Bezzina v Transport for NSW

THE COURT: At the commencement of the hearing on 18 December 2025, the applicant, Ms Leslee-ann Bezzina, reiterated the substance of an application she had made at the commencement of her separate summons which had been listed before this Court identically constituted on 16 December 2025, and which is described in our reasons in another matter brought by Ms Bezzina published today: Bezzina v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] NSWCA 276. Ms Bezzina also relied on a small bundle of documents which became MFI A. They comprised the following:

Two points should be made about the statutes relied upon by Ms Bezzina. The first is that s 80 itself provides that statute law can and does modify common law, and that common law only applies to the extent it is not inconsistent with statutes, and in any event s 80 only applies if the Court were exercising federal jurisdiction. Ms Bezzina’s view that common law overrides statute is wrong.

Secondly, it may be accepted that s 6 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW) read with the Second Schedule produces the result that the Bill of Rights 1689 is taken to be in force in New South Wales except so far as affected by any Imperial enactments or State Acts from time to time in force in New South Wales. The fact that much the same is true of Victoria, by reason of the matters to which Ms Bezzina has drawn attention, is not greatly to the point. The real difficulty faced by Ms Bezzina, as was pointed out during the hearing, is not whether or not s 12 of the Bill of Rights is in force, but whether it is infringed by the process involved in administering fines for traffic offences. Submissions similar to those sought to be made by Ms Bezzina have been made by other unrepresented litigants, without success. One example is the decision mentioned during the hearing, Waddington v State of Victoria [2018] VSC 746 at [32]-[34]. Another is Topic v DPP [2024] ACTSC 398 at [42]-[46].

Aside from her reliance on those materials, Ms Bezzina’s application was materially identical to that made on 16 December. She maintained that she was entitled to a “guarantee” from each member of the Court that her human rights would be protected, and that if she did not receive such a guarantee, she was not prepared to move on her summons. She pointed to no instance where any court had acceded to such an application. When it was pointed out that she had not, so far as the transcript recorded, sought any such guarantee in the Local Court or the District Court, or indeed three months ago in an interlocutory application in this proceeding in this Court (Bezzina v Transport for NSW [2025] NSWCA 216) she said that that was because she had only recently learned of this.

After hearing from Ms Lewer and Ms Bezzina in reply, and a short adjournment, we refused the application. Our reasons for doing so are the same as those for refusing the identical application two days earlier.

Thereupon, Ms Lewer appearing for Transport for NSW applied to have the summons heard on its merits, and tendered the white folders which had been prepared by each side. Ms Bezzina remained in the Court while this occurred, and was given an opportunity to be heard if she wished.

In order to address the grounds of the summons seeking judicial review of orders made by the District Court, it is necessary to provide some background to the litigation.

These proceedings arise from a Court Attendance Notice issued on 9 December 2021 following Ms Bezzina having contested her exceeding the speed limit in Mount Victoria on 11 May 2021 by driving at 69 km/h in a 60 km/h zone. There was a hearing in the Local Court extending over most of 28 March and 8 August 2023, at the conclusion of which the Magistrate delivered reasons (transcript 8 August 2023 pp 38-46) and recorded:

The Court convicted Ms Bezzina and imposed a fine of $123.

Ms Bezzina exercised her right to appeal against conviction to the District Court. She did not appeal against the fine. On 5 December 2023, that Court constituted by David DCJ refused an application to adduce fresh evidence, and then proceeded, after Ms Bezzina had left the Court, to dismiss the appeal, doing so on a full consideration of the evidence. Her Honour’s reasons for dismissing the appeal occupy some eight pages of transcript. They make it plain that she proceeded on the basis that the onus rested on the prosecutor to make out its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Ms Bezzina applied by motion for a revocation of the order dismissing her appeal under s 22 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). Ms Bezzina was not present when the motion was listed on 26 July 2024 before the District Court constituted by Mendes DCJ, and her Honour recited the history of Ms Bezzina not attending the previous hearing (on 26 April 2024), when she was told that there would be no further adjournments. The motion was dismissed in her absence.

By a further notice of motion dated 5 November 2024, Ms Bezzina made another application under s 22, as well as seeking to tender fresh evidence, in the following terms:

That motion came on before the District Court constituted by Everson SC DCJ on 8 November 2024. This time Ms Bezzina appeared. Her affidavit in support had referred, repeatedly, to “my human right to an appeal”, to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to the proposition that “Common Law, that allows fresh evidence to be submitted that couldn’t be discovered before, will prevail over the NSW Crimes Appeal and Review Act 2001”, and maintained that there would be an abuse of process if her application were refused. She also maintained that the fine had been increased because, following the dismissal of her application before Mendes DCJ, she had received a notice saying she had to pay $5,289, rather than $123.

Everson SC DCJ delivered an ex tempore judgment, stating that her application was misconceived at a number of levels, including that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights did not apply as domestic law, and that the penalty was not increased by reason of the fact that the notice included an order for the payment of costs.

By her amended summons in this Court, Ms Bezzina identifies the decision maker as Everson SC DCJ and the decision of which she seeks judicial review as his decision not to grant an appeal hearing to her on 8 November 2024. The summons identified two grounds:

The allegations are serious. They lack any proper foundation. Had they been made by a legal practitioner, there would have been a breach of the professional conduct rules. Ms Bezzina is not a legal practitioner, but that does not relieve her of the obligation to establish the abuse of process and perversion of justice she alleges.

The allegations also travel well beyond the summons, which is confined to the decision of the District Court constituted by Everson SC DCJ on 8 November 2024. For example, insofar as it is said that there has been an abuse of process by those persons who prosecuted in the lower courts, they have not even been joined. But the real difficulty with the summons in its entirety is that there is no foundation for the allegations of serious misconduct.

The simple fact of the matter is that Ms Bezzina holds views about her “human right of an appeal” which do not represent the law in this jurisdiction. She had a right to have her case tried in the Local Court, which she exercised and which found against her. She had a right of appeal against that conviction in the District Court, which she invoked, but walked out of the hearing when she failed to obtain an adjournment of her appeal (David DCJ, 5 December 2023). She has a qualified right to apply to reopen a decision, which she exercised, but once again, she did not attend the hearing at which her application was listed, on two occasions (Mendes DCJ, 26 April 2024 and 26 July 2024). She holds an incorrect view of the law concerning the applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and whether her fine was increased, for the reasons identified by Everson SC DCJ in the District Court on 8 November 2024.

Indeed, given the days of time that have been spent in three courts now entertaining Ms Bezzina’s applications to challenge her speeding fine, it is very difficult to see a basis for any complaint that there is no right of appeal. She has had an opportunity twice now fully to develop the arguments in support of her summonses in this Court, but on both occasions she has said she is not prepared to do so in the absence of a “guarantee” from each member of the Court, despite being unable to point to any basis for such an entitlement or any decision in which a litigant had sought and obtained such a guarantee.

The foregoing does not address a variety of submissions advanced by Ms Bezzina in the Local Court and the District Court. They are well outside the scope of her summons. However, we would add that some of those submissions overlap with the submissions summarised in the other reasons for judgment delivered today. Indeed, the affidavit filed on 5 December in this proceeding is markedly similar to the affidavit which constituted her submissions in reply in the earlier matter, and our reasons for rejecting every aspect of that affidavit apply equally to the present proceedings.

It is possible that Ms Bezzina formulated some or all of her submissions herself. However, at one stage before the Registrar on 20 October 2025, where there had been discussion concerning whether both of her summonses could be listed on the same day, Ms Bezzina is recorded as saying that “I have been talking with my constitutional expert” (transcript, 20 October 2025, p 6 line 28). If there is a “constitutional expert” advising Ms Bezzina who is a natural person, it may be as well to say, with no disrespect whatsoever to Ms Bezzina, that the constitutional submissions she has been prevailed upon to advance are legal nonsense. If he or she is charging a fee and is not a legal practitioner, he or she is committing a serious offence. Section 10 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law makes it an offence for someone other than a “qualified entity” to engage in legal practice in his jurisdiction, and imposes a maximum penalty of 250 penalty units and imprisonment for 2 years. If the “constitutional expert” is a legal practitioner, there is a sound basis for reporting him or her to the appropriate regulatory body. Alternatively, if the “constitutional expert” is a large language model such as ChatGPT, then Ms Bezzina would be well advised to ask a lawyer, including at a community legal centre, for a second opinion.

Finally, Ms Bezzina referred repeatedly to her intention to apply to the High Court. She is free to exercise her right to apply for special leave to appeal from either or both of our judgments. Once again, we would respectfully suggest that before taking that course, she ask a lawyer for advice on the merits of her case and the likely consequences of making a further application in a dispute which commenced with a speeding fine for $123.

The Court makes the following orders: