Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force

These reasons concern a notice of motion filed by the plaintiff on 16 October 2025. The purpose of the motion is to substantially expand a summons filed on 13 July 2023.

The notice of motion is supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff dated 15 October 2025. The affidavit annexes a draft summons upon which the plaintiff would like to proceed. In addition, the motion seeks some amendments to the draft summons. There is a final version of the proposed summons commencing on p 76 of the Court Book which was used by the parties for the purposes of their submissions.

In addition to the affidavit of 15 October 2025, there are also affidavits from the plaintiff dated 10 November 2025 and 5 March 2026, respectively.

The first defendant relied on an affidavit of Ms Alice Zhou dated 27 November 2025. Ms Zhou is a solicitor employed by the Crown Solicitor for New South Wales.

There is a second defendant (the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT)) which did not appear at the motion. The second defendant has filed a submitting appearance.

The plaintiff filed written submissions on 11 November 2025. I will quote the whole of the submissions:

The brevity of the submission should not be overly criticised. It encapsulates the only viable point open to the plaintiff; namely that allowing the plaintiff to agitate the whole of her grievances in a single hearing is the most “just, quick and cheap” means of resolving her concerns in accordance with s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).

The plaintiff did make more detailed oral submissions but did not, in my view, develop a better point than the s 56 argument.

The first defendant, in somewhat more extensive written submissions, endeavoured to demonstrate why the expansion of the summons is far from just, and would not be cheap. In addition, the first defendant submitted that there is no explanation for why the plaintiff’s application had not been made earlier and there are “no compelling reasons” to grant leave.

I do note the concession by the first defendant that no substantial prejudice had been suffered by the delay.

The history of the litigation between the parties is complex. I think a chronology of events relevant to the current proceedings will help. The chronology is derived from the Court Book and the relevant judgments.

The above chronology refers to “confidential” orders and material. I note that when dealing with the objections to the first defendant’s affidavit material the plaintiff took objection to the description of “confidentiality” which she said was a conclusion and not a fact. I said I would proceed on the basis that the description was the opinion of the deponent and not a statement of fact.

The original summons seeks a judicial review of three decisions made in the NCAT. The decisions were made on 7 February 2023, 16 February 2023, and 12 April 2023, respectively. The orders requested also include setting aside a Local Court order of 5 July 2023.

The proposed summons maintains complaints against the NCAT decisions of 7 February 2023, 16 February 2023, and 12 April 2023. The orders of the Local Court remain under attack. The new summons is again styled as an application for judicial review, but the “Type of Claim” refers to an appeal. The subheading to the new pleading is a “SUMMONS SEEKING LEAVE TO APPEAL (PART 50)”. The quest for judicial review seems to have receded.

An appeal under pt 50 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) must be filed within 28 days of the “material date” (r 50.3). Rule 50.2 defines the material date as the date of the decision. Clearly the appeals here are well out of time so leave to continue will be required. Leave is contemplated by the proposed summons. No doubt waiting for the Court of Appeal and High Court decisions will be a relevant factor.

In her affidavit of 10 November 2025, the plaintiff gives some explanation as to why she initially chose the judicial review path. To the extent that I understand the explanation, the decision seems to have been governed by the plaintiff’s anxiety about being in the Supreme Court, expense and that the costs order made by NCAT was made without jurisdiction or power.

In her affidavit dated 5 March 2026 the plaintiff says:

The statement just quoted highlights what I have said above about the plaintiff’s reliance on s 56. She is effectively saying that it would be much more time and cost effective for her to be granted leave to amend rather than have to file a separate summons, followed by a consolidation of the two proceedings.

On 2 March 2026, the plaintiff sent an email to the first defendant asking:

The first defendant replied on 4 March 2026 stating that the first defendant “would consider his position if a different draft amended summons were provided.” The first defendant then set out what were considered to be proper amendments to the summons. The plaintiff did not take up the suggestions made by the first defendant.

It is important for me to take into account that the plaintiff is self-represented and may not have the background and skills necessary for the drafting of a sensible pleading. At the same time however, the plaintiff is far from an inexperienced litigant and lists her occupation as a solicitor. As illustrated by the chronology her appearances have encompassed many jurisdictions extending from NCAT to the NSW Court of Appeal and ultimately the High Court (New South Wales v Wojciechowska [2025] HCA 27).

The plaintiff being self-represented raises a significant point in relation to her motion. It became clear during argument that the primary focus of the plaintiff’s concerns is on the costs order made against her in the Local Court which was for the sum of $7,309.76. I asked the first defendant if this sum was being pursued and was told that it was.

I also pointed out to the plaintiff that, should she ultimately lose the substantive proceedings, the costs order made in the Local Court would, in terms of relative size, pale into insignificance. The plaintiff said she appreciated this fact but emphasised the following:

All of the above noble sentiments are important and relevant to the administration of justice. Meritorious assertions should be considered by the courts. The difficulty here is that many of the complaints the plaintiff wishes to agitate have already been dealt with (in some instances going all the way to the High Court). In addition, on some topics, the plaintiff had chosen not to take part. An example relates to some proceedings before the Appeal Panel with the plaintiff choosing not to make any submissions.

In Ground 1(d) of the proposed summons, for example, the plaintiff makes allegations of the Appeal Panel denying her procedural fairness. On my understanding she simply did not participate in the proceedings.

The plaintiff accepted that her grounds were not perfect, but she said “perfection is not an objective in this exercise”. She is perfectly correct, but that does not mean that her grounds may raise untenable points or not be understandable.

Again, by way of example, Ground 1(b) has already been dealt with in the Court of Appeal. There are a number of assertions about the jurisdiction of the Local Court (Grounds 29 – 32), but there is a strong probability that no appeal lies from the Local Court. Section 39 of the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) restricts appeals as of right to questions of law.

In addition, because the Local Court order arose from the application of s 78 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), it is even arguable that the plaintiff was not a party to the proceedings in the Local Court and therefore, in any event, would not have any right of appeal.

Also, the terms of s 78 suggest that there is no obligation to give reasons. All that is required is certification by the registrar of a court having appropriate jurisdiction.

There are numerous complaints about the Appeal Panel which seem to arise from allegations of fact (for example Grounds 5, 8 and 9), which would render them not susceptible to appeal. There are some grounds, for example Ground 19, which are very general and have no particularisation.

The plaintiff said that any absent particulars could be supplied in submissions. Submissions can fill gaps and requests for particulars can be made. But to allow general statements in a pleading which are uncertain against a background of ultimately a complaint of a costs order of the size in the present case, is I think to allow an expansion of a case that is not justified.

In respect of proposed Ground 31 the first defendant suggested the possibility that the plaintiff might like to be referred for pro bono assistance. This Ground relates to the High Court decision in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; [1996] HCA 24. The plaintiff in reply did not take up the suggestion of assistance. Absent her interest I do not propose to refer her for assistance, leaving Ground 31 as vague and probably incapable of response.

Although I have singled out some grounds for particular mention, I have examined all of the proposed grounds to find at least one which seems to have substance and clarity of meaning. I have not been able to do so, although I accept that within all of the grounds is the plaintiff’s concern about, especially, the Appeal Panel’s powers in relation to making costs orders.

I have considered giving the plaintiff ‘another go’, but have decided against that course. I think her notice of motion, notwithstanding her advocacy for self-represented litigants, and her perceived righting of wrongs should not overcome the dictates of s 56 and case management.

It would certainly not be cheap to allow the large expansion of the plaintiff’s claim, and it would not be just to impose upon the first defendant the need to answer a claim in which many of the assertions have been dealt with at the highest level, some are obviously doomed to failure, and some are too confusing to understand.

The motion also seeks leave to join the Registrar of NCAT as a party. The reason seems to be because the Registrar issued a certificate purporting to exercise “federal judicial power.” Joining a party can be done under r 6.24 of the UCPR, if the joinder “is necessary to the determination of all matters in dispute in any proceedings.” NCAT is already a party and there is no separate need to join the Registrar.

As to costs, they must follow the event.

I make the following orders: