R v Vikatos

1. [1]

   On 31 May 2023, the offender, Nathan Vikatos, murdered his own infant son in circumstances which were tragic, perverse and a monstrous breach of a father’s duty to care for his son. The victim, Alexi Vikatos, was only three years and nine months old at the time of his death. The adult relatives of Alexi have consented to the publication of his name.

2. [2]

   The offender was arrested on 31 May 2023. He entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder on 14 November 2025 in the Local Court and was committed for sentence to the Supreme Court. On arraignment in the Supreme Court on 12 December 2025, the offender adhered to his guilty plea.

3. [3]

   The parties agree that, as a result of the early guilty plea, the offender is entitled to a 25% discount on the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed to account for the utilitarian value of his plea, in accordance with s 25D(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“CSPA”).

4. [4]

   It is appropriate to commence these remarks on sentence by acknowledging the tragic loss of a young life and the extreme distress and trauma that Alexi Vikatos’ death has had on his family.

5. [5]

   Later in my remarks, I will have more to say about Alexi and what his tragic, horrific and untimely death has meant to his family. I will also later make reference to the victim impact statements that have been tendered by the Crown which set out the impact that Alexi’s death has had on his family.

6. [6]

   It is my task to sentence the offender according to law. It is worth noting early in these remarks that, in sentencing offenders for murder, judges are asked to perform an impossible equation. No human life, particularly a human life as young as the three-year-old victim in this case, can ever be equated with a period of imprisonment. No goal term, of any length, can ever return a loved one. No life can ever be measured simply by equating it to the punishment imposed.

7. [7]

   The sentence I intend to impose does not, and could not ever, measure the value of Alexi Vikatos’ life. Instead, it reflects the sentencing discretion informed by proper legal principle. It must reflect adequate punishment, deterrence and denunciation, in addition to rehabilitation and protection of the community. It must hold the offender to account and reflect the objective seriousness of the offence. It must also reflect the offender’s subjective case, his moral culpability, his prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood of offending again in the future.

8. [8]

   The legal principle involving the purposes of sentencing requires that this sentence punishes the offender and holds him to account for his actions. The offender’s sentence, which unsurprisingly will be to a significant term of full-time imprisonment, goes some way to fulfilling those purposes. However, punishment is not the only purpose of sentencing. In the circumstances of this case, the offender will have to live the rest of his life with the burden of the consequences of his actions in taking the life of his own infant son and with the consequences of depriving Alexi Vikatos’ family of his presence in their lives. It can be expected that such a burden, in addition to a significant period of imprisonment, will form part of the offender’s punishment.

The agreed facts on sentence

1. [9]

   Alexi Vikatos was born on 27 August 2019. He was three years and nine months old at the date of his murder on 31 May 2023. The offender, who was born on 22 September 1977, was 46 years of age at the time. He is presently 48 years old.

2. [10]

   Alexi Vikatos was the biological child of the offender and Ms Jessica Marett. Ms Marett predeceased Alexi, having died of unascertained natural causes on 7 April 2021.

3. [11]

   Alexi was born prematurely and within weeks of his birth was admitted to hospital with extreme hypothermia which, according to a report from the Department of Communities and Justice, arose because his parents had a limited understanding of how to care for a premature baby. That report referred Alexi’s parents for ongoing assistance, noting that there were concerns regarding parental drug and alcohol use and ill-preparedness for caring for a baby.

4. [12]

   In 2012, the offender commenced a relationship with Ms Carmen Melek. That relationship initially lasted for approximately two years. During the relationship, the offender was violent towards Ms Melek both physically and through violent threats. Ms Melek also witnessed the offender taking methylamphetamine and noted that he became violent when affected by illicit drugs. That initial period of their relationship ended in March 2014.

5. [13]

   In May 2021, shortly after Ms Marett’s death, the offender contacted Ms Melek. They recommenced their relationship approximately six months later. Some four months after recommencing their relationship, Ms Melek observed that the offender was agitated and angry and he admitted that he had recommenced using methylamphetamine. Ms Melek observed that the offender appeared to believe that he was being watched by the police and he appeared to believe that people were trying to take his son away from him or show that he was a neglectful father.

6. [14]

   On 25 May 2023, the offender telephoned Ms Melek and told her that he was taking Alexi to a children’s playcentre in Penrith. Later that same day, the offender called Ms Melek and told her that he was going to Katoomba in the Blue Mountains. She did not see him or hear from him for the next two days.

7. [15]

   When he called her on 27 May 2023, Ms Melek went to Medlow Bath where the offender lived. When she arrived, she noticed that the offender appeared “a bit on edge” and asked if he had taken methylamphetamine. The offender confirmed that he had.

8. [16]

   On 28 May 2023, the offender questioned Ms Melek and confronted her with allegations of infidelity.

9. [17]

   On 29 May 2023, the offender told Ms Melek that he was going out to get a coffee in Blackheath and that he would return. He left in a taxi, leaving Ms Melek at the offender’s home with Alexi. The offender did not return and did not respond to telephone calls from Ms Melek. Later that same day, the offender contacted Ms Melek and requested money. Although she agreed for him to borrow $20, he took $50 from her bank account. A little later that same afternoon, the offender telephoned Ms Melek and told her that he needed some time to clear his head and that he needed some space. He telephoned Ms Melek as he was walking towards his home and she noticed that he sounded calm and normal. He then asked about Alexi and what he had eaten. When Ms Melek told him that he had been rejecting his milk, the offender said “how can you fucking neglect my child?”. He arrived home at about 6:00 pm.

10. [18]

    On his arrival, the offender told Ms Melek that she should go. After she agreed to leave, the offender said “no you’re not going anywhere until I tell you when you can go”. He again confronted her with allegations of infidelity. He then told Ms Melek that the reason he had gone to Katoomba that day was to meet up with “the boys” and to organise for them to kidnap and torture her. He verbally threatened Ms Melek whenever she tried to speak including stating “if you don’t stop, I’m going to stab you”.

11. [19]

    The offender then asked Ms Melek for her mobile telephone and access code. Ms Melek complied. She again complied when the offender asked her for her work mobile telephone and access code, but she requested that the offender not damage her work telephone. He subsequently smashed Ms Melek’s telephone on the bathroom floor because he thought that she was using it to make an emergency telephone call.

