King v The University of Notre Dame

1. [1]

   The Plaintiff enrolled in the Bachelor of Medicine/Bachelor of Surgery degree at the University of Notre Dame in 2008. She withdrew from the program in 2008 and was later readmitted in 2013 as a first year student. She failed her first year as a result of her final grade in Foundations of Medical Vocation. She was unsuccessful in relation to appeals provided under the University’s Regulations and, as a result, commenced the present proceedings on 13 May 2014.

2. [2]

   By reason of the appeals that she brought against the University’s determination that she did not satisfactorily pass MED1000, she was permitted to proceed to MED2000 in 2014. At the end of that year she again failed the course. She lodged an internal appeal which was unsuccessful.

3. [3]

   As a result of the two failures (MED1000 and MED2000) she was terminated from the University.

4. [4]

   Although the Plaintiff has not amended her Summons (in which she seeks declarations and judicial review of the University’s decisions) to include the 2014 decisions to fail her and terminate her from the University, the interim order that she sought, and with which this judgment is concerned, was designed to preserve the status quo until she has both pursued the appeals provided by the University Regulations and the present proceedings which she has indicated will be amended. For the Plaintiff, the preservation of the status quo means that she should be permitted to proceed to MED3000 whilst the appeals and the proceedings are determined.

5. [5]

   It is now necessary to look in greater detail at the matters surrounding the Plaintiff’s failure to complete satisfactorily MED1000 and MED2000.

MED1000

1. [6]

   It should be said at the outset that although the proceedings were commenced by the Plaintiff when she was legally represented, her solicitors ceased to act within a month of the proceedings being commenced. The Plaintiff thereafter continued the proceedings acting for herself. She is not without some ability to do this because, prior to embarking upon the study of medicine, she had completed a law degree and passed the Bar exams. Nevertheless, the material for consideration on the present interlocutory application was not well organised nor set out in a very coherent fashion. It was not easy to determine precisely what failures the Plaintiff sustained, precisely what appeal were lodged and when decisions were made by the University in relation to those failures.

2. [7]

   What follows in relation to MED1000 has largely been discerned from the report of an external review conducted pursuant to an appeal lodged by the Plaintiff pursuant to the University’s Regulations for review and appeal.

3. [8]

   There appear to have been a number of issues that came to a head at the completion of MED1000 by the Plaintiff. She appealed to the Pro Vice Chancellor on three apparent bases from determinations of the University at the end of that year.

4. [9]

   Provision for appeals is made in the University Regulations and a publication entitled “Policy: Student Appeals”. The latter document relevantly provides:

5. [10]

   There was nothing to suggest the Plaintiff first appealed to the Dean as clause 21.1 provides but no point was taken about this.

6. [11]

   The first appeal lodged on 10 February 2014 to the Pro Vice Chancellor was an appeal against:

7. [12]

   That appeal was rejected by the Pro-Vice Chancellor on 24 February 2014. On the same day the Plaintiff appealed to the University’s External Appointee under clause 23.3 on the same grounds.

8. [13]

   The External Appointee determined the appeal on or about 7 May 2014.

9. [14]

   The External Appointee accepted that the Plaintiff provided apparently legitimate evidence of a severe illness which manifested itself in a number of ways arising from iron deficiency resulting in anaemia and hypoxia. The Plaintiff attended and attempted all four examinations between 7 to 15 November 2013. Although she was advised by the Dean that she had been given special consideration through the scheduling of her exams in the afternoon rather than the morning examination time slot, the Plaintiff argued that this was not in fact special consideration but was a random assignation of the slot attributable to 50% of the cohort who were not seeking special consideration.

10. [15]

    The External Appointee found that the University had accorded special consideration in respect of her illness.

11. [16]

    In relation to the final PBL grade the Plaintiff asserted that the grade should be favourably reassessed because of:

12. [17]

    The External Appointee noted that the Plaintiff provided a detailed self-analysis of her review of her PBL scores and a rationale as to why her scores should be changed accordingly. Beyond her own opinion, the Plaintiff provided no corroborating evidence as to the bias she alleged on the part of her supervising doctor.

13. [18]

    The External Appointee noted that the School of Medicine conducted a review of the final PBL grade awarded by the Plaintiff’s supervising doctor according to their published processes and rubrics. That review yielded a grade lower than the one previously awarded but, despite that, the Plaintiff’s grade was not altered accordingly.

14. [19]

    The External Appointee found that there was no evidence provided to suggest administrative error or a breach of or failure to adhere to the University’s assessment policy or procedures or Regulations including the School of Medicine’s published Assessment requirements. The appeal against the final PBL grade was declined.

15. [20]

    The appeal in relation to the final grade for Foundations of Medical Vocation turned on the grading of the marks for the course.

16. [21]

    It is not necessary to enter into the detail of the weighting arrangements for the tasks completed by the Plaintiff nor the way in which the raw marks were calculated and subsequently graded. It is sufficient to note that her final mark was moderated within the University’s guidelines in grade distribution to a fail grade with a mark of 48. Part of the reason for that at least seems to have been that she had failed three critical components being the BCS and CCS domains (quite what these were was not identified) and her continuous PBL mark. The Plaintiff had claimed that her raw mark for the course was 57 and there was no proper basis upon which the marks could be graded at that level.

17. [22]

    She pointed to aspects of the Regulations which apparently permitted a grading of marks at high distinction and distinction level, and argued that the express right to do that for those levels implied that it could not be done at the level she achieved for her raw mark. That is the principle enunciated in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The part of the University’s General Regulation relied on was this:

18. [23]

    The External Appointee found that she had been awarded a fail grade by the Board of Examiners because she had not demonstrated “at least an adequate level of knowledge/understanding/competencies/skills required to meet Unit objectives” as required by the General Regulations. On that basis the external reviewer declined her appeal. The External Appointee said also that there were no grounds to accept that the Plaintiff’s appeals within the University’s internal administration had been treated inequitably or contrary to stated procedures.

MED2000 and termination from the University

1. [24]

   By reason of what appears in clause 25 of the Student Appeals Policy it seems that the Plaintiff was permitted to proceed to MED2000 pending the determination of the appeals. Despite the external appeal being determined in May 2014 it appears that the Plaintiff remained in attendance for the remainder of MED2000. It appears that the University permitted her to do that because these proceedings were on foot. However, the Plaintiff submitted that she was entitled to complete that year because on 13 May 2014 she commenced the present proceedings. She submitted that these proceedings were an appeal subject to Clause 25. I will return to this matter presently. Nevertheless, it should be noted that until the Plaintiff amended her Summons on 19 October 2014, all that she had sought by way of relief was a series of declarations that the determination made 21 December 2013, effectively that she had failed MED1000 was invalid and was made in breach of contract

2. [25]

   In any event, at the conclusion of 2014 the Plaintiff failed MED2000. That led to the University advising the Plaintiff that she was terminated from the University in accordance with clause 5.2.4. of the Regulations on the ground that she had made unsatisfactory progress for two successive semesters (each semester was for a year). Clause 5.2.4. provides:

3. [26]

   Relevant provisions of the Student Appeals Policy are these:

4. [27]

   The Plaintiff had applied on 11 November 2014 to a Unit Coordinator for Special Consideration. That request was denied on 21 November 2014. She appealed to the Dean. The Dean reviewed the Unit Coordinator’s decision and denied the appeal on 10 December 2014.

5. [28]

   The Plaintiff sought a supplementary examination for the Population and Public Health Domain (PPH) in MED2000. She also lodged an appeal against the final grade of “Fail due to Non-Completion” (FN) for MED2000 and an appeal against the finding of Unsatisfactory Progress for MED2000. These appeals were made to the Dean and were rejected.

6. [29]

   On 10 December 2014 the Plaintiff appealed to the Pro Vice Chancellor against the Dean’s decision. On 6 January 2015 the Plaintiff was told that her appeal had been denied because it was considered that the matters upon which she relied did not fit within the circumstances in which Special Consideration could be granted. It was noted that the decision of the Pro Vice Chancellor was final and not open to any further appeal. The letter went on to say that the reasons and evidence that the Plaintiff had provided were inadequate and did not substantiate any of the grounds of appeal alleged. On that basis no valid appeal had been made against the Plaintiff’s final grade.

7. [30]

   The Pro Vice Chancellor said that the appeal against a finding of unsatisfactory progress for MED2000 was invalid. This was because unsatisfactory progress is a term defined under the Regulation and describes the situation where a student does not achieve satisfactory progress. A student fails to achieve satisfactory progress if they do not pass. There was therefore no basis for a separate ground of appeal in respect of that finding which was the consequence of the final grade. There was no valid appeal in respect of that final grade.

8. [31]

   On 23 January 2015 the Pro Vice Chancellor wrote to the Plaintiff saying that she could not apply for a Supplementary Examination in respect of PPH and that the Pro Vice Chancellor had not granted one.

9. [32]

   The Pro Vice Chancellor noted that the appeal the Plaintiff made to the Dean against her final grade of FN for MED2000 was on three bases as follows:

10. [33]

    The Pro Vice Chancellor said it was not clear from the Plaintiff’s letter to the Dean what reasons and evidence she relied on for the separate grounds of appeal. She noted the matters set out in [27] above.

11. [34]

    On 13 January 2015 the Plaintiff appealed against her termination from the University on the grounds of exceptional circumstances which seriously impaired her performance in both MED1000 and MED2000. Her requests and appeals for Special Consideration due to exceptional circumstances were denied on 14 January 2014, 7 May 2014, 6 January 2015 and 23 January 2015. In those circumstances, the termination from the University was upheld on 27 January 2015.

12. [35]

    On 27 January 2015 the Plaintiff requested that the following appeals be referred to an External Appointee:

13. [36]

    On 21 January 2015 the Plaintiff by Notice of Motion sought this order:

14. [37]

    This judgment concerns a determination of that prayer for relief. At the time the Motion was heard the external appeal referred to in [35] above had not been determined.

15. [38]

    The Notice of Motion contains some ancillary orders including an application by the Plaintiff for leave to amend (again) her Summons although the precise form of the amendment was not put before the Court, and an application for the Defendant to produce certain documents listed in a Schedule to the Motion. These documents included exam scripts, model answers and all documents generally about the grading of marks. The Plaintiff sought all documents and communications between various persons at the University for almost everything to do with her time at the University. She required documents showing all grants of special consideration to medicine students at the University from 2008 to 2014. No argument was addressed to these documents until the Plaintiff mentioned it in passing at the conclusion of her address in reply. I declined to order production at this stage on the basis that the documents did not concern the interlocutory relief sought and their production was not urgently required.

16. [39]

    The Plaintiff wishes to continue to attend lectures and complete her medical degree pending (a) the outcome of the appeal to the external appointee in respect of her 2014 failures, (b) her appeals against termination from the University and (c) the present proceedings. At the time of hearing the Motion the present proceedings dealt only with her failures in MED1000 semester but the Plaintiff says that she will amend the proceedings to include the other matters now in dispute.

17. [40]

    The Plaintiff in supplementary submissions handed up on the second day of the hearing claimed that the interlocutory order she sought could be seen as an order for mandamus. She sought mandamus on an interlocutory basis. The purpose of seeking mandamus was said by the Plaintiff to be that it did not require her to show a serious question to be tried nor to demonstrate that the balance of convenience favoured her.

18. [41]

    The basis for mandamus was said to be clause 25 of the Student Appeals Policy. Alternatively, the Plaintiff says that there is a serious question to be tried to justify the grant of the interlocutory injunction and says also that the balance of convenience favours her. She says that if she is not able to continue with MED3000 this year she will be disadvantaged by reason of her age in that she will be a year older by the time she manages to complete the medical degree.

19. [42]

    I do not consider that characterising the order the Plaintiff seeks on an interlocutory basis as mandamus means that she does not have to satisfy the ordinary requirements for obtaining an interlocutory injunction. In any event it is difficult to read the order being sought as an order seeking mandamus. In substance what the Plaintiff seeks is the preservation of what she sees as the status quo, namely, her continuing the university course.

20. [43]

    The Plaintiff, in substance, sought the injunction on one of two bases. First, she said that the Regulations and the Student Appeals Policy gave her a right to attend classes and continue with her course of MED3000. Alternatively, she submitted that she had a serious question to be tried, namely that there were errors of principle, procedure and interpretation by decision makers that would ultimately result in declarations and/orders in the nature of prerogative writs. Those declarations and orders would mean that she would be shown to have passed both MED1000 and MED2000.

21. [44]

    It is convenient to deal first with her argument based on the Regulations and the Student Appeals Policy.

Students Appeal Policy

1. [45]

   The University accepts that for internal and external appeals, not including termination from University, clause 25 would permit her to continue the course. The University denies that clause 25 enables the Plaintiff to continue attending classes where she has been terminated from the University. It also denies that judicial review proceedings are appeals within the meaning of clause 25.

2. [46]

   As noted, the University accepts that under clause 25 of the Policy a student who has lodged an appeal whether an internal appeal or an appeal to an external appointee, may attend classes until they are notified of the outcome of their appeal.

3. [47]

   In the proceedings as presently constituted, the Plaintiff is seeking judicial review of the University’s decision with regard to her completion of MED1000. She was permitted to continue to attend classes to the time of termination of her final appeal to the External Appointee and that person’s determination. By grace only, it would seem, she was permitted to complete MED2000 notwithstanding the determination of the External Appointee in May 2014.

4. [48]

   The only issue on the construction of the Regulations and Student Appeals Policy is whether the Plaintiff has any right under clause 25 of the Student Appeals Policy or otherwise to insist on being allowed to continue with her classes because the present proceedings have been brought.

5. [49]

   In my opinion, nothing in the Regulation or the Student Appeals Policy contemplates judicial review proceedings or anything similar. Where the term “appeal” appears in the Policy it is apparent that the only appeals being dealt with are internal appeals (clauses 4 to 22) and external appeals under clause 23. Some of the internal appeals have built within them a double appeal process such as clauses 12 (failure in a compulsory unit) and clause 19 (Special Consideration). The Plaintiff availed herself of such appeals.

6. [50]

   It is also apparent that references to “an external person or agency” in clauses 3, 23 and 25 are references to specified external reviewers and agencies in respect of which the Registrar of the University maintains a list (see clause 23.1). The reference to “external reviewers and agencies” cannot be regarded as a reference to a Court. There is nothing, therefore, to support the Plaintiff’s contention that, because she has brought the present proceedings, clause 25 enables her to continue to attend classes.

7. [51]

   It does not seem to me that this position is altered by the fact that the Plaintiff was permitted to attend classes in her MED2000 semester and complete that semester. The Plaintiff did not suggest that any estoppel arose from that course of conduct. In any event, as I have noted already, the present proceedings do not seek any relief in respect of events concerned with her MED2000 semester.

8. [52]

   To the extent that the Plaintiff relies upon the provisions of the Student Appeal Policy her claim to be allowed to continue classes must fail. Clause 25.1 allows her to continue to attend classes “until [she is] notified of the outcome of [her] appeal”. The Plaintiff was so notified on about 7 May 2014. The fact that she was permitted to complete MED2000 does not accord her greater rights than the Student Appeal Policy allows.

9. [53]

   It is not, therefore, strictly necessary to consider the Plaintiff’s position flowing from her termination because from 7 May 2014 she has had no right to attend classes. However, in deference to the arguments advanced I will do so.

10. [54]

    If the Plaintiff had successfully completed MED2000 she might have been in a better position to argue that, notwithstanding clause 25, she could demonstrate a serious question to be tried, namely, that there was a real possibility that she would be successful in establishing error on the part of the External Appointee who dealt with her appeal in respect of MED1000. Her failure in MED2000 has three consequences, in my opinion. First, it reinforces the fact that she has no right (as I have determined) to attend classes because all her appeals with respect to MED1000 have been decided adversely to her. Secondly, it strikes a serious blow against her argument that there is a serious question to be tried that the status quo should otherwise be maintained. Thirdly, it resulted in her termination from the University.

11. [55]

    It is convenient to deal with the termination first because that also turns on construction of the Student Appeals Policy.

12. [56]

    The Plaintiff argues that her right to attend classes continues until her appeals against the termination have been heard and determined. She includes amongst those appeals the present proceedings as she intends to amend them. However, I have already determined that as a matter of construction of the Student Appeals Policy the present proceedings do not constitute appeals in the Policy. The Plaintiff points to clause 1.1 of the Appeals Policy ([26] above) and clauses 25.1 and 25.2 to submit that an appeal against termination is in the same position as other appeals with the result that she can attend classes until such appeal is determined.

13. [57]

    In my opinion, the Plaintiff’s submission ignores clause 25.5 and the structure of the clause as a whole. Special provision is made by clause 25.5 in respect of termination. The requirement is to cease attending classes when an appeal against termination is denied. That requirement does not operate in respect of appeals concerning matters other than termination which are denied. The effect is for those appeals, as a reading of clauses 25.1 and 25.2 together shows, that an internal appeal may be denied but if an external appeal is lodged the student may continue to attend classes until that external appeal is determined.

14. [58]

    Clause 25.5 applies only to appeals against termination. The clause does not refer either to “external appeal” or “final appeal” or “all appeals”. Here, the Plaintiff appealed against her termination. That appeal was denied. Clause 25.5 operates to require her to cease attending classes even if she lodges another appeal to an External Appointee.

Serious question to be tried

1. [59]

   The Plaintiff also submitted that there was a serious question to be tried and that the balance of convenience favoured her to justify an interlocutory injunction.

2. [60]

   On 10 October 2014 the Plaintiff filed an Amended Summons in relation to orders she seeks in relation to the MED1000 year. In addition to the declarations previously sought she seeks orders setting aside the decision of the University on 11 December 2013 that she achieved a final mark of 48 and/or a final grade of Fail in MED1000. She seeks the same order in respect of a decision said to have been made on 7 May 2014. The evidence discloses that the 11 December 2013 decision was the date of rejection by the University of her appeal to the Pro Vice Chancellor and 7 May 2014 was the notification of the rejection of her appeal by the External Appointee.

3. [61]

   However, the Plaintiff makes it clear that a number of earlier decisions are “the subject of collateral attack”, as she put it in the Summons. These prior decisions appear to be steps along the way such as when she was awarded the mark of 48 and when a committee was established to review her final grade as well as the various dates on which appeals were rejected.

4. [62]

   Although the Amended Summons is couched in terms that suggest on its face that the Plaintiff is seeking a judicial review based on commonly understood administrative law grounds, it is fairly clear that the Plaintiff is actually seeking a merits review including a re-mark of the paper that ultimately gave rise to the fail grade for the subject. The proceedings also seek to challenge the marking system in place at the University.

5. [63]

   The High Court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 has elucidated the meaning of a serious question to be tried. Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreed at [19]) said:

6. [64]

   Accordingly, what the Plaintiff must demonstrate is a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo.

7. [65]

   In Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 113 Wood CJ at CL said:

8. [66]

   Despite the Court of Appeal allowing the appeal from this judgment on one point, nothing was said to suggest that what is contained in those paragraphs does not state the law: Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 325.

9. [67]

   In Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 1 WLR 1988 Sedley LJ (with whom Lord Woolf MR and Ward LJ agreed) said:

10. [68]

    I agree with those remarks. They seem to me to be consistent with, and flesh out in a practical way, what Wood CJ at CL is saying in Harding.

11. [69]

    As far as there being a serious question to be tried is concerned, the Plaintiff is in the position that she has to show error on the part of the External Appointee in respect of MED1000. Her position appears to have been reviewed a number of times. The External Appointee noted that the School of Medicine conducted a review of the Plaintiff’s final PBL grade awarded by the Plaintiff’s supervising doctor. They would have awarded a lower grade but her grade was not altered. Her appeals to both the Pro-Vice Chancellor and the External Appointee were unsuccessful. Her position has, therefore been reviewed three times up to the present. Absent a merits review which is not available in the present proceedings, it is not clear on what administrative law basis the Plaintiff seeks to challenge the determination of the External Appointee.

12. [70]

    The Plaintiff submitted that part, at least, of her complaint about the External Appointee was that the Plaintiff was denied procedural fairness in that she was not given the opportunity to make submissions to the Appointee, and that the Reviewer did not provide detailed reasons for her decision.

13. [71]

    There was no evidence about the procedure adopted by the External Appointee. In particular, there was no evidence from the Plaintiff (as opposed to a statement from the Bar Table) that she was not given an opportunity to make submissions. The determination of the External Appointee was Exhibit A on the Motion. It was an 11 page report with extensive reasons. On these two aspects of the Plaintiff’s case I do not consider the Plaintiff demonstrates a sufficient likelihood of success.

14. [72]

    Even, however, if she was successful in her challenge to the External Appointee, the result would be, presumably, that either the External Appointee needed to determine the appeal according to law or that the issue would somehow revert to the examiner for a further review.

15. [73]

    If the Plaintiff was successful in that regard she would next need to demonstrate that her results in MED2000 were wrongly determined in a similar fashion to the challenge to the MED1000 results. As best I could understand the Plaintiff’s submissions, she has simply put forward the same arguments at each level of review and/or appeal including on the present application in the hope that they would be accepted. Whilst that is not impossible, what seems tolerably clear is that the Plaintiff is really seeking a merits review, in the form of a re-mark of the exams and course she has failed.

16. [74]

    In that regard clause 3.3 of the Student Appeals Policy may have some relevance. It provides:

17. [75]

    One of the Plaintiff’s chief complaints concerns her mark of 48 when she asserts her raw mark was 57. The University’s Assessment Policy relevantly provides:

18. [76]

    These provisions suggest that what the Plaintiff complains about (the grading of her marks) falls within a decision based on the judgment of a staff member who made the decision. They tend also to highlight that what the Plaintiff seeks is a merits review by means of a re-mark of her work. Because such a merits review is not available by judicial review proceedings, and is not achieved by the declarations the Plaintiff seeks, I do not consider that the Plaintiff demonstrates sufficient likelihood of success with respect to that aspect of the claim. If the Plaintiff does not succeed on that part of her claim, she will not have passed MED1000.

19. [77]

    Given her history of failures in MED1000 and MED2000, the history so far of unsuccessful reviews and appeals, and what she is ultimately trying to achieve in the litigation I cannot be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried.

Balance of convenience

1. [78]

   The University says that it would be severely prejudiced if the Plaintiff were entitled to enrol in MED3000 because the MED3000 unit requires students to attend clinical placements external to the University. These clinical placements involve students attending placements, most of which are at hospitals and require students to use the knowledge and skills developed in MED1000 and MED2000 when interacting with patients. From the grades the Plaintiff achieved in MED1000 and MED2000 she has not demonstrated an ability to meet the performance requirements of those units.

2. [79]

   The University says that it has obligations to help service providers who allow students from the University to attend their clinical facilities to ensure that its students are fit to undertake the tasks required for the placements. It says that the University is unable to protect itself against the risk of harm to patients at the clinical placement at which its students are placed. The University would be required to inform the health service providers of the Plaintiff’s academic status at the University to allow them to make an informed decision about permitting the Plaintiff to carry out her clinical placements at facilities, and that this has the potential to harm the University’s relationship with those health service providers and poses a risk to the University’s academic and professional reputation.

3. [80]

   The Plaintiff submits that she achieved sufficient marks in her practical skills courses in MED1000 and MED2000. She says that she will be supervised by a registered practitioner. She says that appropriate safeguards could be put in place to answer the University’s concerns. As to the University’s reputation she would undertake confidentiality in relation to any placement.

4. [81]

   The Plaintiff says that she is prejudiced if not permitted to continue in MED3000 because it is a year out of her life when she has come to study medicine late. She says there are financial disadvantages to her being delayed a year or longer if the University does not re-admit her in 2016.

5. [82]

   In my opinion, that balance overwhelmingly favours the University.

6. [83]

   The damage that the Plaintiff will suffer if the injunction is denied is a delay until 2016 before she can continue her degree if she is successful. She points to her age in that regard. She is aged 43. However, her desire to do medicine appears to have emerged well after the time she first enrolled, or could have enrolled at a university. She obtained degrees in Law and Economics from Sydney University and a degree in Science from Macquarie University. She sat and passed the Bar Exams. Moreover, no explanation was offered for why she enrolled but withdrew from the medical degree in 2008 and did not re-commence until 2013. It is difficult to see, therefore, why a year’s delay is a detriment or much detriment. If she is successful in showing that the University should not have terminated her there can be no question of her not being allowed to return to the University.

7. [84]

   On the other hand I accept the University’s concerns about permitting a student to continue to MED2000 who has been unsuccessful in completing the first two years of a medical degree where MED2000 involves clinical placements. Both the University and those conducting the placements need to be in the position to make safe assumptions about such a student’s knowledge and learning.

8. [85]

   Even, therefore, if the Plaintiff could show there was a serious question to be tried, she fails to show that balance of convenience favours her to justify the grant of an injunction.

9. [86]

   In my opinion, the Plaintiff fails to show that an interlocutory injunction should be granted.

Conclusion

1. [87]

   I make these orders: