GHZ v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force

1. [1]

   This decision involves judicial review of a decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales (NCAT).

2. [2]

   The plaintiff is GHZ. She is self-represented in these proceedings. An order was made under s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) that the plaintiff not be identified but instead be referred to by the pseudonym “GHZ”.

3. [3]

   The defendant is the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF). It is represented by S Hoare of counsel. The parties relied on a court book compromising of 4 volumes (Ex B1, B2, B3 and B4) and supplemented by a smaller court book (Ex 1). NSWPF also relied upon the affidavit of its solicitor, Robert Sherrington dated 13 March 2025 and its exhibits (Ex 2).

4. [4]

   By a notice of motion filed 13 March 2025 the defendant, NSWPF, seeks the following orders:

5. [5]

   The gravamen of GHZ’s complaint arises out of the Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) database. That database records the fact that she was charged with two offences of common assault. She has sought to have the existence of the record that she was charged expunged or deleted.

6. [6]

   GHZ has an entrenched view that the record on the COPS database that she was charged with those two offences must be expunged or deleted.

This current judicial review

1. [7]

   GHZ seeks to have the record of the charges being made deleted or expunged from her criminal record. She says that she should not have been charged and that at the hearing before the Magistrate and at the hearing in the Local Court, the police relied on a falsified video.

2. [8]

   It is not in dispute that s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) (Supreme Court Act) is applicable. It relevantly reads:

3. [9]

   By summons filed 13 December 2024, GHZ seeks judicial review of the NSWPF internal review that was heard on 3 July 2024 and 12 December 2024. On 12 December 2024, the decision of the Senior Tribunal Member was delivered, a decision to which I will return.

4. [10]

   In this judicial review, GHZ seeks the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Declare GHZ’s two no prima facie criminal charges brought on 20 May 2021 invalid, illegitimate, prejudicial, unlawful and malicious constituting a breach of the integrity principles outlined in the State Records Act 1998 (NSW) (State Records Act) (order 1).

   2. (2)

      Set aside the decision of Commissioner of Police, made on 3 July 2024 at the NSWPF to refuse expungement (deletion) of GHZ’s two criminal entries from the police database (COPS) pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act (order 2).

   3. (3)

      Direct a public official within the NSWPF to fulfill their legal duty to expunge (delete) GHZ’s two criminal entries from all police databases (COPS) and all records through a prerogative writ of mandamus (order 3).

   4. (4)

      Direct the NSWPF to complete the expungement process within 30 days from the date of the order (order 4).

   5. (5)

      Direct the NSWPF to provide GHZ with written confirmation of the expungement, including the date of removal and the specific records expunged (order 5).

   6. (6)

      Direct the NSWPF to cover all costs associated with proceedings (order 6).

5. [11]

   It is noted that orders (4) and (5) follow on if order (3) is granted. During the hearing, GHZ agreed to have order (7) of the summons and the corresponding remedy sought struck out (T11 [45]-[50]; T12 [1]-[15]). That means that her claim for damages is not pressed.

6. [12]

   Judicial review grounds 2, 3, 4 and 5 are related and will be dealt with together.

Judicial review grounds

1. [13]

   At pars 1-2 of the summons, GHZ articulates her grounds of judicial review as follows:

   1. (1)

      Application for review of decision by government and public officials pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act being errors of law on the face of the record.

   2. (2)

      Breach of both common law and statutory provisions, including:

2. [14]

   GHZ referred to a number of sub-grounds in seeking her review of part of the decision by the Commissioner of Police, NSWPF, made on 3 July 2024 to refuse the expungement or deletion of GHZ’s two entries from COPS (Internal Review Decision). These sub-grounds are wide ranging. As best I can understand, GHZ’s application for judicial review can be summarised in the following way:

   1. (1)

      GHZ’s right to have her own, correct, legitimate and not misleading personal record in line with statute including the PPIP Act, State Records Act, Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), and Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (Australian Human Rights Commission Act) (the central grounds of review).

3. [15]

   GHZ seeks to have:

   1. (1)

      the decision to refuse deletion of GHZ’s criminal entries from the police database be set aside; and

   2. (2)

      GHZ’s two criminal entries removed from the police database (COPS) and from all records once and forever.

Extension of time

1. [16]

   The first issue to be determined is whether GHZ should be granted an extension of time to file the summons pursuant to the UCPR. Rule 59.10 of the UCPR sets out the rule for the time for commencing proceedings. It relevantly reads as follows:

2. [17]

   On 13 December 2024, GHZ filed her summons seeking relief under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act.

3. [18]

   NSWPF submitted that by her summons, GHZ only seeks to review the Internal Review Decision dated 3 July 2024, rather than the Tribunal Decision dated 12 December 2024. The Internal Review Decision is outside the three-month requirement under UCPR r 59.10. Leave for an extension of time should not be granted, as there is no application and no reasons provided for the extension.

4. [19]

   In oral submissions, GHZ sought an extension of time to file her summons out of time if she needed it. GHZ submitted that, at the end of July 2024, she told NSWPF of her intention to file the summons in August to review the Internal Review Decision. On 2 August 2024, she received a letter from the Crown Solicitor which, based on her understanding, told her that she should not file the summons until she received the NCAT decision; and that if she filed it in August, NSWPF would file a notice of motion to dismiss her summons. For this reason, GHZ filed the summons on 13 December 2024, one day after the decision of the Tribunal dated 12 December 2024.

5. [20]

   GHZ further submitted that she does not need to seek an extension of time. However, if the Court decides that she should seek leave for the extension, she seeks leave based on the reasons that she has taken all the possible steps to not to abuse the process and also because of what the NSWPF stated in its letter dated 2 August 2024 that she should not file her summons before the decision of NCAT was made.

6. [21]

   I am satisfied that GHZ should be granted an extension of time to file her summons, if in fact she needs one. Her explanation for her delay was that, based on the letter from the Crown Solicitor, she believed that if she filed the summons immediately in August, her summons would be dismissed.

7. [22]

   GHZ took into account the contents of the letter from the Crown Solicitor’s Office about the written reasons and decision of NCAT. On 12 December 2024, NCAT handed down its decision dismissing GHZ’s internal appeal. The next day, namely, 13 December 2024, GHZ filed her summons in this Court. While GHZ may not be entitled to seek judicial review from an internal decision of NCAT, she filed her summons a day after the decision of NCAT. In these circumstances, it is my view that GHZ does not require an extension of time to appeal, but in the event I am wrong, I would grant GHZ leave to extend the time to file her summons.

The background

1. [23]

   It is the making of charges against GHZ and her subsequent criminal record that form the gravamen of her application for judicial review.

2. [24]

   On 23 May 2021, GHZ was charged with two charges of common assault. In response to a National Police Check requested on 7 June 2022, NSWPF disclosed to the Department of Education that there was a ‘pending court appearance’ on 29 July 2022 for these assault charges.

3. [25]

   On 19 August 2022, the Department of Education notified GHZ via email that a criminal history check disclosed an incident in 2022 and asked her to show cause why her application to be a School Learning Support Officer should proceed. On 16 September 2022, the Department of Education informed GHZ that her application had been withdrawn because of the pending court appearance.

4. [26]

   On 7 November 2022, GHZ appeared before the Local Court. Her charges were dismissed, and it was noted that “there was no prima facie case.” GHZ applied for her costs incurred in the Local Court be paid by NSWPF. The Magistrate dismissed her application for costs.

5. [27]

   GHZ appealed to the District Court only in relation to the costs order. GHZ then sought judicial review of the costs order. That judicial review was dismissed (Mikhaylova v Commissioner of New South Wales Police [2025] NSWSC 542 (‘GHZ (No 1)’). The COPS record inaccurately recorded that criminal proceedings were pending. This record was later corrected on the COPS database.

The prior Local Court proceedings

1. [28]

   Faulkner J in the earlier proceedings, GHZ (No 1), has provided a complete and thorough timeline of the plaintiff’s proceedings in the Local Court. I have carefully read them and agree with his Honour’s history. I gratefully acknowledge and adopt his Honour’s summary. I have extracted only the relevant history of the Local Court proceedings so far as it relates to this judicial review. It is as follows:

2. [29]

   GHZ recorded a video as to these encounters. I have carefully viewed that video (Ex A).

3. [30]

   In summary, on 3 November 2023, the two charges of common assault were dismissed by Magistrate Reiss (the Magistrate). At that stage, the Local Court made findings that there was “no prima facie case”, and that GHZ was not guilty. After the hearing concluded, GHZ made an application under ss 213 and 214 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) that NSWPF pay for her professional costs. That costs application was dismissed by the Magistrate.

4. [31]

   On 10 November 2023, GHZ appealed to the District Court in relation to the Magistrate’s dismissal of her costs application. On 19 March 2024, Barrow DCJ dismissed her appeal as to costs on the basis that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear her appeal against the refusal of the Local Court to award costs against the NSWPF. GHZ subsequently sought judicial review in this Court in relation to the appeal to the District Court decision regarding her costs application: that was GHZ (No 1). Her application for judicial review was dismissed by Faulkner J.

The NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) proceedings

1. [32]

   On 1 March 2024, GHZ lodged an application in NCAT for internal review pursuant to s 53 of the PPIP Act, in relation to the conduct of NSWPF in relation to the Local Court criminal proceedings against her.

2. [33]

   Section 53 of the PPIP Act reads as follows:

3. [34]

   On 8 April 2024, after she lodged her application for internal review, the NSWPF criminal records team forwarded GHZ a letter informing her that NSWPF does not delete information relating to criminal charges. The letter stated that NSWPF may disclose all criminal charges for working with children checks; however, the assault charges would not be disclosed for a National Police Check for the purposes of general employment.

4. [35]

   So far as a working with children check is concerned, of relevance here is s 5C of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (NSW). It reads as follows:

5. [36]

   On 6 May 2024, GHZ also commenced the Tribunal Information Proceeding in NCAT by lodging an application for administrative review in relation to the conduct of NSWPF, the subject of the internal review.

6. [37]

   On 3 June 2024, the Tribunal Information Proceeding was listed for a first case conference. GHZ appeared in person. Mr Sherrington, solicitor, appeared for NSWPF. At the case conference, the solicitor acting for the Crown Solicitor’s Office deposed as follows:

7. [38]

   In summary, on 3 June 2024, the NSWPF filed a copy of the Internal Review Decision. The reconsideration of the Tribunal Information Proceeding was subsequently conducted by reference to the issues raised that were meant to be dealt with the Internal Review Decision.

NCAT reconsideration

1. [39]

   As the internal review application was not completed 60 days after the review was mailed to the Police Commissioner, GHZ was entitled to lodge a review application to NCAT pursuant to s 55 of the PPIP Act. The plaintiff relied on extensive and similarly wide-ranging submissions as in this judicial review.

2. [40]

   On 3 June 2024, the NCAT Senior Member Higgins ordered that the matter be returned to the NSWPF for reconsideration (Amended Order 4(a)):

3. [41]

   On 3 July 2024, GHZ was notified of the result of the reconsideration that was conducted by Philippa Reeves, lawyer, Office of General Counsel of NSWPF (the reconsideration).

4. [42]

   I have extracted a number of relevant portions of the reconsideration that relate to the issues raised in GHZ’s current application for judicial review:

The NCAT decision in relation to the reconsideration

1. [43]

   On 20 November 2024, the NCAT Information Proceeding was heard by Senior Member Macintyre (the Senior Member). The NCAT Information Proceeding then continued by reference to the Internal Review Decision pursuant to s 55 of the PPIP Act, s 9 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) (ADRA) and s 30 of the NCAT Act.

2. [44]

   On 12 December 2024, Senior Member MacIntyre in the NCAT (Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division) largely relied upon and adopted the reconsideration decision. He determined that there had been no contravention of the PPlP Act by NSWPF. The Senior Member then ordered, pursuant to s 55(2) of the PPIP Act, that “no further action to be taken in this matter”.

3. [45]

   In the Senior Member’s decision, he set out the history like how it was set out in the reconsideration. The relevant paragraphs of his decision have been extracted below:

4. [46]

   The Senior Member decided that “no further action” was required. This decision replaced the earlier Internal Review Decision as the “operative decision”.

NCAT appeal

1. [47]

   It is noted that GHZ did not appeal to the Appeal Panel of NCAT, a right which was afforded to her by s 80 of the NCAT Act. It reads:

2. [48]

   Section 83 of the NCAT Act sets out a statutory right of appeal from a decision of the NCAT Appeal Panel to this Court:

NSWPF’s current notice of motion

1. [49]

   The NSWPF refers to the following legislative provisions to dismiss or strike out GHZ’s summons. They are extracted below.

2. [50]

   Section 34(1) of the NCAT Act relevantly reads:

3. [51]

   Rules 13.4 and 14.28 of the UCPR provide:

4. [52]

   The NSWPF in its submissions has explained how r 13.4 of the UCPR applied to orders sought in a summons. However UCPR r 14.28 applies to pleadings – pleadings are not relevant to proceedings commenced by summons. It is my view that UCPR r 14.28 is inapplicable here.

5. [53]

   Where s 34(1) of the NCAT Act is applicable, as the Court of Appeal said in Makowska v St George Community Housing Ltd [2022] NSWCA 5 at [28] and [30], an order under it will “usually” be made. This reflects that, as Beech-Jones J “emphasised” in Allen v TriCare (Hastings) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 416 at [8]:

6. [54]

   Illustratively, orders under s 34(1) were made in Shapkin v The University of Sydney [2023] NSWSC 1534 (‘Shapkin SC’) (affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Shapkin v The University of Sydney [2024] NSWCA 156 (‘Shapkin CA’); and special leave to appeal to the High Court refused in Shapkin v The University of Sydney [2024] HCASL 272), in circumstances where a plaintiff sought simultaneously, leave to appeal a decision of the Appeal Panel under s 83 of the NCAT Act and review under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act of that same decision and the Tribunal’s decision at first instance. See also, for example, Dokas v Gallagher (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 236 at [69]-[70].

7. [55]

   The s 34(1) power can be exercised before final hearing, like that conferred by s 10(2)(b)(ii) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). In that context, it has been said that this is the “preferable” approach: BUSS (Queensland) Pty Ltd at The Building Unions Superannuation Scheme (Queensland) v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2025] FCA 31 at [61].

8. [56]

   There is some doubt as to how its early exercise should be approached. Where consideration of s 34(1) and discretionary denial of relief generally, it is subsidiary to an application for summary dismissal under UCPR r 13.4(1)(b), it has been said that the Court must be satisfied that “no judge acting reasonably could but refuse the remedy”: Blooms the Chemist Management Services Ltd v Pharmacy Council of New South Wales [2024] NSWSC 296 at [19]-[26] referring to Commonwealth of Australia v BIS Cleanaway Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1075 (‘BIS Cleanaway’) — or that there is "no reasonable prospect of a trial judge exercising the discretion to grant relief”: Davies v Minister for Urban Development and Planning [2011] SASC 87; 109 SASR 518 at [101] (in the context of the general discretion to refuse relief).

9. [57]

   If taken beyond that context, such an approach is in tension with that endorsed by the Full Court of the Federal Court to preliminary applications under s 10(2)(b)(ii) of the ADJR Act: CSL Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Infrastructure and Transport [2014] FCAFC 10; (2014) 221 FCR 165 at [219] (cited with approval by Stern JA in Shapkin v Lorenzato [2024] NSWSC 1620 at [55]).

10. [58]

    In the preliminary s 10(2)(b)(ii) context, there is an assumption that, discretionary considerations aside, the applicant would succeed in their claim. That assumption reflects that the power to dismiss summarily an application for an order of review under s 10(2)(b)(ii) is designed to avoid the necessity for the Court to consider the whole of the applicant’s case “where, even if otherwise an applicant would succeed, no order would be made in favour of the applicant”: Edelsten v Minister of Health (1994) 58 FCR 419 at 422. That assumption may not carry across to s 34(1) because s 34(1) is not concerned with the declining of relief but the refusal to conduct a review: Nation v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 620.

11. [59]

    The better view is that no heightened bar applies where an early order is sought directly under s 34(1). Section 34(1) is an independent power to refuse to “conduct a judicial review” (not merely to refuse relief). Its early exercise does not require the “presag[ing]” of a postulated subsequent exercise of discretion by the trial judge: Cf Makucha v Richardson [2008] NSWSC 945 at [31]-[33] referring to BIS Cleanaway. It is itself inherently apt for early exercise; its purpose of rationally allocating work as between the Tribunal and this Court is promoted by early exercise without any heightened bar: see for example, Gennacker Ply Ltd t/a Homestead Holiday Park v Fontainas [2019] NSWSC 1376 at [32]-[37], where Lonergan J granted an application for order that this Court decline to exercise jurisdiction under UCPR r 12.11(1)(h) having regard to s 34(1) and the availability of an appeal to the Appeal Panel, stating that “it was responsible and appropriate, for this application to be made as it has been, by way of notice of motion, early in the proceedings” and did not consider that any heightened barrier applied when this course was adopted. See further Hausfeld v Commissioner of Police [2018] NSWSC 1540 at [27]-[28].

12. [60]

    In any event, there should be no need to resolve this to resolve the current proceeding because the s 34(1) power is available and, on any view, should be exercised.

13. [61]

    Section 34(1)(a) of the NCAT Act is engaged as “adequate provision is made for... an administrative review of the [Internal Review Decision] by the Tribunal under the [ADRA]”. Section 55 of the PPIP Act, s 9 of the ADRA and s 30 of the NCAT Act made provision for administrative review by NCAT of the Internal Review Decision. The fact that administrative review has already occurred (in the Tribunal Decision) does not disengage s 34(1)(a); rather, it underlines the adequacy of provision for that review. Otherwise, an application for judicial review in respect of an administratively reviewable decision that has already been the subject of administrative review might fall between ss 34(1)(a) and 34(1)(c) — inconsistently with any rational legislative design.

14. [62]

    The s 34(1)(a) power should be exercised. The Internal Review Decision has already been the subject of administrative review in the Tribunal Information Proceeding. The relief GHZ seeks under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act in respect of the Internal Review Decision is plainly unavailable (making this an even clearer case than the Shapkin cases).

15. [63]

    The Internal Review Decision has been “replaced” by the Tribunal Decision as the “operative decision”: Wishart v Fraser [1941] HCA 8; (1941) 64 CLR 470; Vitaz v Westform (NSW) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 254 at [20], [53]; Navazi v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation [2015] NSWCA 308 at [82]-[87] (‘Navazi’); Shapkin SC at [7]-[9]; Shapkin CA at [46]-[47].

16. [64]

    Shapkin CA at [46]-[47] has been extracted below:

17. [65]

    The Tribunal Decision is that “no further action [is] to be taken in this matter”. As Adamson J said in Masterson v Commissioner of Police [2018] NSWSC 892 at [34]-[35], in terms directly applicable to the present proceeding:

18. [66]

    As to the application of this in the summary dismissal context, see Potkonyak v Attorney General of NSW [2019] NSWSC 987 at [5]. Accordingly, like Bell P held in Stephens v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2019] NSWSC 761 at [17], there is no reasonable cause of action for UCPR r 13.4(1)(b) purposes.

19. [67]

    If GHZ is dissatisfied with the Tribunal Decision, she should file an internal appeal to the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal under s 80 of the NCAT Act. If she is dissatisfied with the Appeal Panel’s decision, she should seek leave to appeal to this Court under s 83 of that Act. She should not be permitted to circumvent the scheme of the NCAT Act, including its leave requirements in respect of appeals to this Court. This is especially so in circumstances where she has been given repeated “salutary warning[s]” that she ought pursue the matter, if at all, before the Appeal Panel (see BUSSQ v APRA [2025] FCA 31 at [62]).This is the very clearest of cases for the exercise of the s 34(1)(a) power and, consequent thereupon, dismissal of the proceeding.

20. [68]

    GHZ submitted that NSWPF’s notice of motion should be struck out including the following bases:

    1. (1)

       No reasonable cause of action being disclosed under r 13.4 UCPR, as all other authorities refused to hear the matter including based on a lack of jurisdiction.

    2. (2)

       Prejudice, abuse of process, and intent to delay proceedings, showing the defendant’s “bad faith and unclean hands” under r 14.28 of the UCPR and common law, evidenced by the failure to provide a Statement of Reasons, omission of vital relevant facts including the refusal of all other authorities to hear the matter, and the deliberate charging of an innocent victim to shield a criminal offender – all contrary to the law, public interest, and the defendant’s public duty. [I interpose here, UCPR r 14.28 has no application here.]

    3. (3)

       High prospect of GHZ’s success based on the evidence before the Court, case merit and value.

    4. (4)

       In the public interest, in the interest of justice and as per GHZ’s equal citizen’s right for the matter to be heard in court pursuant to statute including ss 23 and 69 of the Supreme Court Act and s 15 of the PIPP Act to provide the last and only opportunity for GHZ to receive unavoidable life affecting justice denied by all other authorities since 20 May 2021.

21. [69]

    GHZ referred to s 23 of the Supreme Court Act. It reads:

22. [70]

    She submitted that pursuant to s 23 of the Supreme Court Act and the common law established by the High Court, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction, authority and grounds to:

23. [71]

    Finally, GHZ submitted that she has followed the process diligently, correctly, and in accordance with the law. Therefore, any potential denial of her last and only opportunity to obtain life-affecting justice in court would be unjustified, contrary to High Court standards and legally invalid. Specifically:

    1. (1)

       Internal Review addressing several matters was completed by NSWPF on 3 July 2024 following an NCAT order.

    2. (2)

       Internal Review by NCAT was completed on 12 December 2024 and affirmed that it lacked jurisdiction to hear this matter while other matters were determined; so, the external review on this matter is not “spent” as falsely stated by the defendant, is valid and is available to GHZ in the Supreme Court pursuant to ss 23 and 69 of the Supreme Court Act along with s 15 of the PIPP Act and High Court common law. NSWPF has failed to reveal the fact of several matters under one Internal Review; and NCAT’s lack of jurisdiction on this matter points at the defendant’s “bad faith and unclean hands” so its Notice of Motion should be dismissed according to the legal standards mentioned below.

    3. (3)

       NCAT’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the unlawfulness of the charges is not in question and therefore, this decision is not appealable in NCAT or elsewhere – another thing omitted by the defendant, relevantly pointing at the defendant’s “unclean hands and bad faith”.

    4. (4)

       Consequently, the Supreme Court is the only and the last avenue to determine the matter lawfully in court so the Notice of Motion should be immediately dismissed to comply with the law.

    5. (5)

       GHZ has made every possible effort since 20 May 2021 to be heard, have her evidence reviewed and considered, and restore her clear name and life normality, only to be unjustly dismissed by the authorities in breach of the law and points at potential racism as citizens of non-Russian origin were afforded protection under Australian statute and were treated differently in the same circumstances. GHZ refers to the bundle of authorities regarding offenders charged and convicted for perjury, perverting the course of justice, physical assaults, trespassing, break and enter, intimidation, and tampering with evidence.

    6. (6)

       It is unlawful and against the public interest to encourage her to receive unavoidable life affecting justice outside of court by denying her procedural fairness and evidence; and leaving her with a damaging criminal record stemming from the criminal acts of others, not her own, which have a detrimental daily impact on her mental health.

    7. (7)

       There is nothing else she could have possibly done to receive life affecting justice.

24. [72]

    The Court has power to grant the relief sought in the NSWPF’s Notice of Motion, either under s 34(1) of the NCAT Act or UCPR r 13.4. Both powers are discretionary, and neither ousts the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction (Shapkin CA at [24], [40]).

25. [73]

    GHZ’s submissions reflect the misapprehensions that underpin these proceedings. She repeatedly suggests that this Court can and must grant her relief without identifying any recognisable legal right enforceable by this Court to that relief. Sections 23 and 69 of the Supreme Court Act do not in themselves generate any such right; their invocation does not assist to found a cause of action where one does not exist (Commissioner of Corrective Services v Liristis [2018] NSWCA 143; (2018) 98 NSWLR 113 at [24]-[35] and [60]-[65]).

26. [74]

    GHZ’s application for judicial review seeks review of the Internal Review Decision made under the PPIP Act. This review does not afford her an opportunity to collaterally attack the validity of the charges laid against her in Local Court criminal proceeding; given that the validity of those charges is non-justiciable and so, irrelevant to the Internal Review Decision.

27. [75]

    These proceedings are not an opportunity for GHZ to reventilate her complaints regarding the Magistrate’s dismissal of her application for professional costs in respect of the Local Court criminal proceeding. Those complaints were the subject of Supreme Court proceeding 2024/00170239, in which Faulkner J handed down his decision on 29 May 2025.

28. [76]

    The Tribunal Decision was not that it “lacked jurisdiction” to review the Internal Review Decision. If GHZ’s suggestion is in reference to the Senior Member’s observation at [67] of the Tribunal Decision that “it is not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine the question of whether or not the charges laid against the Applicant had a proper basis at law”, that observation applies equally to this Court for “it is axiomatic that decisions made in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are not amenable to review or enquiry by the court[s]” (DPP v Tuteru [2023] VSCA 188 per Beach, Walker and Taylor JJA at [79]).

29. [77]

    Additionally, the authorities concerning denial of relief in the nature of the constitutional writs to a plaintiff who has “unclean hands” or who has acted with “bad faith” do not assist GHZ because the Motion does not seek such relief and the requirements set down in those authorities are not met.

30. [78]

    UCPR r 59.9(3) does not require the production of a further statement of reasons in respect of the Internal Review Decision (Minister for Resources and Energy v Gold and Copper Resources Ply Ltd [2015] NSWCA 113 at [57]-[58]). The reasons for the Internal Review Decision accompany that decision.

31. [79]

    Insofar as GHZ’s complaints are concerned, I have carefully read all of her evidence and submissions seeking judicial review and opposing the NSWPF’s orders sought in its notice of motion. GHZ submitted that her application for judicial review should not be dismissed but rather the NSWPF’s notice of motion for dismissal of her proceedings should be dismissed pursuant to r 13.4 UCPR.

32. [80]

    GHZ cannot seek a judicial review of the internal review decision of NCAT made under the PPIP Act. The Senior Tribunal Member provided reasons that largely adopted the reconsideration decision. In his decision, the Senior Member concluded that “no further action be taken”. That order then became the operative order. Section 80(1) of the NCAT Act stipulates that an appeal of an internally appealable decision may be made to the Appeal Panel by a party to the proceedings in which the decision was made.

33. [81]

    GHZ’s application for judicial review in this Court seeks judicial review of the Internal Review Decision made under the PPIP Act. This review, under the PPIP Act does not afford her an opportunity to collaterally attack the validity of the charges laid against her in Local Court criminal proceeding; given that the validity of those charges is non-justiciable and so, irrelevant to the Internal Review Decision, a subject to which I will return.

34. [82]

    So far as GHZ’s submissions for judicial review is concerned, as explained in Navazi at [85], relief in the nature of certiorari (order 2) is not available because “certiorari is not available in respect of an exercise or purported exercise of power the legal effect or purported legal effect of which is moot or spent”.

35. [83]

    Relief in the nature of mandamus (orders 3-5) could only be consequent upon the quashing of the Internal Review Decision by certiorari; its grant would, otherwise, be inconsistent with the Tribunal's Decision that “no further action [is] to be taken”. Declarative relief (order 1) is likewise unavailable as it would “produce no foreseeable [legal] consequences for the parties”: Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 581-582; Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd [2000] HCA 11; (2000) 200 CLR 591 at [52]; CGU Insurance Ltd v Blakeley [2016] HCA 2; (2016) 259 CLR 339 at [26].

36. [84]

    GHZ could have appealed to the NCAT Appeal Panel, but she did not do so. Had she appealed to the Appeal Panel and failed, she could then make an application for judicial review in this Court. Then GHZ’s first step would be to seek leave in this Court, pursuant to s 83(1) of the NCAT Act. That is an essential requirement before the judicial review can proceed in this Court.

37. [85]

    The next issue to be decided is whether this Court should dismiss GHZ’s summons pursuant to s 34 (1) of the NCAT Act and/or in the alternative, pursuant to UCPR r 13.4.

38. [86]

    Where s 34(1) of the NCAT Act is applicable, as the Court of Appeal said in Makowska v St George Community Housing Ltd [2022] NSWCA 5 at [28] and [30], an order under it will “usually” be made. This reflects that, as Beech-Jones J “emphasised” in Allen v TriCare (Hastings) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 416 at [8]:

39. [87]

    In my view, GHZ’s application for judicial review insofar as it concerns the Internal Review Decision, should be dismissed pursuant to s 34(1) of the NCAT Act as GHZ has an administrative right of appeal to the Appeal Panel pursuant to s 80 of the NCAT Act.

40. [88]

    GHZ has raised a number of issues that fall outside the application she made for internal reconsideration pursuant to s 55 of the PPIP Act and has also included extra ones in this application for judicial review. Both in GHZ’s application for internal review and before the Senior Tribunal Member, she complained of police misconduct including malicious prosecution, defamation, corruption, evidence tampering, perjury and intimidation; and that the complainant and the police informant should have been charged with the assault charges. However, an internal review under s 53 of the PPIP Act could only consider whether the alleged conduct amounted to a contravention of the PPIP Act insofar as it applies to NSWPF. The internal reviewer was not empowered to review the conduct of NSWFF more broadly. In this judicial review, GHZ also included prejudice, intent to delay proceedings, bad faith, that the proceedings are in the public interest, the effect it has had on her family and violation of her human rights.

41. [89]

    GHZ’s submissions reflect the misapprehensions that underpin these proceedings. She repeatedly suggests that this Court can and must grant her relief without identifying any recognisable legal right enforceable by this Court to that relief. Sections 23 and 69 of the Supreme Court Act do not in themselves generate any such right; their invocation does not assist to found a cause of action where one does not exist (Commissioner of Corrective Services v Liristis [2018] NSWCA 143; (2018) 98 NSWLR 113 at [24]-[35] and [60]-[65]).

42. [90]

    GHZ says she has suffered prejudice and abuse of process. She further claimed that NSWPF has sought to delay her application for judicial review, she has prospects of success and to allow her to proceed with her application to judicial review is in the public interest and her case has merit or value.

43. [91]

    The internal review was confined to the parameters set out in s 55 of the PIPP Act. So, the Senior Member’s decision was likewise confined to s 55 of the PIPP Act. The decision of the Senior Member replaced the Internal Review Decision. The Senior Member determined that “no further action be taken in this matter”. The Senior Member was acting within power to make his determination.

44. [92]

    In relation to the internal review, the Senior Member stated that GHZ submitted that

45. [93]

    In order to attempt to explain to GHZ why NCAT and this Court cannot exercise administrative or judicial power to grant the orders she seeks, firstly, the criminal history of a person is defined by s 5C(1) of the Working with Children Act (reproduced earlier in this judgment). It includes “criminal charges, whether or not heard, proved, dismissed, withdrawn or discharged”. Section 5C(1) captures information relating to criminal history of the applicant. “Criminal history” is defined to include criminal charges that have been dismissed. The Senior Tribunal Member stated that he was unaware of any other power NCAT had under the PPIP Act that could allow NCAT to order the deletion or expunging of the information in question and stated that GHZ consented to national police checks when she applied for a “working with children check” following the dismissal of charges against her.

46. [94]

    Judicial ground 3 focuses on the decision of the police to charge her with two accounts of assault. That contention was raised before NCAT, that NSWPF should not have charged her, but as far as the duty of care of the police is concerned, in relation to the bringing of criminal charges where it was not within the jurisdiction of NCAT, there is no remedy in relation to the bringing of charges against her or Ms N.

47. [95]

    Secondly, by way of explanation, the laying of the charges against her by NSWPF lies at the heart of GHZ’s complaints. The reasons as to why NCAT and, more particularly, this Court, cannot provide the remedy that GHZ seeks is set out in Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59 (‘Sullivan’). The High Court cited Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 in Sullivan and stated at [57]:

48. [96]

    In another words, the decisions made by police officers in the course of an investigation and their decision as to whether or not to charge a person with a criminal offence is not subject to a common law duty of care and not within the statutory jurisdiction of NCAT to consider pursuant to s 55 of the PPIP Act.

49. [97]

    Finally, NCAT has no power to award damages for breach of the PPIP Act under s 55. GHZ did not press her claim for damages at this hearing of the application for judicial review. Damages are not a remedy that can be granted in an application for judicial review.

50. [98]

    In summary, it is my view that the plaintiff's application for judicial review of a decision or decisions made by NCAT while non-specific, appear to challenge the internal decisions of NCAT. She has a right of administrative review to the Appeal Panel under s 80 of the NCAT Act. She has not taken this step. As explained earlier in this judgment, complaints of legal or factual error should be agitated by appeal mechanisms set out in the NCAT Act prior to invoking this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. On this basis, the grounds of judicial review arising from NCAT decisions are dismissed pursuant to s 34(1) of the NCAT Act.

51. [99]

    So far as GHZ’s grounds of judicial review not directed to NCAT are concerned, she has not established any cause of action that would found a ground for judicial review. So these remaining grounds of judicial review are dismissed pursuant to r 13.4(1)(b) of the UCPR on the basis that GHZ has not articulated any reasonable cause of action.

52. [100]

    The plaintiff’s application for judicial review fails. The plaintiff’s summons dated 13 December 2024 is dismissed.

53. [101]

    Costs are discretionary. Costs normally follow the event. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings including the defendant’s notice of motion.

    1. (1)

       The plaintiff’s summons dated 13 December 2024 is dismissed.

    2. (2)

       The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs.