Choi v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice

1. [1]

   THE COURT: Before the Court for hearing on 28 July 2022 were two proceedings commenced by the applicant (Ms Choi) in relation to decisions made by Bellew J in March this year in proceedings in the Common Law Division: the first, on 9 March 2022 (Choi v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2022] NSWSC 190 (the 9 March 2022 Decision)), dismissing Ms Choi’s application for an extension of time to file an appeal from a decision of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT); and the second, on 22 March 2022 (Choi v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 301 (the 22 March 2022 Decision)) in relation to the costs of the application that had been dismissed on 9 March 2022.

Proceedings in this Court

1. [2]

   Following the two March 2022 decisions, Ms Choi has brought two separate sets of proceedings in this Court, as party to which she joined: the Department of Communities and Justice (the name of which was corrected by the Registrar to the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice – a change with which Ms Choi cavils); “Victim Services” (the name of a business unit within the Department but which Ms Choi contends is a legal entity with statutory obligations in relation to applications for access to information under the relevant legislation); the Attorney-General; and the Head of the Department of Communities and Justice, Mr Michael Tidball.

2. [3]

   In these reasons, where reference is made to the “respondent” it is to the Secretary, Department of Justice and Communities but (when dealing with the Secretary’s summary dismissal application on Ms Choi’s application for judicial review) reference will be made to the “Secretary” to avoid confusion – as he is there the applicant to the motion and Ms Choi is the respondent to that motion.

3. [4]

   The first of the two sets of proceedings (being proceeding number 2022/123488), which will be referred to as the Appeal Proceeding, is an application by Ms Choi (by summons dated 6 April 2022 and stamped as filed on 20 April 2022) in which Ms Choi seeks, among other relief, leave to appeal from the orders made by Bellew J in the Common Law Division proceeding. With that summons there was a draft notice of appeal and document headed Summary of Argument, both dated 6 April 2022 (this being relevant to note in relation to the subsequent complaint by Ms Choi as to the stage at which a direction was made that the Appeal Proceeding be listed for a leave only hearing in the first instance). The draft notice of appeal and draft Summary of Argument were subsequently amended by Ms Choi and this Court has proceeded on the basis that those represent the latest iterations of the appeal and submissions in relation thereto that Ms Choi wishes to bring.

4. [5]

   The second of the two sets of proceedings (being proceeding number 2022/170633), which will be referred to as the Judicial Review Proceeding, is an application by Ms Choi (by summons dated 9 June 2022 and stamped as filed on 13 June 2022 but which Ms Choi identifies elsewhere as having been lodged also on 6 April 2022 – see order 13 of the orders sought in her subsequent 21 June 2022 notice of motion) in which Ms Choi, again amongst other relief, seeks judicial review of the same decisions the subject of the Appeal Proceeding (the 9 March 2022 and 22 March 2022 Decisions) and an order that the three judges in the Judicial Review Proceeding hear the matter concurrently with her summons seeking leave to appeal in the Appeal Proceeding – see order 24 of the relief there specified.

5. [6]

   There have also been various notices of motion either filed or lodged with the Registry (for the most part by Ms Choi) in one or other of the respective proceedings (and, in the case of one such motion, apparently in both). There is some overlap in the relief sought in the respective notices of motion (which are identified below).

6. [7]

   The impetus for at least some of the relief sought by Ms Choi in various of her notices of motion appears to be that on 9 May 2022 there was a directions hearing before the Registrar in the Appeal Proceeding, at which time the Registrar made various directions, including a direction (to which Ms Choi took objection) that the Appeal Proceeding be listed for a leave only hearing on 28 July 2022 (see the orders entered on 10 May 2022). Ultimately, as will be explained when outlining the background to the present dispute, the Appeal Proceeding was heard as a concurrent hearing by this Court at the same time as the summary dismissal application brought by the respondent in the Judicial Review Proceeding. Accordingly, various of the orders sought by Ms Choi in some of her notices of motion are now otiose.

7. [8]

   The respective notices of motion that have been received since the commencement of the Appeal Proceeding are as follows.

8. [9]

   Ms Choi, by notice of motion dated 6 June 2022 but only stamped as filed on 21 June 2022 (in the Appeal Proceeding) sought a variety of relief, including that the order for a leave only hearing be revoked and that the Appeal Proceeding be heard as a concurrent hearing (of the application for leave to appeal and, if leave be granted, the appeal itself); and also that there be an order “for a concurrently [sic] hearing and a judicial review hearing together to be listed” (seemingly a reference to the Judicial Review Proceeding, the summons for judicial review having been forwarded to the Registry on 6 April 2022 with the documents in connection with the Appeal Proceeding but at that stage not having yet been accepted for filing). This will be referred to as the 21 June Notice of Motion.

9. [10]

   By notice of motion dated 23 June 2022 and filed on 24 June 2022 in the Judicial Review Proceeding, the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (as the first respondent in that proceeding, though as noted above, Ms Choi takes issue with whether the Secretary is the proper respondent) sought an order for the summary dismissal of the applicant’s summons in the Judicial Review Proceeding pursuant to r 13.4(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), on the grounds that the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious and (alternatively or additionally) an abuse of the process of the Court; and an order for the costs of the notice of motion. This will be referred to as the Summary Dismissal Motion.

10. [11]

    By notice of motion dated 24 July 2022, (which has not yet been accepted for filing), Ms Choi sought relief in the Judicial Review Proceeding, including the revocation of orders made by Registrar Hedge in relation to “the summons and the motion filed 24 June 2022” (presumably the Summary Dismissal Motion); the revocation of orders made by the Court of Appeal Registrar on 18 July 2022 (one of which was to amend the name of the first respondent in the proceeding to Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice; another being to remove the second respondent – “Victim Services” as a party). The orders sought by Ms Choi in this notice of motion also include an order for the revocation of the listing of the Secretary’s notice of motion for summary dismissal of the summons to be heard on 28 July 2022 and for the setting aside of a direction made on 22 July 2022 by the Court of Appeal Registrar in relation to a Court Book prepared by the Registrar to be made available to the presiding judges at the hearing. This will be referred to as the 24 July Notice of Motion.

11. [12]

    By notice of motion dated 27 July 2022 (which has not yet been accepted for filing), Ms Choi sought relief in the Appeal Proceeding, including: an order to reserve and review an order or direction made by the Registrar on 21 July 2022 declining to grant leave to the applicant to file an Amended Summary of Argument and an amended draft notice of appeal; an order to disqualify Ward P from “the hearing and matter”; an order to dismiss the Secretary’s notice of appearance and notice of motion (there identifying a notice of motion dated 5 May 2022); and an order to record the hearing on 28 July 2022. This will be referred to as the 27 July Notice of Motion.

12. [13]

    By notice of motion also dated 27 July 2022 (which again has not yet been accepted for filing), and which bears no case number on the cover sheet but which later was said to be filed in relation to both the Appeal Proceeding and the Judicial Review Proceeding, Ms Choi seeks orders to punish alleged contempt of court by two solicitors involved in the proceedings (General Counsel, Legal, in the Office of General Counsel Department of Communities and Justice, Ms Lida Kaban, and a solicitor employed in the Crown Solicitor’s Office, and subsequently seconded to the Office of General Counsel where he remains as a permanent employee, Mr Justin Cahill) by committal to a correctional centre and fine. This will be referred to as the Contempt Motion. The Contempt Motion was not accompanied by any statement of charges as to the alleged contempts.

13. [14]

    It should be noted that certain of the documents forwarded by Ms Choi to the Registry for filing were not accepted for filing on the date on which they were lodged (by email) with the Registry. This is in circumstances where it appears that Ms Choi has lodged fee waiver applications at the same time. Rule 4.10(5)(b) of the UCPR provides that an officer of the Court can refuse to accept a document until the requisite fee is paid or satisfactory payment arrangements have been made. So, for example, the summons emailed by Ms Choi in the Appeal Proceeding on 6 April 2022 was not accepted for filing until later in April 2022 (after Ms Choi’s fee application had been determined and that part of the filing fee that had not been postponed was paid). The summons was then stamped as filed on 20 April 2022 after payment of that part of the fee had been processed. The summons was then allocated a file number (2022/115722) but was incorrectly listed on JusticeLink as a judicial review proceeding rather than a leave application. On 29 April 2022, the Registry cancelled that file allocation and opened the file for the Appeal Proceeding as 2022/123488 but with that new file treated as being opened on 20 April 2022.

14. [15]

    Similarly, the summons forwarded by Ms Choi in the Judicial Review Proceeding was not stamped as filed when initially received. It appears that Ms Choi queried this on 9 May 2022 and produced a fee waiver letter for the (incorrectly opened and by then closed 2022/115722 file number). Ms Choi was notified on 17 May 2022 that her fee application for the judicial review proceeding was refused and, after some communications between Ms Choi and the Registry, on 13 June 2022, Ms Choi paid the filing fee for that summons and it was stamped as filed.

15. [16]

    Hence, the apparent disparity between the dates of various documents and when they were stamped as filed. For completeness, it may be noted that insofar as Ms Choi in at least one of her notices of motion seeks a review of the fee decisions, r 49.19(2)(a) provides that an application for review may not be made in respect of a decision to make, or not to make, an order under cl 11(1) of the Civil Procedure Regulation 2017 (NSW), except as provided by cll 14 and 19 of the Guidelines for the Waiver, Remission and Postponement of Fees published by the Attorney-General.

Background

1. [17]

   In order to place the present applications in context, it is necessary to explain the matters leading up to these proceedings insofar as can be gleaned from the material that is now before the Court. In so summarising that procedural history, the Court is here making no findings as to disputed facts nor relying on factual findings in earlier proceedings.

2. [18]

   Since 2017, Ms Choi has commenced various proceedings both in the Supreme Court and NCAT, including proceedings against the NSW Ombudsman, Legal Aid Commission of NSW, University of Technology Sydney, and the Commissioner of NSW Police (see the list of proceedings in the annexure to the respondent’s submissions on the present applications). Those proceedings followed Ms Choi’s exclusion from a course she was undertaking at the University of Technology, Sydney. Ms Choi had left Sydney in December 2016 and has resided in South Korea since then. From Ms Choi’s Amended Summary of Argument, it appears that on 13 February 2017 the Deputy Ombudsman made a determination (to which Ms Choi refers in her Amended Summary of Argument) that Ms Choi was a vexatious litigant (and, she says, that this was “caused by mental disorders”). On 19 October 2018, Deputy President Hennessy, in NCAT, appointed a guardian ad litem for Ms Choi in each of two proceedings brought in NCAT by Ms Choi (the first, a proceeding against the NSW Ombudsman seeking a review of a decision that her application for information under s 100 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (GIPA Act) was invalid; and the second, being a complaint by Ms Choi against the refusal of the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board to refer a complaint by her to NCAT) (see the background as explained in earlier proceedings in this Court – Choi v NSW Ombudsman (2021) 104 NSWLR 505; [2021] NSWCA 68 (Choi v NSW Ombudsman)).

3. [19]

   Ms Choi has alleged that the appointment of the guardian ad litem resulted from corrupt conduct committed by a wide range of persons including the Attorney-General, Legal Aid NSW, the NSW Ombudsman, the President of NCAT, other Tribunal members, the Department, her former guardian ad litem and various public servants.

4. [20]

   The genesis of the particular proceeding that came before Bellew J in the Common Law Division last year was an application by Ms Choi on 20 December 2018 under the GIPA Act for access to information held by the Department of Communities and Justice (the Department). The information sought by Ms Choi related the appointment of the guardian ad litem to her in respect of the earlier proceedings.

5. [21]

   Ms Choi contends that the information she seeks is necessary to correct wrong information about her, which she says has caused the rejection of passport applications and hence has inhibited her return to Australia with her son; and Ms Choi says that this information will or is likely to reveal serious misconduct or corruption (hence her accusations as to why the information has not been released to her).

6. [22]

   Ms Choi was advised that processing charges would apply to her GIPA application, and an advance deposit (amounting to 50% of the then estimated charges) of $52.50 was requested (and paid by Ms Choi). Subsequently, on 27 March 2019, the Department forwarded to Ms Choi a list of the documents it would release to her (some with redactions) in response to the access application and requested that Ms Choi pay an additional (and reduced) processing charge of $155 (that request for payment being made by reference to ss 65(1) and 68(1) of the GIPA Act). That payment was required before the Department would release the documents it had identified as responsive to her access application.

7. [23]

   Ms Choi initially did not pay the $155 processing charge. Instead, Ms Choi applied to the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) for an external review of the Department’s decision, both in relation to the processing charge and in relation to the decision by the Department not to release some of the information it held.

8. [24]

   The IPC provided a report and recommendation on 7 June 2019, in which the IPC recommended an internal review by the Department of its decision.

9. [25]

   Following the IPC’s recommendation, an internal review was conducted of the Department’s decision. The internal reviewer reached the same conclusion as the original decision-maker. Ms Choi was notified on 4 July 2019 that, after conducting the internal review, the Department had decided to uphold the original decision of 27 March 2019 and that the Department would not release any information until Ms Choi paid the further ($155) processing charge (the 4 July 2019 decision).

10. [26]

    On 24 September 2019, Ms Choi applied to NCAT for an extension of time to file an application for administrative review of the 4 July 2019 decision, (i.e., the decision made at the conclusion of the Department’s internal review) and for administrative review of: the decision to refuse access to some of the information held by the Department on public interest considerations; the decision to impose processing charges; and the reasonableness of the searches conducted by the Department in considering the access application. The September 2019 application was thus not confined to an application for administrative review of the decision as to the further processing charge.

11. [27]

    The extension of time was necessary because the application for administrative review was out of time, being filed more than 40 working days after the decision (that time expiring on 29 August 2019) (see s 101(1) of the GIPA Act).

12. [28]

    On 5 December 2019, Ms Choi’s application for an extension of time for administrative review was dismissed by NCAT (Senior Member Ransome) (Choi v NSW Department of Justice [2019] NSWCATAD 248) as was her application for administrative review of the impugned decision.

13. [29]

    Ms Choi then paid the $155 processing charge and the Department released to her some 849 pages of material. Ms Choi contends that there was other material that should have been released to her. It was suggested by the respondent at the hearing before this Court that Ms Choi’s belief that there are some further 100 pages of documents that have not been released to her is mistaken and that it is based on an erroneous estimate given at a directions hearing at some stage in NCAT that there were around 950 pages of documents. Ms Choi, in her amended notice of appeal, includes as order 19 an “order to release 100 pages subjected [sic]” and order 20, being an order “to release all the information under s 12(2)(e) of the GIPA Act”. Thus, it appears that the complaint as to documents that have not been produced to Ms Choi may include the documents in respect of which there were redactions from the material produced to her.

14. [30]

    On 13 January 2020, Ms Choi filed a further application in NCAT for administrative review of the Department’s 4 July 2019 decision and of Senior Member Ransome’s decision, which application was again out of time. Ms Choi is adamant that this was not a re-litigation of the September 2019 NCAT application (as will be explained in due course).

15. [31]

    On 11 February 2020, Senior Member McAteer (of NCAT) made orders that there be a preliminary hearing to determine whether Ms Choi should be granted leave under s 41 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (the CAT Act) to extend time to file her application. Ms Choi places no little weight on a statement that she contends was made by Senior Member McAteer at this case conference, which she maintains was a determination that the 2020 NCAT application was not a re-litigation of the 2019 application. Ms Choi alleges that NCAT “cut off” part of this recording (and Ms Choi complains that leave was not given by Bellew J for her to issue a subpoena in relation to this audio recording – although it appears that Ms Choi has already obtained or made a copy of this recording, since it is referred to in the amended index to the material filed on 27 July 2022 by email in the present applications).

16. [32]

    The preliminary hearing as to whether an extension of time should be granted was held on 20 March 2020 by Senior Member Gracie.

17. [33]

    On 18 June 2020, Senior Member Gracie dismissed Ms Choi’s application for an extension of time for administrative review and her application for administrative review was dismissed (Choi v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] NSWCATAD 154).

18. [34]

    On 29 June 2020, Ms Choi lodged an appeal from Senior Member Gracie’s decision of 18 June 2020 to the Appeal Panel under s 80(2)(a) of the CAT Act. The three grounds of appeal contended by Ms Choi were: a failure to provide proper reasons, the application of a wrong principle of law, and a failure to afford procedural fairness. Ms Choi required leave to appeal, this being for an internal appeal of an interlocutory decision (see ss 4(1)(d) and 80(2)(a) of the CAT Act).

19. [35]

    Ms Choi’s leave application was listed for hearing before the Appeal Panel constituted by Deputy President Westgarth and Senior Member Frost on 23 October 2020 by telephone.

20. [36]

    A solicitor appeared on behalf of the respondent at the hearing on 23 October 2020. Ms Choi appeared by telephone and asserted that she could not hear any of the parties. The respondent maintains that emails sent by Ms Choi to the Registry of the Tribunal revealed that she was able to hear the proceedings before the Appeal Panel, but it is not necessary here to engage in that issue. It is sufficient to note that the respondent points to the following emails sent by Ms Choi, namely that Ms Choi: informed the Registry that she could not hear the parties, that she was unable to browse the justice.nsw.gov.au website in Korea, and that she was unable to access the telephone number that the Registry had provided for her dial into the hearing; asked who the Appeal Panel was constituted by (and asked that, if it was constituted by Acting District Court Judge Hennessy and Deputy President Westgarth, they be disqualified from hearing the application); asserted that the Department did not file and serve a proper notice of representation and therefore sought to disqualify the Department’s solicitor from appearing on behalf of the Department; and requested that the Appeal Panel make an order to provide access to all of the information relating to the 4 July 2019 decision (this last request thus clearly pertaining to the 4 July 2019 decision the subject of both the 2019 and 2020 applications).

21. [37]

    The Appeal Panel did not proceed with the telephone hearing on that occasion. Orders were made for the Department to provide submissions on the issues raised by Ms Choi in her emails to the Registry and for Ms Choi’s application to be determined on the papers.

22. [38]

    On 18 January 2021, the Appeal Panel (constituted by Deputy President Westgarth and Senior Member Frost) decided that the appeal be determined on the papers without any further oral hearing, refused leave to appeal, and dismissed the appeal (Choi v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2021] NSWCATAP 8). On the same day, the Appeal Panel dismissed an application made by Ms Choi for Deputy President Westgarth to recuse himself.

23. [39]

    By a summons filed on 24 February 2021 (and later amended on 11 March 2021) in proceeding number 2021/58322 in the Supreme Court, Ms Choi then sought leave to appeal from the Appeal Panel’s decision. The appeal, involving a question of law, required the leave of the Court (see s 83(1) of the CAT Act). The summons was also filed out of time (see r 50.12 of the UCPR), since under the UCPR Ms Choi had until 15 February 2021 to file a summons seeking leave to appeal the Appeal Panel’s decision to the Supreme Court, and hence an extension of time to file the summons was also required.

24. [40]

    On 9 March 2021, a notice of appearance was filed for the Secretary, Department of Justice and Communities (the respondent), recording the respondent’s legal representative as Ms Lida Kaban (as noted above, General Counsel, Legal, of the Department).

25. [41]

    On 10 March 2021, Ms Choi’s application was listed for directions before Registrar Jones. At the commencement of the directions hearing, Ms Choi took issue with the appearance of Mr Cahill, the solicitor who was appearing (on the instructions of General Counsel) for the respondent. The respondent notes that the Registrar informed Ms Choi that General Counsel might instruct others to appear on her behalf if she wished and accepted that Mr Cahill was entitled to appear.

26. [42]

    On that occasion, Ms Choi indicated that she wished to file an amended summons and the Registrar made orders: for Ms Choi to file and serve an amended summons, for the parties to exchange evidence and submissions, and to list the proceedings for further directions on 28 April 2021.

27. [43]

    On 11 March 2021, Ms Choi filed an amended summons pursuant to the directions made by Registrar Jones on 10 March 2021.

28. [44]

    On 28 April 2021, the application was listed for directions again before Registrar Jones. At the commencement of the directions hearing, Ms Choi again took issue with the appearance of Mr Cahill on behalf of the respondent (on the basis that he worked for the Crown Solicitor’s Office). The respondent notes that the Registrar again accepted that Mr Cahill was entitled to appear. There was discussion as to the preparation of a joint Court Book; and the respondent’s position, as explained by Mr Cahill, was that: Ms Choi had already filed and served on the respondent approximately 3,360 pages of documents and that the parties were unlikely to agree on the contents of a joint Court Book. (Ms Choi’s position is that she made it clear on a number of occasions that she was prepared to participate in a joint Court Book provided it contained the 849 pages of material that had been released to her by the Department; and hence she contends that the respondent caused the issue that subsequently arose in relation to the Court Books – as to which see below.)

29. [45]

    The Registrar made orders on 28 April 2021 that the application be listed for hearing for one day on 21 July 2021 and for each of the parties to prepare its own Court Book by 14 July 2021.

30. [46]

    The respondent prepared a Court Book (comprising 461 pages of documents some of which the respondent says had been served on Ms Choi prior to 28 April 2021), which was filed on 13 July 2021. The respondent’s position (which the primary judge was prepared to accept) was that a copy was emailed to Ms Choi (who as noted above was residing in South Korea) on 14 July 2021. Ms Choi complained in due course that she had not received the respondent’s Court Book.

31. [47]

    On 21 July 2021, the date of the hearing listed before Bellew J, Ms Choi forwarded the respondent 23 emails attaching approximately 3,300 pages of documents. Ms Choi also sent a series of emails to his Honour’s associate. (Ms Choi, in her submissions in this Court, explained in some detail why she contends that she was “caused” to send the emails twice.)

32. [48]

    At the commencement of the hearing on 21 July 2021 (at which Ms Choi appeared by AVL), Ms Choi asserted that she had not received the respondent’s Court Book. There was then a discussion concerning the difficulty that his Honour considered this posed. In the 9 March 2022 Decision, his Honour records the following as having occurred on that occasion (see at [6]-[8]), including reference to the transcript (the accuracy of which Ms Choi here contests) of exchanges on that occasion:

33. [49]

    His Honour then made the following orders:

34. [50]

    His Honour further recorded the following notations to those orders (the second being the “further note” to which Ms Choi refers in the Appeal Proceeding):

35. [51]

    Ms Choi appears to refer to the orders made orally by his Honour on 21 July 2022 as the judgment given orally (which she complains does not accord with the subsequent written judgment) and in her amended draft notice of appeal Ms Choi seeks leave to appeal from those as well as from the 9 March 2022 Decision itself.

36. [52]

    It is relevant here also to note that Ms Choi maintains that, after the statement recorded at [6] of his Honour’s judgment, there was the following exchange (which she maintains has been fraudulently omitted or “sneakily edited” from the official transcript):

37. [53]

    Relevantly, Ms Choi does not appear to dispute that it was she who raised the suggestion that the matter be determined on the papers (a course with which she was presumably familiar given that this was the way that the Appeal Panel had proceeded) but Ms Choi is adamant that her consent was conditional and that she did not understand that there would not be a further hearing. Ms Choi has also (as adverted to above) made very serious allegations as to tampering with the transcript of that hearing (variously accusing the Reporting Services Branch under the direction or instruction of Ms Kaban of fraudulent manipulation of the transcript and the Supreme Court of having issued a “fraudulent official transcript”). It may be noted that even on Ms Choi’s own account of events the only condition she identified was that she be given leave to file an audio recording of the tribunal; not that she be given leave to issue a subpoena for such a recording, as now appears to be her complaint – and it does not appear that any audio recording was ever tendered to the primary judge.

38. [54]

    Complaint is also made by Ms Choi, on the present applications, that the primary judge conducted a “private hearing” of the matter (on the basis that there was an exchange recorded on the transcript between the respondent’s solicitor and his Honour before Ms Choi became connected to the telephone hearing) and Ms Choi makes the very serious allegation that his Honour (who she contends, due to his attire, was conducting wholly or mainly an administrative function – see below) made orders on “instructions” from a third party (who Ms Choi suggests was Ms Kaban through Bluetooth).

39. [55]

    Following the above orders, the respondent served Ms Choi with the respondent’s Court Book and the respondent served written submissions.

40. [56]

    On 31 August 2021, his Honour made the following orders in Chambers:

41. [57]

    The respondent filed and served further submissions on 9 September 2021.

42. [58]

    On 29 September 2021, after receiving a communication from Ms Choi apparently attaching correspondence from the Registrar at NCAT, his Honour’s associate communicated the following to the parties:

43. [59]

    Ms Choi here appears to complain about the direction that there be no further correspondence with chambers as being inconsistent with the leave given for her to represent herself; but, in any event, it does not appear that further material was submitted, and the respondent did not make any further submissions.

44. [60]

    On 9 March 2022, Bellew J published his reasons for refusing an extension of time for the filing of that summons and proceeded to dismiss the summons (the 9 March 2022 Decision).

45. [61]

    On 22 March 2022, Bellew J ordered that Ms Choi pay the Department’s costs of the proceeding in the specified gross sum of $8,039.05 plus GST (the 22 March 2022 Decision).

Primary judgments

1. [62]

   It is convenient at this stage to summarise the two impugned decisions.

2. [63]

   In the first of the impugned judgments (the 9 March 2022 Decision), Bellew J set out in full the orders sought by Ms Choi and the grounds upon which she relied for the relief there sought (at [1]) and then explained the background against which he had come to determine the matter (at [2]-[9]), noting that he had taken into account the material in the respondent’s Court Book as well as the material provided by Ms Choi (which, we interpose to note, was on any view of things voluminous). His Honour described the background to the dispute by reference to the summary contained in the Appeal Panel’s judgment; addressed the reasons of the Appeal Panel; and then turned to consider the threshold issue as to whether to grant an extension of time for the filing of Ms Choi’s summons.

3. [64]

   His Honour concluded that an extension of time should not be granted for three reasons: first, the history of the proceedings, his Honour being of the view that Ms Choi was doing little more than re-agitating a series of issues which had been comprehensively dismissed by the Appeal Panel in the context of a dispute which had been ongoing since 2018 (see at [29]); second, his Honour was not satisfied that an adequate explanation had been proffered for the fact that the summons was not filed in time, referring in that context to Ms Choi as an “experienced litigant” (see at [30]); and, third, that even if an extension were to be granted, Ms Choi would require leave to appeal against the Appeal Panel’s decision and his Honour considered that any such appeal would have little or no prospects of success (see at [31]).

4. [65]

   In the second of the impugned judgments (the 22 March 2022 Decision), his Honour noted that Ms Choi had not availed herself of the opportunity to provide any submissions as to costs but was clearly aware of the orders that had been made (see at [2] of the 22 March 2022 Decision). His Honour considered that there was no reason not to depart from the general rule (see r 42.1 of the UCPR) that costs follow the event and acceded to the respondent’s application for a lump sum costs order on the basis that it was highly desirable that the proceedings (which his Honour noted had had a tortured history) be brought to an end without further costs being incurred. His Honour considered the amount claimed to be entirely reasonable and ordered that Ms Choi pay the respondent’s costs in the specified gross sum of $8,039.05 plus GST.

Procedural history of subsequent proceedings in this Court

1. [66]

   Ms Choi did not file a Notice of Intention to Appeal from the primary judge’s decisions. Therefore, the material date by which, under r 51.10(1)(b) of the UCPR, Ms Choi was required to file a summons seeking leave to appeal from the 9 March 2022 Decision was 6 April 2022 and the material date by which Ms Choi was required to file a summons seeking leave to appeal from the 22 March 2022 Decision was 19 April 2022.

2. [67]

   A summons was forwarded by Ms Choi to the Registry on 6 April 2022, with a draft notice of appeal and draft Summary of Argument. The summons was stamped as filed on 20 April 2022 (hence, strictly out of time).

3. [68]

   On 5 May 2022, the respondent filed a notice of appearance in the Appeal Proceeding.

4. [69]

   On 9 May 2022, the summons in the Appeal Proceeding was listed for directions before the Registrar of the Court of Appeal, Mr Cahill appearing on behalf of the respondent. (The respondent says that there was no objection raised to Mr Cahill’s appearance on this occasion. Ms Choi, in her submissions on the present applications, appears to accept that she did not raise an issue as to Mr Cahill’s delegation when the matter was before Bellew J, but says that this was because Mr Cahill had said at a directions hearing before the Registrar on 28 April 2021 that he was substantively employed by the Crown Solicitor’s Office and was on secondment as a principal for the Secretary; which Ms Choi maintains is a lie; saying that Mr Cahill is working under the title of solicitor of the Department and that a solicitor at the Crown Solicitor’s office has no power for that role; Ms Choi asserts that this is a contempt of court.)

5. [70]

   Registrar Riznyczok informed the parties that Ward P had determined that the application be listed for a leave only hearing; and the matter was listed for hearing on 28 July 2022. Ms Choi indicated that she sought to appeal the decision that the application be listed for a leave only hearing and that she was seeking judicial review of Bellew J’s decision.

6. [71]

   As to the latter, on 9 May 2022 Ms Choi queried with the Registry why her judicial review summons had not been filed (referring it seems to the document dated 6 April 2022). Ms Choi contended that the fee for that application had been waived (by reference to a letter in relation to the cancelled case number 2022/115722). The Registrar refused Ms Choi’s fee waiver application and, after some communication in relation to that decision, on 13 June 2022 Ms Choi paid the fee and the summons seeking judicial review dated 9 June 2022 was accepted for filing (and stamped as filed) on 13 June 2022.

7. [72]

   As noted earlier, there was a deluge of interlocutory motions sent to the Registry in June and July 2022. On 28 July 2022, this Court proceeded to hear (as a concurrent hearing) Ms Choi’s summons for leave to appeal from the two decisions of the primary judge as well as the Secretary’s Summary Dismissal Motion in the Judicial Review Proceeding. Ms Choi appeared by telephone, and through an AVL link in light of some technical difficulties she was experiencing. The Court was unable to see Ms Choi.

8. [73]

   It should be noted that various of the notices of motion prepared by Ms Choi make application for her to be permitted to have a “McKenzie Friend” in the matter (variously named as Mr Peter Zonneyville (incorrectly spelled “Zonnevylle”) and Ms Telina Webb); and the Court was informed at the hearing of the matter on 28 July 2022 that Mr Zonneyville was in the virtual courtroom. However, Ms Choi proceeded to take the conduct of the oral argument in respect of the applications herself (at some length), it was not therefore necessary to call upon or make any formal order in relation to Mr Zonneyville’s assistance as Ms Choi’s “McKenzie Friend”. Suffice it to note that Ms Choi apparently had the assistance of Mr Zonneyville available to her.

9. [74]

   At the outset of the proceedings on 28 July 2022, Ward P heard and refused an application by Ms Choi that her Honour disqualify herself (see the separate reasons published today by Ward P on the disqualification application: Choi v Secretary, Department of Justice and Communities [2022] NSWCA 172).

10. [75]

    The Court then heard an application by Ms Choi that she be permitted to record the hearing on 28 July 2022, which had been foreshadowed in advance in an email dated 27 July 2022 from Ms Choi. The Court refused that application.

11. [76]

    Section 9 of the Court Security Act 2005 (NSW) (Court Security Act) relevantly provides that:

12. [77]

    “Court premises” is defined by s 4 as “in relation to a court … the premises or place where a court is held or that is used in relation to the operations of a court” and includes, in sub-par (c) as “a part of premises or a place being used to enable a person to appear before the court by means of an audio link or audio visual link”.

13. [78]

    Pursuant to s 9A, a person must not use any device to transmit sound or images (or both) from a room or other place where a court is sitting, or to transmit information that forms part of the proceedings of a court from a room or other place where that court is sitting in any of the specified ways (including by transmitting the sounds to any person or place outside that room or other place, or by posting entries that contain the sounds on social media sites, other websites or the internet) except as expressly approved by a judicial officer (see s 9A(2)(b) and (c)).

14. [79]

    Pursuant to s 9B of the Court Security Act, a person must not transmit or distribute a recording of sounds or images of court proceedings, including part of a recording, by any means (unless expressly approved by a judicial officer – see s 9B(2)(a)).

15. [80]

    It is not necessary here to explore the question as to the extraterritorial operation of the Court Security Act, which was not the subject of argument before the Court. Relevantly, it was apparent from various references in the materials relied upon by Ms Choi in this Court that Ms Choi has made a number of recordings of proceedings (both in NCAT and in this Court) and that Ms Choi has (and she admitted as such) uploaded some or all of those recordings to YouTube. These recordings include the audio recording of the hearing on 21 July 2021; and the audio recording file of an NCAT case conference by Senior Member McAteer on 11 February 2020 (as well as other proceedings, including one application heard by Macfarlan JA and McCallum JA, as her Honour then was). There was no authorisation for the placement of sound recordings of such proceedings to be published on YouTube. Ms Choi maintained that the recordings had been uploaded to YouTube as that was the convenient way to forward them to this Court (given the size of the files of the sound recordings). That does not, however, explain the posting of commentary in relation to at least one of the recordings (to the effect that as the footsteps of one of the judges could not be heard that judge could not have been present and that the real “con artists” are the Supreme Court). In that regard, publication of the recordings and the commentary appear calculated to bring this Court (and the administration of justice) into disrepute. That is a serious matter.

16. [81]

    Ms Choi informed this Court that, if she were permitted to record the hearing, she would not upload it to YouTube. Regrettably, in light of the previous instances of such recordings, it is difficult to accept such a promise at face value. In circumstances where there appeared no good reason to permit the recording of the hearing, Ms Choi’s application to record the 28 July 2022 hearing was refused. It was noted that a transcript of the hearing would be available on application in the ordinary course. (Ms Choi has subsequently emailed this Court to provide the benefit of advice apparently obtained by her from an unidentified lawyer in Korea to the effect that the legislation allows her to record proceedings in Court “in these extraordinary circumstances (revealing alleged corruptions [sic] by the Attorney-General, Ms Kaban, staff at the Office of General Counsel, the Registry) where it is reasonably necessary for the purpose of protecting the lawful interests of the party who records at court”. That does not change the ruling made on 28 July 2022.)

17. [82]

    Turning then to the substantive applications before the Court, we deal first with the Appeal Proceeding and then the application for summary dismissal of the Judicial Review Proceeding.

18. [83]

    As noted above, the Appeal Proceeding was commenced by summons dated 6 April 2022, by which Ms Choi seeks leave to appeal from Bellew J’s orders of 9 March 2022 and 22 March 2022; and also seeks relief directed at the underlying NCAT decisions (as set out in her amended draft notice of appeal).

19. [84]

    There is a threshold issue as to whether Ms Choi’s summons seeking leave to appeal is out of time (and hence itself requires leave). As noted above, the relevant date for filing of the summons for the purposes of the 9 March 2022 Decision was 6 April 2022 and was 19 April 2022 in relation to the costs appeal (see r 51.10(1)(b) of the UCPR), those being 28 days after the respective material dates.

20. [85]

    In determining whether to grant an extension of time to bring an appeal, the Court considers the length of delay; any explanation for the delay; whether the applicant for leave has a fairly arguable case; and the extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent to the application (Tomko v Palasty (No 2) (2007) 71 NSWLR 61; [2007] NSWCA 369 at [55] per Basten JA with whom Hodgson and Ipp JJA agreed). Leave to proceed out of time will not ordinarily be granted where an applicant has no prospects of success (see Moran v Armidale Local Aboriginal Lands Council [2019] NSWCA 220 (Moran), the Court there citing Gallo v Dawson (1990) 64 ALJR 458; [1990] HCA 30 at 459 per McHugh J).

21. [86]

    Given that the summons seeking leave to appeal has now been heard (and, as the bench was constituted by three judges, heard as a concurrent hearing with the appeal itself – the very hearing for which Ms Choi had contended), it is not productive here to explore the distinction between lodgement and filing of applications (see Fitness First Australia Pty Ltd v Dubow (2011) 251 FLR 241; [2011] NSWSC 351 at [79]ff); which indicates why an extension of time is necessary even though the summons was emailed to the Registry on 6 April 2022. Rather, in the interests of the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in dispute (see s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (Civil Procedure Act)), there should simply be an extension of time to 20 April 2022 for the filing of the summons seeking leave to appeal and this Court will so order. Of course, Ms Choi still needs leave to appeal from the respective March 2022 Decisions.

22. [87]

    Turning then to the application for leave to appeal itself, the principles applicable on such an application are well known (and, indeed, well known to Ms Choi, since they were restated recently by this Court on another application by Ms Choi (see Choi v University of Technology Sydney (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 342). There, Bell P (as the Chief Justice then was) and Emmett AJA said at [40]:

23. [88]

    Ms Choi has herself noted in her Amended Summary of Argument the decision of Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das [2012] NSWCA 164.

24. [89]

    Thus, something more must be demonstrated by Ms Choi than that the impugned decisions were arguably wrong. What is ordinarily required to be demonstrated is that the matter involves a question of principle or of public importance or an injustice which is reasonably clear in the sense of going beyond what is merely arguable (see, in addition to the above-mentioned authorities, Clarke v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 27; Carolan v AMF Bowling Pty Ltd t/as Bennetts Green Bowl [1995] NSWCA 69; Collier v Lancer (No 2) [2013] NSWCA 186; Moran; and more recently Coffs Harbour City Council v Noubia Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 32 (Coffs Harbour City Council v Noubia)).

25. [90]

    Where a disproportionate amount of time and cost will be involved (as would particularly be the case here insofar as complaint is made as to the requirement to pay a $155 processing charge), that is a factor tending against the grant of leave to appeal, particularly having regard to the case management principles enshrined in the Civil Procedure Act (see Gibson v Drumm [2016] NSWCA 206 (Gibson v Drumm), per Beazley P (as Her Excellency then was) and Simpson JA at [20]). The fact that an allegation of corruption is made is not of itself necessarily sufficient to support an application for leave to appeal (see Moran at [13] and [16]).

26. [91]

    Where the relevant decision involves the exercise of a discretion (such as the costs decision), to succeed on an appeal from the decision it would be necessary to establish error in the House v The King sense (see House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 at 504-505 per Dixon J (as his Honour then was), Evatt and McTiernan JJ), i.e., that there was an error of legal principle; that there was a material error of fact; that the decision made took into account an irrelevant consideration or failed to take into account or give sufficient weight to a relevant consideration; or that the decision was so unreasonable or unjust as to bespeak such an error (see also Micallef v ICl Australia Operations Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 274 at [45] per Heydon JA (as his Honour then was), with whom Sheller JA and Studdert AJA agreed; Gibson v Drumm at [22] and Coffs Harbour City Council v Noubia at [68]).

27. [92]

    Ms Choi’s initial draft notice of appeal dated 6 April 2022 identified a number of grounds of appeal (interwoven with submissions and argument), by reference to ten separate headings. The amended draft notice of appeal forwarded to the Registry by Ms Choi on 22 July 2022 repeats much of the content of the 6 April 2022 version, includes further submissions, and identifies the appeal grounds as being:

28. [93]

    In the amended draft notice of appeal (in the new Summary section, under the heading “Reasons”), there also appears the following heading, which apparently introduces a second appeal ground 9 (but seems to be an expansion of the existing Appeal Ground 9), as follows:

29. [94]

    In her Amended Summary of Argument dated 22 July 2022, Ms Choi identifies the nature of the case as being:

30. [95]

    The reference at [4] to matter 2019/305164 is obviously a reference to the application before Senior Member Ransome which was determined on 5 December 2019 (the Senior Member there dismissing Ms Choi’s application to extend time for the lodging of her September 2019 application for review of the Department’s 4 July 2019 decision; and dismissing that application). The reference to proceeding 2020/11594 is obviously a reference to the application before Senior Member Gracie which was determined on 18 June 2020 (the application to extend time there also being dismissed).

31. [96]

    In Ms Choi’s Amended Summary of Argument, she identifies the following questions as being raised in the Appeal Proceeding:

32. [97]

    It is apparent, from the above recitation of the questions that Ms Choi sees as arising in the Appeal Proceeding (as well as from the relief sought in the amended draft notice of appeal) that if leave to appeal is granted, Ms Choi is seeking to ventilate issues that go well beyond the impugned decisions (those decisions being simply the refusal to extend time for the filing of the appeal from the decision of the Appeal Panel and the decision as to costs). For example, Ms Choi raises issues as to the decision-making powers within the Department and issues as to the proper entities to be joined to the proceeding. In the relief claimed, Ms Choi seeks release of the “100 pages” that Ms Choi believes have been withheld from her.

33. [98]

    As to the reasons why leave to appeal should be granted, in her Amended Summary of Argument Ms Choi raises the following matters.

34. [99]

    First, Ms Choi says that the “volume of the matter” is simple; and that the crux of the dispute is whether or not 2020/11594 (being the NCAT application heard by Senior Member Gracie) is a re-litigation of 2019/305164 (being the NCAT application heard by Senior Member Ransome) (Ms Choi maintains that it is not).

35. [100]

    Second, Ms Choi contends that natural justice has not been offered (except for a case conference in NCAT). Ms Choi complains that NCAT “cut off” part of an audio recording file of the case conference (a reference to the 11 February case conference where she maintains that Senior Member McAteer determined that her 2020 NCAT application was not a re-litigation of the 2019 application); that Bellew J refused to issue a subpoena for the audio recording file of the case conference; and Ms Choi alleges that his Honour:

36. [101]

    Third, Ms Choi maintains that, if leave is not granted, injustice will result in that: there has been a costs order over $8,000 made against her and her “incorrect information” (that she identifies as being information that she is a “false claimer” in an intelligence report made to police) “will remain forever”; and she and her son may be unable to return to Australia.

37. [102]

    Fourth, Ms Choi says that this is a matter of public importance, that she is “an extreme or typical case when individual’s wrong information is shared among the public agencies”. Ms Choi asserts that she is a victim of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model Strategy and that the material already released to her has revealed misconduct and corruption by various persons (including at NCAT and the appointed guardian ad litem). Ms Choi says that the 100 pages “or all my information kept” by the respondent “could reveal more serious corruption” (by the Attorney-General, the NSW Ombudsman, the University of Technology Sydney and the police).

38. [103]

    Finally, Ms Choi invokes the interests of justice, contending that the grant of leave will enhance the interests of justice both at NCAT and in the Supreme Court, Ms Choi submitting that the GIPA Act concerns the conduct of the administrators (about whom she makes a number of complaints) and that the grant of leave “has implications to the most applicants who are self-represented litigant in the GIPA review proceedings”.

39. [104]

    In summary, Ms Choi’s position is that the 9 March 2022 Decision and orders were made irregularly, illegally or against good faith in the meaning of r 36.15 of the UCPR (citing Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Heperu Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 78 NSWLR 190; [2009] NSWCA 387 (Heperu) at [16] per the Court (Allsop P, Campbell JA and Handley AJA)) and similarly Ms Choi submits that the costs decision (the 22 March 2022 Decision) should also be set aside or varied under the r 36.15 and/or r 36.16 of the UCPR (again citing Heperu as well as Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Ltd (No 2) [2019] NSWCA 187 at [13] per Simpson AJA (Bell P, as his Honour then was, and Macfarlan JA agreeing at [1] and [2]), citing Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300; [1993] HCA 6 at 302 per Mason CJ; and Coles v Burke (1987) 10 NSWLR 429 at 437 per Kirby P (with whom Samuels and McHugh JJA concurred).

40. [105]

    Ms Choi contends that the primary’s judge’s handing down of “unconsidered and impulsive” decisions damages judicial accountability (citing Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 at 442 per Meagher JA), emphasising the public nature of court proceedings and judgments as providing an important means of judicial accountability (citing B Debelle, “Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law‟, (2001) 75(9) Australian Law Journal 556 at 563). Ms Choi submits that if a hearing is conducted by telephone (during COVID-19), the Court “should have put more effort to ensure a transparent process for judicial accountability and eventually, public confidence”; and Ms Choi says that special consideration may be required, given that she is a “self-represented widowed single mother with a nine year-old boy with non-English background and no legal knowledge in Korea” (citing Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; [1992] HCA 57).

41. [106]

    Ms Choi complains that her contentions as to obvious jurisdictional errors have not been determined and that investigative agencies have not responded to her complaints. As to the costs of the Appeal Proceeding, Ms Choi contends that the Office of General Counsel has caused the costs and should pay them.

42. [107]

    The respondent (who opposed the grant of leave for an extension of time for filing of the summons seeking leave to appeal) contends that, if leave is granted for an extension of time to file a summons seeking leave to appeal, the application for leave to appeal should nevertheless be refused. In substance, the respondent so submits on the basis that: if leave to appeal were to be granted, it would be the fifth time since 2018 that Ms Choi has re-agitated the issues in dispute before NCAT, the Appeal Panel and the Supreme Court, thereby putting the respondent to further significant costs and resulting in injustice to it; the impugned judgments disclose no error of law; Ms Choi has raised no clear grounds of appeal and raises issues not subject to the proceedings before the primary judge; the application raises no issue of principle and no question of public importance; and that Ms Choi has not identified a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable. The respondent points out that much of the relief sought in the summons seeking leave to appeal goes beyond the appeal sought to be brought against the primary judge’s judgment.

Determination of Application for Leave to Appeal (and Appeal if leave be granted)

1. [108]

   The principles applicable on an application for leave to appeal have been referred to above.

2. [109]

   There are various complaints made by Ms Choi throughout the Amended Summary of Argument and draft notice of appeal, not all of which appear referable to the impugned decisions in respect of which leave to appeal is sought. Addressing the proposed appeal grounds, Ms Choi’s contentions are as follows.

3. [110]

   This proposed ground encompasses the matters raised under the first four headings in the initial draft notice of appeal and, in essence, relate to the decision by the primary judge to determine on the papers Ms Choi’s application for leave for an extension of time to file her application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Appeal Panel.

4. [111]

   First, Ms Choi relies on the fact that on 21 July 2022 his Honour said “I will adjourn” and did not list a further hearing. Ms Choi contends (at [15] of the Amended Summary of Argument) that the primary judge never revoked the statement “I will adjourn”; that his Honour’s word is an order; that a further hearing was not listed; and therefore that the primary judgment is wrong. There is some uncertainty as to the import of this complaint. The respondent says that this appears to be a contention that Bellew J (on adjourning the proceedings on 21 July 2021 so that it could be dealt with on the papers) failed to re-list the proceedings for a further hearing. It appears, however, to be a complaint that it was somehow beyond the power or competence of the primary judge (having adjourned the hearing) then to proceed to determine the matter without a further oral hearing.

5. [112]

   The second heading “The orders and FURTHER NOTE given orally” relates to the orders made on 21 July 2021 (set out above) and the second notation thereto (namely, that “Consistent with the earlier observations made by today’s proceedings I note that I will proceed to determine this matter on the papers sometime after 10 September 2021”).

6. [113]

   Ms Choi contends that the notation “made by todays proceedings” was altered (referring to a recording posted by her on YouTube of the proceeding) and says that the “judgment” given orally was in fact that “I have made regarding today’s proceedings”. The import of such an alteration (even if that contention as to an alteration be correct) is not clear. Nevertheless, Ms Choi contends that this notation “cannot confer the Chamber [sic] to determine the matter on the papers without a hearing” and she maintains that “this note can cause disputes and requires another proceeding”. The complaint thus seems to be that it was beyond the power of the primary judge to proceed to deal with the matter on the papers. Complaint is also made that the “earlier observations‟ referred to in the notation were not identified in his Honour’s subsequent written reasons.

7. [114]

   Ms Choi maintains that:

8. [115]

   Thus, Ms Choi maintains that the orders and “FURTHER NOTE” are invalid; and should be revoked

9. [116]

   The third heading in the initial draft notice of appeal is “3. The hearing date of today is vacated”. Ms Choi’s complaint under this heading appears to be that it was the primary judge who wanted to have the hearing vacated (saying that the parties wanted to have a hearing); and asserting that a reasonable judge would have continued to proceed with a hearing.

10. [117]

    Ms Choi cavils with the accuracy of the matters recorded by the primary judge in the 9 March 2022 Decision as to the proceedings before the Court (saying that nearly all of this section of the judgment is “made-up and baseless”). Ms Choi here takes issue with the suggestion that she was in any way responsible for the listing of the hearing being vacated (in the course of which Ms Choi asserts that for a “standard judge” the one hour and 20 minutes between the sending of the last of her 23 emails (attaching 3,300 pages of documents) and the hearing could be enough time to read her materials “for such a simple matter”); and seems to cast doubt on whether the primary judge “did really vacate the hearing” (on the basis that findings of fact obtained from the oral hearing formed the basis of the principal reason given by his Honour for refusing the extension – i.e., as to the history of the proceeding). Complaint is made in this context that the transcript recorded at [6] and [7] of his Honour’s reasons has been manipulated. Ms Choi is adamant that she “did not have to consent to determine the matter on the papers without conditions for the Respondent”; rather, that she said she “could consent with conditions” and that the condition is not recorded in the judgment.

11. [118]

    The fourth heading in the draft notice of appeal “4. The decision to determine the matter on the papers cannot be justified” effectively encapsulates the nub of the complaints under Appeal Ground 1, namely that the primary judge made the decision to determine the matter on the papers. In so submitting, Ms Choi opined that the primary judge made various errors in determining the matter on the papers, as to which Ms Choi said the following: “[a]ccording to the oral Judgment and the written Judgment, I am unreasonable and irresponsible […] [o]n the contrary, I am responsible at least”.

12. [119]

    Complaint is made in this context that the determination of the matter on the papers is not consistent with the “earlier observations” or “what had been discussed” at the oral hearing on 21 July 2022; that the primary judge did not list the matter for a hearing “despite a commitment”; that NCAT and the Department have never responded to the contention that the Department had no jurisdiction to determine whether the information sought by Ms Choi was held by “Victim Services” and the Attorney-General; that the claim that the 2020 NCAT application was the re-litigation of the 2019 NCAT application and (additionally or alternatively) to review Senior Member Ransome’s decision of 5 December 2019 is absurd; that the audio recording file of the case conference on 11 February 2020 (which Ms Choi believes to have been edited) is important evidence (in that Ms Choi says that Senior Member McAteer said “no” when Ms Chew said that the GIPA Act review proceeding in 2020 was a re-litigation of the processing charge proceeding in 2019) and the primary judge committed to accepting audio recording files from NCAT. As to the commitment to listing a further hearing, Ms Choi refers to the statement made by the primary judge that:

13. [120]

    Complaint is also made in this context that, before the hearing commenced, the primary judge and Mr Cahill were having a “private hearing” in Ms Choi’s absence “talking about a history of the proceedings and the CourtBook [sic]” and Ms Choi says that it was his Honour who raised an issue of the respondent’s Court Book.

14. [121]

    Again, Ms Choi says that she said that she could consent to determine the matters on the papers conditionally; one condition being the provision of an audio recording file from NCAT but that the primary judge refused to issue a subpoena. Ms Choi says that this means that the judge’s chambers “cheated” her by not complying with the commitment; and thus, the decision to determine the matter on the papers cannot be justified.

15. [122]

    Ms Choi complains that the primary judge gave her leave to communicate via email and to conduct the case (and seems to see this as inconsistent with what was recorded in the judgment at [9] about her email communications and the way of conducting her case). (It appears from Ms Choi’s Summary of Argument that the email communications in question related to her “informing” the primary judge’s chambers of a contempt of court application in relation to another judicial officer “so that his Honour could be careful”.) Thus, Ms Choi says that “the negotiation (determining the matter on the papers) was broken”.

16. [123]

    As to the complaints made under this proposed appeal ground of discrepancies between the transcript, the short reasons for vacating the hearing date delivered by his Honour on 21 July 2021 and/or the 9 March 2022 Decision, the respondent submits that there are no such discrepancies (and no factual basis for the assertion by Ms Choi that his Honour found she was unreasonable or irresponsible, as noted above).

17. [124]

    The respondent submits that each of the matters under Appeal Ground 1 centres on whether Bellew J erred in adopting Ms Choi’s proposal that her application be heard on the papers; that it was open to his Honour to do so (pointing to the overriding purpose mandated by s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act and referring by way of example to the approach taken by Garling J in Chandrasekaran v Navaratnem [2021] NSWSC 1446; and noting that his Honour explained to Ms Choi what was involved in determining her application on the papers and that his Honour made orders on 21 July 2021, 31 August 2021 and 29 September 2021 providing Ms Choi with further opportunities to make submissions).

18. [125]

    In relation to the issue of the audio recording of the NCAT case conference, the respondent says that Ms Choi was given three opportunities to submit further material to the Court; and submits that, in any event, an audio recording of the case conference before Senior Member McAteer on 11 February 2020 would not have assisted Ms Choi in her application for an extension of time or as to whether leave to appeal should be granted (the proposed appeal relating to the subsequent decisions of Senior Member Gracie and of the Appeal Panel).

19. [126]

    It was clearly open to the primary judge, in the exercise of his discretion as to the management of the proceeding before him, to order that Ms Choi’s application be heard on the papers. Whether another judge might have taken a different approach is not to the point. There was no House v The King error established in relation to the making of that decision; nor any issue of principle or public importance involved in the making of that decision. Whether or not there had been an opportunity to read the volume of material that Ms Choi had sent the morning of the hearing, and whether or not the respondent’s solicitor had been able to proceed on that occasion, the transcript records that it was Ms Choi who suggested (and she does not dispute this) that the matter could be dealt with on the papers. The primary judge endeavoured to make clear to Ms Choi what that would involve and Ms Choi was given the opportunity to provide further submissions and materials in that context. There was no denial of procedural fairness in the making of that decision; nor was it beyond the power of the primary judge to determine to deal with the matter on that basis.

20. [127]

    As to the complaint about a private hearing, that is addressed in relation to Appeal Ground 2 below. As to the complaint in relation to the audio recording, there was no “commitment” or obligation on the part of his Honour or the Court to obtain or issue a subpoena for the production of such a recording and the relevance of the audio recording is in any event moot. It appears from Ms Choi’s Amended Summary of Argument that Ms Choi is seeking to establish that there was no re-litigation by her of the earlier NCAT application (relevant to the first of his Honour’s reasons for refusing the extension of time) in circumstances where Senior Member McAteer had “determined” this to be the case at the case conference. It is difficult to see how any statements to that effect by Senior Member McAteer could be dispositive of that question and hence anything that was recorded of the case conference would not assist in determining whether the primary judge erred in concluding (as the first of his principal reasons for refusing the extension) that Ms Choi was doing little more than re-agitating a series of issues that had been comprehensively addressed by the Appeal Panel.

21. [128]

    Thus, Appeal Ground 1 (if leave were to be granted) would fail.

22. [129]

    Ms Choi has raised various complaints as to the events on 21 July 2021: in summary, that the primary judge did not robe and did not wear a wig (which she contends was a breach of the Court Attire Policy); that there was a private hearing held in her absence (or that the primary judge had already started the hearing with the respondent in her absence); that the primary judge allowed his associate to email the respondent, without copying Ms Choi into the correspondence during the hearing; that the primary judge was making orders “while being instructed” by a third party (Ms Choi says the third party can only be Ms Kaban, who is alleged to have instructed the primary judge through Bluetooth); that there was a refusal to give audio recording files and written reasons for the orders; and that one ground on which she had consented to determine the matter on the papers conditionally was that his Honour said he had to go on leave and needed to hand the decision down by the end of 2021 but did not hand the judgment down until far later on 9 March 2022; and that the judgment “is not accountable”. As noted, Ms Choi has contended that there was a difference between the official transcript of the oral hearing and her transcript (taken from the unauthorised sound recording).

23. [130]

    Ms Choi says that:

24. [131]

    Ms Choi argues that wigs and robes are symbols of tradition and justice; and complains that the conduct of this matter “did not reach the Court’s expectations and cheap enough to reject my request to provide a sound recording and a full-version transcript including reasons for orders”.

25. [132]

    The respondent accepts that there was a brief conversation (recorded on the transcript) prior to Ms Choi becoming connected to the virtual courtroom but disputes that this amounts to a denial of natural justice. Insofar as Ms Choi raises issues as to the primary judge not being robed or wearing a wig, the respondent says that the customs relating to the wearing of judicial dress in New South Wales probably originated from the Judges’ Rules of 1635 promulgated by the Judges of King’s Bench; and that the Judges’ Rules did not have force of law and so were not received from England as part of the law of New South Wales. The respondent says that there has been no subsequent legislative intervention and the Supreme Court’s Court Attire Policy, insofar as it relates to robes and wigs, is directed at barristers.

26. [133]

    Insofar as Ms Choi maintains that the “oral Judgment” dated 21 July 2021 and the written Judgment dated 9 March 2021 are “not accountable” (by which it appears that she means that the published reasons do not accord with the statements made during the oral hearing), there is no substance to this complaint (which was raised as part of Appeal Ground 1).

27. [134]

    As to the suggestion that there was a denial of procedural fairness by reference to the fact that the primary judge was not robed or wearing a wig (or the contention that the primary judge was wearing a brown jacket), even apart from the fact that the Court Attire Policy governs the manner in which barristers are to appear before the Court, it cannot seriously be suggested that the wearing of robes or wigs is an requirement of natural justice or that a failure to do so is contrary to the rule of law. There are indeed many Courts in this country in which wigs are not worn in court hearings (including in recent years the High Court).

28. [135]

    As to the complaint that there was a private hearing in the absence of Ms Choi, this raises a more serious issue. However, it is apparent from the written transcript that all that occurred was preliminary discussion as to the procedural history of the matter and the fact that his Honour expressed a preliminary view (understandable having regard to the chronology of the proceeding) that the matter had a tortured history does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias nor is it a denial of natural justice. Ms Choi was given the opportunity to be heard and to make submissions in relation to the application and it was, as noted already, her suggestion that the matter proceed on the papers. The conclusion ultimately reached by his Honour that this was simply a re-agitation of issues already comprehensively dismissed by the Appeal Panel was (as is considered below) well open to his Honour and demonstrates no bias on his Honour’s part.

29. [136]

    Ms Choi’s complaint under this appeal ground is that the principal reasons given by the primary judge for his refusal to extend (for nine days) the time for filing her summons seeking leave to appeal were incorrect; and that a wrong principle in Shamieh trading as Consolidated Lawyers v Easy Buy International Pty Limited [2010] NSWSC 970 (Shamieh) per Hislop J was applied.

30. [137]

    As to the first of the three reasons given by his Honour (i.e., that this was a re-agitation of a series of issues already comprehensively dismissed by the Appeal Panel), Ms Choi says that the Appeal Panel applied a wrong principle (in Champion Homes Pty Ltd v Guirgis [2013] NSWCATAP 54 (Champion Homes) and Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 (Collins) – those cases considering principles relevant to the grant of leave to appeal, and to which Bellew J had referred); and that his Honour wrongly outlined the Appeal Panel’s reasoning (at [29]).

31. [138]

    Ms Choi maintains that she was legally exercising her rights to review the decision; that the matter was simple; that Ms Chew (a solicitor in the Office of General Counsel at the Department) determined other agencies’ items; and that there was no problem with the history of the proceeding (and NCAT “cut off this part from the audio recording file”).

32. [139]

    Ms Choi points to the statement in his Honour’s reasons that the Appeal Panel had concluded that her case did not satisfy the principles in Champion Homes and Collins; but Ms Choi says that the Appeal Panel concluded that her case did not “remotely approach any of the principles” (citing the Appeal Panel’s decision at [86]). In this regard, Ms Choi appears to see an inconsistency between a statement that her case did not “remotely approach” any of the relevant principles and the statement that her case did not satisfy those principles. If that be her complaint, then it is a pure question of semantics – a case that did not remotely approach the relevant principles must logically be one that did not satisfy those principles. In any event, Ms Choi says that she did not have to “approach” any of the principles; rather, that she just complied with Senior Member McAteer’s order dated 11 February 2020 for an extension of time.

33. [140]

    Ms Choi says that the finding that “the applicant is doing little more than re-agitating a series of issues which were comprehensively addressed by the Panel in the context of a dispute which has been ongoing since 2018” (at [29]) comes from the “private hearing” on 21 July 2021 with Mr Cahill in her absence and is contrary to natural justice. In this regard, Ms Choi refers to the statement recorded on the transcript as having been made by his Honour that “[t]his is clearly a matter which has a long and some might say tortured history”. That has been referred to above.

34. [141]

    Ms Choi thus maintains that the first of the three principal reasons “is a result from wrongly applied principles, procedural irregularities and unfairness”.

35. [142]

    As to the second reason (lack of a satisfactory explanation for the delay), Ms Choi says that it is unclear whether her four reasons were rejected due to “no oath” or due to no adequate explanation or due to the litigation experience referred to in the judgment. Ms Choi says that she “filed four reasonable grounds on oath” (referring to her affidavits of 31 March 2021 and 11 June 2021) (however, it is unclear from those affidavits what the “four reasonable grounds” explaining the delay indeed are, rather the affidavits are directed towards the merit of the appeal). Ms Choi further says that Bellew J erred in law not by raising an issue as to the lack of an oath before determining the matter on the papers. Ms Choi also cavils with the observation by his Honour that she was an “experienced litigant”, saying that this has been shown to be erroneous by her inability to find the “venue” (presumably, meaning forum) in which to lodge the summons. Ms Choi says that she is “not an experienced litigant with appeals from non-judicial Member to the Supreme Court”; that she is “new with appeal from non-judicial Member’s decision[s]”; and that an irrelevant consideration was here taken into account.

36. [143]

    Ms Choi maintains that a nine-day delay in filing the summons was not unreasonable in her circumstances, here pointing to her circumstances (a single mother in circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic) (and referring to the decision of Macfarlan JA, RA Hulme and Wright JJ who extended time having regard to evidence of the COVID-19 pandemic in GAR v R [2021] NSWCCA 265).

37. [144]

    Ms Choi also complains that his Honour did not provide adequate reasons for the conclusion as to delay (merely relating to the issue of the oath “or his Honour’s belief that I should have lodged summon [sic] within the time despite the organ broker’s threat [sic] caused by the Supreme Court of New South Wales”).

38. [145]

    Ms Choi says that the principles in Pell v Hodges [2007] NSWCA 234 (Pell) at [30] per Handley AJA (with whom Tobias and Basten JJA agreed) and Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 198; [2015] NSWCA (Lachlan) 130 at [29] per the Court (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P (as Her Excellency then was) and McColl JA) “would be relevant”; and she maintains that the respondent would not suffer even though a nine-day extension of time be granted whereas she would suffer if the extension was not granted (since she must amend the wrong information kept by the public agencies before she returns to Australia). Ms Choi emphasises that the Court “must seek to act in accordance with the dictates of justice”.

39. [146]

    As to the third of the reasons given by his Honour (relating to prospects of success), Ms Choi asserts that there is a prospect of success “if a fair-minded judge deals with the matter” (again saying that at the case conference on 11 February 2020, Senior Member McAteer had already determined that her GIPA Act review application was not a re-litigation of the processing charge application). Ms Choi says that the first NCAT hearing sought the revocation of the processing charge of $155, whereas the relief sought in the second NCAT hearing was for the release of the 100 pages and removal of the redactions. Thus, Ms Choi argues that the nature of the two proceedings is different. (As noted earlier, however, the first application also related to a complaint as to the documents not released to Ms Choi, therefore the distinction here drawn by Ms Choi is more apparent than real.)

40. [147]

    Ms Choi maintains that she could only consider any administrative review application after receipt on 5 December 2019 of the information that arose from the decision of 4 July 2019; and so an extension of time under s 41 of the CAT Act should be granted. Further, Ms Choi maintains that the respondent implicitly consented to extend the time to review to 13 January 2020 by, in its notification of 4 July 2019, seeking payment of the charges by 13 January 2020.

41. [148]

    Ms Choi complains that the Appeal Panel did not explain why the 2020 application was a re-litigation of the 2019 proceeding; that NCAT found the decision was a reviewable processing charge decision under s 80(j) as well as 80(c) of the GIPA Act; and therefore it should be said that NCAT concluded that the 2020 application was not a re-litigation of the 2019 application; and that the issue is about delegation (that the decisions made by the solicitors not by administrators are invalid and that the legal representatives under the General Counsel are not entitled to represent the respondents (the Department, Victim Services and the Attorney-General).

42. [149]

    As to the principal reasons articulated by Bellew J for declining to grant an extension of time in which to file the summons seeking leave, the respondent contends that Ms Choi is an experienced litigant (pointing to the fact that she has, since 2017, commenced approximately 30 sets of proceedings against (among others) the NSW Ombudsman, the Legal Aid Commission of NSW, the Commissioner of NSW Police and the University of Technology, Sydney before the Tribunal, in the Supreme Court and in the High Court) (annexing a list of those proceedings to the respondent’s submissions) and reiterates its position that this was simply a proposed re-litigation of matters previously disputed.

43. [150]

    The respondent submits that his Honour applied the correct principles in determining whether to extend time at [27] of his reasons (referring to those in Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232 (Currabubula Holdings) at [87] per Einstein J, cited by Hislop J in Shamieh at [13]) and that there was no error disclosed in his Honour’s reasons.

44. [151]

    The respondent says that the cases referred to by Ms Choi (see above) have no relevance to whether time should be extended for the purpose of r 50.12(1)(c), noting that Pell concerned an application for an extension of time under r 1.12 of the UCPR to file a statement of claim; and that Lachlan concerned an application to extend time to comply with consent orders that were based on an underlying contract. The respondent argues that different considerations apply to whether to grant an extension of time in which an appeal can be instituted; noting that they include factors specific to an appeal, such as the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, the consequences to the parties of the grant or refusal of an extension of time, the prospects of the appeal’s success and any prejudice caused to the respondent by extending the time (reference being made to Currabubula Holdings per Einstein J at [47]).

45. [152]

    Thus, the respondent says that there was no error of law by his Honour in the exercise of the discretion under r 50.12(1)(c) within the principles stated in House v The King.

46. [153]

    There is no issue of principle or public importance raised by Appeal Ground 3.

47. [154]

    As to the first of the reasons given by the primary judge (the question of re-litigation or re-agitation of issues already the subject of earlier proceedings), there is no doubt that the matters hereby raised hark back to the complaints as to the initial decisions of 27 March and 4 July 2019 in relation to the application for review of those decisions. The distinction here sought to be drawn between the complaint as to the processing charge and the complaint as to the material made available to Ms Choi elides the fact that Ms Choi’s fundamental complaint (from the outset) was as to the decision(s) about the materials to be disclosed to her. There is no error of principle or error of public importance in the conclusion that his Honour reached in this regard.

48. [155]

    As to the question of delay, it was open to his Honour to describe Ms Choi as an experienced litigant (notwithstanding that she had been a litigant in different capacities). The fact is that Ms Choi has been the moving party in numerous pieces of litigation and, whether that involved the particular constitution of the tribunal in respect of which the litigation was commenced, was clearly someone not unfamiliar with the litigation process. Nothing can here be drawn as to the observation by his Honour that the submissions by Ms Choi were not on oath.

49. [156]

    As to his Honour’s third reason (concerning the prospects of success), this Court is of the view that his Honour’s conclusion is correct, and hence that the appeal from his Honour’s reasons is without merit.

50. [157]

    These proposed appeal grounds can usefully be considered together.

51. [158]

    First, complaint is made as to the identification of the General Counsel as the solicitor on the record (heading 7 of the previous draft notice of appeal).

52. [159]

    Ms Choi makes lengthy submissions as to the proposition that the respondent has never filed a proper “Notice of Representation” (or notice of appearance); and cavils with the Appeal Panel’s finding at [31] of the Appeal Panel’s decision that, at its highest, Ms Choi’s submission was that there was some minor technical non-compliance by the respondent with directions but that this did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness. Ms Choi maintains her complaint as to the legal representation for the respondent in the relevant proceedings (and accuses the Attorney-General of thereby attempting to conceal breach by the Office of General Counsel of the GIPA Act). Complaint is made by Ms Choi as to the power of Ms Kaban to act as a legal representative at court for Mr Tidball; and maintains that Mr Cahill had no power to be a delegate of Ms Kaban. This is Ms Choi’s jurisdictional argument, (i.e., whether the Office of the General Counsel had jurisdiction to represent the respondent) and whether there was power for the respondent to “delegate” the General Counsel to represent it (there being much complaint as to the lack of evidence of any instrument of delegation). Ms Choi also appears to perceive some form of conflict in the Reporting Services Branch being responsible for transcription and audio recording files and (she says) also being “supervised” by the Office of the General Counsel. As noted, much complaint is made that Mr Cahill is a delegate of Ms Kaban (the solicitor on the record). Ms Choi says that there is no instrument of authorisation from the Secretary; and that this is illegal.

53. [160]

    Finally, Ms Choi also invokes the rule that, ordinarily, there should be only one solicitor on the record for a party (citing Konneh v New South Wales (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 390 at [77] per Garling J); unless leave were granted under the Supreme Court’s inherent power (citing Elphick v Westfield Shopping Centre Management Company Pty Ltd (2011) 216 IR 41; [2011] NSWCA 356 at [5]-[10] per Young JA).

54. [161]

    As to this complaint, the respondent notes that Ms Choi did not raise this issue before Bellew J but in any event the respondent says that there is no defect in the notice of appearance filed by the respondent on 9 March 2021.

55. [162]

    Appeal Ground 5 goes to Ms Choi’s contention that there was error in the amendment (by the Registrar on 18 July 2022) of the name of the first respondent to that of Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (and the removal of “Victim Services” as a respondent). (These are issues that the respondent notes did not arise on the application for an extension of time to file the summons.)

56. [163]

    Ms Choi maintains that the proper party names are as stated in her applications (namely, “Department of Communities and Justice”, “Victim Services”, “the Attorney-General of New South Wales” and Mr Tidball), relying on the fact that the GIPA Act concerns an agency which possesses the information. Ms Choi says that the three agencies “neglected” her access application; that the Attorney-General “even provided a legal representation to conceal the [Office of General Counsel’s] misconduct and the information from [her]” and that the Secretary of the Department (Mr Tidball) empowered Ms Kaban to abuse her power. Ms Choi maintains that this Court should find the exact party name (seemingly, on the basis that this might cause the government to take “an action to build an administrative court under the Department of Justice”).

57. [164]

    Appeal Ground 6 goes to the complaint as to the authority of a solicitor to make decisions in relation to the GIPA Act application (matters going back to the original 4 July 2019 decision and again not arising on the application for an extension of time to file the summons seeking leave to appeal from the decision of the Appeal Panel or that decision per se).

58. [165]

    Ms Choi says that the true reason she filed an NCAT application for a review of the Notice of Decision dated 27 March 2019 and 4 July 2019 was “the decisions were cross-over (mixture) decisions, not processing charges decisions or not final decisions”. Ms Choi complains that several solicitors kept requesting her to amend the scope without giving her “the legal rights”; that no notice of authorisation or delegation was publicly available; and that Mr Tidball has no power to delegate his daily work to the solicitors. Ms Choi says that “[t]he GIPA Act concerns the money. The scope should be amended”.

59. [166]

    These grounds go to matters at least one step removed from the application before the primary judge (which was as to whether to extend time for the filing of the application for leave to appeal). In any event, the complaints by Ms Choi as to the proper party name or the authority to act of the solicitor on record do not raise any issues of principle or public importance. Nor does the complaint as to the authority of a solicitor in the Office of General Counsel to make a determination as to matters relating to an application under the GIPA Act lend itself to an appeal of the present kind. Ms Choi’s complaint in essence seems to be that her underlying complaint as to the decisions made in 2019 by the Department was not reviewed by reason of the decisions made by the Appeal Panel and the primary judge (see Appeal Ground 7 below). However, the contention that the Department should have been sued in its own name is clearly wrong and so is the suggestion that something not a legal entity (the Victim Services business unit), which is not capable of suing or being sued should be joined. As to the complaints about representation of the Department in the proceedings, it is more than appropriate for General Counsel to act for and represent the Secretary – and it is not necessary for there to be an instrument of delegation as such. Nor is it a proper complaint that there is more than one solicitor involved – there is only one solicitor on the record. As to the complaint as to who made the decision in relation to the release of information, the fact that solicitors within the Office of General Counsel reviewed documents or made decisions is not indicative of some kind of error of jurisdiction. The ultimate decision is one made by the requisite officer in the Department.

60. [167]

    The complaint in relation to Appeal Ground 7 is that NCAT has never exercised its enforcing jurisdiction. Ms Choi submits that:

61. [168]

    Again, this appeal ground goes to an issue of jurisdiction, not to the complaint by Ms Choi as to the impugned decisions.

62. [169]

    Insofar as sense can be made of this ground it is a complaint that there was an offence in the alleged failure to release information in response to the GIPA Act access application. Such a complaint should be referred to the relevant authorities. It is not a complaint relevant to the issue of an application for extension of time for, and leave to, appeal from the decision itself.

63. [170]

    This is raised as an appeal ground but is more relevantly considered as a factor to be weighed in the discretion as to whether to grant leave to appeal. As to the issue of public importance, Ms Choi says that:

64. [171]

    In her Amended Summary of Argument, Ms Choi appears to rely on material that was before Meagher, White and Brereton JJA in other proceedings determined by their Honours (in Choi v NSW Ombudsman). Ms Choi complains of misconduct in the Office of the General Counsel; corruption by numerous people (not all identified); and bad faith by the Attorney-General in not taking any action regarding the corruption (and by providing an amicus curiae for the purposes of arguing earlier matters).

65. [172]

    In particular, complaint is made by Ms Choi that the determination of the costs order without giving her the chance to review her material was unfair (complaining that the Office of General Counsel had informed her “of disconnecting the Network”); and Ms Choi also complains as to the rejection by Ms Kaban of a privacy complaint that Ms Choi had lodged with the Office of General Counsel. Ms Choi says that “[e[mpowering unethical officer too much power results corruption [sic]. Defining the role of General Counsel and identity of DCJ Legal is significant for the public members to exercisie [sic] proactive rights under 3 [sic] of the GIPA Act”.

66. [173]

    Under this proposed ground, Ms Choi again complains at decisions being made by legal practitioners (Ms Chew and Mr Long) and says that administrative review decisions should be made by the agency’s administrators. Ms Choi complains of the lack of an instrument of delegation and says that “[i]t is a shame that the decision which were not made by an administrator came to this Court without ventilation. It should be of public importance to grant leave to review the decision”.

67. [174]

    Further, Ms Choi complains that the judgment did not deal with the 2019 decision of Senior Member Ransome and says that no written reasons have been given regarding this judgment. Ms Choi wishes to raise an issue of delegation or authorisation on the public importance ground. Relevantly, Ms Choi complains that the “decision makers” are the General Counsel’s solicitors (Ms Chew and Mr Long); that the General Counsel and her solicitors represent the respondent; and that there is no instrument of delegation or authorisation on the website.

68. [175]

    Insofar as Ms Choi questions whether Departmental decision-makers involved in determining her access application were authorised to do so, the respondent points out that Ms Choi did not raise this issue in the proceeding before Bellew J.

69. [176]

    Under this proposed ground of appeal, Ms Choi contends that Bellew J was unreasonable. This complaint apparently relates to his Honour’s acceptance of the respondent’s position that the respondent’s Court Book had been sent to Ms Choi. It is said by Ms Choi that a test carried out during the hearing as to whether or not the internet networking between Mr Cahill and herself was properly working showed that it was not; so, she says that it should be believed that she had not received the respondent’s Court Book. However, Ms Choi complains that the primary judge did not believe that she had not received the respondent’s Court Book and that his Honour accepted what Mr Cahill said about the Court Book and believed that Registrar Jones did not order the parties to post the Court Book to each other.

70. [177]

    Complaint is also made that Ms Choi received no response from his Honour’s associate to an enquiry as to the respondent’s submissions on costs. Ms Choi complains that Bellew J did not believe that she had not received any costs submissions from the respondent. Ms Choi further asserts that, in Korea, the agency’s legal representatives are not allowed to appear at the court in administrative proceedings which are related to the public officers’ conduct (though the relevance to proceedings here of what may be the position in Korea is moot). In any event, Ms Choi appears to contend that it is in the interests of justice to grant leave to review the costs decision because she says that the public resources of $8,000 were spent “for concealing the corruption”.

71. [178]

    The respondent submits that Appeal Grounds 8, 9 and 10 are not amenable to a response.

72. [179]

    Moreover, in relation to all of the proposed grounds of appeal, the respondent’s position is thus that the proposed grounds of appeal do not disclose any issue of principle, question of general public importance or any circumstance where an injustice has occurred by reason of error in the judgment, which is reasonably clear, going beyond what is merely arguable, by reason of an error of Bellew J. The respondent says that there is no prospect of any appeal succeeding; that the resources which would be consumed in preparing for and hearing an appeal would be wasted; and that no injustice will be done by refusing leave to appeal. Thus, it is submitted that, if the extension of time in which to file the summons is granted, then the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed with costs.

73. [180]

    Appeal Ground 8 goes to the question of the prejudice to Ms Choi of the decisions of which she complains. Those decisions (the refusal of an extension of time and consequential costs decision) do not raise any issue of public importance or principle. To the extent that Ms Choi argues that there is corruption in public office, her remedy lies elsewhere. Appeal Ground 9, insofar as it argues that the issue of jurisdiction was not determined, is not to the point in considering whether there was a relevant error in the refusal of an extension of time for leave to appeal. Appeal Ground 10 goes no further than to cavil with the findings on which the primary judge reached the conclusion that there should be a costs decision made against Ms Choi. No House v The King error is here demonstrated.

74. [181]

    This apparently additional ground of appeal appears to be an expansion of Appeal Ground 9 as it appears both in the initial draft notice of appeal and the amended draft notice of appeal. It raises a complaint that “the requirements of s 125 of the GIPA Act were not made due to the Respondent’s jurisdictional errors”; and that the primary judge did not “answer” this issue of jurisdiction.

75. [182]

    The complaint here made relates to Ms Choi’s contention that “Victim Services” is a separate entity with jurisdiction (and the statutory obligation) to determine access applications under the GIPA Act (contrary to the respondent’s evidence that Victim Services is a business unit within the Department). Ms Choi says that this issue of jurisdiction was responded to by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal for the first time during a directions hearing in the Judicial Review Proceeding on 18 July 2022.

76. [183]

    In this regard, Ms Choi makes various submissions as to the operation of the business units in the Department in 2018 (which need not here be set out). The gravamen of her complaint appears to be that the primary judge should have found the respondent’s “jurisdictional errors” (by which Ms Choi appears to mean that there should have been a finding that “Victim Services” failed to exercise its statutory obligation under the GIPA Act to respond to her access application).

77. [184]

    This additional appeal ground fails to comprehend that the decision which the primary judge was called upon to make was not as to the merits of the initial underlying complaint but a decision as to whether there should be an extension of time to appeal from the Appeal Panel’s decision (which in turn held that there was no error of warranting leave to appeal from the there impugned decisions).

Costs

1. [185]

   Finally, as to the costs decision (in respect of which there were no separate submissions by Ms Choi; simply the assertion in her submissions that the costs were spent in concealing the corruption; and her complaint that the primary judge did not believe that she had not received any costs submissions) the respondent notes that the primary judge’s decision on costs involved an exercise in discretion in applying s 98(4)(d) of the Civil Procedure Act and therefore that Ms Choi is required to demonstrate error in the House v The King sense to succeed on an appeal from that decision. The respondent says that Ms Choi has not done so; and the fact that the amount in issue is small points in itself against a grant of leave.

2. [186]

   There is nothing to establish House v The King error in the making of the costs decision. The primary judge followed the usual rule that costs follow the event; and no error has been shown in the decision to quantify those costs in a fixed sum amount.

Determination of Application for Leave to Appeal

1. [187]

   Having regard to the principles on an application for leave to appeal (as set out above), there has been no issue of principle or public importance identified nor has there been any reasonably clear injustice established going beyond that which is merely arguable. As is evident from the reasons in the successive judgments, Ms Choi has raised the same arguments time and again – so, for example, the arguments identified at [62] and following of the Appeal Panel’s reasons were arguments considered by earlier NCAT members and raised again on the current application for leave to appeal. Further, Ms Choi insists on assertions that have no substance – such as the contention that the proper respondent is the Department (not the Secretary) or that a business unit of the Department (“Victim Services”) which is not a legal entity should be joined; and other similarly unmeritorious arguments as to errors of “jurisdiction”. Leave to appeal should be refused.

2. [188]

   Had leave been granted, this Court would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that no error was established in the reasons of the primary judge; nor was there any procedural unfairness in the determination of the matter on the papers. The claimed issues of public importance largely go to broad and unsubstantiated accusations of corruption and fraudulent conduct, and complaints as to authorisation or delegation of power to determine the access applications and to represent the Department (or decision-makers within the Department). There is no basis on which to assert that the primary judge misapprehended the material facts or wrongly applied the applicable principles of law in the impugned decisions.

Judicial Review Proceeding

1. [189]

   Next, we turn to the application for summary dismissal of Ms Choi’s judicial review application.

2. [190]

   The Judicial Review Proceeding was commenced by summons, in which Ms Choi seeks the judicial review of Bellew J’s decisions of 9 March and 22 March 2022, as well as relief in respect of the decisions of the NCAT Appeal Panel and Senior Members Gracie and Ransome.

3. [191]

   The Secretary seeks an order for the summary dismissal of the Judicial Review Proceeding pursuant to r 13.4(1) of the UCPR on the basis that the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious and (alternatively or additionally) an abuse of the Court’s process. The Secretary contends that there is a high degree of certainty that the judicial review proceeding must fail: first, as the crux of Ms Choi’s case is to seek judicial review of the judicial decisions of a Supreme Court judge; second, on the basis that an extension of time should not be granted for the filing of the summons seeking judicial review; and third, that the issues in dispute and relief sought in the Judicial Review Proceeding largely duplicate those in the Appeal Proceeding.

4. [192]

   The Secretary argues that each of the grounds of review raised in Ms Choi’s summons focusses on the 9 March and 22 March Decisions (even though the relief sought goes beyond those decisions and includes relief relating to the earlier decisions of the Appeal Panel and Senior Members Gracie and Ransome of NCAT).

5. [193]

   It is noted that Ms Choi’s summons alleges that Bellew J: reached a wrong conclusion in refusing Ms Choi an extension of time to file a summons seeking leave to appeal (see at [58] of the summons); identified “a wrong issue or a wrong question” and made a finding of fact not supported by evidence (see the sub-heading to [59] and [63] and [84]-[87] of the summons); made an error of law on the face of the record and relied on irrelevant materials (see at [66]-[72] and [79]-[83] of the summons); did not issue “proper reasons” (see at [75]-[78] of the summons); afforded Ms Choi “procedural unfairness” (see at [87]-[107] of the summons); did not take into account the material filed by Ms Choi on 30 March 2021 (see at [108]-[109] of the summons); and was unreasonable, committed “procedural irregularities” and demonstrated “apprehended bias” (see at [110]-[113] of the summons).

6. [194]

   The Secretary contends that each of those grounds of review (leaving aside the direction for the “leave-only” hearing in the Appeal Proceeding, the complaint as to which is now otiose) arose from and (additionally or alternatively) relates to judicial decisions made by Bellew J. In that regard, the Secretary relies on authority in this Court for the proposition that there cannot be judicial review of the judicial decisions of a Supreme Court judge, citing Penson v Titan National Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 404, where Meagher, Gleeson and Simpson JJA said (at [8]-[10]):

7. [195]

   Even if the leave-only decision is in the exercise of an administrative function the Secretary says that the function is conferred on “the Court” as a whole, not a particular judicial officer; and the Secretary argues that the Court has no jurisdiction to cure a perceived administrative injustice, referring to the observation by Brennan J, as his Honour then was, in Attorney General (New South Wales) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1; [1990] HCA 21 (at 35-36) that:

8. [196]

   As to the second ground relied on by the Secretary, it is said that Ms Choi requires an extension of time in which to file her summons pursuant to r 59.10(2) of the UCPR, on the basis that her summons was filed on 13 June 2022 and therefore Ms Choi is late in filing an application for judicial review in respect of the various decisions referred to in her summons by a range of time from two years and three months to two days (the only matter in respect of which Ms Choi is not out of time being the impugned costs decision of Bellew J, which the Secretary maintains is not amenable to judicial review in any event).

9. [197]

   The Secretary argues that there has been no explanation (and therefore there can have been no adequate explanation) as to why Ms Choi was not able to seek judicial review within the time prescribed by r 59.10(1) of the UCPR (particularly of the decisions of NCAT) and says that it should be inferred that there is no reason for the delay which could assist Ms Choi to resist the Secretary’s application for dismissal (cf Ye v Chen [2021] NSWSC 1098 per Harrison AsJ at [45]).

10. [198]

    The third ground relied upon by the Secretary for summary dismissal is the duplication of proceedings. The Secretary identifies the overlap between the issues in dispute in the Appeal Proceeding and those in the Judicial Review Proceeding, by reference to the summons filed in each proceeding, as follows:

11. [199]

    The Secretary refers to the decision of RA Hulme J in Whitehead v Nickells [2013] NSWSC 1446, where his Honour noted (at [5]) the principles set out by Johnson J in Hamzy v Commissioner of Corrective Services (NSW) (2011) 80 NSWLR 296; [2011] NSWSC 120 at 300 as to summary dismissal applications, those being that:

12. [200]

    In summary, the Secretary’s position is that the Judicial Review Proceeding should be dismissed as being frivolous or vexatious and (additionally or alternatively) an abuse of the Court’s process: that there is a high degree of certainty that the proceedings must fail due to the significant difficulties in ascertaining Ms Choi’s case; that the proceedings reflect a re-agitation of matters that have already been determined and because Ms Choi appears to seek judicial review of the decisions of a Supreme Court judge; that the summons was filed well out of time to seek judicial review of many of the decisions with which Ms Choi takes issue and has low prospects of satisfying the Court she should be granted an extension; and that there is a large amount of duplication between this proceeding and the Appeal Proceeding. The Secretary maintains that the continuance of this proceeding would be unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive for the reason that it seeks to litigate a case that has already been disposed of in earlier proceedings (cf Hammond v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 304 at [29] per the Court (Emmett and Gleeson JJA)).

13. [201]

    In response to the Secretary’s submissions on the summary dismissal application, Ms Choi contends that: first, there was a “fraudulent appearance” in the Judicial Review Proceeding and hence no notice of appearance under the UCPR has been filed (Ms Choi complaining as to the notice of appearance filed 24 June 2022 being filed for the named first respondent; a lack of any instrument of authorisation or delegation having been filed to demonstrate that Mr Tidball (the Secretary) was so authorised; that a name for the solicitor on the record is missing – and instead the notice of appearance simply provides that the solicitor on record is the “General Counsel” and that the General Counsel has no power to represent the first, second and third respondent; and complaint is made that Mr Cahill has no power to be a delegate of Ms Kaban); second, that there is no motion within the meaning of the UCPR (since it has a coversheet filed on-line headed “Written Submissions”; no filing fee was paid for a motion; and there are incorrect details as to the parties and their representatives; and, third, Ms Choi maintains that the affidavit filed in support of the motion is not reliable (and that Mr Cahill witnessed a liar)).

14. [202]

    Ms Choi refers to the decision of this Court (Meagher, White and Brereton JJA) in which the Court exercised jurisdiction for judicial review of the Appeal Panel’s decision in Choi v NSW Ombudsman.

15. [203]

    Ms Choi accepts that there is a question as to whether the primary judge in the present case exercised a judicial function in making the orders and further note given orally on 21 July 2021 and in the 9 March 2022 and 22 March 2022 Decisions. However, Ms Choi’s submission is that Bellew J exercised an administrative (not judicial) function in relation to the matters and that her case thus falls within the exception identified by Leeming JA in Singh v State of NSW; Singh v Lekhwar [2021] NSWCA 260 at [7], namely that :

16. [204]

    Ms Choi advances the following reasons for the proposition that the primary judge was here exercising an administrative function: first, that the primary judge was not wearing a wig and a robe (rather, a light brown suit, a white shirt and no tie) and “did not introduce me to the name etc” (thus contending that Bellew J “chose to act like an administrator”); second, that his Honour determined the matter in accordance with the “further note” dated 21 July 2021 given orally during the vacated hearing (Ms Choi contending that complying with the orders does not give a judge a judicial function to determine the matter on the papers); and that Bellew J determined the matter on the papers by complying with the “further note”; third, that Bellew J vacated the 21 July 2021 hearing but then relied on the communications exchanged during the vacated hearing; fourth, Ms Choi asserts that his Honour altered the oral orders “as if a junior administrator acted” then rejected her application for the reasons for the oral orders, sound recording and a full-version of the transcript without giving reasons; and “manipulated a transcript against my interest and put down made-up words in the Judgement; and gave the oral orders being instructed by a third party through a Bluetooth”; and, finally, Ms Choi asserts that his Honour “directly cheated” her by committing to rely on an audio sound recording which Ms Choi would file but not issuing a subpoena. As to the last, Ms Choi complains that Ms Kaban, who she describes as the Director of the Reporting Services Branch for NCAT and the Supreme Court, refused to provide her with an audio sound recording of the case conference by Senior Member McAteer on 11 February 2020.

17. [205]

    Thus, Ms Choi submits that Bellew J (despite having a judicial function conferred on him) did not exercise a judicial function but determined the matter by exercising an administrative function. Alternatively, Ms Choi submits that his Honour “might have exercised 70% of administrative functions and 30% judicial functions”.

18. [206]

    Ms Choi maintains that her claims for judicial review are arguable and therefore says that her summons is not frivolous or vexatious and that serious injustice would result if the summons seeking judicial review were to be dismissed (complaining that over $8,000 of legal costs were imposed on a widowed single mother with a ten year old son; that “[n]one of the opportunities to give materials was offered”; and that she was excluded).

19. [207]

    In her written submissions Ms Choi then sets out in some detail (which is not here reproduced) her complaints as to the failure of the agencies to respond to her GIPA Act access application (rather that it was Ms Chew, a solicitor at the Office of the General Counsel, that made a “not-held” decision on behalf of Victims Services and on behalf of the Attorney-General of New South Wales) and her contention that the Department (or the Secretary) does not have jurisdiction to determine the Victim Services access application without an Instrument of Authorisation or Delegation, Ms Choi contending that Victim Services is a separate public agency under the GIPA Act governed by the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 (NSW).

20. [208]

    For the reasons set out in her submissions, Ms Choi contends that Victim Services has the power to handle GIPA Act applications and that it should do so (independent from Ms Kaban’s control).

21. [209]

    Ms Choi also makes complaint as to the making by solicitors of administrative decisions, saying that their roles are administrative duty; and makes a number of submissions as to administration within the government (including as to the proliferation of party names – such as Department of Communities and Justice or DCJ or Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice or The Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice).

22. [210]

    As to the first of the grounds raised by the Secretary, while it has been recognised that there is no bright line distinction between judicial power and executive or administrative power, and indeed that line can be very blurred (see McHugh J at 57 in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1; [1992] HCA 64; Palmer v Ayers (2017) 259 CLR 478; [2017] HCA 5), judicial power inherently involves the ascertainment, declaration and enforcement of rights and liabilities of the parties as they exist or are deemed to exist (see Waterside Workers’ Federation (Aust) v JW Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434; [1918] HCA 56). It involves the determination of controversies between subjects, and between the State and its subjects (Huddart Pty Ltd, Parker and Co v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330; [1909] HCA 36).

23. [211]

    Judicial power involves a “decision settling for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the existence of rights or obligations, so that an exercise of the power creates a new charter by reference to which that question is in the future to be decided as between those persons or classes of person” (see R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361; [1970] HCA 8).

24. [212]

    The nature of executive power or administrative functions on the other hand is perhaps less amenable to definition than “judicial power”, except, perhaps, by framing it negatively as that power, or those functions, which are neither judicial nor legislative in nature. Thus, the issuing of a search warrant, for example, has never been conceived of as an exercise of judicial power but, rather, as an administrative function (see, for example, R v Turner; Ex parte Marine Board of Hobart (1927) 39 CLR 411; [1927] HCA 15 at 442, 450).

25. [213]

    What is clear, however, is that one looks to the nature and character of the function that is exercised in order to characterise it as either judicial or administrative: it is undoubtedly a matter of substance rather than form (or, as here suggested by Ms Choi, attire). Thus, whether or not the primary judge was wearing a wig says nothing about whether he was exercising judicial power. (Indeed, as may become apparent if Ms Choi pursues her foreshadowed application for special leave to the High Court, the judges of our ultimate appellate court do not wear wigs; but it would surely not be suggested that in hearing appeals and determining litigious controversies in the High Court without wearing wigs their Honours were exercising administrative rather than judicial functions.) Similarly, what colour suit the primary judge may have worn (Ms Choi expressing the opinion that judges wear black) or whether his Honour was wearing a tie, says nothing about the functions there being exercised.

26. [214]

    The submissions made by the Secretary are well-founded. There is no power for this Court to exercise judicial review of the impugned decisions of its own judges; and therefore whether or not the judicial review application duplicates the summons for leave to appeal (and it clearly does) the application is untenable and Ms Choi’s summons for judicial review should be dismissed as untenable and an abuse of process.

Notices of motion

1. [215]

   It is not necessary to say much as to the remaining notices of motion (not all of which have been accepted for filing).

2. [216]

   As to the 21 June 2022 Notice of Motion, the relief sought for revocation of the leave only direction and for a concurrent hearing (together with the judicial review hearing) is now otiose; as is the application for leave to amend the Summary of Argument and notice of appeal (those having been considered in the present applications). The relief sought as to the respondent’s notice of appearance and representation is not made good. As to the relief sought in relation to the decisions for fee waiver, there is no right of review.

3. [217]

   As to the 24 July Notice of Motion, which has not been accepted for filing, the orders sought in relation to the case management directions (including as to the party names) are inappropriate and would not be made.

4. [218]

   As to the 27 July 2022 disqualification motion, that has been dealt with (in separate reasons published by Ward P) and the application to record the hearing under s 9(2) of the Court Security Act has been dismissed.

5. [219]

   As to the 27 July 2022 Contempt motion, leave to file that motion is refused as it is not accompanied by a statement of charges as required.

Teoh direction

1. [220]

   Finally, at the hearing on 28 July 2022, submissions were sought from the parties as to the making of a direction of the kind made in Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 4) (2011) 81 NSWLR 771; [2011] NSWCA 324 (Teoh v Hunters Hill Council), wherein Handley AJA (with whom Allsop P, as the Chief Justice of the Federal Court then was, and Beazley JA, as Her Excellency then was, agreed) made the following direction:

2. [221]

   The respondent embraced the making of such a direction. Ms Choi did not address it in terms (but that may be because Ms Choi was not focussed on the enquiry that had there been made).

3. [222]

   It is no small thing for this Court to impose a requirement that Ms Choi obtain leave before proceeding with any further motion based on the matters she has to date litigated in more than 30 proceedings in the past few years. Restricting a person’s right to access the courts is an extreme interference with a basic right. However, there can be no dispute as to the existence of such power (Teoh v Hunters Hill Council; Hassan v Sydney Local Health District (No 5) [2021] NSWCA 197 and see Hassan v Sydney Local Health District trading as Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [2021] HCASL 230 and Samootin v Shea [2013] NSWCA 312. It is clear that the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) does not displace this Court’s inherent power to make such an order, because that is what s 7 provides. It is also clear that there is power to make orders appropriately adapted to the circumstances of the case; see for example Ghosh v Miller (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 212.

4. [223]

   The features which make this a clear case for making such an order are the quantity of proceedings commenced by Ms Choi, the disproportionality between the number of those proceedings and the matters in issue, the thousands of pages of material which regularly accompanies them (to none of which was this Court taken on the present applications) and the seriousness of the allegations made in circumstances where, if they were made by a legal practitioner, there would be a clear breach of the applicable professional rules. Among other things, Ms Choi has made allegations that: the Supreme Court issued a “fraudulent official transcript” of the hearing before Bellew J on 21 July 2021; there has been manipulation and/or removal by the Registry of part of the White Folder; the primary judge is in contempt; there has been a breach of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) by the Registrar who provided assistance to Ms Choi by drafting a notice of change of address for service; and the primary judge has made orders under instructions from a third party. It is clear that Ms Choi has no compunction in making very serious allegations of fraud and corruption against any number of persons involved in the proceedings (without the necessary detail required to make such serious allegations).

5. [224]

   Moreover, following the hearing, Ms Choi has continued to inundate chambers with email correspondence making serious allegations against parties to the proceedings and inappropriate requests of the Court and the other parties. This has the inevitable result that Court time has been occupied in dealing with the matters and the respondents’ time and costs have been expended in responding to them.

6. [225]

   In addition, there is the absence of any place of address in New South Wales at which Ms Choi may be served, and against which, if necessary, execution can be levied. We do not express a view as to whether there has been conduct which amounts to either or both of a serious contempt of court and a serious breach of the Court Security Act by what has been published on YouTube, but the potential criminality as well as the practical difficulties in enforcing the costs orders that regularly accompany Ms Choi’s unsuccessful applications make the absence of the local address required by UCPR r 4.5 more than a merely technical breach.

7. [226]

   In short, all persons enjoy an important right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. However, that right comes with concomitant responsibilities, and it must not be thought that this Court is powerless to prevent its processes from being abused. It is appropriate in those circumstances and having regard to case management principles and the overriding purpose mandated by s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act to make such a direction in the present case.

8. [227]

   As to costs, there is no reason that costs should not follow the event.

Orders

1. [228]

   For the above reasons, the Court makes the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Dismiss with costs Ms Choi’s summons dated 6 April 2022 and filed 20 April 2022, seeking leave to appeal from the decisions of Bellew J of 9 March 2022 and 22 March 2022, respectively.

   2. (2)

      Dismiss with costs (pursuant to r 13.4 of the UCPR as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process) Ms Choi’s summons dated 9 June 2022 and filed 13 June 2022, seeking judicial review of the said decisions of Bellew J.

   3. (3)

      Dismiss with costs Ms Choi’s notice of motion dated 21 June 2022.

   4. (4)

      Direct the Registrar not to file the notices of motion dated 27 and 28 July 2022 forwarded by email by Ms Choi.

   5. (5)

      Direct the Registrar that, should Ms Choi file a further motion seeking, in substance, leave to appeal from the decisions of Bellew J dated 9 March 2022 and 22 March 2022 respectively, the Registrar shall promptly vacate the return date, notify the parties, and refer the papers to a judge nominated by the President to determine, in Chambers, whether the Court should fix a new return date and notify the parties, or whether Ms Choi should be invited to show cause in writing why the Court should not, in Chambers, summarily dismiss the proceedings as vexatious and an abuse of process.