12. [20]

    The offender then told Ms Melek to go into the bathroom and demanded that she tell him the truth. He then slapped her to the left side of her face with his right hand. She fought back and hit the offender. The two scuffled and the offender slapped Ms Melek again. The offender then told Ms Melek to stop and said that he loved her.

13. [21]

    At about 7:30 am on 30 May 2023, the offender telephoned his mother, Ms Anna Wilson. The offender told his mother that he needed her to come to his home in the Blue Mountains. Ms Wilson lived in Sydney and refused, saying that she had to work and could not come. The offender then told his mother that he was being followed by undercover detectives, that a friend of his was an undercover police officer and that people were conspiring against him. His mother accused him of being paranoid.

14. [22]

    The offender called his mother repeatedly. When Ms Wilson stopped answering his telephone calls, the offender started telephoning her workplace. When a work colleague answered the telephone, the offender said “I need to speak to my mum. I’m going through a situation and this is really taking an effect on my mental health”. Ms Wilson’s work colleague refused to put her on the telephone.

15. [23]

    The offender then insisted that he, Ms Melek and Alexi needed to leave the house at Medlow Bath. He telephoned a taxi driver he had known for some years and arranged for that person to drive them from his home in Medlow Bath to the suburb in Sydney where Ms Wilson worked.

16. [24]

    On the journey, the offender saw an AFP police car drive past and said to Ms Melek “oh do you think that’s linked?”.

17. [25]

    The taxi arrived at Ms Wilson’s workplace at about 11:29 am. The offender left the taxi and attended his mother’s workplace, where he confronted staff members and made threats towards them. When the staff advised that they would call the police, the offender left and ran back to the taxi at 11:35 am.

18. [26]

    The offender then directed the taxi driver to drive to the home of his aunt, Ms Chris Vikatos, in suburban Sydney. During that leg of the journey, the offender took Ms Melek’s mobile telephone, held it out of the window and threatened to throw it. The offender also threatened to jump out of the car.

19. [27]

    The taxi driver later told the police that he had known the offender for a number of years and had noticed during the journey that he was acting very strangely, appeared to be paranoid, was very angry and at one stage was crying.

20. [28]

    The offender’s aunt, Ms Vikatos, received a telephone call from the offender at about 12:30 pm saying that he was at her unit complex. Ms Vikatos returned to her home unit a short time later and let the offender and Alexi into her unit. The offender told Ms Vikatos that he was intending to stay the night and that he had left the Blue Mountains. Ms Melek arrived at the unit a short time later.

21. [29]

    That evening, they attended a supermarket at a local shopping centre. While at the supermarket, the offender said to Ms Melek that he thought a man behind him was trying to listen into their conversation. He approached the man and asked him if he was a police officer and stated “I’m on the run from the police right now”. The offender said to Ms Melek that he thought the man was a police officer.

22. [30]

    He was then approached by two loss prevention officers from the supermarket. The offender told Ms Melek that he thought they were undercover police. Although the two loss prevention officers answered that they were police when asked by Ms Melek, they showed the offender their badges and told him that they were loss prevention officers.

23. [31]

    When they returned to Ms Vikatos’ unit, the offender continued talking about the men at the supermarket and said that he had seen a black Commodore motor vehicle they had been driving in the carpark in front of the unit. He said that he thought he saw that motor vehicle leave and come back three times. The offender was observed to stand on the balcony of the unit and started “freaking out” and suggested that bikies were coming to get him. The offender also asked “is this the night I’m going to die?”.

24. [32]

    The offender later telephoned the local police station, advising that he had been approached by two men who said that they were police officers although he did not believe they were. He asked the police to attend his aunt’s unit and said that he was scared for his life. That telephone call to the police was noted as having been made at 9:24 pm.

25. [33]

    At 12:45 am on 31 May 2023, two police officers attended the unit. The offender told the police that he had been approached by two men who purported to be police officers and that he believed that the men had told him that there were people watching him. He reported that the two men may have been in a black station wagon motor vehicle and that he may have seen that vehicle following him the previous day. He also reported that he had seen another man inside the shopping centre who he believed had been watching him. The police told the offender that they would make a report and left the unit.

26. [34]

    At 7:30 am on 31 May 2023, the offender told Ms Melek that he was going out for the day with his son because he had to find a place to live. Shortly before he left the unit, he argued with Ms Melek about a text message she had received from a colleague.

27. [35]

    About one hour later, he telephoned Ms Melek and told her that he was going to return to the unit. Ms Melek decided to leave in the meantime; she packed her bags and left in a taxi.

28. [36]

    Ms Melek telephoned the police at 11:51 am and advised that she had been assaulted by the offender and had sustained a black eye. She also told the police that the offender had made threats to kill her and that he had smashed her mobile telephone. She told the police that the offender had been on methamphetamine for several days and that she was afraid for her life.

29. [37]

    A little later, the offender telephoned Ms Melek and told her that he had to decide where he and Alexi were going to go and said “I don’t know where Alexi and I are going to live after today. You never know darl. This might be where we part ways. You might not see us again after today”.

30. [38]

    The New South Wales Police then made several unsuccessful attempts to speak further to Ms Melek regarding her domestic violence complaint.

31. [39]

    During telephone calls at 2:00 pm and then at 2:24 pm, the offender asked Ms Melek to return. She refused.

32. [40]

    At about 2:30 pm, police officers telephoned the offender on his mobile telephone and told him that they were wanting to speak to Ms Melek because she had telephoned the police. The offender said that he did not believe the person calling was a police officer and refused to give any details. He also stated that he was scared of the police, that he did not want to be arrested again and said “I’ve done nothing wrong”. The police then told the offender that there was a report of domestic violence and that they wanted to speak to Ms Melek. They told the offender that they took domestic violence complaints very seriously. The offender said that he was scared and needed to speak to his lawyer and asked “if there had been a scuffle between me and her and we both slapped and hit each other, am I going to be charged?”.

33. [41]

    The offender then made a number of telephone calls to his solicitor. The offender also telephoned the police, a call at 3:07 pm which lasted for two minutes.

34. [42]

    Only the offender, his aunt and Alexi were then in the unit. The offender was observed by his aunt to offer a lolly to Alexi, which she took particular notice of because Alexi was not allowed lollies. Ms Vikatos then observed the offender pick up Alexi, who was crying at the time, and take him into the bathroom. He then closed the bathroom door behind them. Ms Vikatos told the police that the offender did not appear to be agitated or angry at the time. Ms Vikatos recalls that she did not hear Alexi crying after the offender took him into the bathroom.

35. [43]

    After a while, because the offender had not come out, Ms Vikatos knocked on the bathroom door and said that she needed to use the toilet. The offender said that he would not be long and stated that he had diarrhea. After a further 10 to 15 minutes, Ms Vikatos went back to the bathroom door and found that it was locked. She then asked what the offender was doing in there. She then obtained a butter knife from the kitchen and used it to unlock the door from the outside. She heard the offender say “aunty Chris, if you love me …” but cannot recall what he said after that. She unlocked the bathroom door, but was unable to open it all the way. She observed Alexi’s body on the floor, that he was not moving and that his eyes were open. She tried to revive him. She noticed blood splattered all over the bathroom and that the offender was covered in blood. Ms Vikatos called 000 at 4:00 pm.

36. [44]

    Police attended at 4:13 pm. When they approached the bathroom, they heard a male voice from inside saying “stay out or I’ll kill ya, stay out”. The police observed the offender lying on the floor of the bathroom with Alexi’s body lying beside him. They noticed an extensive pool of blood on the floor surrounding the offender and Alexi and a large amount of blood splatter on the bathroom basin, mirror and walls. The police also observed a small kitchen knife on the floor next to Alexi’s body.

37. [45]

    The offender had taken the knife from Ms Vikatos’ kitchen and used it to make a deep incision in Alexi’s neck, severing the artery and veins. Alexi died as a result of the blood loss from this injury. The offender also used the knife to wound himself in the neck, causing bleeding, in an attempted suicide.

38. [46]

    As the police entered the bathroom, they heard the offender say a few times “it’s all Campsie police’s fault”.

39. [47]

    The police observed that Alexi had a large laceration to his neck which was deep and gaping. The wound had drained and was no longer bleeding. There were no signs of life. Alexi was pronounced dead at the scene.

40. [48]

    The offender was found to have several wounds to his neck, a larger wound to his left side and smaller wounds to his right side. He became agitated and aggressive. He repeated “this is Campsie police’s fault” and said “ask them what they said to me today!”. The offender said to a paramedic “you have to believe me, I had to do this. I couldn’t do this to my boy”. The offender was taken to St George Hospital.

41. [49]

    A subsequent post-mortem examination on Alexi’s body determined that he had an incised wound to the neck into the larynx, a transection of the right external jugular vein and superficial cervical artery and a partial transection of the left external jugular vein.

42. [50]

    When the offender was examined, he was observed to have a five centimetre long laceration to the left of his neck, a superior incision of approximately eight centimetres in length and nine puncture wounds. His blood was subjected to toxicology testing which revealed a positive result for amphetamines, cannabinoids and Benzodiazepine.

43. [51]

    On 2 June 2023, while still hospitalised, the offender became agitated, was head banging and became aggressive towards staff. He was then reviewed by a psychiatric registrar. During that review, the offender said that he did not like the police, claimed not to have any mental illness, admitted to using methylamphetamine, and stated that he and Ms Melek had smoked about half a gram of cannabis and a point of ice. He said that he and Ms Melek had gotten into a scuffle and that she had scratched him over his neck whilst he was holding his son. He also stated that he had been approached by undercover officers and become suspicious and that the police then contacted him and said that a domestic violence complaint had been made. He said that he knew the police would come to arrest him and asserted that he had no family that he could rely on to care for his son and did not want him “bouncing around in foster care”. He then stated that he would “rather die and take my son with me than have him in the care of FACS”. He said that he would rather “kill myself and take my son with me”, rather than be arrested. He stated that he had first stabbed himself and then slit his son’s throat, adding that he made sure “it” was quick. He asserted that he had brought his son into the world and said “I can take him out of it”. He added “I know that I’ll probably get 30 years and come out as an old man, but I’d rather that than my son be given to FACS, no way was I ever going to let that happen”.

44. [52]

    The psychiatric registrar was unable to identify any evidence of psychotic symptoms, pervasive mood disorder or severe mood disturbance.

45. [53]

    On 5 June 2023, the offender was examined by Dr Berman, clinical psychiatrist. Dr Berman determined that the offender was not suffering any mental illness and was not mentally disordered. The offender told Dr Berman that he had intended to kill his son and himself. He said that he did that to prevent his son going into FACS’ care. The offender stated that he regretted that he had survived, that he was aware that he would go to prison, that he realised that police had put him under surveillance and that there had been an undercover officer outside his place for three or four months.

46. [54]

    The offender was discharged from hospital on 5 June 2023 and taken into custody.

47. [55]

    The offender was reviewed by psychiatrist consultant Dr Ching Long Ho on 9 June 2023. Dr Ho prescribed Olanzaphine, which the offender refused to take. Dr Ho formed the opinion that, although the offender had previously not been diagnosed with a mental illness diagnosis, he presented with psychotic and affective symptoms evidenced by paranoid delusions towards police.

48. [56]

    Whilst in custody, the offender made a number of comments to staff including:

49. [57]

    During a call from custody on 5 June 2023, the offender said to Ms Melek “why did you call the police, if you didn’t do this it wouldn’t have happened”.

50. [58]

    When Ms Melek asked the offender why he killed Alexi, he responded “I did myself first. Then I said to Alexi what colour is this. Alexi said red and then I said you want to be red too. Alexi said yes and then I did it”.

51. [59]

    In a telephone call on 8 June 2023, the offender said to Ms Melek “it wouldn’t have happened if it wasn’t for Campsie police and the telephone call. I wouldn’t have done it. This wouldn’t have happened. You were going to put me in”. The offender then stated “after I got off the phone call I knew I had to do it”. The offender also said “it’s not murder, its murder/suicide”.

52. [60]

    From the date of Ms Marett’s death on 7 April 2021 until the offender’s arrest on 31 May 2023, he was not recorded as ever having been under police surveillance.

53. [61]

    The offender has a history of domestic violence and controlling conduct directed at intimate and domestic partners. There were several instances of domestic violence directed at the offender’s former wife, which resulted in apprehended violence orders being imposed. There were complaints by Ms Marett that the offender engaged in violence and controlling behaviour against her during their relationship.

Additional Crown evidence

1. [62]

   The Crown tendered a statement of the offender’s mother, Ms Anna Wilson, dated 27 February 2026. Ms Wilson is also Alexi’s grandmother. Ms Wilson was called to give evidence and was cross-examined. This evidence was called by the Crown to answer the history given by the offender to Dr Furst, in relation the offender’s background and upbringing.

2. [63]

   Ms Wilson stated that she and the offender’s father were married but separated on 3 July 1985, when the offender was about seven and a half years old. She described the offender’s childhood as a good one. She said that he was surrounded by family who loved him and who wanted to be involved in his life. She stated that she and the offender’s father hardly ever consumed alcohol. She described the offender as being spoilt with clothing, fragrances and food. She also stated that after her separation from the offender’s father, when she had to attend work, the offender was looked after by his grandmother and aunt, Ms Vikatos.

3. [64]

   Ms Wilson said that, with two isolated exceptions, there was no violence in the house when the offender was growing up. She recalled one occasion, following a trivial dispute between the offender and his father about the offender’s clothing, when the offender said that he hated his father. When that was reported to his father, he struck the offender to the face. Ms Wilson further described that incident, explaining that she observed the offender’s father slap him to the cheek of his face with an open hand and observed that the offender bled from the corner of his mouth, which she believed had been caused by a ring on her husband’s finger. She also recalled another occasion when the offender, his sister and her husband were playing backyard cricket. She did not observe what occurred but was later told by the offender that his father had hit him. She recalled the first of those incidents occurred when the offender was approximately 11 years old and the second when the offender was approximately 12 or 13 years old. Apart from those two occasions, she was unaware of any time when the offender had been hit.

4. [65]

   Ms Wilson also described that he performed well at primary school, attended frequently, had a large number of friends and appeared to love school. She described that the offender started associating with the wrong crowd in high school, truanted regularly and started running away from home. She described that when that occurred, she and her other family members would engage in extensive searches to find the offender and bring him home.

5. [66]

   In relation to illicit drugs, Ms Wilson stated that she and the offender’s father only consumed illicit drugs on one occasion at a party at a friend’s house at a time when the offender was asleep.

6. [67]

   Ms Wilson said that after her divorce, contact visits between the offender and his father were “sporadic”. She described that the contact visits would sometimes occur a couple of times a month and then nothing for months at a time. She said the contact visits were during the day and that the offender’s father would drive to her house to collect the children and then drive them back to her house to return them. She said that on those occasions, she often spoke briefly to her former husband and there was never any occasion when he appeared to be intoxicated. She recalled there only being a few occasions when the offender and his father had overnight contact visits. She described that as being a rare event.

7. [68]

   Ms Wilson also said that there were never any occasions after a contact visit when the offender complained that his father had hurt him or abused him and he had never complained that his father was intoxicated.

8. [69]

   In cross-examination, Ms Wilson agreed that there were a number of occasions when the offender told her that he believed people were listening to him and she recalled him saying that he had pulled apart a smoke detector and found a listening device inside. She also confirmed that the day before the murder, she had received a telephone call from the offender in which he complained that he believed a person was trying to interfere with him and Alexi, had accused him of wearing the same clothes and that he had asked Ms Wilson to come to the Blue Mountains to tell that person off. She confirmed that in a statement to police, she had stated that the offender complained that people were listening to him and watching him.

9. [70]

   Ms Wilson also confirmed that the offender always appeared to care for Alexi. She said that she never saw the offender hit Alexi and observed that the offender was fearful and vigilant about watching Alexi and protecting him from harm.

Objective seriousness

1. [71]

   The killing of another person is recognised in the authorities as an extremely serious offence. That is exemplified by the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and the standard non-parole period, which in this case is 25 years because of the age of the victim. The maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period are statutory guideposts. In determining the objective seriousness of this offending, I am required to take into account that the crime of murder can be committed in a wide range of circumstances with differing gravity. Those circumstances can range from brutal contract killings to merciful euthanasia.

2. [72]

   The maximum penalty of life imprisonment must be imposed if the level of culpability involved was so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence: s 61(1) CSPA. The Crown did not submit that s 61(1) applied. I am satisfied that the level of culpability involved in this case is not at such an extreme level as to engage that section. Accordingly, a life sentence is not appropriate.

3. [73]

   In assessing the objective seriousness of this offence, I take into account the offender’s state of mind and intention at the time, any degree of planning or premeditation involved, the use of a weapon, the breach of trust, the motive, the circumstances generally and the age of the victim.

4. [74]

   It was agreed between the parties that at the time the offender committed the offence, he had an intention to kill. That intention is clearly evidenced by the statements and admissions made by the offender to the psychiatric registrar on 3 June 2023 and to the clinical psychiatrist on 5 June 2023 that he had intended to kill Alexi and intended to commit suicide. His state of mind is further confirmed in the admissions he made from custody that he wanted him and his son to become “two ghosts” and that he intended a murder/suicide.

5. [75]

   In relation to premeditation and planning, I take into account that some limited degree of premeditation is established by the chronology in that the offender was put on notice by the police during the telephone call at 2:30 pm that an allegation of domestic violence had been made by Ms Melek. This was later confirmed by the offender in his conversation from custody when he told Ms Melek “after I got the phone call I knew I had to do it”. Very limited planning was involved in the murder, which included the offender obtaining a knife from his aunt’s kitchen, taking his son into the bathroom and concealing his possession of the knife from his aunt. I also take into account that the total period over which there was any premeditation was 90 minutes at the most, between 2:30 pm and 4:00 pm. An even shorter period of time was involved in planning, including taking the knife and walking into the bathroom.

6. [76]

   The offender’s use of a bladed kitchen knife as a weapon adds to the seriousness of the offending. However, the use of a weapon for an offence of murder does not have much effect on objective seriousness by virtue of that fact alone: R v Chamma; R v Hicks (No 3) [2023] NSWSC 1057 at [85]-[86]; R v Youseff (No 4) [2025] NSWSC 125 at [47].

7. [77]

   In the circumstances of this case, the most significant factors in assessing objective seriousness are the age of the victim and the egregious breach of trust involved in a father killing his own son. Here, Alexi was young, being three years and nine months, and vulnerable in that he relied on the care and protection normally expected of a father. At the time of the offence, the offender was in a position of trust as Alexi’s father and as his adult supervisor that afternoon. A child of such tender years as Alexi is entitled to feel safe and protected when in the presence of their father. By killing his own infant child, the offender has perversely and egregiously breached the trust, protection and love that Alexi deserved.

8. [78]

   In relation to motive, I accept the submission made on the offender’s behalf, supported by Dr Furst’s opinion, that the offender was motivated by a bizarre and irrational belief, contributed to by his delusional disorder, that the police were likely to arrest him, that Alexi was likely to be taken away from him and that Alexi would be better off dead rather than being cared for by somebody other than the offender.

9. [79]

   The Crown submitted that the objective seriousness of the offence fell above the mid-range for offences of this type. It was submitted on behalf of the offender that, were it not for mental health issues contributing to the commission of the offence, it would be well above the mid-range of objective seriousness and that, after taking into account mental health issues, the parties were “probably on the same page” about objective seriousness.

10. [80]

    Accordingly, and taking into account the submissions of the parties, I find that this is a very serious example of murder with the intention of killing and I find that it falls above the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of this type. The reasons for those findings include that the offender used a bladed weapon, which he used to cut the neck of a vulnerable infant, the relatively brief period of time over which the offence was committed, the egregious and perverse breach of trust, the limited planning and premeditation involved and that the offender was motivated by an irrational belief associated with his delusional disorder that his son was better off dead rather than being taken from him.

11. [81]

    The parties made competing submissions about the meaning and significance of the conversation between the offender and Ms Melek on 31 May 2023 during which the offender said that they might part ways and she might not see them again. The Crown submitted that it can be inferred that that was a reference to a later intention to kill Alexi and himself. The offender submitted that this conversation related to ending the relationship, not ending a life. I accept the defence submission in relation to that conversation. That is so because these words were said at a time before the offender was made aware that a domestic violence allegation had been made against him and at a time when the offender and Ms Melek were talking about separate future living arrangements. Accordingly, the conversation is not evidence of early pre-meditation.

12. [82]

    Because I have already taken into account, in assessing objective seriousness, the use of a weapon, the abuse of a position of trust and the age and vulnerability of the victim, I will not take them into account as statutory aggregating factors. Otherwise, those features would be doubly counted.

13. [83]

    The only additional aggravating factor arises pursuant to s 21A(2)(be) CSPA in that the offence was committed in the home of another person, being Alexi’s great aunt. However, because the unit where the murder occurred was not Alexi’s usual residence, it is not a particularly significant aggravating feature in the circumstances.

14. [84]

    The offender has a limited criminal history. That history reveals that the offender was convicted of resisting police officers in the execution of their duty on three occasions, the most significant penalty arising from those convictions being a three-month suspended sentence. In addition, his record includes three convictions for common assault and one conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the penalties for which were community service orders for 150 hours and a good behaviour bond for 18 months. As was submitted on the offender’s behalf, that criminal history is consistent with his history of domestic violence outlined in the agreed facts. Although his criminal history does not amount to an aggravating factor, in my view it is sufficient to disentitle him to any leniency that would otherwise be afforded to a first time offender.

15. [85]

    The offender has made only very limited expressions of contrition and remorse. The offender told Dr Furst he was “devastated” or “so sorry for the pain of course everyone”. Senior counsel for the offender submitted that the last quotation appeared to have a typographical error and should be understood as “so sorry for the pain [I caused] everyone”. I accept that the offender also told Dr Furst that he found it painful to think about what he had done, that he wished it had never happened and that he missed his son. The offender did not give evidence and did not write a letter of apology to be tendered on his behalf.

16. [86]

    Although I accept that the offender’s expressions to Dr Furst provide some evidence of genuine remorse, I am unimpressed by the limited nature and extent of those expressions. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the offender has provided evidence that he has accepted responsibility for his actions or acknowledged the extent of the injury, loss or damage caused by his conduct. I accept that his plea of guilty to murder as opposed to a plea to manslaughter, adds somewhat to the limited expressions of remorse. However, in the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the expressions of remorse rise to the level required to satisfy s 21A(3)(i) CSPA as a mitigating factor.

17. [87]

    The only mitigating factor which applies in my view is that the offender pleaded guilty: s 21A(3)(k) CSPA.

Subjective and other considerations

1. [88]

   Dr Richard Furst, forensic psychiatrist, interviewed the offender on 25 February 2025 for a period of 90 minutes and on 2 February 2026 for a period of 60 minutes. Each of those interviews was conducted by AVL. Dr Furst also had access to relevant documents, including the agreed facts and brief of evidence.

2. [89]

   In his report, Dr Furst summarised the offender’s background by reference to the matters which had been reported to him by the offender. He confirmed that he did not speak to any of the offender’s relatives to independently corroborate the self-reported history.

3. [90]

   The offender told Dr Furst that his father was a heavy drinker, used amphetamines and was physically abusive towards him on a regular basis until he was around 13 years old. He also told Dr Furst that after he left school in Year 10, he was subsequently living on the streets. Those aspects of the reported history were contradicted by the sworn evidence of the offender’s mother, Ms Wilson. He also told Dr Furst that he got into trouble with the police from about the age of 15 years for breaking and entering offences and for stealing cars.

4. [91]

   The offender told Dr Furst that he had worked at an ice cream store in Circular Quay between the ages of 19 and 21 years and then worked in the hospitality industry for the following 16 years. He denied having any mental health problems or any symptoms of mental illness in his 20’s or early 30’s and he denied having any psychotic symptoms during that period. In 2015, he was admitted overnight to Concord Hospital’s Centre for Mental Health/Emergency Department for holding a screwdriver to somebody’s throat. He said he had been using methylamphetamines prior to that admission. He was later admitted to St George Hospital for three days in 2016 after attempting to electrocute himself in a bathtub. Dr Furst noted that there were no persistent psychotic symptoms and reported that the offender told him that he was withdrawing from “ice” at the time. He was prescribed during that admission an antipsychotic medication, Olanzapine, which he took for a few months and then stopped.

5. [92]

   The offender told Dr Furst that he believed he had been under police surveillance since 2022 and that he had pulled a fire alarm apart and found a listening device and a camera.

6. [93]

   The offender also told Dr Furst that he had started “hearing voices” on the day of the offending and that he had been hearing them every two to three days since. He also reported to Dr Furst that he had consumed methamphetamine and cannabis three days before the offending. He said that he and Ms Melek had been fighting in the lead up to the offending, that she had been physical with him and that he had pushed her.

7. [94]

   In relation to the offence, the offender told Dr Furst that he was “in a state of psychosis” and that voices had told him to find a knife and kill himself. He told Dr Furst that he was paranoid that the police were coming to get him and claimed that he heard voices “over and over” telling him to kill himself, kill everything he loved and to take his son with him.

8. [95]

   Dr Furst concluded that the offender’s assertion of hearing voices instructing him to kill himself and his son were inconsistent with external auditory hallucinations. He noted that the account of hearing voices was inconsistent with what the offender had told the responders at the scene of the murder, inconsistent with what he had told the psychiatric registrar on 3 June 2023 and inconsistent with the admissions he made in hospital and in custody. Dr Furst was of the opinion that the offender was not experiencing auditory hallucinations but was either malingering or misdescribing his internal thoughts. He said he reached that conclusion because there were no other signs indicative of schizophrenia such as thought disorder or affective blunting.

9. [96]

   Dr Furst recorded that the offender commenced drinking alcohol on a regular basis during his teenage years, commenced smoking cannabis on a regular basis from the age 16 or 17 years and occasionally used LSD from that same age. He reported the use of heroin from the age of 17 years with intermittent use thereafter, cocaine from the age of 19 or 20 years and ice from the age of 27 years. The offender told Dr Furst that his drug use was in moderation, explaining that it was every month or two.

10. [97]

    Dr Furst was of the opinion that the offender met the criteria for the diagnosis of delusional disorder – persecutory type, substance use disorder and antisocial personality disorder. He noted that the offender presented with paranoid thinking and associated mood disturbance that predated the offending. He considered the offender was highly paranoid about police leading up to and on the day of the murder. Dr Furst described a delusional disorder as a psychotic disorder characterised by holding one or more non-bizarre delusions in the absence of any other significant psychopathology. He stated that a person with delusional disorder may be highly functioning in daily life in other respects and may not exhibit odd or bizarre behaviour apart from the presence of delusions or behaviours that stem from those delusions.

11. [98]

    In Dr Furst’s opinion, the offender’s delusional disorder contributed to the commission of the offence because there was evidence of delusional thinking in relation to police in the lead up to the offending, evidenced by persistent erratic and disturbed behaviour. He explained that behaviour evidencing his delusional disorder in the days leading up to the offence included erratic behaviour at the shopping centre and in the Blue Mountains, believing that strangers were undercover police and believing that he was being watched and listened to. He considered that blaming his offending actions on the Campsie police and on Ms Melek’s report of domestic violence was consistent with paranoid thoughts about the police and consistent with comments that he made in hospital. He considered that the offender was not rational when he committed the murder and was in a disturbed mood in believing that his son was better off dead rather than being taken into care. Dr Furst explained that this was because of his paranoid thinking about the police at the time, that his delusional disorder distorted his perceptions of reality, and that in that delusional state it would have been difficult for the offender to make rational choices or to appreciate the consequences of his actions.

12. [99]

    Because of his mental health issues, principally his delusional disorder and tendency towards mood instability, Dr Furst considered that the offender would be more vulnerable to the stressors of custody and more vulnerable to be stood over by other inmates and as a result, his circumstances of custody would be more onerous for him.

13. [100]

    On the issue of prospects of rehabilitation, Dr Furst considered that the offender’s chronic problems, his personality, his drug addiction and his delusional disorder made it difficult to predict his long-term outcome or treatment requirements. Notwithstanding that opinion, Dr Furst believed that the offender may have reasonable prospects of being rehabilitated.

14. [101]

    When cross-examined, Dr Furst confirmed that he had read Ms Wilson’s statement and heard her give evidence. Despite hearing her evidence and its contradiction of the background of disadvantage asserted by the offender, Dr Furst said that he did not wish to change his opinion in relation to the relevance of apparent alcoholism, drug abuse and domestic violence in the family home during the offender’s formative years. He agreed that Ms Wilson’s evidence established that his family background was a loving and caring one.

15. [102]

    In cross-examination, Dr Furst said that although the offender may have displayed some rationality or logic in the hours leading up to the murder, that was not inconsistent with him having delusional disorder. He explained that people with delusional disorder can do calculated things and act in a rational yet delusional way. He said that the offender’s conduct, in obtaining the knife, secreting the knife, taking it and his son into the bathroom and then giving an apparently logical but false explanation as to why he was in the bathroom for so long, may have appeared logical but his reasoning was delusional.

16. [103]

    Although Dr Furst explained the delusional disorder as being a paranoia focused on him being afraid of the police, he accepted that it was possible that the offender was also rationally concerned about being arrested.

17. [104]

    Dr Furst said that delusion disorders were difficult for lay observers to notice because they were internal processes that were not always obvious. Although he agreed that the offender was medicated with Olanzapine, he commented that Olanzapine rarely works and has a response rate of about 10%. He described personality disorders as persistent and often fixed. He described the offender’s antisocial personality disorder as ongoing and unlikely to resolve.

18. [105]

    In relation to prospects of rehabilitation, Dr Furst said that the opinion expressed in his report about positive prospects was a qualified opinion and that much depended on the offender’s participation in available rehabilitation programs. Notwithstanding that uncertainty, he believed that there were still reasonable prospects of rehabilitation. He acknowledged that in light of the likely lengthy sentence to be imposed, it was difficult to make any accurate prediction. He also confirmed that the offender’s record of good behaviour in custody to date and the likely diminishing symptoms of mental illnesses with age, counted in favour of future prospects of rehabilitation.

The conflicting evidence of the offender’s background

1. [106]

   The background which the offender reported to Dr Furst, of exposure to alcohol abuse, illicit drug abuse and physical abuse during his formative years, lies in stark contrast with the evidence given by the offender’s mother, Ms Wilson. Ms Wilson’s evidence, which I have already referred to, indicated that the offender grew up in a loving and caring family environment. She described that she and her then husband, together with their extended family, created a loving, supportive and prosocial environment for the offender. She described her extended family as a traditional Greek family and explained that numerous family members assisted in caring for the offender when he was young and assisted in caring for Alexi and would have continued to do so had the offender not murdered him.

2. [107]

   I accept Ms Wilson’s evidence unreservedly. She impressed me as an honest, reliable, forthright and impressive witness. She was not prone to embellishment or exaggeration and made appropriate concessions when parts of her previous statements were brought to her attention. Notwithstanding those concessions, the overwhelming effect of her evidence was that the offender’s account of his background given to Dr Furst was false.

3. [108]

   In circumstances where the offender did not give evidence to confirm the truth of his assertions to Dr Furst and where those assertions are contradicted by Ms Wilson’s evidence, I do not accept the offender’s reported background of disadvantage.

4. [109]

   Accordingly, the evidence does not establish that the offender’s early upbringing involved neglect, abuse, exposure to alcohol abuse or exposure to illicit drugs. The isolated incidents that Ms Wilson gave evidence about concerning an open-handed strike by her then husband to the offender’s face and reported physical altercation during a backyard cricket match, are insufficient to establish a background of physical abuse. The evidence is insufficient to establish that the offender’s start in life was such that he does not bear equal moral responsibility with someone who had what might be termed a “normal” or “advantaged” upbringing. Rather, the evidence established that the offender himself had a relatively advantaged upbringing surrounded by food, shelter, educational opportunities and love.

5. [110]

   Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the circumstances of this case engage the authorities of Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 (“Bugmy”) or R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2. Accordingly, there will be no reduction to the offender’s moral culpability on account of any background of disadvantage.

6. [111]

   Senior counsel for the offender conceded that, in light of Ms Wilson’s evidence, this was not “the strongest” Bugmy case but nonetheless submitted that the offender had been exposed to “some domestic violence”. I do not accept that submission. Two incidents of parental discipline, without more, are insufficient to engage the Bugmy principles.

Mental health issues

1. [112]

   I accept Dr Furst’s opinion that the offender suffered from a mental health disorder, namely delusional disorder of a persecutory type, together with substance abuse disorder and antisocial personality disorder. I also accept that the first of those disorders, being delusional disorder, is of most relevance to the sentencing exercise. Dr Furst opined that the offender was in a disturbed mood and was not rational when he killed his son and that he was operating under the deluded belief that his son was better off dead in the circumstances of some threat that his son may be taken into care.

2. [113]

   On the basis of Dr Furst’s report, I accept that the offender’s delusional disorder played a contributing role in the commission of the offence. I am also satisfied that his mental health contributed to the commission of the offence in a material way and that, as a result, his moral culpability and the need to denounce the crime are both reduced in accordance with Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194. I also accept that because of the offender’s mental health conditions and because of the nature of his offence, his conditions of custody are likely to be more onerous on him. He has spent time to date in protective custody because of the nature of his offence and it is likely that situation may continue for some time into the future.

3. [114]

   The Crown submitted that the offender’s mental illness may result in him being an increased danger to society and that specific deterrence should be given additional weight. I am not persuaded by that argument. Although Dr Furst’s opinion was that the offender’s mental health issues were pervasive and may be treatment resistant, there is only a very limited history of previous violence directed towards domestic partners and resisting the police. The most recent of those offences was committed in 2017. Beyond that limited record, there is no pattern of endangerment to the community at large and no incidence of violent offending in the six years prior to Alexi’s murder. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that, because of his mental health issues, he presents as a greater danger to the community upon his ultimate release from custody. Accordingly, I will not give greater weight to specific deterrence in the sentencing exercise.

Other matters

1. [115]

   In considering the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation, I take into account that Dr Furst expressed the qualified opinion that he had good prospects of rehabilitation but predicted that much depended on the offender’s engagement with rehabilitative programs. I am unable to find that his prospects of rehabilitation are good. He has mental health issues which Dr Furst described as pervasive and likely to be resistant to treatment. His willingness to engage in future programs is untested and unclear. In addition, he has shown extremely limited remorse or contrition. Accordingly, I find that the offender’s prospects at this stage are guarded. I am also unable to find that he is unlikely to reoffend in the future. Much depends on his willingness to engage appropriately with programs offered to him in custody, to abstain from illicit drugs and to be compliant with treatment. In any event, where a lengthy term of imprisonment is likely, such as in the present case, the prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood of future offending take on less significance in the sentencing process.

2. [116]

   I accept the submission made on the offender’s behalf that he is entitled to a finding of special circumstances under s 44(2) CSPA on the basis that he is more vulnerable in custody due to his mental disorders, that custody will accordingly be more onerous on him than for the typical inmate, that he is likely to serve a period of his sentence in protective custody because of the nature of the offence and that there is an increased need for treatment and supervision upon his eventual release into the community. Accordingly, I propose to make some variation to the statutory ratio to account for the finding of special circumstances.

Victim impact statements

1. [117]

   During the course of the sentence proceedings, the Court received victim impact statements from Alexi’s paternal grandmother Ms Anna Wilson and her husband Mr Craig Wilson, his maternal grandmother Ms Narelle Hughes, his maternal aunt Ms Donna Sewell, his paternal aunt Ms Ramona Angelopoulos and his de facto step-mother Ms Carmen Melek.

2. [118]

   Pursuant to s 30E(3) CSPA, I consider that it is appropriate to take the victim impact statements into account on the basis that the harmful impact of the offending on Alexi’s family is an aspect of the harm done to the community. The victim impact statements also allow the Court to obtain a better understanding of Alexi and how deeply his death has impacted on his family and those who loved him.

3. [119]

   Anna and Craig Wilson described the pain and unbearable emotions in knowing that their grandson was murdered by Ms Wilson’s own son. They described the offender’s conduct as horrific and selfish in that it has deprived them of the opportunity to see Alexi grow and mature. Their statement described that the murder has resulted in them being different people, that they no longer feel good and instead feel emptiness. They described that attending family gatherings was now difficult and that Ms Wilson was no longer able to visit Chris Vikatos’ home because of the knowledge of what happened there. They also state that they have observed a change in their daughter, the offender’s sister Ramona Angelopoulos, who they described as becoming introverted and withdrawn. They state that they will never come to terms with Alexi’s death or the fact that he was taken from them by his own father.

4. [120]

   Narelle Hughes described her grandson as a lovely little boy. She now finds it difficult to look at photographs of Alexi and said that she has vivid flashbacks of his funeral. She also stated that she suffers from nightmares and has difficulty sleeping as a result of the murder. She mourns the loss of Alexi’s life as well as the loss of opportunities to see him grow and develop.

5. [121]

   Donna Sewell stated that Alexi was loved and adored by the whole family and in particular was adored by his biological mother Jessica Marett, Ms Sewell’s sister. She stated that she vowed to do as much as she could to help Alexi live a normal life following Ms Marett’s death in 2021. She described that her heart is broken and that she is unable to comprehend and cope with the offender murdering her infant nephew. She described that her mind now wonders into negative thoughts, she struggles to be present-minded and finds it difficult to sleep. She said that Alexi’s murder has shattered her life and those of her children. She suffers from nightmares and incredible sadness.

6. [122]

   The offender’s sister, Ramona Angelopoulos, stated that Alexi was deeply loved by his biological mother and that following her death, Ms Carmen Melek stepped in and loved Alexi as her own child and she described that under her care Alexi had been thriving. Ms Angelopoulos explained that she will never comprehend how her own brother could do something so cruel and heartless to his own child. She described the offender’s act as selfish, inhumane and depriving the whole family of future opportunities with Alexi. She stated that the offender had other options and that her brother was not alone. She said he had support all around him in his extended family and that help was there, love was there and taking Alexi’s life was never the only option. She stated that she lives with the constant pain of knowing that she could not protect Alexi. She is no longer the same person, describing that she feels as though a part of her died when Alexi died. There are days when her grief is so heavy that she feels unable to face the world and that the pain of what her own brother has done feels unbearable. She has been unable to return to her aunt’s unit and believes she never will be able to do so.

7. [123]

   Carmen Melek described the effect Alexi’s death has had on her. She described that, although she was not Alexi’s biological mother, she raised him, loved him and devoted her life to him. She described that she now lives with anxiety, stress and a profound loss of trust. Her life has now been shaped by Alexi’s absence. She now finds it difficult to concentrate, maintain routines or function at her previous levels. She feels disconnected from reality, feels constantly unsettled in her own home and has feelings of disorientation and instability. She said that she will never understand how the offender could have taken his own son’s life, describing his conduct as calculated, deliberate and cruel. She stated that Alexi’s murder was not just the destruction of a child’s life but also the destruction of her soul as Alexi’s mother. She said that she will always live with the regret of not being able to save him.

8. [124]

   The devastating impact on each of the victims was poignant and palpable. I am grateful to each of them for providing their statements. They displayed considerable bravery and composure in delivering their statements to the Court in such traumatic circumstances.

9. [125]

   I am acutely aware that no mere words nor the sentence that I will impose could ever mitigate the loss of Alexi’s life or the loss felt by his family and those who loved him, nor could it ever provide them with any comfort. However, I can assure each of the authors of the victim impact statements that their voices have been heard. I take each of them into account to the extent permitted by the law. It is important that the impact of the offender’s crime on Alexi’s family be recognised and never forgotten. On behalf of the Court, I extend my sincere condolences.

The comparable cases

1. [126]

   The parties referred me to a number of cases said to be relevantly comparable. I have considered each of them but acknowledge that each case is unique.

Sentence of imprisonment

1. [127]

   The Court must not sentence an offender to a period of imprisonment unless it is satisfied, having considered all other alternatives, that no other penalty is appropriate. In the serious circumstances of this offending and in light of the findings which I have already referred to, clearly no penalty other than full-time imprisonment is warranted.

2. [128]

   In relation to the commencement date for the sentence, I intend to backdate the commencement date to 31 May 2023, the date upon which the offender was arrested.

3. [129]

   I propose to set a non-parole period that is shorter than the standard non-parole period for the offence. That is because of my findings concerning the offender’s subjective case, his somewhat reduced moral culpability because of his mental health conditions and because of the onerous conditions of custody to date which are likely to continue for some time into the future. I have relied on those same considerations and my other findings in this judgment as warranting a departure, albeit a limited one, from the statutory ratio of the non-parole period to the balance of the term.

Orders

1. [130]

   Nathan Vikatos, I convict you of the murder of Alexi Vikatos.

2. [131]

   After taking into account a 25% reduction for the early guilty plea, I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 28 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 18 years and 6 months commencing on 31 May 2023 and expiring on 30 November 2041 and a balance of term of 10 years expiring on 30 November 2051.

3. [132]

   Accordingly, the first date upon which you will become eligible for release on parole is 30 November 2041.

4. [133]

   I order that you are a registerable person pursuant to s 3C(1) of the Child Protection (Offender’s Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) and that, in accordance with the provisions of that Act, the reporting period is a period of 15 years.

5. [134]

   I am satisfied that the murder of Alexi Vikatos is a domestic violence offence. Accordingly, I direct, pursuant to s 12(2) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), that the conviction be recorded on your criminal history as a domestic violence offence.

6. [135]

   I am required to advise you that the provisions of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) apply to the offence of murder and that you may be subject to its provisions at the end of the sentence I have imposed. That Act allows for certain orders for the continued detention or extended supervision of violent offenders at the conclusion of their sentence. I invite your lawyers to advise you of the possible application of the provisions of that Act.