Briggs v IAG Limited t/as NRMA Insurance

1. [1]

   HER HONOUR: This is a judicial review of a review panel of the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (“SIRA”).

2. [2]

   By summons filed 5 February 2020, the plaintiff seeks firstly, an order in the nature of certiorari or, alternatively, a declaration setting aside or declaring invalid the decision of the review panel constituted by SIRA (“the Review Panel”) dated 7 November 2019, made purportedly pursuant to ss 7.23 and 7.26 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) (“the MAI Act”); secondly, an order in the nature of mandamus remitting the matters the subject of that decision to SIRA for re-allocation to a differently constituted review panel for determination according to law; and thirdly, if necessary, an interim order or stay in the nature of prohibition, or an interlocutory injunction, preventing the defendants or any of them or their officers, servants or agents from acting on or taking any further step in reliance on that decision until the final determination of these proceedings.

3. [3]

   The plaintiff is Adam Briggs. The first defendant is IAG Limited t/as NRMA Insurance (“the insurer”). The second defendant is SIRA. The third defendants are Chairperson Philippa Harvey-Sutton, occupational medicine specialist; medical assessor Chris Oates, occupational medicine specialist; and medical assessor Tai Tak Wan, rehabilitation medicine specialist, in their capacities as medical assessors of SIRA, together comprising the Review Panel. The second and third defendants have filed submitting appearances. The plaintiff and the defendant relied upon their joint court book. The plaintiff also relied upon the affidavits of his solicitor, Scott Hall-Johnston, dated 30 March 2020 and 17 August 2020.

Background

1. [4]

   On 22 May 2018, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident (“the accident”). It is the plaintiff’s case that as a result of the accident, he sustained injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine, including an annular tear of the L4/5 disc.

2. [5]

   The insurer is the compulsory third party insurer of the vehicle at fault in the accident.

3. [6]

   Liability is not in dispute. However, in the process of determining the plaintiff’s level of injury, a dispute arose between the plaintiff and the insurer as to whether his injury was a “minor injury” in accordance with s 1.6 of the MAI Act. Whether the plaintiff’s injury is minor has significant bearing on his entitlement to damages.

4. [7]

   Section 1.6 defines “minor injury” as follows:

5. [8]

   Pursuant to s 1.6(2), an injury that includes “complete or partial rupture of tendons, ligaments, menisci or cartilage” is not a minor injury under the Act.

6. [9]

   Clause 4 of the Motor Accident Injuries Regulation 2017 (NSW) further defines “minor injury” as follows:

7. [10]

   Under ss 7.1 and 7.17 of the MAI Act, the issue of whether the plaintiff’s injury was minor is considered a “medical assessment matter”. As such, the plaintiff’s medical dispute was referred for assessment by a medical assessor on behalf of SIRA.

8. [11]

   On 14 December 2018, Medical Assessor Carr (“the Medical Assessor”) assessed the plaintiff and issued a medical assessment certificate (“MAC”) certifying that the plaintiff’s injury was a minor injury for the purposes of the MAI Act.

9. [12]

   The plaintiff applied for a review of the Medical Assessor’s decision pursuant to s 7.26 of the MAI Act. Section 7.26 relevantly reads:

10. [13]

    In other words, a review panel is to conduct its assessment afresh: see Frost v Kourouche (2016) NSWLR 214 at [9].

11. [14]

    The plaintiff’s ground of review before the Review Panel which remains relevant in these proceedings is that the Medical Assessor mischaracterised the plaintiff’s lumbar spine disc injury as a “bulge” rather than an annular tear.

12. [15]

    The Review Panel proceeded to determine the matter without re-examining the plaintiff. On 7 November 2019, it issued a certificate and reasons pursuant to ss 7.23 and 7.26 of the MAI Act, again certifying that the plaintiff’s injury was a minor injury. Unlike the Medical Assessor, the Review Panel determined that the plaintiff did have an annular tear at L4/5 region, but that it was not causally related to the accident. It is the decision of the Review Panel which is subject to judicial review in this Court.

13. [16]

    In addition to the provisions of the MAI Act set out earlier, the following provisions and guidelines are relevant to these proceedings.

14. [17]

    Section 7.1 defines “medical assessment matter” as follows:

15. [18]

    Clause 2 of Sch 2 of the MAI Act concerns medical assessment matters. It relevantly reads:

16. [19]

    Section 7.17 of the MAI Act defines “medical dispute” as follows:

17. [20]

    Section 7.23 concerns the status of medical assessments, including the power of a court to reject a MAC and the obligation of the medical assessor (or review panel) to give reasons. It relevantly reads:

18. [21]

    Under s 10.2 of the MAI Act, the Authority may issue Motor Accident Guidelines in respect of any matter authorised or required under the Act. Version 4 of the Motor Accident Guidelines, effective from 17 April 2020, is relevant to these proceedings.

19. [22]

    Clauses 6.120-121 of the Motor Accident Guidelines state:

20. [23]

    Clause 7.295 of the Motor Accident Guidelines, with reference to s 7.23(7) of the MAI Act, also sets out the Medical Assessor’s obligation to set out reasons as follows:

The Review Panel’s decision

1. [24]

   On 7 November 2019, the Review Panel issued its certificate and reasons in relation to the plaintiff’s review. In its review, the Review Panel considered afresh all aspects of the assessment (CB, p 51).

2. [25]

   Under the heading “Disputes Identified by the Parties”, the Review Panel stated:

3. [26]

   The Review Panel noted that it received a CD of an MRI scan of the plaintiff’s lumbar spine dated 14 August 2018, which was not available to the Medical Assessor. The scan was viewed by each member of the Review Panel.

4. [27]

   Under the heading “C. Panel Deliberations”, the Review Panel relevantly stated:

5. [28]

   Under the subheading “Lumbar spine injury – L4/5 disc bulge – annular tear”, the Review Panel stated:

6. [29]

   The Review Panel then referred to an article published in The Spine Journal, “Lumbar Disc Nomenclature: Version 2.0” (“the Spine Journal article”), which it reproduced in detail as follows:

7. [30]

   The Review Panel then continued:

8. [31]

   Finally, under the subheading “Minor Injury”, the Review Panel stated:

9. [32]

   Having considered the plaintiff’s application, the Review Panel revoked the Medical Assessor’s certificate dated 14 December 2018 and issued a new certificate determining that the plaintiff’s injuries to his cervical spine and lumbar spine were minor injuries for the purposes of the MAI Act.

Judicial review generally

1. [33]

   This Court has jurisdiction to grant any relief or remedy in the nature of a writ of certiorari, which includes jurisdiction to quash the ultimate determination of a court or tribunal, including both a medical assessor and review panel, if that determination has been made on the basis of an error of law on the face of the record. The face of the record includes the reasons expressed by the court or tribunal for its ultimate determination: s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).

Grounds of judicial review

1. [34]

   The plaintiff seeks a review of the whole of the Review Panel’s decision on the grounds that it erred in the following respects:

   1. (1)

      by denying the plaintiff procedural fairness, in that it did not give him notice of its intention to rely on the Spine Journal article;

   2. (2)

      by failing to apply the correct principles of causation of the plaintiff’s injury; and

   3. (3)

      by failing to give proper and lawful reasons for its decision, in breach of s 7.23(7) of the MAI Act.

2. [35]

   I will now turn to consider the grounds of judicial review in order.

3. [36]

   The plaintiff submitted that the Review Panel’s “findings” from pp 7 to 8 of its decision, extracted earlier in this judgment, are a direct quote from the Spine Journal article. After reproducing the article, the Review Panel then stated that the plaintiff’s injury was not “violent” or “less than violent”, in reference to terms taken from the Spine Journal article. After listing a number of factors allegedly supporting this finding, and noting that the plaintiff’s MRI scan had been taken two months after the accident, the Review Panel concluded:

4. [37]

   The plaintiff submitted that the Spine Journal article played a critical role in the Review Panel’s adverse finding concerning the nature of his injury. As the Review Panel relied on the Spine Journal article without notice to the parties, the plaintiff submitted that he was denied procedural fairness.

5. [38]

   The plaintiff referred to Pascoe v Mechita Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 454 (“Pascoe”). In Pascoe, the review panel, in reaching its determination, relied on a set of tables developed by the International Standards Organisation (“ISO”) relating to progressive hearing loss. In his Honour’s consideration of the judicial review in this Court, Button J stated at [70] and [79]:

6. [39]

   The plaintiff also referred to the well-known passage in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; (1985) 62 ALR 321 (“Kioa”), where the High Court held at [40] that decision makers “need to bring to a person’s attention the critical issue or factor on which the administrative decision is likely to turn so that he may have an opportunity of dealing with it.” This includes providing a claimant with an opportunity to confront evidence contrary to his or her claim.

7. [40]

   In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; (2011) 273 ALR 223 (“SZGUR”), French CJ and Kiefel J stated at [9]:

8. [41]

   In Barrett Burston Malting Co Pty Ltd v Kotzman [2013] VSC 248 (“Kotzman”), Cavanough J stated at [36]-[37]:

9. [42]

   Finally, the plaintiff referred to Re Refugee Review Tribunal, Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; (2000) 176 ALR 219 (“Aala”), in which the High Court stated that there is no such thing as a trivial denial of procedural fairness. The High Court concluded at [17]:

10. [43]

    The plaintiff submitted that these authorities demonstrate that relying on material without notice to the plaintiff, and to his detriment, amounted to a failure to afford him procedural fairness. As such, the decision of the Review Panel should be set aside.

11. [44]

    The insurer refuted that the Review Panel denied the plaintiff procedural fairness by relying on the Spine Journal article without prior notice.

12. [45]

    The insurer submitted that in forming his or her opinion, a medical assessor is expected to apply knowledge gleaned from peer-reviewed medical literature, as well as his or her own clinical and professional experience. On the plaintiff’s view, it would be a denial of procedural fairness for a medical assessor to refer to medical literature in providing his or her reasons, without first providing the unsuccessful party with notice as to the literature to be referred to, and providing both parties with an opportunity to debate its use. The insurer submitted that this obligation would be far too broad.

13. [46]

    The insurer further sought to differentiate these proceedings from Pascoe, in which the review panel assessed the plaintiff’s hearing loss using an ISO model developed to calculate a worker’s hearing loss, involving the “input” of nuanced assumptions and a process of calculation of which the parties had no prior knowledge. In Pascoe, no notice was given of the actual process of calculation of hearing loss, which was fundamental to the assessment. The insurer submitted that Pascoe is very different from this case.

14. [47]

    According to the insurer, the Spine Journal article was not a critical factor in the Review Panel’s finding on causation. When read in context, it is clear that the Review Panel referred to the Spine Journal article for the primary purpose of clarifying the meaning of a number of relevant medical terms.

15. [48]

    Importantly, the insurer contends that the Review Panel’s determination that the plaintiff’s left posterolateral annular tear at L4/5 (revealed by an MRI scan) was not caused by the accident was not dictated by the Spine Journal article. Rather, it was a conclusion drawn from the circumstances of the injury, the medical treatment history and the Review Panel’s analysis of the radiological findings, each of which involved the exercise of its own clinical judgment.

16. [49]

    The insurer submitted that the Review Panel made the following findings relevant to causation:

    1. (1)

       that on the basis that the plaintiff was able to self-extricate from his vehicle, did not require an ambulance to be called, and had no tenderness in his lower back on the day of the accident, any low back injury he suffered was not a “violent” injury;

    2. (2)

       that there was no restriction of range of motion of the plaintiff’s back, or any other abnormality in that area, noted on the day of the accident;

    3. (3)

       that despite being assessed at his usual medical centre and in the Emergency Department of Hornsby Hospital, clinicians did not consider it necessary to order x-rays or other radiology of the plaintiff’s back;

    4. (4)

       that an MRI scan was not ordered until 2.5 months later;

    5. (5)

       that the Review Panel considered the radiological findings at L4/5 to be degenerative, rather than traumatic in origin;

    6. (6)

       that the annular tear at L4/5 was left-sided, whereas the plaintiffs’ sciatica and leg pain are right-sided;

    7. (7)

       that because the plaintiff suffered at most a “less than violent” injury, the exercise of clinical judgment was required to determine whether it was a “minor injury”; and

    8. (8)

       that in the exercise of its clinical judgment, the Review Panel determined that the injury to the plaintiff’s lumbar spine was a “minor injury”.

17. [50]

    The insurer submitted that the Review Panel’s reasons concerning causation are clear. As such, there is no error of law and the plaintiff has not been denied procedural fairness.

18. [51]

    As the Review Panel’s use of the Spine Journal article is critical to all three grounds of review, it is necessary to address its contents in some detail.

19. [52]

    It is the insurer’s case that the Spine Journal article is merely a text clarifying medical terminology, and not a critical factor in the Review Panel’s finding on causation. Counsel for the insurer pointed to the abstract of the Spine Journal article, where the authors stated that the intention behind its publication was to revise a 2001 version “to promote greater clarity and consistency of usage of spinal terminology.” The abstract went on to state:

20. [53]

    The abstract then outlined the purpose, study design and results of the article as follows:

21. [54]

    In the introduction to the review article on p 2526, the authors state that physicians need standard terms for normal and pathological conditions of lumbar discs. They continue from pp 2526-2527 to state:

22. [55]

    The Spine Journal article then continues from pp 2527-2531 in the terms reproduced by the Review Panel, as extracted earlier in this judgment. I note that in its written reasons, the Review Panel did not reproduce the abstract, purpose, study design and results of the Spine Journal article.

23. [56]

    I accept that the Spine Journal article, read independently as medical literature, presents as a text written for the purpose of clarifying spinal terminology. However, its function within the Review Panel’s reasons is not as clear. Over two pages of its reasons, the Review Panel reproduced the body of the Spine Journal article verbatim, without indentation or quotation, and then added its own conclusion with reference to the article’s terms of “violent” and “less than violent” injury. Although the Review Panel prefaced the extract by stating that it “also noted [the Spine Journal article]”, it is not clear to a reader that what follows is a direct quote from the article, unless the two texts are held up and compared.

24. [57]

    I will address sufficiency of reasons in more detail later in this judgment, as it has been separately articulated as a ground of judicial review in relation to causation. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that the Review Panel had an obligation to set out its actual path of reasoning so as to enable a reader to determine whether it fell into error: see Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; 303 ALR 64 (“Wingfoot”) at [55]. It is not enough for counsel for the insurer to point to the abstract to the Spine Journal article, which states that the text is intended to provide a glossary of medical terms, and impute its contents to the reader of the Review Panel’s reasons.

25. [58]

    More to the point, even if the Review Panel had more clearly attributed the reproduced portions of the article, in my view its use was a denial of procedural fairness to the plaintiff. The Review Panel was entitled to refer to medical literature which was straightforward or contained common knowledge. It may be that the Spine Journal article can be described in these terms in isolation. However, the Review Panel seems to have made much of the final paragraph of the Spine Journal article, which it reproduced as follows:

26. [59]

    The Review Panel’s resultant conclusion that the plaintiff did not suffer a “violent” or “less than violent” injury was a finding informed by the terms of a source previously unknown to the parties. The terms “violent” and “less than violent”, pulled from the article, introduce defined standards of severity which do not appear in the statue or relevant guidelines. Had the parties been advised that the Review Panel intended to rely on the Spine Journal article, they may have consulted their medico-legal experts to make submissions in relation to the concepts it introduced.

27. [60]

    As in Pascoe, it is my view that the Review Panel in these proceedings used the article to draw an important adverse conclusion about the plaintiff’s case. The Review Panel had an obligation to provide the plaintiff with notice, and an opportunity to respond, before taking into account concepts drawn from an unknown source. To fail to do so was to deny the plaintiff procedural fairness. As such, the decision of the Review Panel should be set aside.

28. [61]

    The plaintiff submitted that in determining causation of the annular tear, the Review Panel relied on two factors: the Spine Journal article and the lack of contemporaneous evidence of the injury.

29. [62]

    The plaintiff submitted that the review panel made much of the absence of an immediate complaint of lower back pain. It noted that the plaintiff was not referred for imaging studies of his lower back at the time of the accident. The Review Panel then concluded:

30. [63]

    The plaintiff submitted that by reasoning in this manner, the Review Panel has fallen into the type of error identified in Bugat v Fox (2014) 67 MVR 150; [2014] NSWSC 888 (“Bugat”); AAI Ltd t/as GIO v McGiffen (2016) 77 MVR 348; [2016] NSWCA 229 (“McGiffen”). The error is in treating the absence of a contemporaneous complaint or report of injury as determinative of the issue of causation.

31. [64]

    In Bugat, RS Hulme AJ held that the lack of contemporaneous evidence cannot be determinative of causation. His Honour stated at [31]-[32]:

32. [65]

    In McGiffen, the Court of Appeal held at [64] – [65]:

33. [66]

    The plaintiff submitted that the Review Panel was further distracted from its statutory task by applying a test for causation that it drew from the Spine Journal article, rather than from the relevant guidelines informed by the common law. As such, the Review Panel failed to apply the required test in order to discharge its jurisdictional function. This was jurisdictional error.

34. [67]

    The insurer identified the plaintiff’s complaint on this ground as being that the Review Panel treated the lack of contemporaneous evidence of significant injury as determinative on the question of causation, rather than as one factor relevant to causation. The insurer noted that the plaintiff does not appear to dispute that there was, in fact, a lack of contemporaneous evidence of significant spinal injury.

35. [68]

    The insurer says that the Review Panel did not treat the absence of contemporaneous evidence alone as determinative of the question of causation. The Review Panel interpreted the radiological findings for itself, and considered that the changes at L4/5 were degenerative rather that traumatic in origin. This involved the exercise of the Review Panel’s collective clinical judgment.

36. [69]

    The Review Panel also took into account that the annular tear at L4/5 is left-sided, whereas Mr Briggs’ sciatica and leg pain are right-sided. Again, in the Review Panel’s judgment, this is consistent with the plaintiff’s symptoms being of degenerative origin, rather than caused by traumatic disc injury.

37. [70]

    So in determining the question of causation of the plaintiff’s annular tear, the Review Panel went beyond the lack of contemporaneous evidence of significant spinal injury. It considered that factor alongside its clinical interpretation of the radiological findings, and the pattern of the plaintiff’s symptoms. The Review Panel did not fall into the same error as was identified in Bugat or McGiffen. As such, the insurer submitted that there is no error in the Review Panel’s approach to the question of causation.

38. [71]

    I have set out the Review Panel’s reasons in relation to causation earlier in this judgment. In addition to setting out the accident history, the Review Panel noted the clinical record of Dr Ward, who had referred the plaintiff for a MRI scan after he complained of right-sided back pain, sciatica and weakness in the right knee. The MRI scan, taken two and a half months after the accident, revealed a left-sided annular tear.

39. [72]

    After setting out the extract from the Spine Journal article, the Review Panel then listed seven factors (i)-(vii) which it considered significant to its conclusion that the plaintiff had not suffered a “violent” or “less than violent” injury to the lumbar spine. The Review Panel then concluded:

40. [73]

    I have already set out my reasons for finding the Review Panel’s use of the Spine Journal article to have been in error. Be that as it may, I do not accept that the effect of these reasons is that the Review Panel has treated the absence of a contemporaneous complaint or report of injury as determinative of the issue of causation. Rather, the Review Panel noted an extensive body of collective factors, including that the plaintiff’s contemporaneous complaints concerned his right knee and back, whereas the eventual MRI revealed a left-sided annular tear. In my view, it was open to the Review Panel in the exercise of its clinical judgment to determine that although later MRIs showed an annular fissure in the L4/5 disc, it was not, on the evidence, an acute traumatic injury caused by the subject accident, but more likely degenerative. This ground of review fails.

41. [74]

    The plaintiff referred to Wingfoot at [55], which set out the obligation of a medical assessor to provide reasons as follows:

42. [75]

    This case has been consistently applied in NSW in relation to medical assessors under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), the predecessor to the current legislation, and applies to the MAI Act.

43. [76]

    The plaintiff submitted that in relation to its findings, the Review Panel set out a summary of the evidence before it, including the Spine Journal article, and then concluded:

44. [77]

    The plaintiff submitted that there is an unexplained leap in the Review Panel’s reasoning process in respect of causation. It simply leapt from setting out a summary of the evidence to a conclusion that the annular tear was not causally related to the subject motor vehicle accident.

45. [78]

    The plaintiff further submitted that the Review Panel had a heightened obligation to consider the issue of causation because it was the subject of extensive submissions before it. The plaintiff had relied specifically on reports from Dr Ward and Dr Brooker, who opined that the annular tear was causally related to the subject accident.

46. [79]

    The plaintiff referred to Campbelltown City Council v Vegan (2006) 67 NSWLR 372; (2006) 235 ALR 342 (“Vegan”), where Basten JA stated at [121]:

47. [80]

    The plaintiff submitted that the Review Panel was obliged to explain why it preferred the conclusion that the annular tears were not causally related to the accident, over the conclusion that they were causally related to the accident, in circumstances where the medical evidence before it supported the latter conclusion. In failing to address and engage with the plaintiff’s expert medical case, the Review Panel failed to address and engage with a substantial and clearly articulated case put by the plaintiff, which is constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction and a denial of procedural fairness.

48. [81]

    The insurer submitted that the plaintiff’s summary of the Review Panel’s reasons as to causation does not do justice to the Review Panel’s analysis. The relevant reasons occupy three pages of consideration.

49. [82]

    Having set out the relevant portions of the police report, general practitioner’s notes, hospital clinical records and medical certificates, the Review Panel summarised the results of an MRI scan of the lumbar spine on 14 August 2018 and provided its comments as to the significance of the radiological changes, including a comparison with the pattern of the plaintiff’s reported symptoms.

50. [83]

    The Review Panel then referred in detail to the nature of degenerative changes that may affect the discs in the lumbar spine, and explained the medical terminology by reference to the Spine Journal article. The Review Panel then explained its conclusion conclusion that the annular tear at L4/5 is not of traumatic origin.

51. [84]

    The insurer noted that the Review Panel’s reasons on causation are not to be read selectively; the whole of the reasons should be taken into account, not just its conclusion.

52. [85]

    As foreshadowed in relation to ground 1, the standard to which the Review Panel was required to set out its written reasons is not the standard required of a Court. Rather, the Review Panel was required to set out its actual path of reasoning in sufficient detail to enable to a reader to determine whether it fell into error. The Review Panel was not required to engage with every medico-legal opinion to which the plaintiff referred, nor to explain why it did not arrive at an opinion it did not form, even if that opinion was shown by material before it to have been formed by someone else: see Wingfoot at [56].

53. [86]

    I have set out a summary of the Review Panel’s reasons in relation to causation under the second ground. It is my view that when read as a whole and fairly, the Review Panel’s reasons meet the required standard. They indicate the Review Panel’s opinion that the circumstances of the accident were not consistent with significant spinal injury; that there was a lack of contemporaneous evidence of significant spinal injury; that the nature and pattern of medical treatment following the accident is not consistent with significant spinal injury; that the radiological findings do not fit the pattern of the symptoms of which the plaintiff complains; and that disc degeneration unrelated to trauma is another explanation for the radiological changes. Having set out these factors, the Review Panel stated that in the exercise of its clinical judgment, it was not satisfied that the motor accident caused the plaintiff’s annular tear at L4/5. I do not agree that there is an “unexplained leap” in this path of reasoning, as submitted by the plaintiff. This ground of review fails.

Result

1. [87]

   The result is that the Review Panel, in drawing an adverse conclusion about the plaintiff’s claim from concepts introduced by the Spine Journal article, without notice, denied him procedural fairness. The Review Panel has constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction and made errors of law as it relates to findings on whole person impairment arising from the accident. It is not clear that had the parties been afforded the opportunity to put on submissions in relation to the Spine Journal article, the Review Panel would not have reached a different conclusion. As such, in the exercise of my discretion, it is my view that the decision should be quashed and the proceedings remitted to SIRA to be determined in according to law.

Costs

1. [88]

   Costs are discretionary. Costs usually follow the event. The first defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs on an ordinary basis.

   1. (1)

      The decision of the Review Panel dated 7 November 2019 is vitiated by jurisdictional error.

   2. (1)

      In the nature of certiorari removing into the Court the decision of the Review Panel and quashing that decision.

   3. (1)

      The matter as it relates to findings on whole person impairment arising from the accident is remitted to the State Insurance Regulatory Authority to be determined according to law.

   4. (2)

      The first defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs on an ordinary basis.