Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2)

This is a meritless application brought by the plaintiff, Rekha Sanjiv, against the defendants, Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (CGL) and Karina Ralston (a Principal/Director of CGL) in proceedings between them that have been finally determined by Meek J against Ms Sanjiv.

Ms Sanjiv is a former client of CGL. CGL represented Ms Sanjiv in property settlement proceedings in the Family Court of Australia (Family Court proceedings). Ms Ralston was the principal solicitor from CGL acting for Ms Sanjiv in the Family Court proceedings. There is an extensive history of litigation between Ms Sanjiv, CGL and Ms Ralston, arising out of costs disputes concerning the Family Court proceedings.

On 20 September 2023, Ms Sanjiv commenced these proceedings in this court (as a self-represented litigant) by filing a summons against CGL and Ms Ralston in relation to CGL’s costs, costs agreements and costs disclosure in acting for Ms Sanjiv in the Family Court proceedings.

On 2 April 2025, Ms Sanjiv filed a statement of claim commencing proceedings in the Professional Negligence List of the Common Law Division of this court making claims of professional negligence against CGL (proceedings number 2025/126128) (Negligence proceedings).

On 26 May 2025, Meek J delivered a comprehensive, carefully reasoned and highly detailed judgment (spanning 574 paragraphs and 445 footnotes) dismissing the summons in these proceedings: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 528 (Principal Judgment). The Principal Judgment sets out the detailed history of the numerous proceedings initiated by Ms Sanjiv in various courts.

Ms Sanjiv did not appeal the Principal Judgment and the time for doing so has now expired.

By notice of motion filed 29 May 2025 (Notice of Motion), Ms Sanjiv seeks orders, including that:

For the reasons set out below, I have determined to dismiss the Notice of Motion and order that Ms Sanjiv pay the costs of CGL and Ms Ralston in relation to the Notice of Motion on an indemnity basis.

The background to these proceedings is set out in detail in the Principal Judgment. For the purposes of this judgment, I have summarised below certain salient matters from the Principal Judgment that deal with the history between Ms Sanjiv and CGL, the various proceedings initiated by Ms Sanjiv, the proceedings before Meek J in which he delivered the Principal Judgment and the issues now raised by the Notice of Motion.

Over a decade ago, Ms Sanjiv became involved in litigation following the breakdown of her marriage to Dr Sanjiv Shah and various disputes over the property settlement to be made between them (Principal Judgment, at [1]).

In October 2014, Dr Shah commenced proceedings in this court seeking the appointment of trustees to sell the matrimonial property in Epping, which was solely in Ms Sanjiv’s name (Epping property) (Principal Judgment, at [3]). Within two weeks, Ms Sanjiv commenced the Family Court proceedings seeking an adjustment of property interests between herself and Dr Shah (Principal Judgment, at [3]).

Ms Sanjiv has been represented by numerous law firms since the commencement of the litigation in this court and the Family Court of Australia (as it was previously known), including by Slater & Gordon, Prominent Lawyers and, relevantly, CGL (Principal Judgment, at [4]).

From about June 2018 to May 2019, CGL acted for Ms Sanjiv in the Family Court proceedings (Principal Judgment, at [6]). Ms Ralston was the solicitor from CGL who had the main carriage of the Family Court proceedings for Ms Sanjiv (Principal Judgment, at [4]).

On 17 January 2019, Ms Sanjiv provided a signed irrevocable authority to CGL, which confirmed that she had received a costs notice dated 17 January 2019 (Costs Notice) from CGL, acknowledged the outstanding debts indicated in the Costs Notice and agreed that they were properly incurred and due and payable, acknowledged that there had been work undertaken in the matter that had been incurred and not yet charged to her and confirmed that she would incur further legal fees in accordance with the Costs Notice (Principal Judgment, at [200]).

On 30 April 2019, consent orders were made in the Family Court proceedings (signed by Ms Sanjiv), which provided for the Epping property to be sold (Principal Judgment, at [215]–[216]).

In around May 2019, CGL ceased acting for Ms Sanjiv due to Ms Sanjiv’s failure to provide instructions in relation to the sale of the Epping property (Principal Judgment, at [513] and [553]).

At the time that CGL ceased acting for Ms Sanjiv, they had rendered 11 invoices to her in respect of their fees totalling $470,579.11 (Principal Judgment, at [7]).

In around July 2019, CGL commenced legal proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales against Ms Sanjiv for the recovery of its outstanding fees plus pre-judgment interest and costs (District Court proceedings) (Principal Judgment, at [10]).

