Meredith v Rural Press Pty Ltd

HIS HONOUR: By a Statement of Claim (“SOC”) filed on 18 December 2025 the plaintiff, Mr Meredith, who is a litigant in person without legal representation, purports to sue the defendant, Rural Press Pty Ltd, for defamation in respect of newspaper articles published on 19 December 2024, 23 December 2024 and 18 July 2025. It is not necessary for the purpose of this judgment to detail with any particularity the content of the articles upon which Mr Meredith relies.

When the matter came before me on the first listing date in accordance with Practice Note SC CL 4 on 27 February 2026 Ms Norman, solicitor, sought leave to appear as (more or less) a friend of the Court to point out to me that there were issues that the defendant wished to agitate. The first issue was about service of the SOC. The second issue, and perhaps the principal issue, was about the competence of the proceedings.

On that day I pointed out some deficiencies with the pleading that I had perceived in the SOC and directed that the plaintiff file and serve an Amended Statement of Claim in accordance with the rules on or before 13 March. I then adjourned the matter for further directions in the Defamation List last Friday, 27 March 2026. I should say that my direction that Mr Meredith file and serve an Amended Statement of Claim (“ASOC”) was subject to the issues concerning service and also competence of the proceedings. It was not intended by way of any remedial step in respect of those issues.

When the matter came back before me on 27 March the issue about service had been partially resolved in as much as it was accepted that Mr Meredith had re-served or had sent the originating process to the named defendants registered office in accordance with the requirements of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“Corporations Act”). Some issues in relation to the form of the ASOC were raised but those issues were readily resolved, Mr Meredith accepting the objections raised by the defendant were valid and he indicated that he would withdraw or amend the particular matters about which the defendant raised objection.

Included among those matters were imputations particularised ASOC [35](c), (e), (h). The matter then proceeded on the basis of the argument as to competency. The basis of the defendant’s objection relates to the statutory bar created by section 12B of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) (“the Act”).

Section 12B(1) of the Act provides:

The difficulty in relation to competence as raised by the defendant is that on the very day that proceedings were issued, Mr Meredith had earlier purported to give a concerns notice. As he frankly has pointed out, he took that step knowingly because he believed that his failure to start proceedings would put him out of time to sue, in accordance with the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) (“the Limitation Act”) in respect of the first publication of 19 December 2024. I interpolate that, as was pointed out by Ms Norman, he was mistaken about that because the service of a concerns notice by force of section 14B of the Limitation Act extended the time for commencing proceedings by a period of 56 days.

The issue about service can be put to one side at this stage because it seems to me that although careful argument has been put by Mr Meredith about it, it is an argument which goes nowhere, given that there is no issue about the fact that the proceedings have now been properly served on the registered office of the company. With respect to him, Mr Meredith’s careful argument is not to the point, given that he is largely basing his approach upon the consideration that he undertook a business name search, not a company search, and purported to serve the document at the address for service of notices specified in that document. I repeat, nothing turns on that point, and I will put it to one side.

Of more substance are two points that he raises. The first of those is that a letter forwarded to the editor of the masthead which published the articles, dated 15 July 2025 is now said by Mr Meredith to be the concerns notice. By implication he disclaims reliance upon the notice of 18 December. If he is right in that argument, the proceedings would be valid, at least in respect of the first two publications.

The substantive requirements of a contents of a concerns notice are set out in section 12A of the Act. There is no particular form prescribed. It is not even necessary to entitle the document a “concerns notice”. The requirements are that it: be in writing; specifies the location where the offending publication can be accessed; informs the publisher of the defamatory imputations that the person is concerned about; informs the publisher of the harm the person considers to be serious harm to the person’s reputation; and it provides a copy of the matter in question, if practicable. I have said that the form is not prescribed, although other provisions, for instance, subsection (2), make clear that a draft statement of claim or other originating process, for example, cannot be utilised as a concerns notice.

Mr Meredith’s concerns notice of 18 December follows a form which is familiar and is utilised by many practitioners, even though, as I say, it is not prescribed. By way of explanation of that, it is headed “Concerns Notice”. It refers to section 12A of the Act. It sets out in some detail the particulars in relation to each of the publications complained of. Under the heading “Defamatory Imputations” it sets out 11 matters that he relies upon as arising out of the published matter and explains that, as is necessary, in some detail, why the matter is defamatory of him and, under the heading “Serious Harm and Republication”, he sets out a narrative of why he says that the publication of what he says is defamatory material has caused him serious harm.

With respect, that document is unimpeachable in its status as a concerns notice, as the defendant accepts, and, in particular, it complies with the requirements of section 12A as explained in two decisions of the District Court Zimmermann v Perkiss [2022] NSWDC 448 at [160-161] and Georges v Georges [2022] NSWDC 558 at [80].

The 15 July document is quite a different document. It is under the hand of the plaintiff, but it is entitled “Formal Letter of Demand-Defamation”. It is said to be a demand for retraction, apology and compensation. It notifies the editor of the newspaper of a defamation claim concerning two articles and sets out statements from the articles which Mr Meredith asserts are false and/or irrelevant and, so far as particulars of serious harm are concerned, they are quite general in a wrapped-up way. Under the heading “Reputation Harm Caused” it simply states: “These publications cause significant harm to my reputation, wellbeing and livelihood.” It also includes, not insignificantly, that: “This letter is not a complete statement of my claim and all my rights are expressly reserved.”

While no form is prescribed, the substantial requirements of a concerns notice are entirely inconsistent with a statement of that nature and I accept Ms Norman’s submission that whatever else might be said about the matter, the particulars in relation to serious harm are, with respect, non-existent.

One can appreciate a litigant seeking to make the best of a difficult position, but I am not persuaded by Mr Meredith’s argument that the letter of 15 July was in fact, or even intended, to be a concerns notice. The obvious inference, with respect to him, is that the letter was sent to notify his intention to bring a claim, but in ignorance of the requirements of section 12A of the Act. I am satisfied that the proceedings were commenced on 18 December 2025 in contravention of the mandatory provisions of section 12B of the Act. By force of section 14(2)(b), the publisher is permitted the period of 28 days to offer amends and proceedings may not be commenced within that period.

I am empowered, however, to grant leave for proceedings to be commenced despite noncompliance with section 12B(1)(c), which requires the applicable period to have elapsed, but only if a proposed plaintiff satisfies the Court of one of two conditions. Mr Meredith does not rely upon section 12B(3)(a), but he does invoke (b) which is in the terms of “it is just and reasonable to grant leave”. In this regard Mr Meredith relies principally upon an email from the executive editor of the newspaper which published the articles.

There are a number of things about that letter, which formed Annexure PS 12 to his affidavit of service, which Mr Meredith draws to my attention. The first matter that Mr Meredith relies upon is that even if I accept, as I do, that the original Statement of Claim was not served in accordance with the requirements of the Corporations Act, it came to the attention of the editor of the relevant newspaper, a Mr Joyce. Mr Joyce refers to the concerns notice and also refers to receiving a document entitled “Amended Statement of Claim” purporting to bring a defamation claim in respect of the publications referred to in the concerns notice. The title of an “amended statement of claim” was a misnomer by Mr Meredith. It was indeed the original Statement of Claim as I understand it.

Mr Joyce acknowledges that the concerns notice and Statement of Claim were sent to the Newcastle address that Mr Meredith derived from the business name register and it is obvious from the email that Mr Joyce had received the July letter because he states as follows:

I pause to interpolate clearly Mr Joyce received and read and understood the letter of July 2025. Mr Joyce continues:

Mr Joyce goes on to make clear that he is taking the section 12B(1)(c) point. He states that the proceedings are invalid and liable to be struck out. He also makes the point that service has not yet been affected on the registered office. He suggests that Mr Meredith let the proceedings lapse without serving them, as formal service will simply result in an application to have them struck out as invalid. He goes on to say that if Mr Meredith wishes to proceed, then he will have to ensure formal service on the registered office. He provided the address of the registered office, but at that time the address he gave was a little premature because the change from a Kent Street address to the Bridge Street address where the registered office is now was not effective until 6 February 2026. To my mind nothing turns on that for the reasons I have already stated.

One can draw certain inferences from this. The first is that the concerns notice was received and understood and that the defendant indicated an available defence which, if made good, will be a complete answer to the claim of defamation. One can also infer from that considered position by the defendant, which obviously had been developed since the receipt of the letter of 15 July 2025, that there would be no offer at any time to make amends. I am not suggesting anything unreasonable about the attitude of the newspaper, I am simply stating the reality is that had Mr Meredith not jumped the gun and served the Statement of Claim prematurely, no offer to make amends would have been made and the matter would likely proceed to trial on the basis of the fair and accurate report of court proceedings defence.

So far as I can tell, there have been no decided cases concerning the just and reasonable discretion in section 12(3)(b) empowering the Court to grant leave. It is clear that a just and reasonable power to grant leave provides a flexible, discretionary power for the avoidance of injustice.

The just and reasonable formulation is familiar in various iterations of limitation provisions providing a statutory bar of a remedy where proceedings are commenced out of time rather than, as here, before time. An example may be found in section 60D of the Limitation Act concerning certain claims for personal injuries. The touchstone of section 56A of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) concerned with defamation is a “just and reasonable” discretion.

The gravamen of the provision it seems to me, as I have already indicated, is that the Court has power to grant leave for the proceedings to be commenced if it is in the interests of justice to do so. I am also of the view that a provision of this type confers a power which can be exercised nunc pro tunc. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to apply for leave by the commencement of proceedings seeking leave to commence proceedings for damages in advance of filing the statement of claim. It would seem to me that requirement would entirely defeat the flexibility that the Parliament intended to allow in relation to a just and reasonable exception to the statutory bar provided by section 12B(1)(c) of the Act.

However, in determining what the interests of justice require one has to bear in mind the purposes of sections 12A and 12B. They are principally that proceedings for defamation should not be commenced until the plaintiff’s case has been fully set out in a concerns notice and a defendant has had adequate time to consider its contents with a view of considering whether to offer to make amends. The purpose of this, of course, is to avoid unnecessary litigation in relation to defamation proceedings. The avoidance of unnecessary proceedings will in many cases occur through the amends process. That is to say that given the opportunity to consider and resolve the matter out of court, a defendant may well make an offer of amends which may satisfy the plaintiff, and the matter will be fully resolved without recourse to the Court. In any event, the general rule is the defendant must be allowed that opportunity. However, there are exceptional cases that will fall within the just and reasonable exception.

The Court should be slow to allow the application of the just and reasonable exception. By this I mean some restraint should be exercised, given the purposes of sections 12A and 12B to which I have referred. On the other hand, it is clear in the particular circumstances of this case, and I am not casting any aspersions upon the defendant whatsoever, that the defendant had an earlier opportunity to consider its position, considered it again when it received the concerns notice and reiterated its position as conveyed to the plaintiff’s then solicitor back in August 2025 that it had a complete defence and, if I may say so, with respect, this is hardly a surprising position for a newspaper to adopt in respect of its report of legal proceedings.

While I would not say that in every such case it is just and reasonable for the plaintiff to be granted leave nunc pro tunc to commence the proceedings issued prematurely, I am satisfied in the particular circumstances of this case, given the not unreasonably firm position that Mr Joyce has expressed, that there is nothing to be gained by striking out the proceedings other than the imposition of forensic discipline.

Forensic discipline is not an unworthy aim of the Court’s procedures. At the same time, however, the interests of justice are better, and I am of the view that given the mistake that Mr Meredith made about the operation of the Limitation Act, the interests of justice are available as a ground for the Court’s indulgence in this case to allow the proceedings to be maintained.

I should add ignorance of the law, as the maxim goes, is no defence. At the same time, the ignorance of a layman may provide an explanation for why he breached the rules. This is not a case where he acted in defiance of section 12B or with contumelious disregard of the defendant’s rights. He mistakenly thought he had a legitimate reason for issuing the proceedings when he did.

In any event, for the reasons I have given, I propose to grant leave nunc pro tunc. Before I do so I will indicate that following the argument on Friday and Mr Meredith’s acquiescence in aspects of Ms Norman’s argument, I propose to make orders striking out the imputations found as ASOC [35](e), [35](h) and [38](e).

My orders are: