The Discharge of Adoption of Rose Mary Smith

This is an application by Taylor Imogen Jones (Ms Jones) under s 93(4)(b) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) seeking to discharge the adoption order which was made in respect of her by this court on 3 July 1989. At the time of the adoption order, the name of Ms Jones was “Rose Mary Smith”.

Ms Jones also seeks consequential orders under s 19(2) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) to register her birth in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register in the event that the discharge order is made.

The discharge application arises in the most distressing circumstances, being the alleged sexual assault of Ms Jones by her adoptive father during her childhood, the alleged emotional and physical abuse by her adoptive parents and the complete breakdown of her relationship with her adoptive family.

The Secretary of the New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) was joined as an intervener to the proceedings to assist the court in determining the discharge application. I was greatly assisted by the submissions made by the Secretary.

For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which I should order the discharge of the adoption order and make the consequential orders. In this published version of this judgment, all persons and places referred to have been assigned pseudonyms in keeping with s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW). I have not used Korean pseudonyms so as to ensure that I do not unknowingly transgress any Korean naming conventions and practices.

On 10 February 1987 at 9:10pm, Ms Jones was born as Rose Mary Smith, weighing 3.2 kilograms in Seoul, South Korea. Ms Jones was born as the daughter to her birth parents, Kate Smith (nee Roberts, her birth mother) and Jacob Smith (her birth father), who were married to each other at that time but have since divorced.

Ms Jones has three older biological sisters: Olivia Smith, Poppy Smith and Jessica Smith.

Also on 10 February 1987, Ms Jones was taken into care by the Eastern Child Welfare Society, a Korean adoption agency. On 6 March 1987, the Executive Director of the Eastern Child Welfare Society became the guardian of Ms Jones. On 10 March 1987, the Executive Director of the Eastern Child Welfare Society gave consent to the immigration of Ms Jones to Australia and authorised the New South Wales Department of Youth and Community Services (as the predecessor to the DCJ was then known) to make any and all decisions and to take any and all legal steps necessary to accomplish her immigration to Australia and adoption.

On 25 June 1987, the adoptive parents of Ms Jones, Henry Evans (her adoptive father) and Mia Evans (her adoptive mother), arrived in Korea. The adoptive parents have an older biological child, Laura Evans (her adoptive sister), who is about 10 years older than Ms Jones.

On 30 June 1987, Ms Jones was placed in the care of the adoptive parents.

On 1 July 1987, the adoptive parents returned to Australia accompanied by Ms Jones.

At all relevant times, the adoptive parents were Australian citizens.

Ms Jones entered Australia as an immigrant child under the guardianship of the then Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, and was subject to the relevant provisions of the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth). The guardianship of the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs was then delegated to the Director General and other executive officers of the New South Wales Department of Youth and Community Services.

On 3 July 1989, this court made orders for the adoption of Ms Jones in favour of the adoptive parents pursuant to the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW), approved her change of name to Taylor Evans and dispensed with the consent of the birth parents and the Eastern Child Welfare Society.

Ms Jones resides in Victoria and works full-time.

In June 2020, Ms Jones gave birth to her daughter Sarah, who is now five years old.

On 6 April 2021, Ms Jones (then named Taylor Evans) married Harry Jones.

Ms Jones resided with the adoptive parents in New South Wales for 13 years and then in Victoria. During the time that Ms Jones was residing with the adoptive parents in New South Wales, and when Ms Jones was seven years old, her adoptive sister moved out of the family home.

Ms Jones recalls that when she was aged around four years old, she was standing on her bed in her pyjamas saying goodnight to her adoptive father and, while he was kissing her, he stuck his tongue into her mouth. This resulted in Ms Jones pulling away and saying, “I don’t want to do this anymore”.

Ms Jones also recalls that at about the same age, she was sleeping in the bed of her adoptive parents with only her adoptive father present and, in the middle of the night, she woke up while she was being sexually assaulted by him. Ms Jones said that during this episode, her whole body felt like she was floating above the bed, which she described as a “memory of dissociating” from what was happening to her.

Ms Jones also described episodes during her growing up years with her adoptive parents to the following effect:

Subsequently, Ms Jones says that she has been consistently asked for money by her adoptive father and her adoptive sister, and she has felt obliged to provide them with funds. Ms Jones also says that even while she has been a grown adult, her adoptive mother has continued to yell at her and verbally abuse her.

