Bryl v Law Society of New South Wales

1. [1]

   By a summons filed 1 July 2025, the plaintiff, Mr Artem Bryl (who represented himself), seeks judicial review of a decision dated 29 May 2025 and communicated to Mr Bryl on the following day (the Decision). The Decision, by the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (the Council), was to refuse to renew Mr Bryl’s practising certificate because the Council considered him not to be a fit and proper person for the purposes of s 45 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (Uniform Law). The Council was joined as a party to the proceedings on 14 August 2025.

2. [2]

   On the same day, the Council refused to renew the practising certificate of Mr Bryl’s wife, Ms Marie Odtojan, and a manager was then appointed to the law practice at which they both practised. Ms Odtojan has challenged both those decisions in separate proceedings, which are the subject of separate reasons for judgment (see Odtojan v Law Society of New South Wales [2026] NSWSC 23). Aside from the challenge to the validity of the decision to appoint a manager to the law practice, there is a substantial overlap in the twelve grounds of judicial review raised by both Mr Bryl and his wife. They may be summarised with reference to the following five broad categories:

3. [3]

   For the following reasons, the summons will be dismissed with costs. I will also explain why, at the outset of the hearing, I allowed the defendants’ motion filed 24 November 2025 challenging two notices to admit facts issued by Mr Bryl and why I also dismissed the defendants’ application for a non-publication order.

4. [4]

   These reasons for judgment are structured as follows:

(a) Background facts summarised

1. [5]

   The Council’s reasons for the Decision describe many relevant background facts.

2. [6]

   Mr Bryl was admitted to practice in NSW on 25 March 2022. Prior to 29 May 2025, he held what is called an “employee of a law practice (supervised) practising certificate” and worked together with his wife at that law practice from 12 April 2022. There were no other solicitors working there at the relevant times. Ms Odtojan was the sole principal of the law practice.

3. [7]

   On 15 May 2024, Mr Bryl applied to have his practising certificate renewed for the period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 (Renewal Application).

4. [8]

   Prior to Mr Bryl lodging his Renewal Application, the New South Wales Legal Services Commissioner (Commissioner) had made two referrals dated 7 July 2023 and 8 March 2024 (Referrals) respectively to the Law Society concerning correspondence which the Commissioner had received from the Registrar of the Court of Appeal. The first referral related to matters concerning the conduct of Ms Odtojan and Mr Bryl raised by Leeming and Kirk JJA in Odtojan v Condon [2023] NSWCA 129 and Odtojan v Condon (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 149, together with papers relating to those proceedings (First Court of Appeal Proceedings).

5. [9]

   The second referral related to matters raised by White JA and Basten AJA in Odtojan v Ford [2023] NSWCA 277; Odtojan v Glynn t/as Glynns Lawyers [2023] NSWCA 276 and Odtojan v Glynn t/as Glynns Lawyers; Odtojan v Ford (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 25, together with papers in those proceedings (Second Court of Appeal Proceedings). The matters relate to the conduct of Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan in those particular proceedings.

6. [10]

   The relevant conduct occurred in the context of civil proceeding brought by Ms Odtojan in the District Court against three legal practitioners. Those practitioners had either represented Ms Odtojan or provided legal advice to her in relation to a debt recovery matter in the Local Court which had resulted in a judgment debt being entered against Ms Odtojan in the sum of approximately $45,000, together with an adverse costs order which ultimately was assessed in the amount of $216,000.

7. [11]

   In the District Court proceedings, Ms Odtojan made serious allegations that two of the practitioners retained to represent her in the Local Court had conspired with each other and with lawyers for the plaintiff to obtain judgments against her, such that the judgments had been obtained by fraud and collusion. She also alleged that the third practitioner (a senior counsel) became a party to the conspiracy when he advised her in 2016 concerning her prospects of appealing the Local Court decision. Ms Odtojan appeared for herself in the District Court proceeding.

8. [12]

   In February and March 2003, the District Court ordered that Ms Odtojan’s amended statements of claim be struck out in respect of the three legal practitioners, but leave was given to replead.

9. [13]

   Instead of repleading, Ms Odtojan commenced appeal proceedings in the Court of Appeal against all three practitioners seeking leave to appeal. Ms Odtojan signed her written submissions in the first of the Court of Appeal proceedings, but Mr Bryl appeared for her at the hearing, in effect as a McKenzie friend. Mr Bryl also confirmed that he had a substantial role in drafting the written submissions and he took professional responsibility for them.

10. [14]

    In the First Court of Appeal Proceedings, Ms Odtojan’s summons seeking leave to appeal was dismissed and Ms Odtojan was ordered to pay costs. The Court described Ms Odtojan’s allegations against the legal practitioners as “self-evidently baseless and improper”. In Odtojan v Condon at [80], Leeming and Kirk JJA summarised the serious allegations made by Ms Odtojan and/or Mr Bryl against various people, including the legal practitioners and the District Court Judge:

11. [15]

    Their Honours expressed concerns at [66] about Ms Odtojan and her husband’s lack of understanding of, and compliance with, basic ethical requirements and professional obligations. They were given an opportunity to show cause why that particular judgment and the related papers should not be referred to the Commissioner.

12. [16]

    The response by Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan simply further reinforced the Court’s concerns, as is reflected in the following paragraphs from their Honours’ second judgment handed down on 3 July 2023 (Odtojan v Condon (No 2)):

13. [17]

    In the Second Court of Appeal Proceedings, White JA and Basten AJA raised similar concerns regarding the conduct of Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan in making serious allegations and accusations which were without any factual or evidentiary foundation. In a judgment dated 21 November 2023, White JA noted in Odtojan v Glynn t/as Glynns Lawyers at [107] that, notwithstanding the admonition by Leeming and Kirk JJA and the referral of the papers in the First Court of Appeal Proceedings to the Commissioner, Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan persisted in making baseless allegations of fraud and collusion against the legal practitioners. Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan were given 14 days to show cause why that judgment and the related papers should not also be referred to the Commissioner.

14. [18]

    In Odtojan v Glynn t/as Glynns Lawyers; Odtojan v Ford (No 2) at [4], White JA and Basten AJA noted that, although Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan had provided a “lengthy and inappropriate email” questioning the Court’s reasons in its judgment dated 21 November 2023, they had not made any submissions as to why there should not be a referral to the Commissioner.

15. [19]

    It is evident from the Council’s reasons for the Decision that it was aware of the fact that the concerns raised in the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings had been referred to the Commissioner under cover of two separate letters dated 3 July 2023 and 29 February 2024, who then forwarded them to the Council. Copies of the Referrals from the Commissioner to the Council were not adduced in evidence in the present proceedings, but the Council noted in its reasons for the Decision at [6] that those concerns were relevant to the Council’s consideration of Mr Bryl’s Renewal Application.

16. [20]

    I shall now summarise the relevant correspondence which was exchanged between Mr Bryl and the Law Society concerning his Renewal Application.

17. [21]

    On 17 July 2024, Ms Griswold wrote to Mr Bryl and invited him to provide submissions as to why the Council should not refuse his Renewal Application. Under the heading “Alleged Conduct” Ms Griswold described three broad topics which were considered to be relevant to the Council’s decision whether to renew the practising certificate. Under the first of the three headings “Court of Appeal referrals”, Ms Griswold identified the following seven “alleged conduct issues” as arising from the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings:

18. [22]

    Under a second heading, “Failure to Disclose”, Ms Griswold identified another relevant issue as Mr Bryl’s failure to disclose all the Court of Appeal findings and orders in his Renewal Application.

19. [23]

    Under a third heading, “Declarations”, Ms Griswold identified as another relevant matter the declarations made by Mr Bryl in his Renewal Application. Mr Bryl was invited to provide any further submissions by 9 August 2024.

20. [24]

    In her letter, Ms Griswold added that she intended to ask the Council at its next meeting to consider whether to grant or refuse Mr Bryl’s Renewal Application, referring explicitly to s 45 of the Uniform Law and r 13 of the Legal Profession Uniform General Rules 2015 (NSW) (Uniform Rules).

21. [25]

    Ms Griswold attached a lengthy annexure to her 17 July 2024 letter, setting out numerous extracts from the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings relating to the conduct of Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan.

22. [26]

    On 14 August 2024, Mr Bryl emailed a 12-page letter dated 13 August 2024 (written jointly with Ms Odtojan) in response inter alia to Ms Griswold’s 17 July 2024 letter. His covering email provided a Google Drive link to 25 different sets of documents upon which he relied.

23. [27]

    In brief, in the 13 August 2024 letter Mr Bryl complained that the 17 July 2024 letter was the first notice he had received of the allegations of misconduct and prior misconduct. He claimed that the allegations had already had an adverse effect on him because his Renewal Application was neither approved nor refused and was therefore taken to continue in force on and from 1 July 2024 pending a final decision. Mr Bryl accused Ms Griswold of using her position, authority and delegated powers to influence the Council and to prevent his practising certificate from being renewed on the false premise that Mr Bryl had engaged in misconduct.

24. [28]

    Mr Bryl submitted that the documents in Annexure A to the 17 July 2024 letter were incomplete. He said that the missing documents were listed in [31] of Ms Odtojan’s letter dated 13 August 2024.

25. [29]

    In his 13 August 2024 letter, Mr Bryl also complained that Ms Griswold’s 17 July 2024 letter contained “unfounded statements of fact of a serious nature against a legal practitioner, that there are findings of misconduct and ‘prior misconduct’”. He added that it appeared that Ms Griswold had “used [her] position, authority and delegated powers to influence the Law Council/Licencing and Registry Office (communications which are not made transparent to me), to prevent my certificate from being renewed on the false premise that there was misconduct by me”.

26. [30]

    Mr Bryl made the following additional claims in response to Ms Griswold’s letter (footnotes omitted):

27. [31]

    This is not an exhaustive summary of all of the matters raised by Mr Bryl in his 13 August 2024 letter. For example, he also called for Ms Griswold’s “removal” from the matter on the basis that she had “demonstrated partial and corrupt conduct in [her] office of authority, as PSD Director”. Also, Mr Bryl claimed that the Judges in the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings had “by ambush, impermissibly conducted a re-hearing under r 13.4 of the [Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR)] of summarily (sic) dismissal for claims that are baseless, vexatious and frivolous”. Mr Bryl repeatedly complained that the PSD was acting unlawfully by proceeding under Ch 3 and not Ch 5 of the Uniform Law.

28. [32]

    By a letter dated 15 August 2024, Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan jointly wrote to various people within the Law Society, including the President and members of Council, raising concerns regarding Ms Griswold’s letters dated 8 and 17 July 2024 to Ms Odtojan and Mr Bryl respectively. They claimed that the letters were evidence of “an agenda” on the part of Ms Griswold to target their practising certificates “based on false premises of misconduct and non-disclosure of misconduct, with the intent to effect [their] ability to practice law”.

29. [33]

    By a separate letter dated 30 August 2024, Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan jointly wrote to the Attorney General raising numerous complaints regarding the conduct of Ms Griswold and the PSD. After describing the conduct complained of, the authors said that it raised “serious questions of [Ms Griswold’s] fitness as a legal practitioner” and that, as Director, she had “used her position to make unfounded statements of facts [sic] of misconduct and has acted upon those false premises to prevent the legitimate process of the renewal of our practising certificates”. They added at [20] that Justices Leeming, Kirk, White and Basten had, in their respective judgments, “recorded facts, representations and evidence substantially by ambush, which do not reflect what transpired in court”. They added that those Justices “are alleged to have engaged in conduct which interferes with the administration of justice” and that those “Justices, in their judicial positions, have intimidated, threatened and referred a victim and two witnesses to be subject of investigation by the OLSC (ss 314, 315, 315A and 319 of the Crimes Act 1900)”.

30. [34]

    A response to the joint letter dated 30 August 2024 was sent by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Attorney General. The letter referred to the fact that the Law Society had advised that there were typographical errors in the July 2024 letters in that they should have referred to “alleged prior conduct” and “alleged prior misconduct”. The Parliamentary Secretary said, however, that it would not be appropriate for the Attorney General to comment on any investigation being undertaken by the Law Society.

31. [35]

    On 12 February 2025, Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan sent a joint email to the Deputy Director of the PSD inquiring about the status of their practising certificates and membership of the Law Society, noting that they were no longer recorded on the Register of Solicitors and it appeared that they were no longer regarded as members of the Law Society. They enclosed documents relating to their attempts to renew their memberships as well as screenshots of the Register of Solicitors.

32. [36]

    On 24 March 2025, the Deputy Director of the PSD wrote to Mr Bryl. After reiterating that the Council had taken no action to date concerning Mr Bryl’s practising certificate and correcting two inadvertent errors in the 17 July 2024 letter, Mr Bryl was invited to address new concerns arising from social media statements and comments, including on the website and LinkedIn account of the law practice. The following alleged conduct issues were identified as arising from this material:

33. [37]

    The Deputy Director stated that the Council would consider the matters raised in the letters dated 17 July 2024 and 24 March 2025, as well as in Mr Bryl’s correspondence received to date, in considering whether he was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. Mr Bryl was invited to provide any submissions by 17 April 2025.

34. [38]

    Mr Bryl and Ms Odtojan sent a joint email dated 15 May 2025 addressed to the Deputy Director of the PSD. The letter was copied to various other email addresses, including those of the President of the Law Society and the Commissioner. The email was primarily directed to criticising the PSD’s actions as being “nonsensical” and making “unclear”, “unfounded” and “unsubstantiated” allegations against them. They claimed that they had been “unlawfully prevented from making our regular annual applications for renewal of our practising certificates and memberships, including the Professional Scheme”. They accused the Deputy Director, PSD and the Council of engaging in “an unlawful targeted discriminatory hate crime and fraud” against them. They sought a response to the email dated 12 February 2025 and requested further information and particulars of the alleged “findings of misconduct” in the various court cases referred to in earlier correspondence.

35. [39]

    The Deputy Director responded by an email dated 21 May 2025. The letter did not address all the matters raised by Ms Odtojan and Mr Bryl in their email dated 15 May 2025. The Deputy Director reiterated that the letters to Ms Odtojan and Mr Bryl dated 8 July 2024 and 17 July 2024 respectively had inadvertently omitted the word “alleged” before the words “prior conduct” and “prior misconduct”.

36. [40]

    By a letter dated 30 May 2025, Ms Griswold informed Mr Bryl that, on the previous day, the Council had considered his Renewal Application and had resolved that it was of the opinion that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. Accordingly, his Renewal Application was refused under s 45 of the Uniform Law. Ms Griswold enclosed a formal notice dated 30 May 2025 under ss 45 and 464 of the Uniform Law signed by her on behalf of the Council. The Council’s reasons for the Decision were provided as an attachment to the notice.

(b) Council’s reasons for the Decision summarised

1. [41]

   I shall now summarise relevant aspects of the Council’s reasons for refusing Mr Bryl’s Renewal Application.

2. [42]

   In concluding that it considered Mr Bryl not to be a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate, the Council said at [61] that it had had regard to the following material:

3. [43]

   At [62], the Council described as “extremely serious” Mr Bryl’s conduct in “repeatedly and persistently advocating what the Court of Appeal directly flagged during its exchanges with the Solicitor to be “serious allegations”, and then found to be baseless allegations and unjustified accusations of misconduct against various persons, including members of the legal profession and judiciary”. It referred to the significance attached by the Court of Appeal to the fact that both Ms Odtojan and Mr Bryl were legal practitioners and were under “heightened obligations when invoking legal process”. It then added at [62] that “such conduct also has a strong tendency to be destructive of the relationship of mutual confidence and trust between the Court” and, in this case, the Solicitor, “which is essential to the prior and efficient administration of justice” (referring to Wentworth v New South Wales Bar Association (Court of Appeal (NSW), 14 February 1994, unrep) at 23–4).

4. [44]

   It is well to set out [63]–[66] of the Council’s reasons:

5. [45]

   After referring to the information and declaration made by Mr Bryl in his Renewal Application, the Council said at [70] that Mr Bryl was aware at that time of the concerns about his conduct identified in the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings. In those circumstances, the Council found at [71] that it was incumbent on Mr Bryl to disclose all matters relevant to his fitness and propriety to hold a practising certificate, “regardless of his belief about what the Law Society was aware of”.

6. [46]

   While acknowledging that when Mr Bryl lodged his Renewal Application there were no disciplinary findings of professional misconduct or disciplinary action being taken against him, the Council then stated at [71]-[72]:

7. [47]

   As to the Deputy Director’s March 2025 letter regarding the posting of various material, including on social media and the law practice’s website, the Council noted at [73] that Mr Bryl had made no substantive submissions but had instead requested copies of the examples particularised in that letter. In these circumstances, the Council considered that there was sufficient information for it to conclude at [73] of its reasons that:

8. [48]

   The Council set out the following additional conclusions at [76]-[77]:

(c) Mr Bryl’s grounds of judicial review summarised

1. [49]

   As noted above, the summons contains twelve separate grounds of judicial review (some of those grounds overlap). Many are expressed in a lengthy narrative form and are accompanied by detailed particulars. To avoid adding unnecessarily to the length of these reasons, I will not reproduce the grounds but will adopt the three “themes” used by Mr Bryl in his outline of written submissions under which the grounds are grouped.

(d) Consideration and determination

1. [50]

   It is convenient to address the following matters in turn:

2. [51]

   For completeness, it should be noted that Mr Bryl did not press his notice of motion filed 11 August 2025 which sought to set aside the first defendant’s formal response dated 28 July 2025 in the proceedings. The motion was dismissed with an order that costs be costs in the cause.

3. [52]

   As previously noted, Mr Bryl’s core complaint is that the Decision was unlawful because the Council applied the processes under Ch 3 and not Ch 5 of the Uniform Law. Accordingly, it necessary at the outset to outline some relevant legislative provisions and related caselaw relating to the power to refuse to renew Mr Bryl’s practising certificate.

4. [53]

   The objectives of the Uniform Law are described in s 3:

5. [54]

   The Uniform Law is divided into nine distinct chapters, not all of which are relevant to the present proceeding. Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6 are relevant. Broadly speaking, Ch 2 provides for the “Threshold requirements for legal practice”, including admission to the Australian legal profession.

6. [55]

   Chapter 3 contains multiple provisions relating to legal practice, including the holding and renewal of a practising certificate.

7. [56]

   Chapter 5 deals, inter alia, with professional disciplinary matters, while Ch 6 deals with external intervention in the business and professional affairs of law practices.

8. [57]

   I shall now highlight particular relevant provisions in Chs 3, 5 and 6 respectively.

9. [58]

   Part 3.3 relates to Australian legal practitioners and contains relevant provisions concerning the important role of practising certificates. The objectives of this Part are described in s 42, which relevantly provides:

10. [59]

    An “Australian legal practitioner” (who is defined in s 6 to mean an Australian lawyer who holds a current Australian practising certificate) is entitled to engaged in legal practice in NSW, subject to any requirements of the Uniform Law, the Uniform Rules and the conditions of the practitioner’s Australian practising certificate (s 43).

11. [60]

    Sections 44 and 45 contain important provisions concerning the grant and renewal of Australian practising certificates in New South Wales. Under s 44(1), “[t]he designated local regulatory authority may, on application, grant or renew an Australian practising certificate in respect of a financial year”. The term “designated local regulatory authority” is defined in s 6(1) of the Uniform Law as follows:

12. [61]

    Table 1 in s 11(1) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) (Application Act) provides that, subject to certain exceptions not relevant in the present proceedings, the “designated local regulatory authority” is the “Appropriate Council”. That phrase is defined in s 3(1) of the Application Act as follows:

13. [62]

    The “Appropriate Council” is the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (i.e. the second defendant in the present proceeding).

14. [63]

    The power to grant or renew a practising certificate conferred by s 44(1) of the Uniform Law is subject to s 45, which relevantly provides as follows:

15. [64]

    Section 45 imposes two conditions on the Council’s power to grant or renew a practising certificate. First, the Council “may grant or renew an Australian practising certificate only if it is satisfied that the applicant” satisfies the criteria set out in s 45(1) of the Uniform Law. Secondly, and more relevantly for present purposes, the Council “must not grant or renew an Australian practising certificate if it considers that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold the certificate” (s 45(2)). This absolute prohibition is important in assessing Mr Bryl’s core complaint.

16. [65]

    Section 45(3) of the Uniform Law provides that, in considering whether a person is or is not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate, the Council “may have regard to the matters specified in the Uniform Rules for the purposes of this section”. Those matters are specified in r 13 of Uniform Rules and relevantly include:

17. [66]

    Part 3.5 of Ch 3 contains provisions concerning the variation, suspension and cancellation of, and refusal to renew practising certificates. The objectives of this Part are described in s 72:

18. [67]

    Division 3 of Pt 3.5 contains provisions which empower the designated local regulatory authority (in this case the Council) to vary, suspend or cancel a certificate under that Division on specified grounds, including that the holder of a practising certificate has contravened a condition of the certificate (s 82(1)(a)) or, in the case of an Australian practising certificate, if the designated local authority “reasonably believes that the holder is unable to fulfil the inherent requirements of an Australian legal practitioner”. This means that the Council has a continuing power and responsibility to monitor the conduct of Australian legal practitioners in New South Wales. Its regulatory powers in this regard are not confined to considering on an annual basis whether or not to grant the renewal of a practising certificate.

19. [68]

    Division 4 of Pt 3.5 contains provisions concerning what is described as “Show cause procedure”. According to the heading to Div 4, this procedure relates to “the variation, suspension or cancellation of, or refusal to renew certificates”.

20. [69]

    It is not necessary to describe the detailed provisions of Div 4 at any length other than to note that the provisions are plainly intended to provide procedural fairness to practitioners who are at risk of adverse regulatory action. Having regard to Mr Bryl’s core complaint, however, it is important to note s 97 of the Uniform Law which expressly addresses the relationship between Chs 3 and 5:

21. [70]

    Before summarising some relevant aspects of Ch 5, it is desirable to note the provisions in Pt 3.6 of Ch 3, which create a right of appeal or review concerning decisions about Australian practising certificates.

22. [71]

    Section 99 (which is in Pt 3.6) provides:

23. [72]

    Section 100 provides a right of appeal or review to the “designated tribunal” against decisions of the Council under s 44 of the Uniform Law. For reasons which will become clear below, it is well to set the section out in full:

24. [73]

    The Supreme Court of New South Wales is the “designated tribunal” for the purposes of s 100 of the Uniform Law (see s 11(3) of the Application Act). Appeals brought under s 100 are in the nature of hearings de novo (PQ (A Pseudonym) v Law Society of New South Wales (No 3) (2021) 104 NSWLR 375; [2021] NSWSC 420 at [18] per Adamson JA, citing Veghelyi v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (1989) 17 NSWLR 669 at 674 per Smart J).

25. [74]

    The Uniform Law does not specify the period of time within which an appeal or review must be commenced. However, s 100(1) refers to “applicable jurisdictional legislation”. I consider that r 50.3 of the UCPR therefore applies. Rule 50.3 provides as follows:

26. [75]

    Chapter 5 of the Uniform Law contains detailed provisions concerning dispute resolution and professional discipline. At the risk of repetition, Mr Bryl’s core complaint is that the Council was obliged to act in accordance with the processes under Ch 5 if it proposed to take any regulatory action against him based on allegations concerning his professional conduct. The objectives of Ch 5 are described in s 260:

27. [76]

    Part 5.2 deals at length with complaints relating to any dispute or issue about any conduct to which Ch 5 relates (s 266). This includes conduct concerning a “disciplinary matter”, which is defined in s 270 to mean “so much of a complaint about a lawyer or a law practice as would, if the conduct concerned were established, amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct” (which concepts are defined in ss 296 and 297 respectively).

28. [77]

    Chapter 5 also contains detailed provisions relating to such matters as the power of the designated local regulatory authority to recommend that a practising certificate be immediately suspended in specified circumstances (s 278) and procedural fairness requirements (Div 3 of Pt 5.2).

29. [78]

    Part 5.4 of Ch 5 deals specifically with disciplinary matters, being conduct of a lawyer which amounts to either “unsatisfactory professional conduct” or “professional misconduct”. Section 298 defines, non-exhaustively, conduct which is capable of constituting either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. This includes conduct consisting of a contravention of the Uniform Rules (s 298(b)). The designated local regulatory authority (i.e. the Council) is empowered by s 299 to make a determination that a legal practitioner has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct and, having made such a determination, impose various specified sanctions. Procedural fairness requirements are spelt out in relation to any such determination (s 299(2)).

30. [79]

    It is notable that the Council is not the body which is empowered to make a final determination that a legal practitioner has engaged in professional misconduct. Instead, Div 3 of Pt 5.4 provides for there to be disciplinary proceedings in the “designated tribunal” (in New South Wales being NCAT). Section 300 provides:

31. [80]

    As noted above, in his written submissions filed 4 November 2025, Mr Bryl grouped his twelve grounds of judicial review (which were described as “inter-related”) into three separate themes. Those themes provide the broad structure for the following analysis.

32. [81]

    These grounds relate to Mr Bryl’s core complaint, namely that, where there are allegations of professional misconduct, the Council lacked jurisdiction to determine facts or make findings of misconduct in relation to s 45 (which is included in Ch 3 of the Uniform Law) as opposed to the processes provided under Ch 5 where there are allegations of professional misconduct. Mr Bryl claims that if the Council wished to pursue allegations of professional misconduct this must occur within the framework provided by Ch 5, which provides different processes and confers stronger rights to protect legal practitioners against whom allegations are levelled.

33. [82]

    For the following reasons, I do not accept these claims.

34. [83]

    First, the Council was statutorily obliged to consider and determine the Renewal Application. The process for doing so is set out in Ch 3, which is the process employed by the Council here. Without doubt, the Council was aware that the Commissioner had made the Referrals to it, both of which involved serious allegations regarding the professional conduct of Mr Bryl, as highlighted in the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings. Those matters, if substantiated, had the potential to affect an assessment of the Council of whether Mr Bryl was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate, that being a mandatory consideration affecting the Council’s determination of the Renewal Application (see s 45(3) of the Uniform Law). Moreover, as noted above, the Council was expressly prohibited by s 45(2) from renewing a practising certificate if it considered that the person was not fit and proper. Necessarily, therefore, the Council had to turn its mind to that issue in considering the Renewal Application.

35. [84]

    Given the nature of the conduct issues raised against Mr Bryl, there was a possibility that Mr Bryl could be found guilty by the designated regulatory body of unsatisfactory professional conduct and/or professional misconduct. But the Council had a discretion whether to proceed, in all the relevant circumstances, under Ch 3 or Ch 5. The fact that Mr Bryl had lodged the Renewal Application was no doubt an important consideration in the decision to consider and determine that application before any attention was given to initiating action under Ch 5.

36. [85]

    Secondly, the fact of this discretion is reflected in s 97 of the Uniform Law, the terms of which are set out at [69] above. That provision clarifies the relationship between Chs 3 and 5 in the following two respects:

37. [86]

    Thirdly, the statutory regime under the Uniform Law leaves no room for the operation of the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum. That maxim is reflected in the following statements by Gavan Duffy CJ and Dixon J in Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia [1932] HCA 9; (1932) 47 CLR 1 at 7:

38. [87]

    It is widely acknowledged that the maxim has several significant limitations and qualifications (see Herzfeld & Prince, Interpretation (3rd ed, 2024, Lawbook Co), at [6.160]). As Gummow and Hayne JJ stated in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566; [2006] HCA 50 at [59]:

39. [88]

    As the detailed analysis above of Chs 3 and 5 of the Uniform Law reveals, the powers of the Council to consider and determine the effect of Mr Bryl’s conduct as a legal practitioner is not confined to proceedings under Ch 5. In the context of considering whether or not to refuse to renew his practising certificate, Ch 3 confers on the Council alternative powers and processes which are distinct from those within Ch 5. This conclusion is similar of that reached in Nystrom, where a detailed statutory analysis of the different legislative context there resulted in the High Court concluding that the relevant statute did not confer one power only. Gleeson CJ stated at [2], with reference to the relationship between s 501 and ss 200 and 201 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (provisions which dealt with the removal of person who have been convicted of offences in Australia) (emphasis added):

40. [89]

    Fourthly, merely because the Council has determined in one or more other cases (such as in Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Jaruwan Tangsilsat [2018] NSWCATOD 138) to proceed under Ch 5 and not Ch 3 where consideration is being given to whether or not to renew a practising certificate, does not have the legal effect of converting what is a discretion into a mandatory duty which obliges the Council to always proceed under Ch 5 in the first instance where issues of professional conduct are raised and there is also pending an application to renew a practising certificate. The Council has a genuine discretion which must, of course be exercised in accordance with the usual legal constraints on the proper exercise of a statutory discretion.

41. [90]

    Fifthly, I also reject Mr Bryl’s claims that Ch 3 is available only to deal with “administrative matters” relating to legal practice. That claims fails to recognise that one of the specified circumstances in which the Council must refuse to renew a practising certificate is where the Council considers that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold the certificate (see s 45(2) of the Uniform Law). The concept of a person not being a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate cannot be confined, as suggested by Mr Bryl, to circumstances in which the person has some relevant medical or other physical condition which renders them not to be a fit and proper person.

42. [91]

    This particular contention is also inconsistent with the terms of s 45(3) (which are set out at [63] above). It provides that, in considering whether or not a person is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate, the Council may have regard to matters relevantly specified in the Uniform Rules. Some relevant matters specified in this regard in r 13 are set out at [65] above. Consideration of whether an applicant is currently of good fame and character or has provided inconsistent or misleading information in applying for an Australian practising certificate necessarily involve matters which go far beyond the limited matters advanced by Mr Bryl as relating to fitness and propriety. Whether or not a legal practitioner is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate may include consideration of that practitioner’s conduct which informs their fitness and propriety to practice law.

43. [92]

    It is well established that the concept of a fit and proper person is broad (see, for example, Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [1957] HCA 46; (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 297-298 per Kitto J; Prothonotary of Supreme Court of New South Wales v Montenegro [2015] NSWCA 409 at [66] per Meagher and Leeming JJA and Emmett AJA and de Robillard v Council of the New South Wales Bar Association; Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v de Robillard (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 299 at [236]-[238] per Gleeson JA, with whom Griffiths AJA agreed). A broad meaning of fitness and propriety is consistent with the overall objectives of the Uniform Law, including ensuring that lawyers are competent and maintain a high ethical and professional standards in the provision of legal services as well as enhancing the protection of clients of law practices and the protection of the public generally.

44. [93]

    Conduct which is relevant to an assessment of fitness and propriety of a legal practitioner includes, but is not confined to, conduct which constitutes professional misconduct for the purposes of s 297 of the Uniform Law. I reject Mr Bryl’s submission that professional misconduct is a “jurisdictional precondition to any finding or opinion that a lawyer is not a fit and proper person”. For similar reasons, I would also reject any claim that a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct is a jurisdictional precondition to a conclusion that a person is not fit and proper to hold a practising certificate.

45. [94]

    Sixthly, I reject the significance which Mr Bryl sought to attach to parts of the Law Society of New South Wales, Legal Regulation Department Annual Report 2024, (2024). That document contains a section under the heading “Complaints”. It states that the complaint may be made by any person or body, including the Commissioner and the Law Society but then states at page 8:

46. [95]

    Naturally, such a document cannot be determinative of the proper legal construction of provisions in Chs 3 and 5. In any event, the extracts referred to by Mr Bryl fall far short of saying that where the conduct of a legal practitioner is raised, the Council can only use the processes in Ch 5 and not those in Ch 3 where the renewal of a practising certificate is under consideration.

47. [96]

    By these grounds (which overlap with some of the other grounds of review), Mr Bryl claims that the defendants “conducted an undisclosed internal process with no meaningful engagement or notice of any lawful procedure or timeframe, maintaining eight months of silence following the Plaintiff’s initial correspondence”. Mr Bryl complains that he was not afforded due process regarding adverse actions taken in respect of his practising rights, including publishing his name on the Register maintained by the Commissioner, removing his name from the Register of Solicitors maintained by the Law Society, deactivating his Law Society membership and altering his practising certificate status such that it operated “in force” with reference to his expired 2023/2024 practising certificate. He also claims that Ms Griswold’s memorandum to the Council prior to its meeting on 29 May 2025 “pre-recorded ‘unfitness’ and ‘appointment of management limb’ outcomes before any purported Council meeting”. He alleges that the defendants disregarded materials or exculpatory evidence provided by him. Mr Bryl claims that the allegations against him were unsubstantiated and he was not given an opportunity to respond to some attachments in the materials provided to the Council. Furthermore, he complains that the Decision “solely relied on untested judicial commentary, from which the Defendants, through Ms Griswold, drew speculative and adverse conclusions about [Mr Bryl’s] character and conduct”.

48. [97]

    Many of these individual claims and complaints relate in one way or another to Mr Bryl’s core complaint concerning the defendants’ reliance on processes under Ch 3 and not those under Ch 5.

49. [98]

    For the following reasons, I reject these claims.

50. [99]

    First, the only decision identified in the summons which is expressly challenged is that relating to the Decision dated 29 May 2025 concerning non-renewal of Mr Bryl’s practising certificate. The summons does refer to various internal administrative steps taken by the “Defendant”, including removing Mr Bryl’s name from the “Law Society of NSW solicitor register”, but it appears that that conduct is criticised on the basis that it provides context for the impugned Decision. In oral address, Mr Bryl confirmed that his complaints regarding the internal actions concerning such matters such as the removal of his name from the Register of Solicitors and the termination of his Law Society membership were either contextual or were relevant to his complaint of predetermination.

51. [100]

    The way in which Mr Bryl has pleaded his case has necessary implications for any evidentiary burden carried by the defendants.

52. [101]

    Secondly, and in any event, aside from the way in which the judicial review challenge has been pleaded, I consider that Mr Bryl (who carries the burden of proof) has failed to establish that any of these internal actions involve reviewable error. I will return below to explain why I have reached that conclusion.

53. [102]

    Thirdly, no procedural unfairness has been established. Mr Bryl was given adequate notice of matters which the Council would consider in determining his Renewal Application. Those matters were sufficiently identified in the letters dated 17 July 2024 and 24 March 2025. Mr Bryl was given a reasonable opportunity to respond to those matters. Rather than squarely address the concerns identified in that correspondence, Mr Bryl preferred to adopt a strategy which involved him making serious allegations of persecution, victimisation, bad faith and repeated complaints that he had not been provided with adequate particulars.

54. [103]

    For reasons which I will explain, I consider that the letters sent by the Director and Deputy Director made sufficiently clear that the Council’s concerns regarding Mr Bryl’s conduct related to various matters raised against Mr Bryl in the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings, as well as the material posted on social media accounts and the website of the law practice.

55. [104]

    In her 24 March 2025 letter, the Deputy Director gave several examples of the material which contained disparaging and inflammatory statements regarding the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings. They included reference to the “Public Notice” posted on the website of Ms Odtojan’s law practice. The Deputy Director then identified the concerns raised by that material in the following terms:

56. [105]

    Moreover, Mr Bryl was left in no doubt by the terms of the Deputy Director’s letter that the Council would consider whether he was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate having regard to the following additional matters set out in the letter:

57. [106]

    Similarly, the Director’s letter dated 17 July 2024 put Mr Bryl on adequate notice of the matters which the Council would consider in addressing his Renewal Application.

58. [107]

    Nor was it procedurally unfair for the Council to rely on the transcript of the YouTube video posted on 17 May 2025 in circumstances where Mr Bryl does not deny that he had a role in posting the video (see [39]-[42] of the Council reasons).

59. [108]

    Procedural fairness does not require the defendants to provide additional particulars of these concerns, nor provide physical copies of the posts. I accept the defendants’ submission that there is no denial of procedural fairness in relying upon information the substance of which is well known to the affected person (see Seek Justice Pty Ltd v Blue Mountains Local Planning Panel/Blue Mountains City Council [2025] NSWCA 201 at [43] per Stern JA, Leeming and Mitchelmore JJA agreeing and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223; [2012] FCAFC 45 at [30] per Rares and Jagot JJ).

60. [109]

    Nor did procedural fairness oblige the Council to respond to Mr Bryl’s multiple requests for additional particulars. That is because the relevant matters had already been adequately particularised in the letters dated 17 July 2024 and 24 March 2025. Alternatively, the particulars requested by Mr Bryl related to matters which ultimately were not relied upon by the Council in making the Decision. Procedural fairness requirements do not oblige a decision-maker to give notice or particulars of matters not relied upon in the making of an adverse decision (see Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; [1985] HCA 81).

61. [110]

    I return now to address Mr Bryl’s complaints that he was not given proper notice of various internal actions taken by the Law Society. He claims this gave rise to procedural unfairness and that there was no proper legal basis for the actions. For the following reasons (and putting to one side the way in which these matters are pleaded in the summons) none of these complaints rises to the level of jurisdictional error or error of law on the face of the record.

62. [111]

    Ground 6 raises claims of apprehended bias and the lack of an impartial decision-maker. Those allegations are primarily directed against the Director and Deputy Director of the PSD. The allegations overlap with the claim that the Director was in fact the actual decision-maker, not the Council. That latter allegation is not made out by the evidence. Without doubt, as might reasonably be expected, the Director had a prominent role in preparing the materials for the Council’s consideration at its meeting on 29 May 2025. As might also reasonably be expected, much of that material (including draft resolutions and draft reasons for decision) were provided to the Council in advance of the meeting. Such matters fall short, however, of establishing that the Director was in fact the decision-maker and not the Council itself. Nor do they demonstrate predetermination on the part of the Council (or anyone else).

63. [112]

    Nor do I accept Mr Bryl’s claim that the Director was the true decision-maker. This claim is not supported by the formal Instrument of Delegation. Under that delegation, the Council delegated to the Director all functions under Pt 3.3 of the Uniform Law. Functions relating to the grant, renewal, refusal and variation of Australian practising certificates were also delegated to other entities and individuals, including the Licensing Committee, the Disclosure Committee, the Director, Licensing and Registry and the Company Secretary/Secretary of the Law Society. The formal Instrument of Delegation also stated that any delegate who was considering refusing to grant or refuse a practising certificate had to give notice to the Council for the Council to decide whether to exercise the power under s 411(1) of the Uniform Law to assume responsibility for the matter.

64. [113]

    Nothing in the evidence indicates that the Director was exercising any delegation in respect of the decision made on 29 May 2025 to refuse the Renewal Application.

65. [114]

    As might reasonably be expected, the Director personally attended the Council meeting on 29 May 2025, as is recorded in the Special Council Meeting Minutes of that day. Nor is it surprising (let alone unlawful) that the Council resolved to delegate to the Director authority to sign the formal notice advising Mr Bryl of the Council’s Decision.

66. [115]

    The Council’s resolutions regarding refusal of the Renewal Application are as follows (emphasis in original):

67. [116]

    There is simply no foundation for Mr Bryl’s claims of apprehended bias in respect of either the Director or Deputy Director. There is nothing in the evidence which satisfies the “might-might” test established in cases such as Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 25 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63. Moreover, and in any event, where the Council was the true decision-maker and not either the Director or Deputy Director, it is hard to see why any apprehended bias on the part of those persons could be determinative of procedural unfairness (see Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy (2002) 210 CLR 438; [2002] HCA 51 at [50]-[52] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

68. [117]

    There is another aspect of this part of Mr Bryl’s case which warrants comment. His written submissions make repeated claims that the Decision was invalid because it “relied upon untested judicial commentary”, referring to the concerns expressed in the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings. Those claims reveal a surprising lack of comprehension on the part of an experienced legal practitioner as to the significance of concerns expressed by judges regarding the conduct of legal practitioners in legal proceedings. As was emphasised in the First and Second Court of Appeal Proceedings it matters not whether a legal practitioner is a litigant in person or is appearing as a legal representative. Relevant ethical obligations may apply and concerns expressed by judges, whether in interlocutory judgments or final judgments, may be relevant to the Council’s assessment as to whether or not a legal practitioner is a fit and proper person to continue to hold a practising certificate. Of course, procedural fairness requirements oblige the Council to give notice of any relevant concerns and an opportunity to respond before acting upon those concerns in making a decision under s 45 of the Uniform Law. But that is what occurred here. There is simply no basis in this aspect of Mr Bryl’s procedural fairness complaint.

69. [118]

    In ground 8 of the summons, Mr Bryl claims that the defendants failed to consider relevant matters, including Mr Bryl’s “unblemished professional record the absence of any findings of misconduct, his extensive written responses in evidence and the serious consequences of refusing his practising certificate demonstrating a failure to engage with mandatory considerations in informing the decision”.

70. [119]

    These claims are not supported by the evidence. It is clear that Mr Bryl’s letters dated 13, 14 and 15 August 2024 and 15 May 2025 (apart from the documents contained within the Google Drive links identified in that correspondence) were placed before the Council. Furthermore, Mr Bryl’s letter dated 12 February 2025 was included in an email chain flowing from his correspondence dated 15 May 2025.

71. [120]

    The fact that not all 25 sets of documents identified in the Google Drive links were placed before the Council does not establish a failure to take into account mandatory relevant considerations. As has been emphasised above, the Council was obliged to consider submissions or supporting materials which were relevant to the basis upon which the Decision was reached.

72. [121]

    Mr Bryl alleges that the Decision was made in bad faith and constitutes a “retaliatory act”. In his written submissions Mr Bryl claims that a series of events collectively demonstrate bias, bad faith, and predetermination.

73. [122]

    Mr Bryl asserts that the Council and Ms Griswold “exhibited hostility by using inflammatory and adversarial language, including aspersions on [Mr Bryl’s] character while evading the procedural requirements and safeguards of Ch 5”. It is well to set out Mr Bryl’s other submissions relating to these matters (omitting footnotes):

74. [123]

    It is evident that these submissions have been copied from Ms Odtojan’s written submissions in the separate proceedings. Given that Mr Bryl had only practised as a solicitor in NSW for three years, it is difficult to understand the reference to “false declarations” in 2017/18.

75. [124]

    To the extent that, by these submissions, Mr Bryl claims actual bias, I reject any such claim. As is well established, actual bias is a serious allegation that should not be made without proper grounds (see, for example, Odtojan v Ford [2023] NSWCA 277 at [19] per White JA, with whom Basten AJA agreed). Any claim by Mr Bryl that there was actual bias on the part of the Director, the Deputy Director or the Council itself is entirely baseless and is unsupported by any evidence. That claim ought not to have been made.

76. [125]

    Grounds 9 and 10 of the summons assert legal unreasonableness in respect of the Decisions, including claims that no reasonable decision-maker could have concluded that Mr Bryl was unfit to practice. These claims are rejected. I accept the defendants’ submission that legal unreasonableness is to be judged by reference to the statutory scheme under which an impugned decision was made (see Martinus Rail Pty Ltd v Qube RE Services (No 2) Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCA 49 at [129] per Payne JA, with whom Gleeson JA and Griffiths AJA agreed and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 at [67] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

77. [126]

    There is nothing in the Council’s reasons relating to either of the impugned Decisions which is disconsonant with the statutory schemes outlined above so as to amount to legal unreasonableness. The Council’s reasons provide an intelligible and rational justification for the Decision.

78. [127]

    For all these reasons, each of the grounds set out in the summons is rejected.

79. [128]

    Mr Bryl does not appeal against or seek review of the Decision of the Council under s 100 of the Uniform Law of the Council’s Decision. Instead, he seeks judicial review of the Council’s decision under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). This is potentially significant, since “it is a well-established principle that relief of the kind available under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act will not generally be granted if there is another equally effective and convenient remedy” (Quach v New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2015] NSWCA 63 at [51] per Sackville AJA, with whom Basten and Ward JJA agreed).

80. [129]

    That the statute under which a decision was made itself prescribes an available route of appeal against the decision will in many cases be a decisive consideration against judicial review. In Lloyds v Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee & Anor [1999] NSWCA 68 at [13], for example, Priestley JA (Mason P and Stein JA agreeing), observed:

81. [130]

    After reviewing this and other relevant decisions in NSW Breeding & Racing Stables Pty Ltd v Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales (2001) 53 NSWLR 559; [2001] NSWSC 494, Barrett J observed at [16]:

82. [131]

    Barrett J’s remarks have been approved by the Court of Appeal (see Fordyce v Leung [2022] NSWCA 55 at [105] per White JA (Beech-Jones JA agreeing) and Ibrahim v Medical Board of Australia [2015] NSWCA 207 at [75] per Gleeson JA (Macfarlan JA and Simpson J agreeing).

83. [132]

    Similar points have been made in the context of complaints of a denial of procedural fairness. In Hill v Green (1999) 48 NSWLR 161; [1999] NSWCA 477 at [164], the following summary of relevant principles was provided by Fitzgerald JA (Beazley JA agreeing) (citations omitted):

84. [133]

    Where, as here, the statutory appeal and review remedies lie with the same court, the position is not necessarily different. As Spigelman CJ (Meagher and Sheller JJA agreeing) observed in New South Wales Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95; 52 ATR 602 at [11], “… prerogative relief, which is always discretionary, is often refused on the basis that alternative remedies are available. The position is a fortiori where prerogative writs and a full appeal are available, and availed of, to the same court”. To similar effect are the remarks of Basten JA (Beazley JA agreeing) in Elias v Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (NSW) [2012] NSWCA 302; 222 A Crim R 286 at [3]–[4]:

85. [134]

    Applying those general principles, I regard the present proceeding as borderline. In particular, it is difficult to appreciate why all the matters raised by Mr Bryl in his summons could not also have been raised in proceedings under s 100 of the Uniform Law, including his core complaint. Such proceedings would have enabled him to raise any other matter which is relevant to the merits of the Decision. He elected, however, to persist with his judicial review challenge notwithstanding that the defendants offered not to take any point about delay if he withdrew the summons and commenced statutory appeal or review proceedings. That challenge raised multiple grounds of review, many of them overlapping, but at least it facilitated the resolution of the core complaint, which involved a pure question of law.

86. [135]

    Not without some doubt and hesitation, I would not dismiss the present proceeding in the exercise of the Court’s discretion. But the delay occasioned by Mr Bryl’s informed decision to persist with his judicial review challenge and not exercise his statutory rights of appeal are likely to be viewed as a significant were he to seek an extension of time to bring future proceedings under s 100 of the Uniform Law.

87. [136]

    These are the reasons why, at the outset of the hearing, I allowed the defendants’ motion to set aside section A in the plaintiff’s notices to admit facts and authenticity of documents dated 11 November 2025 which Mr Bryl served on both the defendants.

88. [137]

    Rules 17.3 and 17.4 of the UCPR permit a party to serve a notice on another party to admit facts and the authenticity of documents respectively. Under r 17.3, if the admitting party does not, within 14 days after service, serve on the requesting party a notice disputing that fact, it is taken to have been admitted subject to the limitations in r 17.3(2). Similarly, the authenticity of any document is taken to be admitted 14 days after service absent a notice disputing authenticity: r 17.4(2). By notices dated 24 November 2025, Mr Bryl was notified by both the first and second defendants that they disputed the facts in [1]–[53] of section A of the notices to admit facts and would seek to have those parts of the notices set aside.

89. [138]

    A notice to admit facts can be set aside on the basis that it is oppressive and/or an abuse of process: Moses v Ratner [2021] NSWSC 185 at [40], citing Gerard Michael McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 253; Parkesbourne Mummel Landscape Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning [2009] NSWLEC 101 at [6] and [11]-[14].

90. [139]

    The Court also has power to set aside a notice to admit facts where this would bring about a speedier determination of the real issues between the parties to the proceedings: Edwards v The State of New South Wales [2017] NSWSC 459 at [17], citing UCPR r 2.1 and s 61(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). I consider that this reasoning also applies to notices to admit authenticity of documents pursuant to UCPR r 17.4.

91. [140]

    The notices to admit set out 53 “facts” which Mr Bryl required the defendants to admit. They also called for admissions as to the authenticity of two documents contained in Exhibit VG-1 to Ms Griswold’s affidavit (the authenticity of none of which is in doubt).

92. [141]

    For the following reasons, section A of the notices should be set aside on the basis that they are oppressive and/or an abuse of process:

93. [142]

    I also accept the defendants’ submission that setting aside section A of the notices to admit is likely to bring about a speedier determination of the real issues in dispute.

94. [143]

    For these reasons, I allowed the defendants’ notice of motion. Costs should be costs in the cause.

95. [144]

    The defendants sought a non-publication and suppression order under ss 7(b) and 8(1)(a) and/or (e) of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW). Their notice of motion filed 24 November 2025 was supported by an affidavit by Valerie Anne Griswold affirmed 24 November 2025. The relevant material for which confidentiality was sought was the Memorandum dated 23 May 2025 prepared by Ms Griswold and which was put before the Council at its meeting on 29 May 2025, together with lengthy attachments to that Memorandum.

96. [145]

    Although it is possible that some of that material may have been privileged or otherwise subject to s 468 of the Uniform Law regarding compellability, Ms Morgan SC (who appeared for the defendants together with Ms Dunlop) acknowledged that any such claim had been waived because the relevant material was relied upon by the defendants in the judicial review proceedings and the defendants had voluntarily served a copy of the material on Mr Bryl.

97. [146]

    Ms Morgan SC confirmed in oral address that the primary basis for the application related to the defendants’ concern, based on past experience, including the fact that Mr Bryl and his wife had posted a YouTube video displaying various documents relating to proceedings involving them in the Court of Appeal, that the plaintiff would publish the materials for purposes which were extraneous to these proceedings.

98. [147]

    I understand those concerns but do not consider that they are sufficient to warrant the making of a non-publication order. In particular, I am not persuaded that such an order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice or that it is otherwise necessary in the public interest to make such an order. I consider that the public interest in open justice is not outweighed by the defendants’ concerns that the material will be misused. This is a judicial review proceeding and, as is usual (unless there is good reason not to do so), the material before the decision-maker relating to the impugned decision should be put into evidence, as has occurred here. I am not persuaded that this is an appropriate case to restrict access to that material. Rather, it is in the public interest that there be appropriate transparency in relation to the Council’s decision-making.

99. [148]

    For these reasons, I dismissed the defendants’ motion filed 24 November 2025 and ordered that costs be costs in the cause.

(e) Conclusion

1. [149]

   For all the reasons given above, the summons filed 1 July 2025 will be dismissed, with costs.