On 11 November 2019, CGL obtained a default judgment against Ms Sanjiv in the District Court proceedings in the amount of $266,860 (Principal Judgment, at [10]).

In December 2019, CGL obtained a garnishee order against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in respect of the default judgment sum and under it subsequently recovered the sum of $5,872.84 (Principal Judgment, at [10]).

In around June 2022, Ms Sanjiv retained CGL with Ms Ralston acting again to assist her in implementing the Family Court orders and selling the Epping property (Principal Judgment, at [249]–[250]).

On 15 June 2022, Ms Sanjiv signed an undertaking authorising the proceeds of the sale of the Epping property to be paid, including a sum of $252,604.87 in payment of CGL’s outstanding invoices (Principal Judgment, at [503]).

By 22 July 2022, settlement of the sale of the Epping property occurred (Principal Judgment, at [257]).

On 25 July 2022, CGL received funds from the settlement of the sale of the Epping property into its trust account (Principal Judgment, [258]).

Following CGL’s receipt of $252,604.87 from the sale proceeds, a small part of the judgment debt obtained by CGL in the District Court proceedings of approximately $8,381 remained outstanding, payment for which has not been pressed by CGL (Principal Judgment, at [10]).

On 12 July 2022 and 2 August 2022 respectively, CGL rendered two further invoices for their fees in the further period acting for Ms Sanjiv totalling $12,286.25 (Principal Judgment, at [7]).

As a result, the total amount of the invoices rendered by CGL for their fees to Ms Sanjiv was $482,865.36 (Principal Judgment, at [7]).

On 31 August 2023, Ms Sanjiv commenced legal proceedings against Ms Ralston personally in the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) seeking copies of all trust account statements and itemised invoices (Principal Judgment, at [271]).

On 8 September 2023, CGL emailed a copy of certain trust statements and itemised invoices to Ms Sanjiv but maintained those documents had been previously provided to her (Principal Judgment, at [272]).

On 18 September 2023, Ms Sanjiv withdrew her NCAT application (Principal Judgment, at [273]).

As stated above, on 20 September 2023, Ms Sanjiv commenced these proceedings by filing a summons in this court against CGL and Ms Ralston. Ms Sanjiv sought the following relief in the summons:

On 26 September 2024, these proceedings were heard for one day and adjourned part-heard before Meek J due to Ms Sanjiv’s inefficient conduct of them, as stated by Meek J in the Principal Judgment, at [115]:

On the morning of 26 September 2024, Ms Sanjiv sought leave to file and rely on an amended summons, which included prior relief that was abandoned (Principal Judgment, at [274]). The leave sought was refused by Meek J. The proposed amended summons sought the following relief (strikethrough and underlining in original):

On 30 September 2024, Ms Sanjiv filed a summons commencing separate proceedings in this court (proceedings number 2024/361481) against only CGL (Second proceedings) seeking the following relief (italics in original) (Principal Judgment, at [275]):

On 10 December 2024, Meek J heard and determined an application by CGL to dismiss the summons in the Second proceedings pursuant to r 13.4 of the UCPR (Principal Judgment, at [276]). Meek J delivered an ex tempore judgment dismissing the summons: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1675 (Second proceedings Judgment).

CGL and Ms Ralston assert that Ms Sanjiv filed a notice of intention to appeal the Second proceedings Judgment (Principal Judgment, at [36]) but the court file does not indicate that any such notice of intention to appeal was filed. In any event, no notice of appeal in respect of the Second proceedings Judgment was filed by Ms Sanjiv.

On 2 April 2025, shortly before the hearing of these proceedings was due to recommence on 7 April 2025 before Meek J, Ms Sanjiv filed a statement of claim commencing the Negligence proceedings against CGL (Principal Judgment, at [83]).

On 7 and 8 April 2025, the hearing of these proceedings recommenced. At the hearing, Ms Sanjiv did not request the court to defer the delivery of judgment, adjourn the proceedings or seek any other specific orders in relation to these proceedings by reference to the existence of the Negligence proceedings.

On 8 April 2025, Meek J reserved judgment in these proceedings.

On 14 April 2025, Ms Sanjiv filed closing written submissions in the Supreme Court proceedings, which stated:

On 22 May 2025 in these proceedings, Meek J made the following orders (set out in full in the Principal Judgment, at [96]):

On 26 May 2025, Meek J delivered the Principal Judgment dismissing Ms Sanjiv’s summons (Principal Judgment, at [573]).

In summary, Meek J made the following findings in relation to the main issues raised by Ms Sanjiv:

Importantly, in the Principal Judgment, Meek J also made findings as to Ms Sanjiv’s asserted vulnerability and special disadvantage, stating at [100]–[101] and [103] that (footnotes omitted, emphasis added):

On 29 May 2025, three days after Meek J delivered the Principal Judgment, Ms Sanjiv filed the Notice of Motion seeking the following orders:

On 11 July 2025, I heard the Notice of Motion and reserved my judgment. Ms Sanjiv was again self-represented. Ms K Young appeared as counsel for CGL and Ms Ralston.

The Notice of Motion raises issues concerning the setting aside of a judgment under rr 36.15 and 36.16(3A) of the UCPR, the stay of a judgment and the procedure for appealing orders made pursuant to a judgment.

A fundamental aspect of the rule of law is that when proceedings have been disposed of by a final order which has been entered, subject to limited qualification, the proceedings are at an end and cannot be revived: Phillips v Walsh (1990) 20 NSWLR 206, McLelland J at 209–10, citing Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; [1971] HCA 49; Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; [1977] HCA 7; and FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268; [1988] HCA 13. See also Grierson v The King (1938) 60 CLR 431, Dixon J (with whom McTiernan J agreed) at 436; [1938] HCA 45; DJL v The Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 245; [2000] HCA 17; Meehan v Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 146; [2002] NSWCA 22, Giles JA (with whom Sheller and Beazley JJA agreed) at [26].

In Bailey, Barwick CJ stated at 530 that:

This general rule, which provides for the finality of a perfected judgment or order, continues to operate at common law: DJL, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [38], citing Bailey, Barwick CJ at 530.

In the interests of expediency, and pursuant to r 36.11 of the UCPR, the entry of orders and judgments in this court now occurs electronically and a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the computerised court record system. Consequently, orders are now generally entered or “perfected” on the same day upon which judgment is delivered.

A judgment that has been entered can only be varied or discharged on appeal subject to some exceptions, including the court’s power under the UCPR to set aside or vary a judgment.

The court has a general power to set aside a judgment or order in any proceedings if the judgment was given or entered or the order was made irregularly, illegally or against good faith: r 36.15(1) of the UCPR. A denial of procedural fairness by a court would constitute a fundamental irregularity which would entitle a person aggrieved to set aside an order as a matter of unconditional right because the court must not be, nor appear to be, an instrument for procedural unfairness: Miltonbrook Pty Ltd v Westbury Holdings Kiama Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 262; [2008] NSWCA 38, Spigelman CJ (with whom Tobias and Campbell JJA agreed) at [85]–[87].

A judgment or order of the court in any proceedings may be set aside by order of the court if the parties to the proceedings consent: r 36.15(2) of the UCPR.

The court may set aside or vary a judgment or order if a notice of motion for the setting aside or variation is filed before entry of the judgment or order: r 36.16(1) of the UCPR.

If the notice of motion for the setting aside or variation of a judgment or order is filed within 14 days after the judgment or order is entered, the court may determine the matter and (if appropriate) set aside or vary the judgment or order under r 36.16(1), as if the judgment or order had not been entered: r 36.16(3A) of the UCPR.

The general power of the court in r 1.12 of the UCPR to extend time is expressly excluded by r 36.16(3C) of the UCPR, which prevents any extension of the 14-day period for filing a notice of motion. This prohibition confirms that the 14-day time limit is fixed and “reflects the need for judgments and orders to be final and certain as to their operation”: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Meredith (No 2) (2008) 75 NSWLR 462; [2008] NSWCA 133, Basten JA (with whom Ipp JA agreed) at [15]. See also Malouf v Prince (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 51, McColl and Macfarlan JJA and Nicholas J at [17].

In addition to the powers in rr 36.16(1) and (2) of the UCPR, the court may set aside or vary any judgment or order, except so far as it determines any claim for relief or determines any question of fact or law arising from any claim for relief, or where it dismisses proceedings or dismisses proceedings so far as concerns the whole or any part of any claim for relief: r 36.16(3) of the UCPR.

Rule 36.16(4) of the UCPR makes it clear that nothing in r 36.16 affects any other power of the court to set aside or vary a judgment or order.

In addition to the powers in r 36.16 of the UCPR, the court may, on application of any party or of its own motion, correct clerical mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission in a judgment or order: r 36.17 of the UCPR.

In Dickson v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 111, Meagher and Brereton JJA summarised the key principles in relation to r 36.16 of the UCPR, at [4] (emphasis added):

In Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256; [1992] HCA 36, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ stated at 265 (in respect of Part 40 r 9 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), the predecessor to r 36.16 of the UCPR) that:

In Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672; [1982] HCA 41, Mason ACJ, Wilson and Brennan JJ stated at 684 that (footnotes omitted, emphasis added):

In Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300; [1993] HCA 6, Mason CJ at 301–3 stated (citations omitted, emphasis added):

I note that Mason CJ dissented on the ultimate issue in Autodesk, but his Honour’s statements of general principle were not questioned in the majority judgments and were cited in Aktas v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 2) (2010) 241 CLR 570; [2010] HCA 47, French CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [6] as accurate propositions.

In Dickson v Petrie (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 176, Stern, Ball JJA and Griffiths AJA at [7] endorsed the following summary of the principles concerning the operation of r 36.16:

The court has an inherent power to grant a stay of a judgment in the interests of justice, which is confirmed by the express terms of s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), under which the court has “all jurisdiction which may be necessary for the administration of justice in New South Wales”: New South Wales Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95, Spiegelman CJ (with whom Meagher and Sheller JJA agreed) at [83].

The court may also make an order prohibiting any other person from taking any further action, either permanently or until a specified day, to enforce a judgment or order of the court: s 135(2)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). In Re Webuildem Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 708, Black J at [13] stated:

A notice of intention to appeal must be filed and served on each prospective respondent within 28 days after the material date: r 51.8 of the UCPR. The material date for a judgment given in proceedings in this court is the date on which the judgment is given and the material date for an order in proceedings in this court is the date on which the order is made: r 51.2 (definition of “material date”) of the UCPR.

An applicant who has filed and served a notice of intention to appeal must file and serve the notice of appeal within three months after the material date or within such other period as the court may order: r 51.9(1) of the UCPR. The filing and service of a notice of intention to appeal does not operate to commence proceedings in the court: r 51.9(3) of the UCPR.

An applicant who has not filed a notice of intention to appeal must file and serve a notice of appeal within 28 days of the material date or such other time as the Court may fix: r 51.16 of the UCPR.

The time for the filing of a notice of appeal can be extended by the court at any time: r 51.16(2) of the UCPR.

Ms Sanjiv submits that it is “in the interest of justice” that these proceedings be stayed and then transferred to the Professional Negligence List of the Common Law Division to avoid any issues of estoppel, risk of inconsistent findings and abuse of process and because these proceedings and the Negligence proceedings are “interrelated” (T3).

Ms Sanjiv submits that CGL and Ms Ralston previously consented to Ms Sanjiv’s proposed order that the Notice of Motion be transferred to the Common Law Division to be case managed together with the Negligence proceedings but then reneged on that consent.

In the hearing before me, Ms Sanjiv recognised that she has a final judgment against her in the form of the Principal Judgment and that she has not sought to appeal it (T10 and T12). Ms Sanjiv claimed that she did not know what to do about appealing the Principal Judgment because she is “not aware of how things work here” (T11).

Ms Sanjiv spent most of her time before me making oral submissions that were discursive and very difficult to follow, raising many matters which were the subject of careful consideration and determination in the Principal Judgment, including the conduct of CGL and Ms Ralston and other extraneous matters such as the domestic violence she claims to have experienced in her marriage to Dr Shah.

Ms Sanjiv’s submissions in this regard are captured in the following extract from the transcript of the hearing (T13–16):

It appeared to me that Ms Sanjiv’s submissions for “justice” ultimately amounted to her disagreement with the findings made in the Principal Judgment on the arguments she had raised before Meek J.

CGL and Ms Ralston oppose the orders sought and submit that the Notice of Motion is misconceived, a re-run of an earlier application made by Ms Sanjiv before Meek J on 22 May 2025, and a re-agitation of issues already raised and dealt with by the court in the Principal Judgment.

Specifically, CGL and Ms Ralston raised six principal submissions opposing Ms Sanjiv’s application as summarised below:

CGL and Ms Ralston raised concerns about the significant costs and delays in the proceedings as a result of Ms Sanjiv’s “wasteful and misconceived efforts” initiating multiple proceedings and raising the same or similar issues across them.

CGL and Ms Ralston submit that the Notice of Motion should be dismissed with indemnity costs.

At 2:48pm on 11 July 2025, after I had reserved my judgment on the Notice of Motion and without any prior leave of the court, Ms Sanjiv sent written submissions by email to my Associate (copied to counsel and the solicitors for CGL and Ms Ralston) purporting to be submissions in reply. CGL and Ms Ralston have stated that they do not object to me considering these submissions if I deem them to be appropriate. In these submissions, Ms Sanjiv claimed that the “respondents knowingly and deliberately served [Ms Sanjiv] with their submissions in Court with the purpose of denying [Ms Sanjiv] procedural fairness to reply”. Ms Sanjiv then sought the proceedings to be re-opened “in the interest of justice”, submitting that there is no prejudice to the CGL and Ms Ralston. Ms Sanjiv claimed that the CGL and Ms Ralston inaccurately submitted that the Principal Judgment is final irrespective of any stay of proceedings.

Ms Sanjiv submitted that she made a timely application pursuant to r 36.16(3A) of the UCPR to vary the orders of Meek J, citing Scott v Kennedy [2025] NSWSC 544, Brereton J at [17], to stay the Principal Judgment and transfer these proceedings to the Professional Negligence List in the Common Law Division.

Applying the principles stated in Bailey and DJL, once the orders made pursuant to the Principal Judgment were entered, subject to limited exceptions (none of which arise in the present case), these proceedings were at an end and cannot revived by Ms Sanjiv.

To the extent that Ms Sanjiv seeks an order under rr 36.15 and 36.16(3A) of the UCPR to set aside or vary the Principal Judgment and the orders made pursuant to it, the principles expounded in Dickson, Wentworth, Smith and Autodesk inform me that the discretionary power must be exercised sparingly and with great caution, having regard to the public interest in maintaining the finality of litigation. Ms Sanjiv did not propose a single basis on which that discretion might be exercised in her favour. Her general disagreement with the ultimate outcome of, and specific findings within, the Principal Judgment does not support the setting aside or variation of Principal Judgment or the orders made pursuant to it. Ms Sanjiv points to nothing that suggests that there was any irregularity, illegality or that the Principal Judgment was entered against good faith.

Further, Ms Sanjiv had an avenue to appeal the Principal Judgment which she chose not to pursue within the 28 days required by either filing a notice of intention to appeal or a notice of appeal, which tells against the exercise of the discretion for her benefit even more. I do not accept Ms Sanjiv’s submission that she did not know what to do about appealing the Principal Judgment and in any event she was informed by me during the hearing that if she wished to appeal the Principal Judgment out of time then she needed to take the necessary steps to do so (T15). Ms Sanjiv has not taken those steps.

There is also no basis on which there should be a stay of the Principal Judgment. The interests of justice do not require there to be any stay of a judgment which has finally determined the controversy raised in these proceedings. The final determination of these proceedings also dictates that they should not be transferred to the join the Negligence proceedings in the Common Law Division of this court. There is nothing left to be heard and determined in these proceedings.

I also agree with CGL and Ms Ralston that the request for a stay based on res judicata, issue estoppel or an Anshun estoppel is misconceived because a stay of the Principal Judgment would only operate to stay its enforcement, not whether it gave rise to res judicata, issue estoppel or an Anshun estoppel.

In relation to Ms Sanjiv’s request that the court makes an order that she is vulnerable and has no legal training, I refuse to make any such order as it is misconceived, and would be completely inconsistent with the Principal Judgment, at [100]–[101] and [103], where Meek J explained why Ms Sanjiv failed in her claim that she suffers from any vulnerability or special disadvantage. Additionally, as Meek J observed in the Principal Judgment, there is also insufficient evidence before me which could support any such finding, order or declaration.

I can briefly dispense with Ms Sanjiv’s claim that the “respondents knowingly and deliberately served [Ms Sanjiv] with their submissions in Court with the purpose of denying [Ms Sanjiv] procedural fairness to reply” and that the proceedings be re-opened “in the interest of justice”. In light of my findings that Ms Sanjiv’s application is bereft of any merit, this submission fails as well. Ms Sanjiv has been given significant procedural fairness in this court and there can be doubt that the interests of justice are best served by dismissing the Notice of Motion.

Finally, I note that Ms Sanjiv’s reliance on Scott v Kennedy [2025] NSWSC 544 at [17] is misguided as it addresses the entirely separate and unrelated issue of the court’s approach to ordering a short stay of interlocutory orders dismissing proceedings by consent during ongoing litigation to enable a plaintiff to seek interim relief in proceedings in another court.

For all of these reasons, I find that Ms Sanjiv has failed in every aspect of the Notice of Motion. Applying the principles in Cappello v HomeBuilding Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 109, as explained by Mitchelmore JA (with whom Simpson AJA and Meagher JA agreed) at [46]–[48], I regard her claim for the orders sought to be hopeless and based upon groundless contentions. As such, I will award indemnity costs to CGL and Ms Ralston.

For the reasons stated above, the orders I propose to make are as follows: