be given in this form. The assertion that she was scared of Robert Geeves fits within s 66A as a representation of Amber’s contemporaneous state of mind. (It is in effect a repetition of what Paul Harding said in his statement). The Crown Prosecutor was given leave to ask about these matters in chief so defence counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine Paul Harding about those matters.

Patricia Haigh (deceased)

1. [89]

   Amber’s aunt gave a statement to police on 21 June 2002. In addition to conveying a representation Amber made to her about being tied up, (dealt with at [57], [59] and [60] of the judgment R v Geeves; R v Geeves (No. 5) [2024] NSWSC 939 dealing with Amber’s assertions regarding Robert Geeves tying her up), Patricia Haigh included the following:

2. [90]

   This is second-hand hearsay within the statement and cannot be admitted: (s 62) but as Patricia Haigh is deceased, all of her evidence of what Amber said to her is second-hand hearsay as Ms Haigh will not be giving evidence at this trial.

3. [91]

   At paragraph 12, Patricia Haigh said:

4. [92]

   This too is second-hand hearsay and so cannot be admitted.

5. [93]

   Objection was taken to the following evidence that Patricia Haigh gave at the Inquest on 20 June 2011:

6. [94]

   This evidence again is second-hand hearsay and cannot be admitted.

Judith Khan (deceased)

1. [95]

   Judith Khan was Amber’s paternal grandmother. In a statement to police dated 16 May 2003, Judith recounted the following:

2. [96]

   This evidence is the subject of objection by the defence. Whilst a representation about Amber’s state of mind or feelings, and so s 66A may on its face appear to apply, Ms Khan is not available to be cross-examined in these proceedings and the representation is second-hand hearsay and not admissible.

3. [97]

   The same applies to those parts of the following extract from the statement that comprise Amber’s representation being repeated by Ms Khan. The first paragraph is problematic in that she does not state the basis of her awareness. The representations of what Amber had said to her and what Tracey had said to her in the following three paragraphs are second-hand hearsay and not admissible:

4. [98]

   In the following paragraph, although the first sentence is admissible: “That’s the last conversation I had with any of them”. The balance of the paragraph is not admissible because it is second-hand hearsay, and the reference to what “Robert wanted” is unattributed third-hand hearsay. What Ms Khan said in her statement about what she, Ms Khan, said to Amber about the christening is admissible, and probably relevant to the issue of family antipathy to Robert Geeves, but objection is taken to all of this evidence by the defence and in those circumstances I will exclude it.

5. [99]

   In respect of the following paragraph, the first two and a half lines down to the word “disease” are admissible, however the next part: “he didn’t get to see Amber or the baby on this occasion” is excluded under s 137 as its probative value to the fact in issue (whether and when Amber went to see her father) is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused because Ms Khan does not state her basis for her assertion: “he didn’t get to see Amber or the baby on this occasion”. The balance of the paragraph regarding Geoffrey’s hospitalisation at Auburn and Mt Druitt Hospitals, and his time at Michael and Tracey’s house, is non-specific and the basis for her understanding not stated. It is at least possible the basis for her belief is hearsay as opposed to actual knowledge and so her recount of it is second-hand hearsay, and so I exclude it under s 62 and alternatively and in addition, s 137, on the basis of the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused versus the limited probative value.

6. [100]

   Ms Khan gave evidence at the Inquest on 22 June 2011. Objection has been taken to the following evidence:

7. [101]

   The evidence of what Amber said is inadmissible as it is second-hand hearsay and so the first and second questions and answers are inadmissible. However the evidence as to what Ms Khan recounted at the Inquest that she herself had said to Amber, needs to be evaluated under s 65(2)(c) as a hearsay representation where the maker is unavailable. I consider a conversation with her granddaughter, Amber, about her son, (Amber’s father), being mortally unwell and about his location, are representations made in circumstances that make it highly probable that her representations to Amber are reliable.

8. [102]

   The third, fourth and fifth questions and answers are admissible. There is no basis under s 135 or s 137 to exclude that evidence. I will direct myself to the question of weight that should be given to that evidence, given that it was not the subject of any cross-examination, when the time comes for me to evaluate together all of the evidence led in the trial.