In August 2018, Ms Jones received documents from the Eastern Child Welfare Society in Korea, which included a letter from her birth mother in which she expressed her hope to see Ms Jones, her love for Ms Jones and her desire to meet Ms Jones.

In February 2023, Ms Jones located her birth mother, Kate Smith. Ms Jones has been unable to locate her birth father despite making attempts to do so. Unsuccessful attempts to locate the birth father have also been made by the Secretary in 2025.

On 30 October 2024, Ms Jones travelled with her husband to Korea to meet her birth family in person. Ms Jones met her birth mother, aunt, brother-in-law and her three sisters.

On 19 March 2024, Ms Jones told her husband of her memories of childhood sexual assault. Ms Jones was 37 years old when she told her husband of the events which occurred when she was four years old. As a result, there was a 33 year gap between the time of the alleged sexual abuse and her first mention of it to anyone.

On 20 March 2024, Ms Jones told her general practitioner, Dr Dawn Oi, of her memories of sexual assault.

On 22 March 2024, Ms Jones disclosed the memories of her sexual assault to her psychotherapist, Gianna Mazzone, and was referred to the Western Region Centre Against Sexual Assault for specialist sexual assault therapy. In May 2024, Ms Jones commenced therapy with the Western Region Centre Against Sexual Assault.

On 14 May 2024, Ms Jones again disclosed the sexual abuse and emotional abuse she had suffered to her psychotherapist, Ms Mazzone.

After visiting her birth family in October 2024 in Korea, Ms Jones told her adoptive mother of the sexual abuse she had suffered from her adoptive father. Her adoptive mother accused her of making up the allegation.

On 28 December 2024, Ms Jones contacted Victoria police to report the sexual assault that she had suffered.

During October 2025, Ms Jones spoke to members of Victoria police of her memories of child sexual assault perpetrated by her adoptive father. She was informed that the record of her report would be forwarded to New South Wales police.

Ms Jones describes the following impact of her adoption by the adoptive parents in the following way:

Ms Jones has been consulting with her psychotherapist, Gianna Mazzone, for the past eight years. Ms Mazzone provides support services to Ms Jones as part of her role in providing free ongoing support to families formed through intercountry adoption, which was established through funding provided by the Commonwealth Department of Social Services.

In a report dated 12 October 2025 provided to the court, Ms Mazzone has provided the following opinions:

I have also been provided with an affidavit dated 29 September 2025 from the treating general practitioner of Ms Jones, Dr Dawn Oi.

In her affidavit, Dr Oi stated as follows:

I have also been provided with a letter dated 18 June 2025 in which Dr Hannah Dobson states that Ms Jones suffers from obsessive-compulsive disorder and that she is on medication for anxiety.

Ms Jones has also stated that even with medication and regular treatment, she experiences “intrusive thoughts daily that someone will take my daughter from me or will sexually assault her”.

Amongst the matters which are recorded in the treatment notes of Dr Oi and Dr Dobson are repeated reports by Ms Jones of her significant anxiety around child safety and intrusive thoughts about potential harm to her daughter, with specific obsessions related to her daughter being sexually assaulted. These anxieties included significant difficulty in trusting others with childcare for her daughter, especially family members and close friends.

Ms Jones has now cut off all contact with her adoptive family, has purposely kept her distance from her adoptive sister since 2022 and regards her adoptive sister as a stranger to her.

By way of a notice to concerned persons, Ms Jones provided notice of the application to discharge the adoption order of 3 July 1989 to the adoptive parents and the Secretary. The adoptive parents did not attend the hearing of the application or make any written submissions in relation to it.

On 7 November 2025, a Citizenship Helpdesk Officer within the Commonwealth Department of Home Affairs confirmed in writing that, assuming Ms Jones to be an Australian citizen, her Australian citizenship will not cease as a result of any discharge of the adoption order. This is because s 10A of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) (ACA) resulted in an automatic acquisition of Australian citizenship upon the making of the adoption order on 3 July 1989.

Section 10A of the ACA applied from 22 November 1984 and stated:

At the time of the adoption order on 3 July 1989, Ms Jones had entered Australia on 1 July 1987 pursuant to a permanent visa and both of the adoptive parents were Australian citizens. As a result, I consider that by the satisfaction of both conditions under ss 10A(a) and (b) of the ACA, Ms Jones became an Australian citizen on the making of the adoption order on 3 July 1989.

The Secretary has sought legal advice from Joanne Kinslor of Kinslor Prince Lawyers, an accredited specialist in immigration law, on various immigration and citizenship law issues in relation to Ms Jones, including what impact, if any, an adoption discharge order would have on her Australian citizenship.

The legal advice provided by Ms Kinslor is confidential. After giving consideration to that advice, I am satisfied that if I make an order to discharge the adoption order in respect of Ms Jones, it is highly likely that she will remain an Australian citizen.

The power of the court to make an order discharging an adoption order is contained in s 93 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), which is in the following terms:

The Dictionary to the Adoption Act defines “adoption order” to mean “an order for adoption of a child made or recognised under this Act or a former Act”, and defines “former Act” to include the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW). This means that s 93 applies to an adoption order made under the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW) as occurred with respect to Ms Jones.

In the present case, the focus of the submissions was on the question of whether there was “some other exceptional reason why the adoption order should be discharged” under s 93(4)(b) of the Adoption Act.

The objects of the Adoption Act are stated in s 7 of the Adoption Act, which include:

Section 8 of the Adoption Act sets out the paramount consideration in making a decision about the adoption of a child to be the best interests of the child and the matters which must be considered in determining those best interests. Section 8 is relevantly in the following terms:

The Dictionary to the Adoption Act states that “child” means a person who is less than 18 years of age or a person who is 18 or more years of age and in relation to whom an adoption is sought or has been made.

It is clear from s 8 of the Adoption Act that a “decision about the adoption of a child” includes the discharge of an adoption order made in respect of a child who is older than 18 years of age, and that the paramount consideration in deciding whether to make the discharge of an adoption order is the best interests of the child throughout the child’s life. I discern that in applying s 8, the interests or expressed wishes of persons other than the child are only relevant for determining those best interests of the child.

This court has previously considered the question of whether to discharge an adoption order for an “exceptional reason” on the basis of alleged sexual abuse of the child by an adoptive father and the resulting trauma to the child. Those decisions provide strong guidance on the approach of the court to that question.

In Re Susan [2009] NSWSC 592, Palmer J dealt with allegations of repeated sexual assault of the adopted child (Susan) by her adoptive father from the time she was five years old, as well as allegations of sexual assault of her sister (Mary). The adoptive father was later charged and convicted of the sexual assault of Mary and sentenced to imprisonment for 12 months. Palmer J noted at [28] that Susan’s allegations could not be corroborated or denied as the adoptive parents were dead, there was no witness of the alleged episodes, Susan did not make a complaint against the adoptive father until many years later, there was no contradictor in the case and Susan’s evidence was not tested by cross-examination.

On the issue of the nature of the relationship between an adoptive parent and child, determining the interests of the child and the appropriate standard to apply in finding the facts in circumstances of alleged sexual abuse in support of an adoption discharge application, Palmer J at [23]–[27] stated as follows:

Importantly, Palmer J also considered the extent to which the account of the child to medical professionals and the history of trauma could corroborate the sexual abuse allegations. Palmer J at [29] stated:

In Re Susan at [30], Palmer J expressed that “I am fully satisfied that Susan’s allegations of sexual abuse by Ralph have been proved”. His Honour then went on to detail the effects of the sexual abuse on Susan and survey the relevant provisions of the Adoption Act and the approach taken to the discharge of adoption orders in this and other jurisdictions. Palmer J at [47]–[53] described two competing policy considerations in an application to discharge an adoption order, being:

Amongst the authorities relied upon by Palmer J in Re Susan was the decision on Re S [1969] VR 490. In Re S, McInerney J considered the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” in s 13(1) of the Adoption of Children Act 1928 (Vic), which was materially in the same terms as the “exceptional reason” used to ground the discharge of an adoption order under s 25 of the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW). In Re Susan, Palmer J at [80]–[81] said:

In Re Susan, Palmer J at [83]–[86] characterised violent abuse of a child (whether physical, emotional or sexual) by a parent in the following way:

Palmer J at [88] expressed the view that “the Court must seriously examine whether a discharge order will make any appreciable difference to Susan’s healing process” and “bearing in mind the high importance of maintaining permanency in the adoptive relationship, the Court should not discharge the adoption order in this case unless it is comfortably satisfied that discharge will make a significant improvement to Susan’s life”.

Palmer J at [94] concluded that on the facts in Re Susan, there was an exceptional reason to discharge the order for Susan’s adoption.

In Adoption of LVH [2014] NSWSC 1902, Brereton J at [9] held that while it is “undesirable to list categories of what might amount to exceptional reasons” under s 93(4)(b) of the Adoption Act, the expression in Re Susan at [86] of there being circumstances arising “post adoption as would justify the termination of the adoptive parent’s parental responsibility for the child if they were natural parents of the child” did provide “a useful touchstone of the circumstances in which post adoption events might amount to exceptional reason”.

In Re Henry [2022] NSWSC 1738, Slattery J considered the application to discharge an adoption order made by a First Nations man (Henry), who alleged that he was the subject of regular and persistent sexual abuse from when he was about four years old by his adoptive father and other male relatives living in the same household.

In Re Henry, Slattery J addressed the issue of the standard of proof required to be satisfied in relation to the findings of fact regarding sexual assault to support an application to discharge an adoption order, saying at [21]:

Slattery J found at [43] that the abuse resulted in “Henry suffering severe psychological damage and a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder” as confirmed in the medical reports of two psychiatrists. Slattery J also found at [44] that Henry was “treated with the hostility, vilification, and active verbal and physical abuse because of his indigenous heritage”. At [54]–[58], Slattery J concluded that there was corroboration of Henry’s evidence of abuse in the DCJ’s records, the medical reports of the psychiatrists and the expert evidence of a social worker who reviewed the DCJ’s records.

In Re Henry, Slattery J at [59]–[71] also focussed on the effect of a discharge order for Henry, being to “begin to release him from the pain and damage he suffered as a result of the sexual abuse”, “allow him to heal”, restore the connection with his indigenous identity and have a public acknowledgment of his parentage and heritage, matters which were supported by the expert evidence. Slattery J concluded at [69]–[71]:

The discharge of an adoption order on the basis of an “exceptional reason” may also be supported on the ground that there has been a breakdown in the relationship between an adopted person and there adoptive family: Re Gordon (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 673, Hallen J at [228], cited in Discharge of Adoption of K [2022] NSWSC 1197, Stevenson J at [17]; Discharge of Adoption of Kate (a pseudonym) [2023] NSWSC 1317, Stevenson J at [13]; and Discharge of Adoption of Isabel (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 565, Stevenson J at [17].

The relevant principles to be applied in determining an application to discharge an adoption order based on “exceptional reason” are aptly and succinctly stated in Discharge of Adoption of Isabel by Stevenson J at [13]–[19] as follows (footnotes omitted):

Guided by the principles expressed in Re Susan, Re Henry and Discharge of Adoption of Isabel outlined above, in my opinion the combination of the various factors which are present in these proceedings constitute there being an “exceptional reason” to make the order discharging the adoption order made in relation to Ms Jones.

First, I am satisfied to the requisite degree that there is clear and cogent proof that Ms Jones was sexually abused by her adoptive father for the following reasons:

Second, I am also satisfied to the requisite degree that Ms Jones has suffered periods of emotional, verbal and physical abuse by her adoptive parents, principally by her adoptive mother. I have direct evidence from Ms Jones of those events and no evidence to the contrary. The written medical reports are consistent with Ms Jones having suffered such abuse, as are the mental health conditions from which she suffers. This abuse has also been destructive of the relationship between Ms Jones and her adoptive parents.

Third, Ms Jones has described in considerable detail the harm she has suffered from being part of the family of her adoptive parents, and that for the adoption order to remain will be detrimental to her mental health and prevent her from recovering from her trauma-induced conditions. As part of her recovery, Ms Jones will have the opportunity to live in what she regards as her “real identity”. The views of Ms Jones are supported by the evidence of her treating medical practitioners.

Fourth, in light of the gravity of the allegations which Ms Jones has made against her adoptive parents and the deleterious impact they have had on her mental health, I accept that there has been an irretrievable and complete breakdown in the relationship between Ms Jones and all three members of her adoptive family. I consider that the abuse of Ms Jones has been destructive of the complete and unquestioning trust of her adoptive parents that is required to exist in their parent/child relationship. It has caused significant harm to Ms Jones and has resulted in her ceasing all contact with her adoptive parents.

Fifth, I am satisfied that making the discharge order is not likely to have any effect on the Australian citizenship of Ms Jones.

Taking all of these matters into account, it is my strong view that this case is an appropriate one in which the paramount consideration of the best interests of Ms Jones are undoubtedly served by the discharge of the adoption order made in respect of her. While I recognise that the making of such an order is of a most serious and permanent kind, I am satisfied that the damage that has been suffered, and will continue to be suffered, by Ms Jones if the adoption order remains in place is also of a most serious and permanent kind. To adopt the words used in Re Susan, in my view the discharge order will make an “appreciable difference” to the life of Ms Jones by enabling her to continue to heal from the trauma she has suffered and significantly improve her life.

Having determined that I should make a discharge order pursuant to s 93(4)(b) of the Adoption Act, s 93(7) of the Adoption Act empowers the court to make such consequential or ancillary orders as it thinks necessary in the interests of justice or to promote the best interests of the child, including orders relating to the name of Ms Jones.

Ms Jones wishes to change her name from “Taylor Imogen Jones” to “Rose Mary Jones” to reflect the first names she was given by her birth parents at the time she was born while retaining her married surname.

I am satisfied that it will promote the best interests of Ms Jones to change her name to “Rose Mary Jones”. I accept that the existing first names, “Taylor Imogen”, connect Ms Jones to her adoptive parents and are part of what she regards as her “fake identity” that causes her distress and from which she seeks freedom. I also accept the proposed new first names, “Rose Mary”, connect Ms Jones to her birth parents and are part of what she regards as her “real identity” in which she can begin to heal. The change of her first names will also bring her closer to the heritage and culture of her birth family, which she was unable to experience growing up with her adoptive family in Australia.

Ms Jones seeks an order under s 19(2) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) (BDM Act) to register the details of her birth because the consequence of the discharge of the adoption order will be that her birth record will be cancelled. This application requires the consideration of the relevant provisions of the BDM Act and the regulations made under it.

The Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (defined as the “Registrar” in s 4(1) of the BDM Act) must maintain a register or registers of registrable events: s 43(1) of the BDM Act.

The Register under the BDM Act must contain the particulars of each registrable event required under the BDM Act or another law to be included in the Register: s4(1) (definition of “Register”) and s 43(2) of the BDM Act.

A “registrable event” is defined to mean a birth, adoption or discharge of adoption, change of name, change of sex, death or marriage: s 4(1) of the BDM Act.

The Registrar registers a birth by making an entry about the birth in the Register, including the particulars required by the regulations and, if the particulars available to the Registrar are incomplete, the Registrar may register a birth on the basis of incomplete particulars: s 17 of the BDM Act.

Section 5 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Regulation 2025 (NSW) (BDM Regulation) provides:

The Registrar registers an adoption or discharge of an adoption by registering the record of the adoption or discharge sent to the Registrar under Chapter 7 of the Adoption Act and making an entry about it in the Register, including the information required by the regulations: s 24 of the BDM Act.

Section 6 of the BDM Regulation states:

Section 19 of the BDM Act is in the following terms:

As a result, if I make a finding about Ms Jones’ birth or her parents, I may order the registration of her birth or inclusion of registrable information about it. The “registrable information” is defined to mean information that must or may be included in the Register: s 4(1) of the BDM Act.

Section 13(2) of the BDM Act provides that if a court orders the registration of a birth, the birth must be registered under the BDM Act.

I am satisfied that in the circumstances of this case, I should order the registration of the birth of Ms Jones and the inclusion of as much of the registrable information about her birth and her birth parents in the Register as is known. I do so based on my view that in accordance with the law of New South Wales, the legal parental responsibility held by the birth parents of Ms Jones between her birth on 10 February 1987 and her arrival in Australia on 1 July 1987 was never disturbed, and on the making of the discharge of the adoption order, her birth parents will revert to being her legal parents.

I am conscious that in arriving at this conclusion, I have not received any evidence or submissions from the birth parents of Ms Jones apart from the letter in August 2018 from her birth mother indicating that she was very content to reconnect with Ms Jones. However, given they are not situated or resident in Australia and there is no evidence that they will be in the future, I do not consider that it is necessary for me to hear from them before I make the relevant orders under the BDM Act.

For the reasons stated above, I make the following orders and notations: